INTRODUCTION
When Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi called on women to travel to the proclaimed Islamic State (IS) on June 29, 2014, hundreds of Western women responded. In an attempt to explain why women traveled in such large numbers to the so-called Islamic State, (media) reports explored the biographies of some of these women, often, (inadvertently) portraying them as “jihadi brides” who followed their radicalized husbands or who had fallen in love with, or had been manipulated by, an IS/Daesh fighter. While marriage is an important practice for female supporters of IS/Daesh, explaining women’s motive for supporting IS/Daesh with the prospect of marriage is an inaccurate oversimplification of the complexity of the phenomenon, which reinforces stereotypes about women and Islam. It presupposes that women are a homogeneous group and leaves little room for women’s agency in their decision to travel to the self-proclaimed Islamic State. In addition, the mono-causality of this narrative (unintentionally) overlooks or downplays other relevant motivational factors.
This paper offers a more neutral exploration of the various motivations of Western women who joined IS/Daesh. It first elaborates on how gender stereotyping affects our (subconscious) view of female supporters of terrorist groups and female terrorists. This section draws on the findings of three leading scholars on the topic. It then moves on to explore what drives people to violent extremist or terrorist groups, working from the theory that individuals are subjected to various factors that push and pull them to and from terrorist groups. These factors are categorized into macro-, meso- and micro levels. This categorization is then used to explore the motivational factors of Western women traveling to IS-controlled territory. To further underscore the multiplicity of Western women in IS/Daesh, the paper moves on to discuss the biographies of several Western women who have joined or attempted to join IS/Daesh. The paper draws on existing literature and research, from consultation with practitioners in the field and from informal interviews with an individual close to women who either traveled to IS-controlled territory or who tried to do so. This person wished to remain anonymous for privacy and safety reasons.
WOMEN AND TERRORISM
While there is a general understanding of what terrorism entails, there is no internationally agreed-upon definition. In this paper, terrorism is defined as the actual or threatened use of violence by non-state actors against civilians or persons not actively taking part in hostilities to induce fear and to bring about political change (based on Hoffman Reference Hoffman1998:61–2; Whittaker Reference Whittaker2001:3-4; Maogoto Reference Maogoto2003:412).
Throughout history, women have supported and joined terrorist organizations. Women were well represented in all levels of various ethno-nationalist, Marxist-Leninist organizations in South America such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Shining Path in Peru. Also, in terrorist groups in Europe and the United States of America such as the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction) in Germany, the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigade) in Italy and the Weather Underground in the U.S., women were present in all levels of the organizations. Often in more covert, supportive, non-militant positions, women have been involved in various right-wing extremist groups as well as in Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. Furthermore, groups like the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Black Widows within the Chechen separatists’ movement are notorious for their female suicide bombers. Yet, despite women’s participation in different terrorist organizations, the realm of terrorism and political violence remains observed as mostly dominated by men.
Several scholars argue that this is (in part) due to gendered assumptions and stereotyping that cloud our judgement in both mainstream and academic thinking about women and terrorism (Sjoberg and Gentry Reference Sjoberg and Gentry2007; Eager Reference Eager2008; Alison Reference Alison2009; De Graaf Reference De Graaf2012; Huckerby Reference Huckerby2015). The assumption, for example, that women will automatically have a sense of solidarity towards other women and that they will, based on this supposed solidarity, reject violence towards other women is pervasive. Numerous recounts of survivors of the Nazi concentration camps of the Second World War about female guards (Lower Reference Lower2014), testimonies of survivors of the Rwandan genocide regarding women’s active role in ordering atrocities including rape (Sjoberg and Gentry Reference Sjoberg and Gentry2007:141–73), but also more recently, testimonies of Yezidi women who escaped their captors in IS territory (Neurink Reference Neurink2015), prove this assumption in reality to be unfounded. So why do such stereotypes prevail?
