Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) target article on folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) and their underlying evolutionary cognitive foundation provides an exciting contribution that can guide and inspire further research in political communication. The rich literature on framing in political communication begins with the premise that issues, candidates, elections, and political actions can be framed – and thereupon interpreted – in multiple ways (e.g., Chong & Druckman Reference Chong and Druckman2007); for instance, a given election might be understood as an opportunity to celebrate strength in diversity or a moment to insulate the ingroup from outsiders. Some frames fall flat, some frames seize attention, some persuade, and some even go viral. B&P's evolutionary cognitive framework provides scholars with a theoretical foundation for moving political communication studies forward, by specifying, ex ante, which cognitive frames appeal to and resonate with those intuitive, evolutionary cognitive structures in place. In this respect, B&P's argument applies well beyond folk-economic beliefs, as it articulates an evolutionary psychology framework for unpacking framing effects in political communication. This is an exciting opportunity for scholars of political communication, as they can examine which frames are more easily processed, become more accessible, are transmitted among social networks, and are more readily marshalled into public opinion, candidate evaluation, and political behavior.
Outside of this theoretical architecture, B&P's specific focus on FEBs does raise some concerns. The first concern revolves around the presumed importance of these folk-economic beliefs. B&P argue that FEBs are important because they predict political decision-making. But to what extent are FEBs actually causal drivers of political decision-making? FEBs are, by definition, “explicit beliefs” – that is, lay explanations for economic conditions that presumably become worthy of study because they correlate with political decision-making. However, is it possible that these FEBs are merely reasonable-sounding rationalizations of evaluations and attitudes, the drivers of which exist outside of the realm of introspection? A rich line of research in psychology (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson Reference Nisbett and Wilson1977) teaches us that people are often unaware of or incapable of articulating the causal drivers of their attitudes; and, moreover, when people do generate causes, these reasonable explanations may themselves simply reflect folk beliefs of causality rather than actual causes. Moreover, insofar as people develop implicit and automatic reactions to policies (valenced reactions to welfare, for example, based upon the race of potential beneficiaries), might FEBs simply constitute an explicit rationalization of an implicitly automatic, valenced reaction? If so, then can we still argue for the causal importance of FEBs?
Another point of concern I raise involves the proximate (and domain-specific) nature of FEBs. Even granting the authors' claim that these beliefs are causal drivers (as opposed to rationalizations), it is probably not surprising to find that people who believe welfare presents perverse incentives are opposed to welfare. Public-opinion scholars often seek to build broader models of public opinion that transcend specific domains. Although some of the exemplar FEBs seem to contradict each other, some common threads do emerge – enough to raise the question of the relative utility of studying these domain-specific beliefs as opposed to the generalized perspectives. For example, suspicion of international trade, beliefs about the nefariousness and laziness of immigrants, and emporiophobia generally stem from distrust of outsiders – be they commodity chains or people from other countries, or anonymous or impersonal traders. I fully grant that distrust of others arises from an intuitive readiness forged by evolutionary adaptation.
Yet, some people are more distrusting than others. An evolutionary psychology argument has a hard time explaining variability across individuals. B&P define folk-economic beliefs as being “widespread” – but how widespread do these beliefs need to be to qualify as FEBs? And how can we understand heterogeneity in ascription to such beliefs? How does an evolutionary psychology story about how small-scale societies have prepared the human mind to process in specific ways account for individual differences in beliefs? B&P seem to fall on cultural transmission to do some work here, but this explanation feels underdeveloped.
Finally, B&P state that their model “is emphatically not a normative proposal” (sect. 1.4, para. 1). That is, they do not intend for their evolutionary cognitive model to prescribe the right (or wrong) ways for ordinary people to understand economic processes. Still, their model does raise normative questions concerning the foundations for democratic governance: public opinion. It is no stretch to characterize many of these FEBs as hard-hearted: encapsulating a zero-sum, conflict-laden, ingroup-oriented state of the world. In many ways, the small-scale evolutionary societies that have left their imprint on the human mind reflect Hobbes' description of human life as “nasty, brutish, and short.” B&P's argument provides a framework for understanding why we succumb to the darker side of human nature, guarding against potential intruders and protecting ingroups from contamination, and, at the same time, for understanding why it can be so difficult for politics and political elites to appeal to the better angels of our nature.
B&P's article provides one framework for understanding the challenges confronting political messages that entreat abstract values such as egalitarianism, diversity, and tolerance. These frames, it would seem, do not as easily resonate with our intuitive cognitive systems – it takes cognitive effort and intentionality to process and apply them. Politics, as “a sideshow in the great circus of life” (Dahl Reference Dahl1961, p. 305), is often interpreted by the automatic, unreflexive mind. Moreover, the electoral temptations to appeal to the intuitive cognitive infrastructure of the insular, small-scale societies of our past have, if anything, become even more prominent and pernicious in contemporary political life.
