In their target article, Veissière et al. provide new theoretical arguments supporting the idea that “the human sense of obligation is intimately connected with the formation of a shared agent ‘we’, directing collaborative efforts and self-regulating them.” Thus, they argue that “the human sense of obligation may thus be seen as a kind of self-conscious motivation.”
Recently, several studies have brought experimental arguments supporting this idea by showing that the cognitive processes involved in this “formation of a shared agent” directly influence the psychological and motor correlates of socioaffective processes. Mainly, these studies have used a well-known theoretical and experimental model, that is, empathy for pain, which compares the processes (ratings, motor correlates) when viewing painful situations as compared to non-painful situations. Classically, the difference between the two conditions can be used as an index of empathy felt toward the character involved in the depicted situation. Therefore, several studies have been able to manipulate the nature of the social link between the observer (i.e., the participant) and the depicted character, in order to explore its influence on empathy.
Within social psychology, it is well-known that people have the propensity to divide the social world into us versus them influencing affective, cognitive, and behavioral processes. Interestingly, a powerful old paradigm (the minimal group paradigm; Tajfel et al. Reference Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and Flament1971) had demonstrated that the mere categorization of individuals into two social groups on the basis of arbitrary criteria (e.g., to over- or under-estimate the number of dots on a screen; Diehl Reference Diehl1990) was sufficient to produce similar consequences as compared to natural groups. We used for the first time this paradigm within the framework of empathy for pain (Montalan et al. Reference Montalan, Lelard, Godefroy and Mouras2012). Briefly, participants were shown pictures of people in painful or non-painful situations and were instructed to imagine themselves or imagine members of two minimal groups (in-group vs. out-group) in the same situation and participants had to rate the level of perceived pain according to the different perspectives. The results were quite clear: More than replicating previous results showing that the mere assignment of individuals to arbitrary groups elicits evaluative preferences for in-group relative to out-group members (Brewer Reference Brewer1979), we found that the mere act of categorizing people in two distinct social groups was also sufficient to elicit an in-group bias in empathy for pain. This was the first clear demonstration that the processes involved in the formation of a shared agent mentioned as central in Veissière et al.'s target article influenced the psychological processes of empathy.
What about the motor processes involved in socioaffective responses? We have been able to address this question by measuring the postural correlates of empathy for pain. The interrelation between the motor and affective components of behavior has been studied for a long time. For some theoretical models, emotion shapes behavior so that pleasant events should trigger approach whereas unpleasant events should trigger withdrawal. The ability to simulate another person's emotional response in a particular situation could be the basis for the development of empathic skills (Meltzoff & Decety Reference Meltzoff and Decety2003) and the instruction to adopt another person's perspective modulates pain rating according to the affective link between the observer and the individual experiencing the outcome (Singer et al. Reference Singer, Seymour, O'Doherty, Stephan, Dolan and Frith2006). In a first study (Lelard et al. Reference Lelard, Montalan, Morel, Krystkowiak, Ahmaidi, Godefroy and Mouras2013), we used posturography to record differential postural responses when participants were instructed to imagine themselves in a painful or non-painful situation within the functional context of empathy for pain. This study demonstrated for the first time a stiffening response to pain visual stimulation, showing that postural responses were dependent of the perceived pain during the induced simulation process. These results laid the basis for further studies the basis for further studies concerning the role of perspective-taking in motivational dimension of motor control and social interaction. However, a main limitation of this study was that the effects of mental simulation were not tested, being unable to determine whether the reported effects were because of embodiment of the situation or to the valence of the visual scene.
A second study (Lelard et al. Reference Lelard, Godefroy, Ahmaidi, Krystkowiak and Mouras2017) was designed to record the differential postural correlates of empathy for pain according to whether or not participants were instructed to imagine themselves in a painful or non-painful situation. Both painful visual scenes (as in the preceding study) and instructions to embody the displayed situation were hypothesized to induce postural postural and physiological changes. The results demonstrated a posterior displacement of the body in the mental simulation condition compared to the passive observation condition, supporting the hypothesis that instruction to imagine ourselves in a painful situation activates internal models that lead to an embodiment of the situation (Zahavi Reference Zahavi2008). This was the first study to describe adjustments of postural control in response to mental simulation of affective/motor pictures.
By summarizing these results in this commentary, we wanted to support the hypothesis of the target paper of the main importance of sharing agency in socioaffective and motivational processes. To us, these studies show that this process (i.e., the social categorization of the other as an in-group or out-group member) is quite arbitrary (as demonstrated by the easy experimental manipulation of social link) and influence not only the central processes involved in empathy (broadly socioaffective processes), but also the motor correlates of these responses.
