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Western Women Supporting IS/Daesh in Syria and Iraq – An Exploration of their Motivations

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Abstract

This paper explores the motivations of Western women who traveled to Syria/Iraq to support the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh. It draws on previous studies of the phenomenon, insights from practitioners and informal interviews with an individual with first-hand insights. The different motivations are categorized into three levels: macro, meso and micro. The author rebukes the intractable stereotype of the "jihadi bride" that (inadvertently) suggests that women are driven mainly by personal motivations or the prospect of marriage, and demonstrates that female Western supporters of IS/Daesh are motivated by various factors. These include ideological or religious motivations, the pull of the cause, frustration and anger over the perceived worldwide oppression of Muslims, but also the search for a purpose in life and for a sense of belonging. Women have been affected by group dynamics and experiences in their past (including sexual abuse). Some women were attracted by the prospect of a clean slate, adventure or a (religious) husband. The author underscores that, in order to tackle the phenomenon of women supporting IS/Daesh, it is essential to deepen our understanding of its appeal on women, which requires acknowledging the diversity of women who joined IS/Daesh and recognizing the complexity and multitude of their motivations.

Keywords women; Islamic State; gender; violent extremism; terrorism

INTRODUCTION

When Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi called on women to travel to the proclaimed Islamic State (IS) on June 29, 2014, hundreds of Western women responded. In an attempt to explain why women traveled in such large numbers to the so-called Islamic State, (media) reports explored the biographies of some of these women, often, (inadvertently) portraying them as "jihadi brides" who followed their radicalized husbands or who had fallen in love with, or had been manipulated by, an IS/Daesh fighter. While marriage is an important practice for female supporters of IS/Daesh, explaining women's motive for supporting IS/Daesh with the prospect of marriage is an inaccurate oversimplification of the complexity of the phenomenon, which reinforces stereotypes about women and Islam. It presupposes that women are a homogeneous

group and leaves little room for women's agency in their decision to travel to the self-proclaimed Islamic State. In addition, the mono-causality of this narrative (unintentionally) overlooks or downplays other relevant motivational factors.

This paper offers a more neutral exploration of the various motivations of Western women who joined IS/Daesh. It first elaborates on how gender stereotyping affects our (subconscious) view of female supporters of terrorist groups and female terrorists. This section draws on the findings of three leading scholars on the topic. It then moves on to explore what drives people to violent extremist or terrorist groups, working from the theory that individuals are subjected to various factors that push and pull them to and from terrorist groups. These factors are categorized into macro-, meso- and micro levels. This categorization is then used to explore the motivational factors of Western women traveling to IS-controlled territory. To further underscore the multiplicity of Western women in IS/Daesh, the paper moves on to discuss the biographies of several Western women who have joined or attempted to join IS/Daesh. The paper draws on existing literature and research, from consultation with practitioners in the field and from informal interviews with an individual close to women who either traveled to IS-controlled territory or who tried to do so. This person wished to remain anonymous for privacy and safety reasons.

WOMEN AND TERRORISM

While there is a general understanding of what terrorism entails, there is no internationally agreed-upon definition. In this paper, terrorism is defined as the actual or threatened use of violence by non-state actors against civilians or persons not actively taking part in hostilities to induce fear and to bring about political change (based on Hoffman 1998:61–2; Whittaker 2001:3-4; Maogoto 2003:412).

Throughout history, women have supported and joined terrorist organizations. Women were well represented in all levels of various ethno-nationalist, Marxist-Leninist organizations in South America such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Shining Path in Peru. Also, in terrorist groups in Europe and the United States of America such as the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction) in Germany, the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigade) in Italy and the Weather Underground in the U.S., women were present in all levels of the organizations. Often in more covert, supportive, non-militant positions, women have been involved in various right-wing extremist groups as well as in Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. Furthermore, groups like the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Black Widows within the Chechen separatists' movement are notorious for their female suicide bombers. Yet, despite women's participation in different terrorist organizations, the realm of terrorism and political violence remains observed as mostly dominated by men.

