Bifocal stance theory (BTS) makes a distinction between instrumental copying behavior, in which the goal is for the behavior copied to have some independent value, and the copying of traditions involving the faithful copying of what one might consider causally irrelevant action. However, there is no need to distinguish between the two. We are social animals, for whom copying traditions have important instrumental rewards, those of affiliation. BTS recognizes that traditions are sensitive to social cues, indicating that modeled behavior is conventional, normative, and otherwise relevant to group alignment, and therefore the motivation to copy such behavior is affiliative in nature. But why is this not instrumental? For humans, there are great advantages to being a member of a group. The authors say, “practices that are ineffective in producing environmental outcomes, result from a non-instrumental, affiliative motivation” (target article, sect. 2, para. 4). Why is affiliative motivation non-instrumental?
Of course, affiliation is a different kind of instrumental behavior from the rewards often used with animals (food) in experimental studies, but so are short cartoon clips (e.g., Alessandri, Darcheville, & Zentall, Reference Alessandri, Darcheville and Zentall2008), colorful stickers (e.g., Roberts, Alexander, & Knapp, Reference Roberts, Alexander and Knapp1990), and social praise (Fefer, DeMagistris, & Shuttleton, Reference Fefer, DeMagistris and Shuttleton2016) in experiments with children.
As the authors note, unlike chimpanzees, children often over-imitate, copying parts of the behavior demonstrated that are clearly not needed to attain the instrumental goal (Horner & Whiten, Reference Horner and Whiten2005). It may be, however, that the instrumental goal of over-imitation is to demonstrate (to others) that the observer has learned, with considerable fidelity, what the demonstrator has done (Over & Carpenter, Reference Over and Carpenter2015). In addition, although over-imitation may not appear to be instrumentally motivated, children have often been socially rewarded in the past for imitating behavior that has no apparent instrumental value. In fact, when children over-imitate they may be well aware that the over-imitation is not necessary to obtain a physical reward (Nielsen, Kapitány, & Elkins, Reference Nielsen, Kapitány and Elkins2015). By over-imitating, however, they may be demonstrating that they understand and remember what the model did, an instrumental goal in itself. Furthermore, as the authors recognize, the instrumental rewards of over-imitation may be opaque at the time of observation, but a child could have learned that it might be wise to copy the behavior because the opaque behavior may have some future instrumental value. For example, learning how to make sparks by hitting a piece of metal against a piece of flint may not be useful at the time of observation, but in the future it may be useful to build a fire. Interestingly, Japanese quail and pigeons, much like chimpanzees, show evidence of imitation (Akins & Zentall, Reference Akins and Zentall1996; Zentall, Sutton, & Sherburne, Reference Zentall, Sutton and Sherburne1996), yet unlike children, they appear to be sensitive to the consequences of the demonstrated behavior. That is, if the demonstrated behavior is not rewarded, Japanese quail shows little tendency to imitate the behavior (Akins & Zentall, Reference Akins and Zentall1998).
Perhaps a more clear-cut example of imitation for purely social rewards is the children's game, “follow the leader.” In this game the sole goal of the children who follow the leader is to copy the leader's behavior. It is a social game that likely has the act of copying as an instrumental reward, as it may demonstrate that one can remember and replicate the behavior.
There is a way in which ritualistic behavior that is associated with a social group may appear to differ from typical instrumental behavior. Rituals often occur even when the individual is alone, that is the affiliative reinforcers are not directly present. But some instrumental behaviors also become habitual even when separated from their consequences. For example, stopping at a red light late at night in the absence of traffic or law enforcement.
As the authors recognize, maintaining the duality between instrumental and ritualistic behavior is difficult because “the ritual and instrumental stances are intimately interwoven in many human pursuits” (target article, sect. 2.1, para. 4). Thus, is the duality necessary or is affiliation just another kind of instrumental behavior?
Magical thinking, a clearly ritualistic behavior supported by group affiliation, often has the effect of giving the individual a sense of instrumental control, especially when actual instrumental control may not be available. Furthermore, magical thinking can sometimes have instrumental effects, especially if the belief is strong enough (e.g., voodoo, Lachman, Reference Lachman1983).
Dietary restrictions mandated by certain religious groups, at one time may have been instituted for health reasons (although it may well be that such an instrumental attribution was suggested after the fact to give the ritual more credibility). Yet the practice remains even though the reasoning may no longer be relevant. Its persistence is surely reinforced by group cohesion, a strong instrumental reinforcer. Furthermore, it may have the added consequence of insulating the group from other groups because dietary customs reduce the likelihood of interacting (eating together) with groups that do not have similar dietary customs (Lewis, Reference Lewis1985) thus reducing the possibility of group fragmentation.
Instrumental behaviors sometimes result in nonsocial approach–avoidance conflicts (Miller & Kraeling, Reference Miller and Kraeling1952) and very often similar conflicts occur between nonsocial and affiliative reinforcers (or punishers). As environments change, social rituals are often slow to change. Individual innovation, typically controlled by nonsocial rewards, may conflict with slow-to-change social rituals. Many individuals sustain the group's rituals to avoid social ostracization, but others may be willing to take a risk for the attraction of nonsocial rewards. Thus, there is the tension between the two instrumental forces, instrumental innovation and instrumental group cohesion.
Although acceptance by a social group may not be as quantifiable as other instrumental outcomes, that does not make group acceptance any less instrumental and certainly not different in kind.
