

To Save Whom They Can: Another Look at Philo and Missionary Deceit

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Henry Chadwick proposed in the 1960s that Philo's *Questions and Answers in Genesis* 4.69 is important for understanding Paul's mission strategy in 1 Cor 9. In 2011 David J. Rudolph revisited that 'missionary-apologetic' reading of QG 4.69 in a discussion of Paul's observance of the Torah but refrained from drawing firm conclusions. This article subjects the missionary-apologetic hypothesis to closer scrutiny, especially regarding its plausibility as a reading of Philo. It argues that Chadwick's hypothesis lacks both evidence and explanatory power. QG 4.69, therefore, contributes little to our understanding of 1 Cor 9 and of Paul's missionary strategy and Torah observance.

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In lectures delivered and published in the 1960s, Henry Chadwick claimed that Philo's *Questions and Answers in Genesis* 4.69 sheds significant light on 1 Cor 9.19–23.¹ He suggested that this passage reflects a 'continuing' and 'lively' discussion in Hellenistic Judaism regarding the integrity and obligations of missionaries.² This suggestion was overlooked until it was briefly discussed in David J. Rudolph's treatment of 1 Cor 9.19–23 and Paul's Torah observance.³ Rudolph concludes that Chadwick's reading is 'within the realm of possibility', but that QG 4.69 'warrants further study'.⁴ This short article will draw firmer conclusions about the 'missionary-apologetic' reading of QG 4.69 and its contribution to debates concerning Paul's mission strategy and Torah observance.⁵

1 H. Chadwick, 'St. Paul and Philo of Alexandria', *BJRL* 48 (1965) 286–307, at 297–8 and *The Enigma of St Paul* (London: Athlone, 1969) 13–14.

2 Chadwick, 'St. Paul and Philo', 298; *The Enigma*, 13.

3 D. J. Rudolph, *A Jew to the Jews: Jewish Contours of Pauline Flexibility in 1 Corinthians 9:19–23* (WUNT 11/304; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011) 131–5.

4 Rudolph, *A Jew to the Jews*, 135.

5 QG 4.69, Chadwick's hypothesis and Rudolph's discussion have featured occasionally in recent scholarship. Citing Rudolph, Nanos claims that QG 4.69 concerns 'rhetorical' (rather

1. The Missionary-Apologetic Reading of QG 4.69

In QG 4.69, Philo affirms that wise people may sometimes be deceitful. He is discussing Gen 20.16, where Abimelech urges Sarah towards truthfulness after he discovered her marriage to Abraham. The majority of QG survives only via an Armenian translation, but this passage survives (partially) in a Greek fragment as well.⁶ Translated from Armenian, the relevant section reads as follows:⁷

But the expression ‘speak the truth about everything’ is the injunction of an unphilosophical and unlearned man. For if human life were properly directed and admitted nothing false, it would be proper to speak the truth to everyone about everything. But since hypocrisy of an evil kind acts with authority as if in a theatre, and arrogance is concealed with the truth, the wise man requires a versatile art from which he may profit in imitating those mockers who say one thing and do another in order to save whom they can. Now it is not right for this to happen in all cases. For it is profitable for a counsellor of evil to speak falsely about everything to his hearers, while a salutary nature is peculiar to virtue.

The wise man may imitate ‘mockers’ whose words are inconsistent with their actions. He ought to do so artfully and constrained by virtue. Chadwick takes these mockers to be missionaries, suggesting that Philo speaks here of the tactful deceit that missionaries employ in seeking to save others. Thus Chadwick sees a parallel to 1 Cor 9, where Paul becomes like others to ‘win’ them.