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Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) target article on folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) and their underlying evolutionary cognitive foundation provides an exciting contribution that can guide and inspire further research in political communication. The rich literature on framing in political communication begins with the premise that issues, candidates, elections, and political actions can be framed – and thereupon interpreted – in multiple ways (e.g., Chong & Druckman Reference Chong and Druckman2007); for instance, a given election might be understood as an opportunity to celebrate strength in diversity or a moment to insulate the ingroup from outsiders. Some frames fall flat, some frames seize attention, some persuade, and some even go viral. B&P's evolutionary cognitive framework provides scholars with a theoretical foundation for moving political communication studies forward, by specifying, ex ante, which cognitive frames appeal to and resonate with those intuitive, evolutionary cognitive structures in place. In this respect, B&P's argument applies well beyond folk-economic beliefs, as it articulates an evolutionary psychology framework for unpacking framing effects in political communication. This is an exciting opportunity for scholars of political communication, as they can examine which frames are more easily processed, become more accessible, are transmitted among social networks, and are more readily marshalled into public opinion, candidate evaluation, and political behavior.
Outside of this theoretical architecture, B&P's specific focus on FEBs does raise some concerns. The first concern revolves around the presumed importance of these folk-economic beliefs. B&P argue that FEBs are important because they predict political decision-making. But to what extent are FEBs actually causal drivers of political decision-making? FEBs are, by definition, “explicit beliefs” – that is, lay explanations for economic conditions that presumably become worthy of study because they correlate with political decision-making. However, is it possible that these FEBs are merely reasonable-sounding rationalizations of evaluations and attitudes, the drivers of which exist outside of the realm of introspection? A rich line of research in psychology (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson Reference Nisbett and Wilson1977) teaches us that people are often unaware of or incapable of articulating the causal drivers of their attitudes; and, moreover, when people do generate causes, these reasonable explanations may themselves simply reflect folk beliefs of causality rather than actual causes. Moreover, insofar as people develop implicit and automatic reactions to policies (valenced reactions to welfare, for example, based upon the race of potential beneficiaries), might FEBs simply constitute an explicit rationalization of an implicitly automatic, valenced reaction? If so, then can we still argue for the causal importance of FEBs?
Another point of concern I raise involves the proximate (and domain-specific) nature of FEBs. Even granting the authors' claim that these beliefs are causal drivers (as opposed to rationalizations), it is probably not surprising to find that people who believe welfare presents perverse incentives are opposed to welfare. Public-opinion scholars often seek to build broader models of public opinion that transcend specific domains. Although some of the exemplar FEBs seem to contradict each other, some common threads do emerge – enough to raise the question of the relative utility of studying these domain-specific beliefs as opposed to the generalized perspectives. For example, suspicion of international trade, beliefs about the nefariousness and laziness of immigrants, and emporiophobia generally stem from distrust of outsiders – be they commodity chains or people from other countries, or anonymous or impersonal traders. I fully grant that distrust of others arises from an intuitive readiness forged by evolutionary adaptation.
Yet, some people are more distrusting than others. An evolutionary psychology argument has a hard time explaining variability across individuals. B&P define folk-economic beliefs as being “widespread” – but how widespread do these beliefs need to be to qualify as FEBs? And how can we understand heterogeneity in ascription to such beliefs? How does an evolutionary psychology story about how small-scale societies have prepared the human mind to process in specific ways account for individual differences in beliefs? B&P seem to fall on cultural transmission to do some work here, but this explanation feels underdeveloped.
Finally, B&P state that their model “is emphatically not a normative proposal” (sect. 1.4, para. 1). That is, they do not intend for their evolutionary cognitive model to prescribe the right (or wrong) ways for ordinary people to understand economic processes. Still, their model does raise normative questions concerning the foundations for democratic governance: public opinion. It is no stretch to characterize many of these FEBs as hard-hearted: encapsulating a zero-sum, conflict-laden, ingroup-oriented state of the world. In many ways, the small-scale evolutionary societies that have left their imprint on the human mind reflect Hobbes' description of human life as “nasty, brutish, and short.” B&P's argument provides a framework for understanding why we succumb to the darker side of human nature, guarding against potential intruders and protecting ingroups from contamination, and, at the same time, for understanding why it can be so difficult for politics and political elites to appeal to the better angels of our nature.
B&P's article provides one framework for understanding the challenges confronting political messages that entreat abstract values such as egalitarianism, diversity, and tolerance. These frames, it would seem, do not as easily resonate with our intuitive cognitive systems – it takes cognitive effort and intentionality to process and apply them. Politics, as “a sideshow in the great circus of life” (Dahl Reference Dahl1961, p. 305), is often interpreted by the automatic, unreflexive mind. Moreover, the electoral temptations to appeal to the intuitive cognitive infrastructure of the insular, small-scale societies of our past have, if anything, become even more prominent and pernicious in contemporary political life.