Several scholars argue that this is (in part) due to gendered assumptions and stereotyping that cloud our judgement in both mainstream and academic thinking about women and terrorism (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007; Eager 2008; Alison 2009; De Graaf 2012; Huckerby 2015). The assumption, for example, that women will automatically have a sense of solidarity towards other women and that they will, based on this supposed solidarity, reject violence towards other women is pervasive. Numerous recounts of survivors of the Nazi concentration camps of the Second World War about female guards (Lower 2014), testimonies of survivors of the Rwandan genocide regarding women's active role in ordering atrocities including rape (Sjoberg and

Gentry 2007:141–73), but also more recently, testimonies of Yezidi women who escaped their captors in IS territory (Neurink 2015), prove this assumption in reality to be unfounded. So why do such stereotypes prevail?

Paige Whaley Eager (2008) argues that violent women generally make most societies uncomfortable. She states that while there are some exceptions in which violent women are accepted in society, including fending off an attacker (especially a rapist), defending her children, fighting back an abusive husband and, to some extent, engaging in military combat, women who commit violence are often viewed as aberrant. Women who perpetrate political violence, she argues, have often been viewed as engaging in such activities due to personal connections and grievances such as revenge. Eager argues that women, like men, engage in political violence and terrorism for all types of reasons – often a combination of ideological and personal motivations – and stresses it is perplexing that the so-called "personal reasons" for women take up so much of the public's and media's fascination (Eager 2008:3–4).

Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry attribute this fascination for "the personal" to the prevalent stereotype of women as peaceful and war-resistant (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007:14–18). They stress that this stereotype not only dominates mainstream thinking about women and terrorism; it also affects academic research on women and terrorism, as few researchers depict violent women as rational actors (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007:13–14). Like Eager, they claim this stems from discomfort with the idea that women can choose to commit (sometimes heinous) violence (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007:17). Sjoberg and Gentry argue that narratives are used to explain why women engage in violence (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007:11–13). These narratives or stories offer different explanations for women's "anomalous" behavior, emphasizing the singularity and corruption of violent women in an attempt to maintain the stereotype of women as more peaceful than men, leaving little to no room for women's agency in their violence (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007:30).

Especially in explaining the violence or support for violence of women in patriarchal movements or groups in which women's rights are constrained – at least from a Western (feminist) perspective – such as the far-right or jihadist movements, the tendency to look for explanatory factors elsewhere seems prevalent. Women are assumed to be manipulated, forced or misled, which reduces them automatically to victims and overlooks the possibility that women share the ideological conviction of the movement, including the views regarding violence and women's role and position.

Interviews with women in the German right-wing scene demonstrate that many women not only share the racist, xenophobic views of their male counterparts, but also the belief that men and women should operate in separate spheres (Balbach 1994). In Kashmir, female activists advocate for the implementation of the Sharia and for a mandatory adoption of the *burqa*. These women confront other women who refuse to wear the garment and accuse them of immoral behavior (Parashar 2011:104). Also, the content of several posts on women's social media accounts, their encouraging online comments on the ruthless tactics of IS and the existence and brutal reputation of the al-Khansaa brigade[1] suggest that at least some women supported the ideology and brutality of IS/Daesh.

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[1] The all-female brigade that patrolled the streets of Raqqa and that carried out corporal punishment to women who failed to meet the strict regulations.

RADICALIZATION LEADING TO TERRORISM

Consensus over what drives a person to a terrorist organization has yet to be reached. However, it is generally accepted that the road leading to terrorism is a multi-causal and highly complex one, which can differ from person to person. It is often argued that a combination of different factors pushes and pulls a person to or from a violent extremist group (Silke 2003; Schmid 2013; OSCE 2014; Allan et al. 2015; Saltman and Smith 2015). Such factors can help explain why a person becomes more susceptible to the rhetoric of extremists. Examples include feelings of estrangement from society, the pull of the cause, a change in group dynamics, economic deprivation, and perceived injustices, for example the atrocities of the regime of Assad or geopolitical events, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This paper divides the factors that motivated Western women to join IS/Daesh into three different levels: the macro-, meso- and micro levels. The macro level refers to the larger societal, international and national level, the meso level to group dynamics and the micro level to the individual, personal level.

