1. The Missionary-Apologetic Reading of QG 4.69

In QG 4.69, Philo affirms that wise people may sometimes be deceitful. He is discussing Gen 20.16, where Abimelech urges Sarah towards truthfulness after he discovered her marriage to Abraham. The majority of QG survives only via an Armenian translation, but this passage survives (partially) in a Greek fragment as well.Footnote ⁶ Translated from Armenian, the relevant section reads as follows:Footnote ⁷

The wise man may imitate ‘mockers’ whose words are inconsistent with their actions. He ought to do so artfully and constrained by virtue. Chadwick takes these mockers to be missionaries, suggesting that Philo speaks here of the tactful deceit that missionaries employ in seeking to save others. Thus Chadwick sees a parallel to 1 Cor 9, where Paul becomes like others to ‘win’ them.

If that reading should be correct, how would it inform our interpretation of 1 Cor 9? It suggests two things: first, that some Jews seeking converts acted in a manner inconsistent with their speech; second, that Philo considered this an acceptable practice, at least within certain limits. Those two points alone do not establish Chadwick's related claim about Paul – that Paul's conduct was ‘in line with a recognized line and not merely the unprincipled vacillation of a trimmer, as his critics took him to be’.Footnote ⁸ They do not reveal whether Paul took a recognised and principled line. If he did, these two points do not tell us which line that was: did he agree with Philo, or with the ‘mockers’ Philo mentions? In short, should Chadwick's reading prove true, it would not provide any significant aid in understanding the details of Paul's missionary strategy or conduct (or any attendant controversies). We know from Paul's own letters that he sought adaptability, that he was accused of inconsistency, that he denounced hypocrisy, and that he defended his integrity.Footnote ⁹ If Philo shows the existence of an ongoing Jewish debate about missionary integrity, this tells us nothing specific about Paul that we do not already know. Thus QG 4.69 can hardly be considered ‘crucial’ for understanding 1 Cor 9, even if it does concern missionary conduct.

More pressing is the question of whether Chadwick's reading of Philo is correct. If Chadwick correctly identifies the mockers and their aims, then QG 4.69 is clearly relevant to 1 Cor 9, even if it does not substantially change our reading thereof. But is he right? Are the mockers missionaries? Is their attempt to ‘save’ others an attempt to proselytise? In seeking to answer these questions, it is helpful to consider QG 4.69 as preserved in a Greek fragment:Footnote ¹⁰

For the most part, the Greek and Armenian versions of this passage agree. But there are some meaningful differences – differences that are overlooked by Rudolph, who thinks Marcus’ translation at this point works from the Greek rather than the Armenian text.Footnote ¹² That is not the case.Footnote ¹³

For our purposes, the significant differences concern the mockers and their hypocrisy. Where the Armenian translates to ‘hypocrisy of an evil kind’, the Greek reads only ὑπόκρισις. Since Philo speaks of people acting inconsistently, the Greek could perhaps be translated as ‘hypocrisy’. Yet the proximity of the phrase ὡς ἐν θεάτρῳ suggests that Philo uses ὑπόκρισις in its theatrical sense (‘acting’), perhaps without the negative connotations of ‘hypocrisy’ in English. The qualifier ‘of an evil kind’, present in the Armenian, is absent from the Greek. A similar discrepancy occurs towards the end of the fragment. The Armenian term translated as ‘mockers’ warrants the derogatory sense of that translation, but the Greek word ὑποκριτάς (accusative of ὑποκριτής) need not bear derogative connotations if used in a theatrical sense, as the context (just discussed) might suggest. Philo's other uses of ὑποκριτής refer to actors, without derogation. The Armenian text speaks of mockers and evil hypocrisy, but the Greek fragment – probably more faithful to Philo's original – is more moderate and less critical.Footnote ¹⁴

Who are these actors, and what salvation do they seek for others? Chadwick supposed them to be missionaries seeking converts. It does seem that some Jews were proselytising in Philo's era.Footnote ¹⁵ It is also clear that Philo had apologetic aims, defending and promoting the Jewish nation, law and customs to his non-Jewish contemporaries. Philo seems to look favourably on proselytes, sometimes describing their transition with what Rudolph calls ‘salvation imagery’.Footnote ¹⁶ These factors are consistent with Chadwick's theory, but they establish only its broad historical plausibility. To evaluate the credibility of his hypothesis, we must consider the probability that Philo would describe missionaries seeking converts as actors behaving inconsistently to save whom they can. We will thus investigate how Philo uses the verb διασῴζω and its root σῴζω, and then how he speaks of justified deceit.