If that reading should be correct, how would it inform our interpretation of 1 Cor 9? It suggests two things: first, that some Jews seeking converts acted in a

than behavioural) adaptability: see M. D. Nanos, ‘Paul’s Relationship to Torah in Light of his Strategy “to Become Everything to Everyone” (1 Corinthians 9.19–23)’, *Paul and Judaism: Crosscurrents in Pauline Exegesis and the Study of Jewish-Christian Relations* (ed. R. Bieringer and D. Pollefeyt; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2012) 106–40, at 122 n. 21. Elsewhere Nanos describes rhetorical adaptability as ‘varying one’s speech to different audiences by reasoning from their premises’, and cites QG 4.69 – an odd choice of example, since it describes people whose speech is inconsistent with their conduct rather than people who argue from their interlocutors’ premises. See M. D. Nanos, ‘Was Paul a “Liar” for the Gospel? The Case for a New Interpretation of Paul’s “Becoming Everything to Everyone” in 1 Cor 9:19–23’, *Review and Expositor* 110.4 (2013) 591–608, at 598. Olson follows Nanos’ reading of 1 Cor 9.19–23, claiming (somewhat inaccurately, given Rudolph’s non-committal stance) that ‘[Rudolph] notes that Philo (QG 4.69) and Paul reflect a continuing discussion ... about the use of tact by a missionary and apologist’: see J. C. Olson, ‘Pauline Gentiles Praying among Jews’, *ProEccl* 20 (2011) 411–31, at 416 n. 19. Elsewhere (‘The Jerusalem Decree, Paul, and the Gentile Analogy to Homosexual Persons’, *JRE* 40 (2012) 359–400, at 367–8 n. 20) Olson again refers to QG 4.69 as evidence for that debate, but acknowledges that Rudolph draws this notion from Chadwick.

6 The Armenian text is probably quite reliable. For a brief discussion, see R. Marcus, *Questions and Answers on Genesis* (LCL Philo Supplement 1; London: Heinemann, 1953) vii–viii.

7 Translation from Marcus, *Questions on Genesis*, 348–9.

manner inconsistent with their speech; second, that Philo considered this an acceptable practice, at least within certain limits. Those two points alone do not establish Chadwick's related claim about Paul – that Paul's conduct was 'in line with a recognized line and not merely the unprincipled vacillation of a trimmer, as his critics took him to be'.⁸ They do not reveal whether Paul took a recognised and principled line. If he did, these two points do not tell us which line that was: did he agree with Philo, or with the 'mockers' Philo mentions? In short, should Chadwick's reading prove true, it would not provide any significant aid in understanding the details of Paul's missionary strategy or conduct (or any attendant controversies). We know from Paul's own letters that he sought adaptability, that he was accused of inconsistency, that he denounced hypocrisy, and that he defended his integrity.⁹ If Philo shows the existence of an ongoing Jewish debate about missionary integrity, this tells us nothing specific about Paul that we do not already know. Thus QG 4.69 can hardly be considered 'crucial' for understanding 1 Cor 9, even if it does concern missionary conduct.

More pressing is the question of whether Chadwick's reading of Philo is correct. If Chadwick correctly identifies the mockers and their aims, then QG 4.69 is clearly relevant to 1 Cor 9, even if it does not substantially change our reading thereof. But is he right? Are the mockers missionaries? Is their attempt to 'save' others an attempt to proselytise? In seeking to answer these questions, it is helpful to consider QG 4.69 as preserved in a Greek fragment:¹⁰

τὸ δὲ "πάντα ἀλήθευσον" ἀφιλοσόφου καὶ ιδιώτου παράγγελμα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος εὐωδεῖ μηδὲν παραδεχόμενος ψεῦδος, εἰκὸς ἦν ἐπὶ παντὶ πρὸς πάντας ἀληθεύειν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑπόκρισις ὡς ἐν θεάτρῳ¹¹ δυναστεύει καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος παραπέτασμα τῆς ἀληθείας ἐστὶ, τεχνῆς δεῖ τῷ σοφῷ πολυτρόπου, καθ' ἣν ὠφελήσει, μιμούμενος τοὺς ὑποκριτὰς οἱ ἄλλα λέγοντες ἕτερα δρῶσι ὅπως διασώσωσιν οὓς δύνανται.

But 'always speak truth' is an instruction from an unphilosophical and uneducated man. For if the life of humanity was properly directed, nobody accepting a lie, it would be reasonable to always tell everyone the truth. But since acting (as in a theatre) prevails and falsehood is a cover for the truth, versatile cunning is necessary for the wise man, by which he may benefit, imitating those actors, those who speak one way and do otherwise in order that they might save whom they can.