Samuel P. L. Veissière
[Opens in a new window]Samuel P. L. Veissière
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In their target article, Veissière et al. provide new theoretical arguments supporting the idea that “the human sense of obligation is intimately connected with the formation of a shared agent ‘we’, directing collaborative efforts and self-regulating them.” Thus, they argue that “the human sense of obligation may thus be seen as a kind of self-conscious motivation.”
Recently, several studies have brought experimental arguments supporting this idea by showing that the cognitive processes involved in this “formation of a shared agent” directly influence the psychological and motor correlates of socioaffective processes. Mainly, these studies have used a well-known theoretical and experimental model, that is, empathy for pain, which compares the processes (ratings, motor correlates) when viewing painful situations as compared to non-painful situations. Classically, the difference between the two conditions can be used as an index of empathy felt toward the character involved in the depicted situation. Therefore, several studies have been able to manipulate the nature of the social link between the observer (i.e., the participant) and the depicted character, in order to explore its influence on empathy.
Within social psychology, it is well-known that people have the propensity to divide the social world into us versus them influencing affective, cognitive, and behavioral processes. Interestingly, a powerful old paradigm (the minimal group paradigm; Tajfel et al. Reference Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and Flament1971) had demonstrated that the mere categorization of individuals into two social groups on the basis of arbitrary criteria (e.g., to over- or under-estimate the number of dots on a screen; Diehl Reference Diehl1990) was sufficient to produce similar consequences as compared to natural groups. We used for the first time this paradigm within the framework of empathy for pain (Montalan et al. Reference Montalan, Lelard, Godefroy and Mouras2012). Briefly, participants were shown pictures of people in painful or non-painful situations and were instructed to imagine themselves or imagine members of two minimal groups (in-group vs. out-group) in the same situation and participants had to rate the level of perceived pain according to the different perspectives. The results were quite clear: More than replicating previous results showing that the mere assignment of individuals to arbitrary groups elicits evaluative preferences for in-group relative to out-group members (Brewer Reference Brewer1979), we found that the mere act of categorizing people in two distinct social groups was also sufficient to elicit an in-group bias in empathy for pain. This was the first clear demonstration that the processes involved in the formation of a shared agent mentioned as central in Veissière et al.'s target article influenced the psychological processes of empathy.
What about the motor processes involved in socioaffective responses? We have been able to address this question by measuring the postural correlates of empathy for pain. The interrelation between the motor and affective components of behavior has been studied for a long time. For some theoretical models, emotion shapes behavior so that pleasant events should trigger approach whereas unpleasant events should trigger withdrawal. The ability to simulate another person's emotional response in a particular situation could be the basis for the development of empathic skills (Meltzoff & Decety Reference Meltzoff and Decety2003) and the instruction to adopt another person's perspective modulates pain rating according to the affective link between the observer and the individual experiencing the outcome (Singer et al. Reference Singer, Seymour, O'Doherty, Stephan, Dolan and Frith2006). In a first study (Lelard et al. Reference Lelard, Montalan, Morel, Krystkowiak, Ahmaidi, Godefroy and Mouras2013), we used posturography to record differential postural responses when participants were instructed to imagine themselves in a painful or non-painful situation within the functional context of empathy for pain. This study demonstrated for the first time a stiffening response to pain visual stimulation, showing that postural responses were dependent of the perceived pain during the induced simulation process. These results laid the basis for further studies the basis for further studies concerning the role of perspective-taking in motivational dimension of motor control and social interaction. However, a main limitation of this study was that the effects of mental simulation were not tested, being unable to determine whether the reported effects were because of embodiment of the situation or to the valence of the visual scene.
A second study (Lelard et al. Reference Lelard, Godefroy, Ahmaidi, Krystkowiak and Mouras2017) was designed to record the differential postural correlates of empathy for pain according to whether or not participants were instructed to imagine themselves in a painful or non-painful situation. Both painful visual scenes (as in the preceding study) and instructions to embody the displayed situation were hypothesized to induce postural postural and physiological changes. The results demonstrated a posterior displacement of the body in the mental simulation condition compared to the passive observation condition, supporting the hypothesis that instruction to imagine ourselves in a painful situation activates internal models that lead to an embodiment of the situation (Zahavi Reference Zahavi2008). This was the first study to describe adjustments of postural control in response to mental simulation of affective/motor pictures.
By summarizing these results in this commentary, we wanted to support the hypothesis of the target paper of the main importance of sharing agency in socioaffective and motivational processes. To us, these studies show that this process (i.e., the social categorization of the other as an in-group or out-group member) is quite arbitrary (as demonstrated by the easy experimental manipulation of social link) and influence not only the central processes involved in empathy (broadly socioaffective processes), but also the motor correlates of these responses.