According to Cushman, rationalization occurs when a person has performed an action and then concocts beliefs and desires that would have made the action rational. He argues that the function of rationalization is to transfer information among the processes that influence our behavior. We argue that Cushman-style rationalization is only one form of rationalization, not the paradigmatic form. Consequently, Cushman's explanation of the function and usefulness of rationalization is less broad-reaching than he intends. Cushman's account also obscures some of rationalization's pernicious consequences.
In one of the earliest psychological treatments of rationalization, Ernest Jones wrote:
Everyone feels that as a rational creature he must be able to give a connected, logical, and continuous account of himself, his conduct, and opinions, and all his mental processes are unconsciously manipulated and revised to that end. (Jones Reference Jones1908)
We rationalize not only our conduct or actions, but also our opinions or judgments. And we rationalize our actions not only after we perform them, but also before we perform them and sometimes as a condition of performing them.
At the newsstand, the cashier accidentally hands Dana $20 in change instead of $1. Dana notices the error and wonders whether to point it out. She thinks to herself, “What a fool! If he can't hand out correct change, he shouldn't be selling newspapers. And anyway, last week he sold me a damp newspaper, so this turnabout is fair.” Consequently, Dana keeps the $20. Despite these thoughts, if Dana had seen someone else receive incorrect change in a similar situation, she would have thought it plainly wrong for the person to keep it.
What is rationalized in this case is both a judgment (that keeping the change is morally fine) and a behavior before it occurs (keeping the extra change), which the judgment is used to license. Dana's reasoning is epistemically flawed in the way characteristic of many rationalizations: It is distorted by an irrelevant factor (financial self-interest) that is not acknowledged. Furthermore, since the act of rationalization precedes Dana's action of walking away with the $20, it is possible that had Dana been unable to concoct a minimally adequate rationalization, she would not have performed that action (Kunda Reference Kunda1990).
Dana's type of rationalization is a – maybe the – paradigmatic form of rationalization, the kind of rationalization frequently lamented and colorfully depicted in literature, philosophy, and psychology. People usually conceive of rationalization pejoratively. Not only does Dana's type of rationalization involve an epistemically distorting factor, but it often licenses selfish, immoral, or harmful actions.
We call this kind of rationalization rationalization in the pejorative sense. Rationalization of this kind occurs when a person favors a particular conclusion as a result of some factor (such as self-interest) that is of little justificatory relevance. The person then seeks an adequate justification of that conclusion, but the very factor responsible for their preferring that conclusion distorts this search for justification. As a result of an epistemically flawed investigation, the person endorses a justification that makes no mention of the distorting factor guiding their search (Schwitzgebel & Ellis Reference Schwitzgebel, Ellis, Bonnefon and Trémolière2017). Human beings rationalize in this way all the time – about climate change, tax cuts, morality, spirituality, relationships, nearly everything of importance.
Unlike rationalization as Cushman characterizes it, this kind of rationalization targets not just behavior, but also judgments, and it can as easily license prospective behavior as justify past behavior. Also, rationalization in this sense is epistemically flawed in a way Cushman's characterization doesn't capture.
We have two concerns. First, although Cushman identifies one form of rationalization and a possible function of that form of rationalization, it is not obvious how Cushman's functional explanation, which appeals to informational transfer, would generalize to paradigmatic forms of rationalization like Dana's. If the account does not generalize, then Cushman's attempt to fill the lacuna he sees in the literature is limited.
Possibly, Cushman would not extend his evolutionary hypothesis to other forms of rationalization. He might argue that he has identified the primary, most fundamental, or evolutionarily or developmentally earliest form of rationalization, and that cases like Dana's are derivative. More needs to be said.
Second, Cushman's characterization of rationalization and his emphasis on its usefulness obscure rationalization's frequent and serious consequences. Paradigmatic cases of rationalization in the pejorative sense involve biased, motivated reasoning that is epistemically flawed and often recruited to justify immoral or harmful actions. And when people rationalize as Dana does, they impair the social evaluation of reasons. In a social exchange of reasons, you might defend conclusion A by appeal to reason B. Ideally, in what we call “open exchange,” B is your real reason for concluding A: Not only do you believe that B supports A, but this belief is also the primary cause sustaining your belief in A. Your interlocutor thus has three ways to change your mind: Either show that A is false or unsupported, show that B is false or unsupported, or show that B does not support A. In cases of rationalization like Dana's, B isn't the real basis of belief in A, and if B is shown false or unsupportive of A, Dana will (if sufficiently motivated) just reach for a new reason C. The real basis of Dana's belief remains hidden; it's not really open for peer examination.
We all know how frustrating it is to argue with someone about politics or about why they (not we) should perform such-and-such unpleasant duty, when they are rationalizing. The person offers reasons for their we-think-mistaken view; we undercut their reasons; they simply shift to new reasons – possibly multiple times. Their stated reasons aren't their real reasons. Rationalization in the pejorative sense is the psychological process behind this phenomenon. Rationalization prevents open dialogue on which socially embedded cognition crucially depends. It is one of the most fundamental epistemic vices.
There is some usefulness to rationalization. There may even be substantial epistemic benefits, as Cushman argues. (See also Bortolotti Reference Bortolotti2015.) But rationalization has a bad name for good reason, and that will be missed on Cushman's theory.