8 Chadwick, *The Enigma*, 14.

9 E.g. 1 Cor 9.19–23; 2 Cor 1.17–2.4; 10.1–11; Gal 1.10; 2.11–14.

10 F. Petit, *Quaestiones in Genesim et in Exodim: fragmenta Graeca* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1978) 165–6. Translation mine.

11 Marcus (*Questions on Genesis*, 348 n. i) says the Greek text features ἐκατέρω, a scribal error for θεάτρῳ. This is not quite correct. As Petit notes (*Quaestiones*, 166 n. b), the Greek source (Vat.gr. 1553 251v) has θεάτρῳ, and the error originates at A. Mai, *Scriptorum veterum nova collection e Vaticanis codicibus*, vol. vii (Rome: Typis Vaticanis, 1833) 106.

For the most part, the Greek and Armenian versions of this passage agree. But there are some meaningful differences – differences that are overlooked by Rudolph, who thinks Marcus' translation at this point works from the Greek rather than the Armenian text.¹² That is not the case.¹³

For our purposes, the significant differences concern the mockers and their hypocrisy. Where the Armenian translates to 'hypocrisy of an evil kind', the Greek reads only ὑπόκρισις. Since Philo speaks of people acting inconsistently, the Greek could perhaps be translated as 'hypocrisy'. Yet the proximity of the phrase ὡς ἐν θεάτρῳ suggests that Philo uses ὑπόκρισις in its theatrical sense ('acting'), perhaps without the negative connotations of 'hypocrisy' in English. The qualifier 'of an evil kind', present in the Armenian, is absent from the Greek. A similar discrepancy occurs towards the end of the fragment. The Armenian term translated as 'mockers' warrants the derogatory sense of that translation, but the Greek word ὑποκριτός (accusative of ὑποκριτής) need not bear derogative connotations if used in a theatrical sense, as the context (just discussed) might suggest. Philo's other uses of ὑποκριτής refer to actors, without derogation. The Armenian text speaks of mockers and evil hypocrisy, but the Greek fragment – probably more faithful to Philo's original – is more moderate and less critical.¹⁴

Who are these actors, and what salvation do they seek for others? Chadwick supposed them to be missionaries seeking converts. It does seem that some Jews were proselytising in Philo's era.¹⁵ It is also clear that Philo had apologetic aims, defending and promoting the Jewish nation, law and customs to his non-Jewish contemporaries. Philo seems to look favourably on proselytes, sometimes describing their transition with what Rudolph calls 'salvation imagery'.¹⁶ These factors are consistent with Chadwick's theory, but they establish only its broad historical plausibility. To evaluate the credibility of his hypothesis, we must consider the probability that Philo would describe missionaries seeking converts as actors behaving inconsistently to save whom they can. We will thus investigate how Philo uses the verb διασώζω and its root σώζω, and then how he speaks of justified deceit.

12 Rudolph, *A Jew to the Jews*, 133.

13 Marcus' policy was to translate the Armenian but not the Greek, using the footnotes to identify differences between Greek and Armenian or suggest what the original Greek terminology may have been. See R. Marcus, *Questions and Answers on Exodus* (LCL Philo Supplement II; London: Heinemann, 1953) 179–80.

14 Though the Armenian is generally trustworthy, Marcus notes some points of inaccuracy here. Marcus, *Questions on Genesis*, 348.

15 This has been much debated, but see J. Carleton Paget, 'Hellenistic and Early Roman Period Jewish Missionary Efforts in the Diaspora', *The Rise and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries of the Common Era* (ed. C. K. Rothschild and J. Schröter; WUNT 301; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013) 11–49.

16 Rudolph, *A Jew to the Jews*, 134.

2. Verbs of Salvation

Philo uses *διασώζω* and *σώζω* in diverse contexts, with various meanings. They appear in his (extant) works approximately eighty times. Slightly fewer than half of these appearances relate not to human salvation but to other things: the preservation of a reputation, the preservation of the past in memory, the maintenance of marital affection, the tendency of like to defend like, and so on.¹⁷ Some forty occurrences do refer to some kind of human deliverance. More than a dozen of these refer to particular instances such as Noah's salvation from the flood, Israel's deliverance from Egypt or Macro saving Gaius' life.¹⁸ Others are more generic, concerning matters such as children saved from exposure or patients saved by doctors.¹⁹