Macro Level

The claim that the wider Muslim community, the *Ummah*, is being threatened, is often cited as a reason to support or join jihad. Particularly the perceived lack of action of the international community against this worldwide persecution and the obligation of Muslims to protect their "brothers" and "sisters" is widely supported (Hoyle, Bradford, and Frenett 2015:11; Saltman and Smith 2015:9; Patel 2017). The various online images posted by women on their social media accounts of the atrocities of the regime of Assad and of the victims of military attacks by the regime or the Western coalition – particularly images of wounded children and women – further underscore this sentiment.

The rise in Islamophobia in the West has fed the rhetoric that the *Ummah* is under threat. Verbal and physical attacks of women wearing headscarves, as well as the hardening of the public debate about banning the *burqa*, have increased sentiments of estrangement (Peresin and Cervone 2015:6; Pearson and Winterbotham 2017; The Carter Center 2017). Such sentiments are cited as pushing Western women towards IS/Daesh. The caliphate was considered a "safe place" where women could practise their religion and follow the rules of Allah. In this new state, women could practise their religion the way they believed best, be treated with honor and respect and not be objectified by men. The prospect of living in such a land pulled women towards IS/Daesh (Saltman and Smith 2015:13–15; Schröter 2015; Patel 2017).

The prospect of contributing to this state-building effort, and the promise of being part of something bigger, something divine, underscores women's search for belonging and purpose in life (The Carter Center 2017).

In addition, women considered it their religious duty to answer the call of the (self) proclaimed caliph to travel to the caliphate and help build the Islamic state (Hoyle et al. 2015:13; Saltman and Smith 2015:13–14; informal interviews by the author 2015).

Meso Level

Different studies underscore the relevance of group dynamics in explaining radicalization (Allan et al. 2015; Feddes, Nickolson, and Doosje 2015). The meeting of a radical person, who can be a leader figure, a peer but also a recruiter, has been cited as a

relevant factor. It can initiate a process in which one's social environment becomes increasingly narrow. The breaking off of previous social connections can lead to a point where the radical scene remains the only scene a person engages with. Without a social network to challenge such radical views, the views can become stronger and, ultimately, they will become the only truth for which every sacrifice should be made (Feddes et al. 2015:47), including joining jihad and traveling to Syria or Iraq. Western women in IS/ Daesh have been highly active in the online recruitment of other women (Patel 2017).

Feelings of estrangement from society, of isolation and of not belonging to the mainstream group can push individuals away from society in search for a group that will accept them. This can make them more susceptible to the rhetoric of violent extremists (Saltman and Smith 2015:10; Feddes et al. 2015). Particularly for women wearing a headscarf, *niqaab* or *burqa*, experiences of discrimination, and sentiments of exclusion, can push them away from society and in search for a place where they feel they belong.

This search for belonging, and the appeal of the strong bond between the "sisters" in IS/Daesh, is stressed in different studies as an important factor to explain why women traveled to Syria and Iraq (Hoyle et al. 2015:12; Saltman and Smith 2015:10; Patel 2017:13; The Carter Center 2017:5). In online posts, women frequently spoke of the warmth of the sisterhood they experienced in IS/Daesh. They admitted that giving up their lives, their friends and families back home was difficult, but they stressed that they found true friends in the caliphate. Those friendships were more valuable, they claimed, because they were built on a shared love for Allah (Petrou 2015; Saltman and Smith 2015; Schröter 2015).

Micro Level

Personal experiences can make a person more susceptible to extremist rhetoric, for example, the death of a loved one, problems at home or in the relational sphere. Some of the girls who have traveled to Syria, or who have attempted to do so, came from broken families, had a history of abuse or had previous encounters with the police (Weenink 2015). Such experiences of course are not a necessary precondition for radicalization, nor do they automatically lead to radicalization, but they can make a person more susceptible to the rhetoric of extremists (Feddes et al. 2015). For some women, traveling to Syria or Iraq provided an opportunity to start a new and independent life (Ranstorp 2014; Bakker and De Leede 2015).

Furthermore, research shows that a sense of adventure or the idea of traveling to a different land was attractive for women who decided to move to Syria/Iraq. The media frequently claimed that women fell in love with a fighter who was already in Syria or Iraq, and that women traveled to Syria or Iraq to be with him. On social media, male fighters were portrayed as heroic men who were willing to sacrifice their life for their beliefs and for the greater good. To be with such a "real" man was appealing to at least some of the women (Saltman and Smith 2015). Other women wanted to live under true Islamic law, as a good wife of a religious husband, caring for her family in the land of Islam (Navest, De Koning, and Moors 2016).