According to Cushman, rationalization occurs when a person has performed an action and then concocts beliefs and desires that would have made the action rational. He argues that the function of rationalization is to transfer information among the processes that influence our behavior. We argue that Cushman-style rationalization is only one form of rationalization, not the paradigmatic form. Consequently, Cushman's explanation of the function and usefulness of rationalization is less broad-reaching than he intends. Cushman's account also obscures some of rationalization's pernicious consequences.
In one of the earliest psychological treatments of rationalization, Ernest Jones wrote:
Everyone feels that as a rational creature he must be able to give a connected, logical, and continuous account of himself, his conduct, and opinions, and all his mental processes are unconsciously manipulated and revised to that end. (Jones Reference Jones1908)
We rationalize not only our conduct or actions, but also our opinions or judgments. And we rationalize our actions not only after we perform them, but also before we perform them and sometimes as a condition of performing them.
At the newsstand, the cashier accidentally hands Dana $20 in change instead of $1. Dana notices the error and wonders whether to point it out. She thinks to herself, “What a fool! If he can't hand out correct change, he shouldn't be selling newspapers. And anyway, last week he sold me a damp newspaper, so this turnabout is fair.” Consequently, Dana keeps the $20. Despite these thoughts, if Dana had seen someone else receive incorrect change in a similar situation, she would have thought it plainly wrong for the person to keep it.
What is rationalized in this case is both a judgment (that keeping the change is morally fine) and a behavior before it occurs (keeping the extra change), which the judgment is used to license. Dana's reasoning is epistemically flawed in the way characteristic of many rationalizations: It is distorted by an irrelevant factor (financial self-interest) that is not acknowledged. Furthermore, since the act of rationalization precedes Dana's action of walking away with the $20, it is possible that had Dana been unable to concoct a minimally adequate rationalization, she would not have performed that action (Kunda Reference Kunda1990).
Dana's type of rationalization is a – maybe the – paradigmatic form of rationalization, the kind of rationalization frequently lamented and colorfully depicted in literature, philosophy, and psychology. People usually conceive of rationalization pejoratively. Not only does Dana's type of rationalization involve an epistemically distorting factor, but it often licenses selfish, immoral, or harmful actions.
We call this kind of rationalization rationalization in the pejorative sense. Rationalization of this kind occurs when a person favors a particular conclusion as a result of some factor (such as self-interest) that is of little justificatory relevance. The person then seeks an adequate justification of that conclusion, but the very factor responsible for their preferring that conclusion distorts this search for justification. As a result of an epistemically flawed investigation, the person endorses a justification that makes no mention of the distorting factor guiding their search (Schwitzgebel & Ellis Reference Schwitzgebel, Ellis, Bonnefon and Trémolière2017). Human beings rationalize in this way all the time – about climate change, tax cuts, morality, spirituality, relationships, nearly everything of importance.
Unlike rationalization as Cushman characterizes it, this kind of rationalization targets not just behavior, but also judgments, and it can as easily license prospective behavior as justify past behavior. Also, rationalization in this sense is epistemically flawed in a way Cushman's characterization doesn't capture.
We have two concerns. First, although Cushman identifies one form of rationalization and a possible function of that form of rationalization, it is not obvious how Cushman's functional explanation, which appeals to informational transfer, would generalize to paradigmatic forms of rationalization like Dana's. If the account does not generalize, then Cushman's attempt to fill the lacuna he sees in the literature is limited.
Possibly, Cushman would not extend his evolutionary hypothesis to other forms of rationalization. He might argue that he has identified the primary, most fundamental, or evolutionarily or developmentally earliest form of rationalization, and that cases like Dana's are derivative. More needs to be said.
Second, Cushman's characterization of rationalization and his emphasis on its usefulness obscure rationalization's frequent and serious consequences. Paradigmatic cases of rationalization in the pejorative sense involve biased, motivated reasoning that is epistemically flawed and often recruited to justify immoral or harmful actions. And when people rationalize as Dana does, they impair the social evaluation of reasons. In a social exchange of reasons, you might defend conclusion A by appeal to reason B. Ideally, in what we call “open exchange,” B is your real reason for concluding A: Not only do you believe that B supports A, but this belief is also the primary cause sustaining your belief in A. Your interlocutor thus has three ways to change your mind: Either show that A is false or unsupported, show that B is false or unsupported, or show that B does not support A. In cases of rationalization like Dana's, B isn't the real basis of belief in A, and if B is shown false or unsupportive of A, Dana will (if sufficiently motivated) just reach for a new reason C. The real basis of Dana's belief remains hidden; it's not really open for peer examination.
We all know how frustrating it is to argue with someone about politics or about why they (not we) should perform such-and-such unpleasant duty, when they are rationalizing. The person offers reasons for their we-think-mistaken view; we undercut their reasons; they simply shift to new reasons – possibly multiple times. Their stated reasons aren't their real reasons. Rationalization in the pejorative sense is the psychological process behind this phenomenon. Rationalization prevents open dialogue on which socially embedded cognition crucially depends. It is one of the most fundamental epistemic vices.
There is some usefulness to rationalization. There may even be substantial epistemic benefits, as Cushman argues. (See also Bortolotti Reference Bortolotti2015.) But rationalization has a bad name for good reason, and that will be missed on Cushman's theory.