Is contempt different?

Categories emerge in science based on assessment of correlated properties (Boyd Reference Boyd1991). To determine whether a new category is warranted, studies must demonstrate that a member has properties different from existing categories. Do the features identified by G&F suggest contempt is different from other emotions?

1. Contempt is intentional. All emotions are “about” or directed toward specific events or objects, including sadness at a failure or anger at an insult. Emotions are “intentional states,” directed toward the world (Neu Reference Neu2000; Solomon Reference Solomon, Lewis, Haviland-Jones and Barrett2008). Indeed, evidence reveals this is the hallmark feature of emotions (Beedie et al. Reference Beedie, Terry and Lane2005; Kaplan et al. Reference Kaplan, Levine, Lench and Safer2016; Lench et al. Reference Lench, Bench, Darbor and Moore2015; Verduyn et al. Reference Verduyn, Van Mechelen and Tuerlinckx2011).

2. Contempt involves enduring evaluation. Emotions were once defined as relatively brief and contrasted with longer-lasting moods (Eich et al. Reference Eich, Kihlstrom, Bower, Forgas and Niedenthal2000; Russell Reference Russell2003). An unfortunate consequence of this definition was the resultant supposition that emotions are ephemeral – there and then gone. The evidence does not support this supposition. Emotions can last for minutes, hours, or days, and re-occur when people think about an event or object (Lench et al. Reference Lench, Safer and Levine2011b; Levine et al. Reference Levine, Lench, Kaplan and Safer2012; Verduyn et al. Reference Verduyn, Delvaux, Van Coillie, Tuerlinckx and Van Mechelen2009; Reference Verduyn, Van Mechelen and Tuerlinckx2011). Widows and widowers, for example, report intense emotions on the anniversary of their spouse's death (Carnelley et al. Reference Carnelley, Wortman, Bolger and Burke2006). Many experimental emotion elicitations rely on this feature of emotion by engaging participants with autobiographical narratives or emotion-evoking objects (Lench et al. Reference Lench, Flores and Bench2011a; Lerner & Keltner Reference Lerner and Keltner2001; Lench & Levine Reference Lench and Levine2005).

3. Contempt follows cues to low relational value. This feature suggests that people engage in evaluation and, as a result, experience contempt. Decades of investigations have revealed the evaluations that cause different emotions (e.g., sadness after perceived loss; Carver Reference Carver2004; Frijda Reference Frijda1987; Lench et al. Reference Lench, Flores and Bench2011a; Levine Reference Levine1996; Roseman et al. Reference Roseman, Antoniou and Jose1996). These evaluations are often called appraisals – fast, typically unconscious, assessments of situations, objects, or people (Arnold Reference Arnold1960; Ellsworth & Scherer Reference Ellsworth, Scherer, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003).

4. Contempt entails loss of respect and status diminution. G&F posit that contempt is associated with these cognitions. Emotions are typically defined as coordinated responses in experience, cognition, behavior, and physiology (Lench et al. Reference Lench, Tibbett and Bench2016; Mauss et al. Reference Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm and Gross2005). In a meta-analysis, emotions had effects on cognition consistent with theoretical accounts and small to moderate in size (Lench et al. Reference Lench, Flores and Bench2011a).

5. Contempt creates “cold” indifference. Any feelings signal relevancy, and many studies demonstrate that emotions orient attention (Arnold Reference Arnold1960; Compton Reference Compton2003; Lench & Levine Reference Lench and Levine2010). Whether contempt is classified as emotion or sentiment, it is unlikely that it creates indifference. This feature might reflect a phenomenological experience of coldness. The experience of dissociation (“coldness”) is also a feature of sadness (Andrews & Thomson Reference Andrews and Thomson2009; Averill Reference Averill1968; Cunningham Reference Cunningham1988) and is not unique to contempt. Generally, emotions are associated with subjective experience (Lench et al. Reference Lench, Flores and Bench2011a; Nummenmaa et al. Reference Nummenmaa, Glerean, Hari and Hietanen2014).

6. Contempt is associated with “anger” and “disgust.” Self-reports of negative emotions are often correlated, and effects are less differentiated among negative emotions than between emotions that vary in valence (Lench et al. Reference Lench, Flores and Bench2011a).

7. Contempt can be expressed in many ways. All emotions are associated with different expressions. The moderator of expression can be identified when sufficient evidence is available. Anger is associated with “approach” brain activation, but only when action is possible (Carver & Harmon-Jones Reference Carver and Harmon-Jones2009). Sadness is associated with physiological arousal when help is available and deactivation when help is not possible (Kreibig Reference Kreibig2010).

8. Contempt leads to intolerance, exclusion, and relationship dissolution. Most theories posit that emotions are associated with behaviors (Lench et al. Reference Lench, Bench, Darbor and Moore2015; Mauss et al. Reference Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm and Gross2005). Thousands of studies examine the behavioral consequences associated with different emotions, and studies frequently include interpersonal behaviors (e.g., anger and aggression).

The preceding review reveals that the “unique” features of contempt are common among emotions. One feature – that contempt is an intentional state about objects – is a defining property of all emotions. There is insufficient evidence to support a new category of feeling.

Shifting sands of contempt research

We were surprised to find so few studies that experimentally manipulated contempt. The majority of studies consider identification of contempt expressions (Ekman & Friesen Reference Ekman and Friesen1986; Matsumoto & Ekman Reference Matsumoto and Ekman2004), contempt as a mediator (Becker et al. Reference Becker, Tausch and Wagner2011; Mackie et al. Reference Mackie, Devos and Smith2000; Melwani & Barsade Reference Melwani and Barsade2011; Romani et al. Reference Romani, Grappi and Bagozzi2013; Ufkes et al. Reference Ufkes, Otten, Vander Zee, Giebels and Dovidio2012), or scenarios that result in contempt (Caprariello et al. Reference Caprariello, Cuddy and Fiske2009; Laham et al. Reference Laham, Chopra, Lalljee and Parkinson2010). This lack of experimental control limits inferences about contempt in two critical ways. First, it is impossible to distinguish contempt from other emotions. Reliance on self-report means findings can be determined by the wording of measures. For example, G&F contend that contempt is sometimes correlated with disgust and sometimes with anger. A close examination of the literature reveals that some measures of contempt include disgust items (Becker et al. Reference Becker, Tausch and Wagner2011; Caprariello et al. Reference Caprariello, Cuddy and Fiske2009; Mackie et al. Reference Mackie, Devos and Smith2000), making the relationship between contempt and disgust difficult to disentangle. Second, without experimental work it is impossible to draw inferences about the effects of contempt on cognition, physiology, and behavior, or whether contempt experienced in one situation can influence subsequent situations (as with other emotions).

Categories must be created or updated based on evidence. Building a new category on the currently available contempt literature would be akin to building a house on sand – likely to fall at any moment.