Bifocal stance theory (BTS) makes a distinction between instrumental copying behavior, in which the goal is for the behavior copied to have some independent value, and the copying of traditions involving the faithful copying of what one might consider causally irrelevant action. However, there is no need to distinguish between the two. We are social animals, for whom copying traditions have important instrumental rewards, those of affiliation. BTS recognizes that traditions are sensitive to social cues, indicating that modeled behavior is conventional, normative, and otherwise relevant to group alignment, and therefore the motivation to copy such behavior is affiliative in nature. But why is this not instrumental? For humans, there are great advantages to being a member of a group. The authors say, “practices that are ineffective in producing environmental outcomes, result from a non-instrumental, affiliative motivation” (target article, sect. 2, para. 4). Why is affiliative motivation non-instrumental?
Of course, affiliation is a different kind of instrumental behavior from the rewards often used with animals (food) in experimental studies, but so are short cartoon clips (e.g., Alessandri, Darcheville, & Zentall, Reference Alessandri, Darcheville and Zentall2008), colorful stickers (e.g., Roberts, Alexander, & Knapp, Reference Roberts, Alexander and Knapp1990), and social praise (Fefer, DeMagistris, & Shuttleton, Reference Fefer, DeMagistris and Shuttleton2016) in experiments with children.
As the authors note, unlike chimpanzees, children often over-imitate, copying parts of the behavior demonstrated that are clearly not needed to attain the instrumental goal (Horner & Whiten, Reference Horner and Whiten2005). It may be, however, that the instrumental goal of over-imitation is to demonstrate (to others) that the observer has learned, with considerable fidelity, what the demonstrator has done (Over & Carpenter, Reference Over and Carpenter2015). In addition, although over-imitation may not appear to be instrumentally motivated, children have often been socially rewarded in the past for imitating behavior that has no apparent instrumental value. In fact, when children over-imitate they may be well aware that the over-imitation is not necessary to obtain a physical reward (Nielsen, Kapitány, & Elkins, Reference Nielsen, Kapitány and Elkins2015). By over-imitating, however, they may be demonstrating that they understand and remember what the model did, an instrumental goal in itself. Furthermore, as the authors recognize, the instrumental rewards of over-imitation may be opaque at the time of observation, but a child could have learned that it might be wise to copy the behavior because the opaque behavior may have some future instrumental value. For example, learning how to make sparks by hitting a piece of metal against a piece of flint may not be useful at the time of observation, but in the future it may be useful to build a fire. Interestingly, Japanese quail and pigeons, much like chimpanzees, show evidence of imitation (Akins & Zentall, Reference Akins and Zentall1996; Zentall, Sutton, & Sherburne, Reference Zentall, Sutton and Sherburne1996), yet unlike children, they appear to be sensitive to the consequences of the demonstrated behavior. That is, if the demonstrated behavior is not rewarded, Japanese quail shows little tendency to imitate the behavior (Akins & Zentall, Reference Akins and Zentall1998).
Perhaps a more clear-cut example of imitation for purely social rewards is the children's game, “follow the leader.” In this game the sole goal of the children who follow the leader is to copy the leader's behavior. It is a social game that likely has the act of copying as an instrumental reward, as it may demonstrate that one can remember and replicate the behavior.
There is a way in which ritualistic behavior that is associated with a social group may appear to differ from typical instrumental behavior. Rituals often occur even when the individual is alone, that is the affiliative reinforcers are not directly present. But some instrumental behaviors also become habitual even when separated from their consequences. For example, stopping at a red light late at night in the absence of traffic or law enforcement.
As the authors recognize, maintaining the duality between instrumental and ritualistic behavior is difficult because “the ritual and instrumental stances are intimately interwoven in many human pursuits” (target article, sect. 2.1, para. 4). Thus, is the duality necessary or is affiliation just another kind of instrumental behavior?
Magical thinking, a clearly ritualistic behavior supported by group affiliation, often has the effect of giving the individual a sense of instrumental control, especially when actual instrumental control may not be available. Furthermore, magical thinking can sometimes have instrumental effects, especially if the belief is strong enough (e.g., voodoo, Lachman, Reference Lachman1983).
Dietary restrictions mandated by certain religious groups, at one time may have been instituted for health reasons (although it may well be that such an instrumental attribution was suggested after the fact to give the ritual more credibility). Yet the practice remains even though the reasoning may no longer be relevant. Its persistence is surely reinforced by group cohesion, a strong instrumental reinforcer. Furthermore, it may have the added consequence of insulating the group from other groups because dietary customs reduce the likelihood of interacting (eating together) with groups that do not have similar dietary customs (Lewis, Reference Lewis1985) thus reducing the possibility of group fragmentation.
Instrumental behaviors sometimes result in nonsocial approach–avoidance conflicts (Miller & Kraeling, Reference Miller and Kraeling1952) and very often similar conflicts occur between nonsocial and affiliative reinforcers (or punishers). As environments change, social rituals are often slow to change. Individual innovation, typically controlled by nonsocial rewards, may conflict with slow-to-change social rituals. Many individuals sustain the group's rituals to avoid social ostracization, but others may be willing to take a risk for the attraction of nonsocial rewards. Thus, there is the tension between the two instrumental forces, instrumental innovation and instrumental group cohesion.
Although acceptance by a social group may not be as quantifiable as other instrumental outcomes, that does not make group acceptance any less instrumental and certainly not different in kind.
Financial support
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Conflict of interest
None.