Paige Whaley Eager (Reference Eager2008) argues that violent women generally make most societies uncomfortable. She states that while there are some exceptions in which violent women are accepted in society, including fending off an attacker (especially a rapist), defending her children, fighting back an abusive husband and, to some extent, engaging in military combat, women who commit violence are often viewed as aberrant. Women who perpetrate political violence, she argues, have often been viewed as engaging in such activities due to personal connections and grievances such as revenge. Eager argues that women, like men, engage in political violence and terrorism for all types of reasons – often a combination of ideological and personal motivations – and stresses it is perplexing that the so-called “personal reasons” for women take up so much of the public’s and media’s fascination (Eager Reference Eager2008:3–4).
Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry attribute this fascination for “the personal” to the prevalent stereotype of women as peaceful and war-resistant (Sjoberg and Gentry Reference Sjoberg and Gentry2007:14–18). They stress that this stereotype not only dominates mainstream thinking about women and terrorism; it also affects academic research on women and terrorism, as few researchers depict violent women as rational actors (Sjoberg and Gentry Reference Sjoberg and Gentry2007:13–14). Like Eager, they claim this stems from discomfort with the idea that women can choose to commit (sometimes heinous) violence (Sjoberg and Gentry Reference Sjoberg and Gentry2007:17). Sjoberg and Gentry argue that narratives are used to explain why women engage in violence (Sjoberg and Gentry Reference Sjoberg and Gentry2007:11–13). These narratives or stories offer different explanations for women’s “anomalous” behavior, emphasizing the singularity and corruption of violent women in an attempt to maintain the stereotype of women as more peaceful than men, leaving little to no room for women’s agency in their violence (Sjoberg and Gentry Reference Sjoberg and Gentry2007:30).
Especially in explaining the violence or support for violence of women in patriarchal movements or groups in which women’s rights are constrained – at least from a Western (feminist) perspective – such as the far-right or jihadist movements, the tendency to look for explanatory factors elsewhere seems prevalent. Women are assumed to be manipulated, forced or misled, which reduces them automatically to victims and overlooks the possibility that women share the ideological conviction of the movement, including the views regarding violence and women’s role and position.
Interviews with women in the German right-wing scene demonstrate that many women not only share the racist, xenophobic views of their male counterparts, but also the belief that men and women should operate in separate spheres (Balbach Reference Balbach1994). In Kashmir, female activists advocate for the implementation of the Sharia and for a mandatory adoption of the burqa. These women confront other women who refuse to wear the garment and accuse them of immoral behavior (Parashar Reference Parashar2011:104). Also, the content of several posts on women’s social media accounts, their encouraging online comments on the ruthless tactics of IS and the existence and brutal reputation of the al-Khansaa brigadeFootnote 1 suggest that at least some women supported the ideology and brutality of IS/Daesh.
RADICALIZATION LEADING TO TERRORISM
Consensus over what drives a person to a terrorist organization has yet to be reached. However, it is generally accepted that the road leading to terrorism is a multi-causal and highly complex one, which can differ from person to person. It is often argued that a combination of different factors pushes and pulls a person to or from a violent extremist group (Silke Reference Silke2003; Schmid Reference Schmid2013; OSCE Reference OSCE2014; Allan et al. Reference Allan, Glazzard, Jesperson, Reddy-Tumu and Winterbotham2015; Saltman and Smith Reference Saltman and Smith2015). Such factors can help explain why a person becomes more susceptible to the rhetoric of extremists. Examples include feelings of estrangement from society, the pull of the cause, a change in group dynamics, economic deprivation, and perceived injustices, for example the atrocities of the regime of Assad or geopolitical events, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This paper divides the factors that motivated Western women to join IS/Daesh into three different levels: the macro-, meso- and micro levels. The macro level refers to the larger societal, international and national level, the meso level to group dynamics and the micro level to the individual, personal level.
Macro Level
The claim that the wider Muslim community, the Ummah, is being threatened, is often cited as a reason to support or join jihad. Particularly the perceived lack of action of the international community against this worldwide persecution and the obligation of Muslims to protect their “brothers” and “sisters” is widely supported (Hoyle, Bradford, and Frenett Reference Hoyle, Bradford and Frenett2015:11; Saltman and Smith Reference Saltman and Smith2015:9; Patel Reference Patel2017). The various online images posted by women on their social media accounts of the atrocities of the regime of Assad and of the victims of military attacks by the regime or the Western coalition – particularly images of wounded children and women – further underscore this sentiment.