2. Verbs of Salvation

Philo uses διασῴζω and σῴζω in diverse contexts, with various meanings. They appear in his (extant) works approximately eighty times. Slightly fewer than half of these appearances relate not to human salvation but to other things: the preservation of a reputation, the preservation of the past in memory, the maintenance of marital affection, the tendency of like to defend like, and so on.Footnote ¹⁷ Some forty occurrences do refer to some kind of human deliverance. More than a dozen of these refer to particular instances such as Noah's salvation from the flood, Israel's deliverance from Egypt or Macro saving Gaius’ life.Footnote ¹⁸ Others are more generic, concerning matters such as children saved from exposure or patients saved by doctors.Footnote ¹⁹

Some of the remaining occurrences refer to the general notion of salvation for people or souls (rather than salvation in worldly or material affairs). People are saved by their obedience to the law, by letting reason rule over anger, by leaving the passions, and by penitence.Footnote ²⁰ The passions steer a person towards disaster, but bridling the passions (like a horse) saves them from that outcome.Footnote ²¹ Yet people cannot save themselves: it is God who saves the good.Footnote ²² It is tempting to imagine Philo saying that proselytes to Jewish piety are ‘saved’ – since they repent and become obedient, embracing reason over passion. But Philo never says that. In none of these ‘salvation’ passages does Philo speak of mission, conversion, missionaries or gentiles. All of them make sense as instances of Philo exhorting other Jews to virtue. Overall, these passages do not suggest a connection between saving (διασῴζω or σῴζω) and mission. The few which could perhaps suggest such a connection are those which speak of people ‘saving’ other people. Those texts deserve closer scrutiny.

Consider QG 2.11, concerning Gen 7.1. There God instructs Noah: ‘Go into the ark, you and all your household, for I have seen you as righteous.’ Philo considers this ‘clear evidence that because of one man, many men are saved (σῴζονται)’. This statement may perhaps be intended universally: any righteous man can ‘save’ others.Footnote ²³ Yet Noah is not a prototype of the missionary, and the members of his household are not proselytes. Noah saved his family by seeking virtue; the salvific benefits brought by that virtue were applied to his household as well as to himself.Footnote ²⁴ This does not seem to describe or advocate mission.

In Decal. 64 Philo condemns the worship of created things as impious blasphemy. He urges his readers instead to ‘do the service of the Uncreated, the eternal, the Cause of all, not submitting nor abasing ourselves to do the pleasure of the many who work the destruction even of those who might be saved (σῴζεσθαι)’. The ‘many’ who work such destruction are presumably those who worship false gods. They must be silenced, partly out of concern for ‘those who might be saved’. Who are those who might be saved, yet face possible destruction? Our only indication comes from Philo's response, advocating that polytheism should ‘never even reach the ears’ of those seeking truth. It is a call to silence influences that might lead Jews astray from the way of salvation, not a call to proselytise non-Jewish peoples.

In Prov. 2.18, Philo likens the philosopher to a royal doctor. The doctor must not be dazzled or distracted by the grandeur of the palace and its attendants. They must attend to the king. Likewise, the philosopher ignores idle opinion and attends to the mind and body, diagnosing affliction by the passions, ‘in order to save’ (εἰς τό σώζειν). Here σῴζω denotes the restoration of a morally compromised soul. Philo invokes a medical analogy to explain the work of philosophy, not the work of mission. Missionaries, gentiles and converts go unmentioned.

Sacr. 123–5 likewise compares the wise person to a doctor. A doctor attempts treatment even in hopeless cases, and encourages improvement. A good and wise man similarly seeks to benefit even those who will inevitably be ruined in evil. Moreover, a good man benefits a wicked city because God blesses the whole city on account of the good man. When that man dies, the wicked city will suffer. But while he lives, they are preserved (ἐσῴζοντο). This passage does concern non-Jewish people, but their salvation is temporary preservation in blessings enjoyed due to proximity to a wise man. Mission and conversion are nowhere in view.

Finally, consider the treatment of anthropomorphic descriptions of God in Deus 65–6. If God does not have human form or passions, how can Moses speak of God's hands, or of God wielding a sword, or of divine emotions like jealousy and anger? Philo presents a medical illustration. The best doctors do not tell the truth about the extent of a malady and the treatment it requires. That would discourage patients and make matters worse. Doctors have greater success with surgical procedures if the truth is withheld. Thus, deceit is justified if undertaken in service of the deceived. Moses’ anthropomorphisms are necessary falsehoods for the chastisement and correction of fools. The verb σῴζω is used of the doctor saving the patient, not directly of Moses chastising the fool. Though the two scenarios are analogous in some sense, Philo does not say outright that Moses’ noble deceit ‘saves’ those whom it corrects. Allowing that Philo could possibly have affirmed that point, his concern in this passage is the reconciliation of philosophical theology with scriptural language – not mission to the gentiles.