Some of the remaining occurrences refer to the general notion of salvation for people or souls (rather than salvation in worldly or material affairs). People are saved by their obedience to the law, by letting reason rule over anger, by leaving the passions, and by penitence.²⁰ The passions steer a person towards disaster, but bridling the passions (like a horse) saves them from that outcome.²¹ Yet people cannot save themselves: it is God who saves the good.²² It is tempting to imagine Philo saying that proselytes to Jewish piety are 'saved' – since they repent and become obedient, embracing reason over passion. But Philo never says that. In none of these 'salvation' passages does Philo speak of mission, conversion, missionaries or gentiles. All of them make sense as instances of Philo exhorting other Jews to virtue. Overall, these passages do not suggest a connection between saving (*διασώζω* or *σώζω*) and mission. The few which *could* perhaps suggest such a connection are those which speak of people 'saving' other people. Those texts deserve closer scrutiny.

Consider *QG* 2.11, concerning Gen 7.1. There God instructs Noah: 'Go into the ark, you and all your household, for I have seen you as righteous.' Philo considers this 'clear evidence that because of one man, many men are saved (*σώζονται*)'. This statement may perhaps be intended universally: any righteous man can 'save' others.²³ Yet Noah is not a prototype of the missionary, and the members of his household are not proselytes. Noah saved his family by seeking virtue;

17 E.g. *Mos.* 2.23; *Spec.* 1.334; 3.80; *Det.* 165.

18 E.g. *Migr.* 125; *Abr.* 46; *Mos.* 2.255; *Hypoth.* 356; *Legat.* 60.

19 E.g. *Spec.* 3.115; *Agr.* 13.

20 *Deus* 129; *Leg.* 3.137; 2.101; *Spec.* 1.239, 253.

21 *Spec.* 4.79; *Leg.* 1.73.

22 *Virt.* 48; cf. *Cher.* 130.

23 *Virt.* 201 says Noah and his family were saved due to his 'high excellence', but there Philo makes no universalising comment. There is no link to mission.

the salvific benefits brought by that virtue were applied to his household as well as to himself.²⁴ This does not seem to describe or advocate mission.

In *Decal.* 64 Philo condemns the worship of created things as impious blasphemy. He urges his readers instead to ‘do the service of the Uncreated, the eternal, the Cause of all, not submitting nor abasing ourselves to do the pleasure of the many who work the destruction even of those who might be saved (σώζεσθαι)’. The ‘many’ who work such destruction are presumably those who worship false gods. They must be silenced, partly out of concern for ‘those who might be saved’. Who are those who might be saved, yet face possible destruction? Our only indication comes from Philo’s response, advocating that polytheism should ‘never even reach the ears’ of those seeking truth. It is a call to silence influences that might lead Jews astray from the way of salvation, not a call to proselytise non-Jewish peoples.

In *Prov.* 2.18, Philo likens the philosopher to a royal doctor. The doctor must not be dazzled or distracted by the grandeur of the palace and its attendants. They must attend to the king. Likewise, the philosopher ignores idle opinion and attends to the mind and body, diagnosing affliction by the passions, ‘in order to save’ (εἰς τό σώζειν). Here σώζω denotes the restoration of a morally compromised soul. Philo invokes a medical analogy to explain the work of philosophy, not the work of mission. Missionaries, gentiles and converts go unmentioned.

Sacr. 123–5 likewise compares the wise person to a doctor. A doctor attempts treatment even in hopeless cases, and encourages improvement. A good and wise man similarly seeks to benefit even those who will inevitably be ruined in evil. Moreover, a good man benefits a wicked city because God blesses the whole city on account of the good man. When that man dies, the wicked city will suffer. But while he lives, they are preserved (ἐσώζοντο). This passage does concern non-Jewish people, but their salvation is temporary preservation in blessings enjoyed due to proximity to a wise man. Mission and conversion are nowhere in view.