WHO WERE THEY?

There is no profile of the female supporters of IS/Daesh who traveled to Syria/Iraq (Bakker and De Leede 2015). While most of the girls were young, some as young as

15 years, there were also mothers in their thirties with young children who made the journey. Some of the girls had difficulties in school and had a below-average intelligence quotient (IQ), but there have also been women who were highly educated. A relatively large proportion of the women had a troubled childhood, yet others came from stable families. Many of the women came from religiously moderate Muslim families, while others converted to Islam at a later age (Bakker and De Leede 2015).

The following case studies illustrate the diverse biographies of women who have traveled or attempted to travel to the Islamic State.

Aqsa Mahmood

Aqsa Mahmood is the daughter of Muzaffar Mahmood who moved from Pakistan to Glasgow in the 1970s. Muzaffar and his wife bought a home in an affluent neighborhood and had four children, who went to the prestigious private school Craigholme down the road. In a CNN interview Muzaffar said, "She was the best daughter you could have. We just don't know what happened to her. She loved school. She was very friendly. I have never shouted at her all my life" (Shubert and Naik 2014). Aqsa enrolled at Glasgow Caledonian University to study diagnostic radiology. According to *The Daily Mail*, her friends from school said she was not very different and got on with everybody. She was a really confident, clever person (Glanfield 2014).

It was a great shock to the school and the family when in November 2013, Aqsa (then aged 19 years) secretly traveled to Syria. Aqsa married a jihadi fighter and, according to her family, said she wanted to be in Syria and to die a martyr's death (Shubert and Naik 2014). Mahmood has been very active online and played an important role in convincing other women to support or join the fight in Syria. On Twitter she wrote: "Follow the examples of your brothers from Woolwich, Texas and Boston" and "If you cannot make it to the battlefield, then bring the battlefield to yourself" (Khaleeli 2014). On her Tumblr page she offered advice to women thinking of making the journey; what they needed to pack and how to prepare (Khaleeli 2014). At least one of the three young British girls who left their London homes in February 2015 had been in touch with Mahmood on social media (Petrou 2015).

Shukri F.

In November 2014, the Somali-Dutch Shukri F., aged 20 years, was charged with proselytization and recruiting for the violent jihad. This was not her first arrest, as she had been arrested in July 2013 for the same charges. In 2013, however, there was not enough evidence to make a case against her. In November 2014, the Public Prosecutor argued Shukri was responsible for persuading both her first and her second husbands to travel to Syria to join the jihad. She was also charged with encouraging a young girl, a close friend of hers who was arrested at the Belgian airport Zaventem, to travel to Syria. Shukri denied all charges and claimed her online posts and her conversations with friends had been taken out of context. She claimed it was coincidental that both her husbands shared her belief in the importance of traveling to Syria. She was acquitted for recruiting for jihad, but found guilty of disseminating inciting materials and sentenced to a suspended imprisonment term of 6 months and a probation period of 2 years (International Crime Database 2016).

Moezdalifa el A.

Moezdalifa el A. from Hilversum, the Netherlands was 15 years old when she was stopped at Düsseldorf airport while on her way to Syria. Moezdalifa went to the Gooise Praktijkschool, a school providing practical education. According to an article in the Dutch newspaper *NRC Handelsblad*, one of her friends said that Moezdalifa had contact with two Muslim women from Belgium who assured her that "in Syria, she could have a perfect life and get married" (Oostveen 2014).

Nora el-Bathy

Nora el-Bathy was a typical French 15-year-old schoolgirl who wanted to be a doctor. In January 2014 she took the train to Paris, changed her mobile phone and boarded a flight to Istanbul. Back home, her parents, who are practising but not conservative Muslims, reported her missing. Her brother Fouad searched her room for clues. He found out she had opened a second Facebook account on which she had said she had plans to make *Hijra*. She also had a second phone, which she had used to talk to "sisters", according to Fouad. While Nora had been talking about helping the wounded in Syria, particularly children, nobody in the family had imagined she was planning to run away. After her disappearance, Nora told her family she was happy and did not want to return to France. Fouad, however, claimed he had seen her in Syria with al Nusra, watching the children of fighters. According to Fouad, Nora had told him she made the biggest mistake of her life (Naili 2014; Sherwood et al. 2014).