Philo's use of διασῴζω and σῴζω is varied. He frequently employs these verbs for things other than human deliverance. When human deliverance is in mind, Philo is usually referring to deliverance from worldly events or situations. He does occasionally describe spiritual or psychical salvation, but only very rarely do such passages depict one person saving others. And even those few examples do not pertain to mission or conversion. Philo uses διασῴζω and σῴζω approximately eighty times, but never with reference to proselytising. If in QG 4.69 διασῴζω refers to mission, that passage would be an anomaly, and difficult to explain. This verb alone does not suggest a missionary-apologetic focus for QG 4.69.

3. Noble Deceit

Since the term διασῴζω cannot sustain Chadwick's hypothesis, we now consider whether the notion of noble deceit suggests a missionary-apologetic discourse. Philo does think deceit valid in some situations. We have seen in Deus 65–6 that Moses’ anthropomorphisms are (for Philo) necessary falsehood, akin to a doctor deceiving a patient. A fragment from the (lost) fourth book of Legum allegoriae allows that statesmen may conceal the truth in promoting the right course, like a doctor lying to facilitate treatment.Footnote ²⁵Cher. 15 states that immoral acts may be rendered moral if performed for a good cause: wise men withhold information from enemies to protect their nation, and doctors conceal the truth to prevent patients from fearfully refusing treatment. QG 4.204–6 explains (from Jacob's concealment of his hairlessness, Gen 27.16–19) that necessity allows one to conceal the truth and appear otherwise than they are. It was right for Jacob to deceive Isaac, and it is right for a spy to lie if caught by an enemy, for a general to conceal his intentions for war or peace by way of false speech, and for kings or slave-masters to disguise themselves when anonymity is advantageous.Footnote ²⁶ Importantly, Philo likens deceitful Jacob to someone who adopts false appearances to please spectators in theatre – note the theatrical imagery as in QG 4.69 – and to a skilled doctor who does immoral things for moral purposes, deceiving or lying without truly being a liar or deceiver.Footnote ²⁷ In QG 4.228, still addressing Jacob's deceit (with reference to Gen 27.35), Philo contends that ‘not every deceit is blameworthy’:Footnote ²⁸ night guards, military commanders and athletes may rightly employ trickery in pursuit of honourable goals. None of these passages relates deceit to mission, nor does mission feature in any of their contexts.Footnote ²⁹ If Philo nowhere else associates deceit with mission, and the context of QG 4.69 does not suggest the theme of mission, there is no reason to think that deception in QG 4.69 is missionary deception.

We may nonetheless learn something of QG 4.69 from Philo's discussions of noble deceit. In this matter, Philo participates in a long-standing tradition in Greco-Roman thought.Footnote ³⁰ In Plato's Republic, Socrates discusses noble deceit several times. He says that if one was to borrow weapons from a friend while he was sane, and he subsequently went mad, it would be right neither to return his weapons nor to tell him the whole truth while he remained in that state.Footnote ³¹ He contends that false statements are good for constructing serviceable myths in the absence of historical knowledge, and for preventing people from causing harm – much as one might use preventative medicine.Footnote ³² Medicine is properly used by doctors only; deceit is properly used by statesmen only, in service of public interest.Footnote ³³ Governors must administer frequent doses of this medicine (deception) to maintain proper marital customs and hierarchy within the Republic.Footnote ³⁴

Other philosophers articulate similar notions. The Dissoi logoi condemns falsehood, except when necessary to make a sick parent take medicine.Footnote ³⁵ Xenophon has Euthydemus defending deception if it is required to make a child take medicine.Footnote ³⁶ According to Plutarch, Chrysippus spoke of wise men using falsehood to prompt others to proper action.Footnote ³⁷ Quintilian says that all Stoics accept that good people sometimes lie: they might comfort sick children with lies about measures taken to heal them and they might save a life or a country by deceiving an assassin or an enemy.Footnote ³⁸ Sextus Empiricus claims that falsehoods spoken by wise men are not lies, for they do not come from an evil disposition. Thus military leaders fabricate letters from allies to encourage the troops, and doctors effect cures by making false promises about treatment.Footnote ³⁹ Later still, Stobaeus justifies lies in the interest of truth.Footnote ⁴⁰

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Philo resembles these traditions at several points. As we have seen, he agrees that bad deeds may be right if done rightly, that it is right to deceive an enemy to save one's country, that statesmen may lie for the common good. Strikingly, in Philo and the Greco-Roman philosophers, medical deceit is the common example and illustration of noble deceit. Of the six Philonic passages concerning noble deceit that we have mentioned (including QG 4.69), at least four invoke the medical illustration.Footnote ⁴¹ Philo does not associate deceit with missionaries, but he associates it firmly with doctors. The significance of this fact will be considered shortly. Note also that both QG 4.69 and QG 4.204 refer to theatrics in their discussions of noble deceit.