Finally, consider the treatment of anthropomorphic descriptions of God in *Deus* 65–6. If God does not have human form or passions, how can Moses speak of God’s hands, or of God wielding a sword, or of divine emotions like jealousy and anger? Philo presents a medical illustration. The best doctors do not tell the truth about the extent of a malady and the treatment it requires. That would discourage patients and make matters worse. Doctors have greater success with surgical procedures if the truth is withheld. Thus, deceit is justified if undertaken in service of the deceived. Moses’ anthropomorphisms are necessary falsehoods for the chastisement and correction of fools. The verb σώζω is used of the doctor saving the patient, not directly of Moses chastising the fool. Though the

²⁴ Reading allegorically, Philo expounds that salvation of the mind benefits also the soul and body.

two scenarios are analogous in some sense, Philo does not say outright that Moses' noble deceit 'saves' those whom it corrects. Allowing that Philo could possibly have affirmed that point, his concern in this passage is the reconciliation of philosophical theology with scriptural language – not mission to the gentiles.

Philo's use of *διασφῆζω* and *σφῆζω* is varied. He frequently employs these verbs for things other than human deliverance. When human deliverance is in mind, Philo is usually referring to deliverance from worldly events or situations. He does occasionally describe spiritual or psychical salvation, but only very rarely do such passages depict one person saving others. And even those few examples do not pertain to mission or conversion. Philo uses *διασφῆζω* and *σφῆζω* approximately eighty times, but never with reference to proselytising. If in *QG* 4.69 *διασφῆζω* refers to mission, that passage would be an anomaly, and difficult to explain. This verb alone does not suggest a missionary-apologetic focus for *QG* 4.69.

3. Noble Deceit

Since the term *διασφῆζω* cannot sustain Chadwick's hypothesis, we now consider whether the notion of noble deceit suggests a missionary-apologetic discourse. Philo does think deceit valid in some situations. We have seen in *Deus* 65–6 that Moses' anthropomorphisms are (for Philo) necessary falsehood, akin to a doctor deceiving a patient. A fragment from the (lost) fourth book of *Legum allegoriae* allows that statesmen may conceal the truth in promoting the right course, like a doctor lying to facilitate treatment.²⁵ *Cher.* 15 states that immoral acts may be rendered moral if performed for a good cause: wise men withhold information from enemies to protect their nation, and doctors conceal the truth to prevent patients from fearfully refusing treatment. *QG* 4.204–6 explains (from Jacob's concealment of his hairlessness, *Gen* 27.16–19) that necessity allows one to conceal the truth and appear otherwise than they are. It was right for Jacob to deceive Isaac, and it is right for a spy to lie if caught by an enemy, for a general to conceal his intentions for war or peace by way of false speech, and for kings or slave-masters to disguise themselves when anonymity is advantageous.²⁶ Importantly, Philo likens deceitful Jacob to someone who adopts false appearances to please spectators in theatre – note the theatrical imagery as in *QG* 4.69 – and to a skilled doctor who does immoral things for moral purposes, deceiving or lying without truly being a liar or deceiver.²⁷ In *QG* 4.228, still addressing Jacob's deceit (with reference to *Gen* 27.35), Philo

25 Mai, *Scriptorum veterum*, 107; J. R. Harris, *Fragments of Philo Judaeus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1886) 8.

26 *QG* 4.206.

27 *QG* 4.204.

contends that ‘not every deceit is blameworthy’:²⁸ night guards, military commanders and athletes may rightly employ trickery in pursuit of honourable goals. None of these passages relates deceit to mission, nor does mission feature in any of their contexts.²⁹ If Philo nowhere else associates deceit with mission, and the context of *QG* 4.69 does not suggest the theme of mission, there is no reason to think that deception in *QG* 4.69 is missionary deception.

We may nonetheless learn something of *QG* 4.69 from Philo’s discussions of noble deceit. In this matter, Philo participates in a long-standing tradition in Greco-Roman thought.³⁰ In Plato’s *Republic*, Socrates discusses noble deceit several times. He says that if one was to borrow weapons from a friend while he was sane, and he subsequently went mad, it would be right neither to return his weapons nor to tell him the whole truth while he remained in that state.³¹ He contends that false statements are good for constructing serviceable myths in the absence of historical knowledge, and for preventing people from causing harm – much as one might use preventative medicine.³² Medicine is properly used by doctors only; deceit is properly used by statesmen only, in service of public interest.³³ Governors must administer frequent doses of this medicine (deception) to maintain proper marital customs and hierarchy within the Republic.³⁴