Sophie Kasiki (not her real name)

Sophie Kasiki was born in 1981 in the Congo and was raised in a Catholic family. Her mother passed away when she was 9 years old and Sophie moved to Paris to live with her sister. Sophie was very much affected by the death of her mother and suffered from depression throughout her childhood and young adult life. Even a happy marriage and the birth of a healthy son could not fill the "hole in her heart". In an attempt to fill the void, Sophie converted to Islam. Her newfound religion brought her comfort.

Sophie worked as a social worker in Paris, mostly with immigrant workers who lived in the *banlieus*. Here, she met three boys with whom she grew close; they were like little brothers to her, she said. In September 2014, these young men traveled to Syria. Sophie talked to them almost every day. She tried to persuade the boys to return to France. Looking back, Sophie says she cannot recall how the boys had managed to persuade her to travel to Syria with her 4-year-old son. She claimed that, because they knew her so well, they knew about her weaknesses and they had managed to take advantage of her. She said she was naive, confused and vulnerable.

Soon after Sophie had arrived in Syria, she realized she had made a terrible mistake, particularly after an incident when someone came and took her son for Quran lessons. Sophie strongly objected, upon which she was slapped in her face. She then realized she needed to try and leave as soon as possible. With the help of the local community, she managed to escape together with her son (Willsher 2016).

CONCLUSION

Gender stereotyping and gendered assumptions about women and violence have affected the portrayal of female supporters of IS/Daesh. Often, narratives such as that of the "jihadi bride" are used to explain why women join or support the group. Such narratives often (inadvertently) lead to simplistic explanations and leave little room for women's agency. This paper has argued that women who have supported or joined IS/Daesh are not a homogeneous group; they are driven by a complex multitude of motivations and are affected by their social, cultural and political environment. They have been driven by a combination of different factors, including ideological or religious motivations, the pull of the cause, frustration and anger over perceived inequalities and injustices, but also in search for a purpose and a sense of belonging. They have been subjected to group dynamics and their past and looked for adventure or a husband. This is not to say that women are never manipulated or lured to IS under false pretences. However, the same can be said for men. Tackling the phenomenon of women supporting IS/Daesh requires a deepening of our understanding of the movement and its appeal to women. It is therefore critical to acknowledge the diversity of Western women joining IS/Daesh and to recognize the complexity and multitude of their motivations.

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Abstracto

Este documento explora las motivaciones de las mujeres occidentales que viajaron a Siria / Iraq para apoyar al Estado Islámico (IS) o Daesh. Se basa en estudios previos, ideas de los practicantes y entrevistas con gente con información de primera mano. Las diferentes motivaciones se clasifican en tres niveles: macro, meso y micro. El autor reprende el estereotipo intratable de la 'novia yihadista' que (inadvertidamente) sugiere que las mujeres son impulsadas principalmente por motivos personales o la perspectiva del matrimonio, y demuestra que las partidarias occidentales femeninas de IS / Daesh están motivadas por diversos factores. Estos incluyen motivaciones ideológicas o religiosas, la atracción de la causa, la frustración y la ira sobre la percepción de una opresión mundial de los musulmanes; pero también la búsqueda de un propósito en la vida y de un sentido de pertenencia. Las mujeres se han visto afectadas por dinámicas grupales y experiencias en el pasado (incluido el abuso sexual). Algunas mujeres se sintieron atraídas por la perspectiva de una "pizarra limpia", una aventura o un esposo (religioso). El autor subraya que, para abordar el fenómeno de las mujeres que apoyan a IS / Daesh, es esencial comprender la diversidad de las mujeres que se unieron a IS / Daesh y reconocer la complejidad y la multitud de sus motivaciones

Palabras clave: mujeres; Estado islámico; Daesh; motivaciones; factores de atracción y atracción; género; extremismo violento; terrorismo