The rise in Islamophobia in the West has fed the rhetoric that the Ummah is under threat. Verbal and physical attacks of women wearing headscarves, as well as the hardening of the public debate about banning the burqa, have increased sentiments of estrangement (Peresin and Cervone Reference Peresin and Cervone2015:6; Pearson and Winterbotham Reference Pearson and Winterbotham2017; The Carter Center 2017). Such sentiments are cited as pushing Western women towards IS/Daesh. The caliphate was considered a “safe place” where women could practise their religion and follow the rules of Allah. In this new state, women could practise their religion the way they believed best, be treated with honor and respect and not be objectified by men. The prospect of living in such a land pulled women towards IS/Daesh (Saltman and Smith Reference Saltman and Smith2015:13–15; Schröter Reference Schröter2015; Patel Reference Patel2017).
The prospect of contributing to this state-building effort, and the promise of being part of something bigger, something divine, underscores women’s search for belonging and purpose in life (The Carter Center 2017).
In addition, women considered it their religious duty to answer the call of the (self)proclaimed caliph to travel to the caliphate and help build the Islamic state (Hoyle et al. Reference Hoyle, Bradford and Frenett2015:13; Saltman and Smith Reference Saltman and Smith2015:13–14; informal interviews by the author 2015).
Meso Level
Different studies underscore the relevance of group dynamics in explaining radicalization (Allan et al. Reference Allan, Glazzard, Jesperson, Reddy-Tumu and Winterbotham2015; Feddes, Nickolson, and Doosje Reference Feddes, Nickolson and Doosje2015). The meeting of a radical person, who can be a leader figure, a peer but also a recruiter, has been cited as a relevant factor. It can initiate a process in which one’s social environment becomes increasingly narrow. The breaking off of previous social connections can lead to a point where the radical scene remains the only scene a person engages with. Without a social network to challenge such radical views, the views can become stronger and, ultimately, they will become the only truth for which every sacrifice should be made (Feddes et al. Reference Feddes, Nickolson and Doosje2015:47), including joining jihad and traveling to Syria or Iraq. Western women in IS/Daesh have been highly active in the online recruitment of other women (Patel Reference Patel2017).
Feelings of estrangement from society, of isolation and of not belonging to the mainstream group can push individuals away from society in search for a group that will accept them. This can make them more susceptible to the rhetoric of violent extremists (Saltman and Smith Reference Saltman and Smith2015:10; Feddes et al. Reference Feddes, Nickolson and Doosje2015). Particularly for women wearing a headscarf, niqaab or burqa, experiences of discrimination, and sentiments of exclusion, can push them away from society and in search for a place where they feel they belong.
This search for belonging, and the appeal of the strong bond between the “sisters” in IS/Daesh, is stressed in different studies as an important factor to explain why women traveled to Syria and Iraq (Hoyle et al. Reference Hoyle, Bradford and Frenett2015:12; Saltman and Smith Reference Saltman and Smith2015:10; Patel Reference Patel2017:13; The Carter Center 2017:5). In online posts, women frequently spoke of the warmth of the sisterhood they experienced in IS/Daesh. They admitted that giving up their lives, their friends and families back home was difficult, but they stressed that they found true friends in the caliphate. Those friendships were more valuable, they claimed, because they were built on a shared love for Allah (Petrou Reference Petrou2015; Saltman and Smith Reference Saltman and Smith2015; Schröter Reference Schröter2015).
Micro Level
Personal experiences can make a person more susceptible to extremist rhetoric, for example, the death of a loved one, problems at home or in the relational sphere. Some of the girls who have traveled to Syria, or who have attempted to do so, came from broken families, had a history of abuse or had previous encounters with the police (Weenink Reference Weenink2015). Such experiences of course are not a necessary precondition for radicalization, nor do they automatically lead to radicalization, but they can make a person more susceptible to the rhetoric of extremists (Feddes et al. Reference Feddes, Nickolson and Doosje2015). For some women, traveling to Syria or Iraq provided an opportunity to start a new and independent life (Ranstorp Reference Ranstorp2014; Bakker and De Leede Reference Bakker and de Leede2015).