Other philosophers articulate similar notions. The *Dissoi logoi* condemns falsehood, except when necessary to make a sick parent take medicine.³⁵ Xenophon has Euthydemus defending deception if it is required to make a child take medicine.³⁶ According to Plutarch, Chrysippus spoke of wise men using falsehood to prompt others to proper action.³⁷ Quintilian says that all Stoics accept that good people sometimes lie: they might comfort sick children with lies about measures taken to heal them and they might save a life or a country by deceiving an assassin or an enemy.³⁸ Sextus Empiricus claims that falsehoods spoken by wise men are not lies, for they do not come from an evil

28 As translated by Marcus, *Questions on Genesis*, 525.

29 It may be that the Philonic corpus contains other passages relevant to the concept of noble deceit; this article does not claim to provide and discuss an exhaustive catalogue.

30 For more on this, see J. S. Zembaty, ‘Plato’s Republic and Greek Morality on Lying’, *JHP* 517–45. Our concern here is to outline Philo’s relationship to Greco-Roman discourse on noble deceit. It should be noted, however, that noble deceit was known also in Jewish tradition – perhaps most famously in Exod 1.17–21 where Hebrew midwives lie to the Pharaoh.

31 *Rep.* 331c.

32 *Rep.* 382c–d.

33 *Rep.* 389b–d.

34 *Rep.* 414–17, 459b–d.

35 *Diss. log.* 3.2–4.

36 *Mem.* 4.2.14–18.

37 *Stoic. rep.* 1057 B.

38 *Inst.* 12.1.38–9.

disposition. Thus military leaders fabricate letters from allies to encourage the troops, and doctors effect cures by making false promises about treatment.³⁹ Later still, Stobaeus justifies lies in the interest of truth.⁴⁰

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Philo resembles these traditions at several points. As we have seen, he agrees that bad deeds may be right if done rightly, that it is right to deceive an enemy to save one's country, that statesmen may lie for the common good. Strikingly, in Philo and the Greco-Roman philosophers, medical deceit is the common example and illustration of noble deceit. Of the six Philonic passages concerning noble deceit that we have mentioned (including *QG* 4.69), at least four invoke the medical illustration.⁴¹ Philo does not associate deceit with missionaries, but he associates it firmly with doctors. The significance of this fact will be considered shortly. Note also that both *QG* 4.69 and *QG* 4.204 refer to theatrics in their discussions of noble deceit.

4. Actors who 'Save Whom They Can'

Having considered verbs denoting salvation and noble deceit, we must bring our discussion together in an evaluation of the missionary-apologetic reading of *QG* 4.69. Chadwick claimed that the passage in question addresses the conduct appropriate to Jewish missionaries. The actors are missionaries seeking to save – that is, to proselytise – whom they can. The wise man also is a missionary, who may justly imitate such 'actors' to a certain degree.⁴² This constitutes evidence of 'lively discussion' about missionary conduct.⁴³

In light of the evidence above, that hypothesis cannot be sustained. Chadwick offers no evidence that this passage addresses mission. He does not justify the assumption that 'save' here means proselytise or convert, nor does he show that Philo associates deception with missionary conduct. Both ideas are unfounded. Nowhere does Philo use *διασώζω* or *σώζω* in connection with mission or conversion. Nowhere does he link noble deceit to missionary

³⁹ *Math.* 7.42.

⁴⁰ *Ecl.* 2.7.

⁴¹ *QG* 4.206 does not directly invoke the medical illustration, but it does follow very closely after *QG* 4.204, continuing the theme of deceit in connection with Jacob's deception of Isaac. If these passages are taken as distinct and separate passages (*QG* 4.204 and *QG* 4.206) rather than one passage (*QG* 4.204–6), despite their proximity and common discursive context, the statement above must be revised to say that at least four of the *seven* passages in question invoke the medical illustration. It nonetheless remains clear that Philo associates deceit with doctors more often and more directly than he associates it with missionaries.

⁴² If the actors are missionaries, it does not follow that the man who imitates them (in their deceitfulness) is also a missionary. Chadwick nonetheless takes them to be so without explanation.