4. Actors who ‘Save Whom They Can’

Having considered verbs denoting salvation and noble deceit, we must bring our discussion together in an evaluation of the missionary-apologetic reading of QG 4.69. Chadwick claimed that the passage in question addresses the conduct appropriate to Jewish missionaries. The actors are missionaries seeking to save – that is, to proselytise – whom they can. The wise man also is a missionary, who may justly imitate such ‘actors’ to a certain degree.Footnote ⁴² This constitutes evidence of ‘lively discussion’ about missionary conduct.Footnote ⁴³

In light of the evidence above, that hypothesis cannot be sustained. Chadwick offers no evidence that this passage addresses mission. He does not justify the assumption that ‘save’ here means proselytise or convert, nor does he show that Philo associates deception with missionary conduct. Both ideas are unfounded. Nowhere does Philo use διασῴζω or σῴζω in connection with mission or conversion. Nowhere does he link noble deceit to missionary conduct. Nothing else in the text or context of QG 4.69 suggests that mission is in mind. It is unlikely that Philo would justify a mission strategy he never discusses, using language he never uses for mission, without any other indication that mission is on view. The missionary-apologetic reading is groundless.

Who, then, are the actors saving whom they can, speaking one way but doing otherwise? There is a plausible case in favour of their identification with medical doctors (not missionaries). Françoise Petit's edition of the fragment suggests that possibility, and Rudolph briefly mentions it.Footnote ⁴⁴ Our discussion has shown that Philo firmly associates noble deceit with medical practitioners. If QG 4.69 were to address noble deceit without mentioning doctors, it would go against the general pattern: most noble deceit passages mention doctors, only a minority do not. Furthermore, QG 4.204 explains noble deception with both medical and theatrical illustrations; should two of those elements appear together again in the same work (as at 4.69), it would not be surprising to find the third element present too. The description of the actors in QG 4.69 is consistent with Philo's depiction of (deceitful) doctors: they speak one way (lying about treatment to encourage the patient) but act otherwise (administering treatment), to save (heal) whom they can.

This reading renders QG 4.69 a sensible setting for the verb διασῴζω. Though verbs of salvation never appear in connection with mission, they do appear in connection with medicine. Three passages (Decal. 12, Deus 66 and Ios. 76) state clearly that doctors ‘save’ patients. Agr. 13 likewise considers saving the sick to be the proper object of medical knowledge (though doctors are not explicitly mentioned). The medical imagery in Prov. 2.18 and Sacr. 123–5 (discussed above) uses these verbs for the salvation of neighbour or soul in such a way that implies that doctors ‘save’ their patients (though the verb is used outside the medical analogy itself).Footnote ⁴⁵ It is not uncharacteristic for Philo to use διασῴζω or σῴζω when he has doctors in mind. The one passage besides QG 4.69 featuring both noble deceit and a verb of salvation does so with reference to a doctor deceiving a patient to save them.Footnote ⁴⁶ The identification of the actors with doctors accords well with the language of salvation, the notion of noble deceit, the theatrical imagery and the description of the actors themselves. This must be preferred over the missionary-apologetic reading.

Discussing the Jewish background of 1 Cor 9.19–23, Rudolph asks, ‘Can Chadwick's missionary-apologetic reading of QG 4.69 be sustained?’Footnote ⁴⁷ This article has argued that it cannot. Even if QG 4.69 did address missionary strategy and integrity, it would make little difference for the interpretation of 1 Cor 9. But QG 4.69 does not address missionary truthfulness or tact; the inconsistent actors seeking to save whom they can simply are not missionaries. It is much more likely that they are doctors, invoked here (as elsewhere in Philo) to explore noble deceit. If the broad idea of noble deceit has some bearing upon 1 Cor 9.19–23, then QG 4.69 has general relevance to that text, but no more so than other passages from Philo (or elsewhere in Jewish tradition) which illustrate noble deceit.Footnote ⁴⁸QG 4.69 is not especially crucial for understanding 1 Cor 9, nor is it a particularly significant datum in discussions of Paul's missionary strategy and Torah observance.