Furthermore, research shows that a sense of adventure or the idea of traveling to a different land was attractive for women who decided to move to Syria/Iraq. The media frequently claimed that women fell in love with a fighter who was already in Syria or Iraq, and that women traveled to Syria or Iraq to be with him. On social media, male fighters were portrayed as heroic men who were willing to sacrifice their life for their beliefs and for the greater good. To be with such a “real” man was appealing to at least some of the women (Saltman and Smith Reference Saltman and Smith2015). Other women wanted to live under true Islamic law, as a good wife of a religious husband, caring for her family in the land of Islam (Navest, De Koning, and Moors Reference Navest, de Koning and Moors2016).
WHO WERE THEY?
There is no profile of the female supporters of IS/Daesh who traveled to Syria/Iraq (Bakker and De Leede Reference Bakker and de Leede2015). While most of the girls were young, some as young as 15 years, there were also mothers in their thirties with young children who made the journey. Some of the girls had difficulties in school and had a below-average intelligence quotient (IQ), but there have also been women who were highly educated. A relatively large proportion of the women had a troubled childhood, yet others came from stable families. Many of the women came from religiously moderate Muslim families, while others converted to Islam at a later age (Bakker and De Leede Reference Bakker and de Leede2015).
The following case studies illustrate the diverse biographies of women who have traveled or attempted to travel to the Islamic State.
Aqsa Mahmood
Aqsa Mahmood is the daughter of Muzaffar Mahmood who moved from Pakistan to Glasgow in the 1970s. Muzaffar and his wife bought a home in an affluent neighborhood and had four children, who went to the prestigious private school Craigholme down the road. In a CNN interview Muzaffar said, “She was the best daughter you could have. We just don’t know what happened to her. She loved school. She was very friendly. I have never shouted at her all my life” (Shubert and Naik Reference Shubert and Naik2014). Aqsa enrolled at Glasgow Caledonian University to study diagnostic radiology. According to The Daily Mail, her friends from school said she was not very different and got on with everybody. She was a really confident, clever person (Glanfield Reference Glanfield2014).
It was a great shock to the school and the family when in November 2013, Aqsa (then aged 19 years) secretly traveled to Syria. Aqsa married a jihadi fighter and, according to her family, said she wanted to be in Syria and to die a martyr’s death (Shubert and Naik Reference Shubert and Naik2014). Mahmood has been very active online and played an important role in convincing other women to support or join the fight in Syria. On Twitter she wrote: “Follow the examples of your brothers from Woolwich, Texas and Boston” and “If you cannot make it to the battlefield, then bring the battlefield to yourself” (Khaleeli Reference Khaleeli2014). On her Tumblr page she offered advice to women thinking of making the journey; what they needed to pack and how to prepare (Khaleeli Reference Khaleeli2014). At least one of the three young British girls who left their London homes in February 2015 had been in touch with Mahmood on social media (Petrou Reference Petrou2015).
Shukri F.
In November 2014, the Somali-Dutch Shukri F., aged 20 years, was charged with proselytization and recruiting for the violent jihad. This was not her first arrest, as she had been arrested in July 2013 for the same charges. In 2013, however, there was not enough evidence to make a case against her. In November 2014, the Public Prosecutor argued Shukri was responsible for persuading both her first and her second husbands to travel to Syria to join the jihad. She was also charged with encouraging a young girl, a close friend of hers who was arrested at the Belgian airport Zaventem, to travel to Syria. Shukri denied all charges and claimed her online posts and her conversations with friends had been taken out of context. She claimed it was coincidental that both her husbands shared her belief in the importance of traveling to Syria. She was acquitted for recruiting for jihad, but found guilty of disseminating inciting materials and sentenced to a suspended imprisonment term of 6 months and a probation period of 2 years (International Crime Database 2016).
Moezdalifa el A.
Moezdalifa el A. from Hilversum, the Netherlands was 15 years old when she was stopped at Düsseldorf airport while on her way to Syria. Moezdalifa went to the Gooise Praktijkschool, a school providing practical education. According to an article in the Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad, one of her friends said that Moezdalifa had contact with two Muslim women from Belgium who assured her that “in Syria, she could have a perfect life and get married” (Oostveen Reference Oostveen2014).