⁴³ Chadwick, *The Enigma*, 13.

conduct. Nothing else in the text or context of *QG* 4.69 suggests that mission is in mind. It is unlikely that Philo would justify a mission strategy he never discusses, using language he never uses for mission, without any other indication that mission is on view. The missionary-apologetic reading is groundless.

Who, then, are the actors saving whom they can, speaking one way but doing otherwise? There is a plausible case in favour of their identification with medical doctors (not missionaries). Françoise Petit's edition of the fragment suggests that possibility, and Rudolph briefly mentions it.⁴⁴ Our discussion has shown that Philo firmly associates noble deceit with medical practitioners. If *QG* 4.69 were to address noble deceit *without* mentioning doctors, it would go against the general pattern: most noble deceit passages mention doctors, only a minority do not. Furthermore, *QG* 4.204 explains noble deception with both medical and theatrical illustrations; should two of those elements appear together again in the same work (as at 4.69), it would not be surprising to find the third element present too. The description of the actors in *QG* 4.69 is consistent with Philo's depiction of (deceitful) doctors: they speak one way (lying about treatment to encourage the patient) but act otherwise (administering treatment), to save (heal) whom they can.

This reading renders *QG* 4.69 a sensible setting for the verb διασώζω. Though verbs of salvation never appear in connection with mission, they *do* appear in connection with medicine. Three passages (*Decal.* 12, *Deus* 66 and *Ios.* 76) state clearly that doctors 'save' patients. *Agr.* 13 likewise considers saving the sick to be the proper object of medical knowledge (though doctors are not explicitly mentioned). The medical imagery in *Prov.* 2.18 and *Sacr.* 123–5 (discussed above) uses these verbs for the salvation of neighbour or soul in such a way that implies that doctors 'save' their patients (though the verb is used outside the medical analogy itself).⁴⁵ It is not uncharacteristic for Philo to use διασώζω or σώζω when he has doctors in mind. The one passage besides *QG* 4.69 featuring both noble deceit and a verb of salvation does so with reference to a doctor deceiving a patient to save them.⁴⁶ The identification of the actors with doctors accords well with the language of salvation, the notion of noble deceit, the theatrical imagery and the description of the actors themselves. This must be preferred over the missionary-apologetic reading.

Discussing the Jewish background of 1 Cor 9.19–23, Rudolph asks, 'Can Chadwick's missionary-apologetic reading of *QG* 4.69 be sustained?'⁴⁷ This article has argued that it cannot. Even if *QG* 4.69 did address missionary strategy

44 Petit, *Quaestiones*, 166; Rudolph, *A Jew to the Jews*, 135.

45 No Greek survives for *QG* 4.45, but Philo probably used a salvation verb for doctors saving patients.

46 *Deus* 65–6. Note also *Cher.* 15, with medical deception and the noun σωτηρία.

47 Rudolph, *A Jew to the Jews*, 133.

and integrity, it would make little difference for the interpretation of 1 Cor 9. But *QG* 4.69 does *not* address missionary truthfulness or tact; the inconsistent actors seeking to save whom they can simply are not missionaries. It is much more likely that they are doctors, invoked here (as elsewhere in Philo) to explore noble deceit. If the broad idea of noble deceit has some bearing upon 1 Cor 9.19–23, then *QG* 4.69 has general relevance to that text, but no more so than other passages from Philo (or elsewhere in Jewish tradition) which illustrate noble deceit.⁴⁸ *QG* 4.69 is not especially crucial for understanding 1 Cor 9, nor is it a particularly significant datum in discussions of Paul's missionary strategy and Torah observance.

⁴⁸ See, for example, M. M. Mitchell, 'Peter's "Hypocrisy" and Paul's: Two "Hypocrites" at the Foundation of Earliest Christianity?', *NTS* 58 (2012) 213–34, at 219. Mitchell cites *QG* 4.69 as a Jewish example of the 'Ubiquitous Hellenistic *topoi* ... about saying one thing and doing another' within the 'cultural cocktail of concerns' to consider in discussing early Christian 'hypocrisy'. This perspective is more moderate than the perspectives of those (like Olson, n. 5 above) who follow Chadwick's hypothesis.