Abstrait

Cet article explore les motivations des femmes occidentales qui se sont rendues en Syrie / Irak pour soutenir l'État islamique (EI) ou Daech. Il s'appuie sur des études antérieures, des entretiens avec des praticiens et des entrevues avec des personnes qui ont des idées de première main. Les différentes motivations sont classées en trois niveaux: macro, méso et micro. L'auteur réprouve le stéréotype intratable de la «mariée djihadiste» qui suggère (par inadvertance) que les femmes sont principalement motivées par des motivations personnelles ou par la perspective du mariage, et démontre que les femmes occidentales qui soutient IS / Daesh sont motivées par divers facteurs. Ceux-ci comprennent des motivations idéologiques ou religieuses, l'attraction de la cause, la frustration et la colère à propos de l'oppression mondiale perçue des musulmans, mais aussi la recherche d'un but dans la vie et d'un sentiment d'appartenance. Les femmes ont été affectées par la dynamique de groupe et les expériences de leur passé (y compris les abus sexuels).

Certaines femmes ont été attirées par la perspective d'une table rase, d'une aventure ou d'un mari (religieux). L'auteur souligne que, pour faire face au phénomène des femmes soutenant IS / Daech, il est essentiel de comprendre la diversité des femmes qui ont rejoint IS / Daech et de reconnaître la complexité et la multitude de leurs motivations.

Mots-clés: femmes; État islamique; Daech; motivations; facteurs de poussée et d'attraction; genre; extrémisme violent; terrorisme

摘要：
本文探讨了前往叙利亚/伊拉克支持伊斯兰国或者达什的西方妇女的动机。本文通过借鉴以前研究成果、从业人员的见解和对有直接见解的人的非正式访谈对这一现象进行研究。不同的动机分为三个层次：宏观，中观和微观。作者谴责（无心地）了"圣战新娘"的顽固刻板印象，暗示女性主要由个人动机或婚姻前景驱动所，并表明西方女性支持伊斯兰国者是受到各种因素的驱使。这些包括意识形态或宗教动机、对穆斯林的世界性压迫的原因、挫折和愤怒的牵引，还包括寻求生活目的和归属感。妇女受到过去的群体动力和经历（包括性虐待）的影响。一些女性被一段清白历史、一次冒险经历或一个（宗教）丈夫的前景所吸引。作者强调，为了解决妇女支持伊斯兰国的现象，必须加深我们对妇女呼吁的理解，这就要求承认加入伊斯兰国的妇女的多样性，并认识到她们动机的复杂性和多样性。

关键词：女性、伊斯兰国家、达什、动机、驱动因素、性别、暴力极端主义、恐怖主义

الملخّص
تستكشف هذه المقالة دوافع المرأة الغربية التي سافرت إلى سوريا/العراق لدعم تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية أو داعش. وهي تعتمد على دراسات سابقة لهذه الظاهرة، ورؤى من ممارسين ومقابلات غير رسميّة مع أشخاص ذوي رؤى مباشرة. تم تصنيف الدوافع المختلفة إلى ثلاثة مستويات: كبيرة ومتوسطة وصغيرة. يستنكر المؤلف الصورة النمطيّة المستعصية "للعروس الجهاديّة" التي توحي (بشكل غير مقصود) أن النساء تقودهن دوافع شخصيّة أو إمكانيّة الزواج، وتظهر أن الغريّات المناصرات لداعش تحرّكهن دوافع مختلفة. تشمل هذه الدوافع الإيديولوجية أو الدينية: المسبّبات الموجبة وقوّة تأثيرها في جذب النساء إلى التنظيم، مشاعر الإحباط والغضب من اضطهاد المسلمين العالمي، وكذلك البحث عن هدف في الحياة والشعور بالانتماء. فلقد تأثرت النساء بديناميات الجماعة وتجاربها السابقة (بما في ذلك الاعتداء الجنسي). واجتذبت بعضهن لاحتمال وجود صفحة بيضاء، أو مغامرة، أو زوج (ديني). يشدّد المؤلف على ضرورة تعمّقنا في فهم أسباب انجذاب النساء لداعش كي نتمكّن من معالجة ظاهرة دعمهن له، ينبغي له، الأمر الذي يقتضي الإقرار بتنوع النساء اللواتي انضممن إلى التنظيم والاعتراف بمضاعفات دوافعهن وكثرتها.

الكلمات الرّئيسيّة
النساء - الدولة الإسلامية - داعش - الدوافع - عوامل الدفع والجذب - النوع الاجتماعي - التطرف العنيف - الإرهاب

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