Nora el-Bathy
Nora el-Bathy was a typical French 15-year-old schoolgirl who wanted to be a doctor. In January 2014 she took the train to Paris, changed her mobile phone and boarded a flight to Istanbul. Back home, her parents, who are practising but not conservative Muslims, reported her missing. Her brother Fouad searched her room for clues. He found out she had opened a second Facebook account on which she had said she had plans to make Hijra. She also had a second phone, which she had used to talk to “sisters”, according to Fouad. While Nora had been talking about helping the wounded in Syria, particularly children, nobody in the family had imagined she was planning to run away. After her disappearance, Nora told her family she was happy and did not want to return to France. Fouad, however, claimed he had seen her in Syria with al Nusra, watching the children of fighters. According to Fouad, Nora had told him she made the biggest mistake of her life (Naili Reference Naili2014; Sherwood et al. Reference Sherwood, Laville, Willsher, Knight, French and Gambino2014).
Sophie Kasiki (not her real name)
Sophie Kasiki was born in 1981 in the Congo and was raised in a Catholic family. Her mother passed away when she was 9 years old and Sophie moved to Paris to live with her sister. Sophie was very much affected by the death of her mother and suffered from depression throughout her childhood and young adult life. Even a happy marriage and the birth of a healthy son could not fill the “hole in her heart”. In an attempt to fill the void, Sophie converted to Islam. Her newfound religion brought her comfort.
Sophie worked as a social worker in Paris, mostly with immigrant workers who lived in the banlieus. Here, she met three boys with whom she grew close; they were like little brothers to her, she said. In September 2014, these young men traveled to Syria. Sophie talked to them almost every day. She tried to persuade the boys to return to France. Looking back, Sophie says she cannot recall how the boys had managed to persuade her to travel to Syria with her 4-year-old son. She claimed that, because they knew her so well, they knew about her weaknesses and they had managed to take advantage of her. She said she was naive, confused and vulnerable.
Soon after Sophie had arrived in Syria, she realized she had made a terrible mistake, particularly after an incident when someone came and took her son for Quran lessons. Sophie strongly objected, upon which she was slapped in her face. She then realized she needed to try and leave as soon as possible. With the help of the local community, she managed to escape together with her son (Willsher Reference Willsher2016).
CONCLUSION
Gender stereotyping and gendered assumptions about women and violence have affected the portrayal of female supporters of IS/Daesh. Often, narratives such as that of the “jihadi bride” are used to explain why women join or support the group. Such narratives often (inadvertently) lead to simplistic explanations and leave little room for women’s agency. This paper has argued that women who have supported or joined IS/Daesh are not a homogeneous group; they are driven by a complex multitude of motivations and are affected by their social, cultural and political environment. They have been driven by a combination of different factors, including ideological or religious motivations, the pull of the cause, frustration and anger over perceived inequalities and injustices, but also in search for a purpose and a sense of belonging. They have been subjected to group dynamics and their past and looked for adventure or a husband. This is not to say that women are never manipulated or lured to IS under false pretences. However, the same can be said for men. Tackling the phenomenon of women supporting IS/Daesh requires a deepening of our understanding of the movement and its appeal to women. It is therefore critical to acknowledge the diversity of Western women joining IS/Daesh and to recognize the complexity and multitude of their motivations.
Seran de Leede holds an M.A. in history and has been working on the topic of women and violent extremism as an independent researcher, a researcher for the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Leiden University Faculty Campus, The Hague and as an Associate Fellow for the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague. She has looked at the role of Neo-Nazi women in contemporary Germany and at the role of Afghan women towards the Taliban in Afghanistan. She has assisted in the organization of the NATO-funded Advanced Research Workshop in Astana, Kazakhstan on “Violent Extremism in Central Asia, Indicators, Trends and Possible Responses” and co-authored a background note on the motivations of European women to travel to IS territory. She has explored the role of women’s initiatives in preventing/countering violent extremism (CVE/PVE) efforts in the Middle East and North Africa region for Hivos, The Hague and the role of women in jihad from a historical perspective for the Dutch National Coordinator on Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV). Most recently, she has co-authored a study on women and Islamist (de-)radicalization for the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality.
