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Liberals and conservatives: Non-convertible currencies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 September 2015

John R. Hibbing
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68588. jhibbing@unl.eduksmith1@unl.eduhttp://www.unl.edu/polphyslab/http://kevinbsmith.com/wp/
Kevin B. Smith
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68588. jhibbing@unl.eduksmith1@unl.eduhttp://www.unl.edu/polphyslab/http://kevinbsmith.com/wp/
John R. Alford
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Rice University, Houston, TX 77251-1892. jra@rice.eduhttp://politicalscience.rice.edu/Content.aspx?id=56

Abstract

Duarte et al. are correct that the social science enterprise would improve on several fronts if the number of politically conservative researchers were to increase; however, because they misunderstand the degree to which liberals and conservatives are dispositionally different, they fail to appreciate the full range of reasons that conservatives are reluctant to enter the modern social sciences.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

Duarte et al.'s target article is valuable and even necessary. We agree that increasing the number of politically conservative researchers would enhance the social scientific process and in this commentary we even mention two additional benefits that could accrue. At the same time, Duarte et al. fail to appreciate the fundamental differences between liberals and conservatives and as a result may misunderstand the potential for rectifying the current situation.

No doubt in part because social scientists are overwhelmingly liberal, conservatives are so much on the defensive that they sometimes believe they are being criticized even when they are not. A clear example is found in the target article itself where the authors accuse us of claiming that conservatives are “hyper-responsive to threatening and negative stimuli” (sect. 5.4, para. 1) even though a simple word search indicates we never used any such phrase (cf. Hibbing et al. Reference Hibbing, Smith and Alford2014). Though our findings do show that, compared to liberals, conservatives are more responsive and attentive to negative stimuli, this does not make them hyper-responsive any more than it makes liberals hypo-responsive. Indeed, in the cited works we go to great lengths to explain that neither side is deserving of a pejorative label and that it is best to stop with the acknowledgment that liberals and conservatives are simply different. From an evolutionary standpoint, responsiveness to negative situations is hardly a bad strategy; but in the current climate, if social science researchers point out any way in which conservatives are different from liberals, the immediate assumption is that the goal is to demean conservatives. Duarte et al. are correct that research needs to be written more carefully, but it also needs to be read more carefully. Perhaps greater ideological balance would help on this front.

A related potential benefit of increasing the number of conservative researchers is enhanced public acceptance of the social science enterprise. We come from a discipline (political science) on the frontline of attacks from politicians. These attacks typically are led by politically conservative lawmakers and resonate most with politically conservative citizens. Would the hostility of conservatives toward political and social science research be diminished if the composition of the research community was more ideologically balanced? A shift toward balance undoubtedly would broaden acceptance of the social sciences; however, in contrast to the tone of the target article, we believe that (1) for the most part, conservatives today do not want to become social scientists; and, (2) even if the number of conservative social scientists did swell, conservatives would remain deeply suspicious of social science research. Duarte et al. do not see the matter this way primarily because they fail to appreciate the fundamental differences between liberals and conservatives even though some of their own research points to foundational differences (e.g., Haidt & Graham Reference Haidt and Graham2007).

Duarte et al. cite recent research suggesting that liberals are as prejudiced as conservatives toward “ideologically dissimilar others” (sect. 3.2.2, para. 2); in other words, conservatives are prejudiced against stereotypically left-leaning targets (e.g., African Americans), whereas liberals are prejudiced against stereotypically right-leaning targets (e.g., religious Christians). Related research shows that liberals and conservatives are equally likely to “misremember” history and to make mathematical errors all in order to affirm their ideology (Frenda et al. Reference Frenda, Knowles, Saletan and Loftus2013; Kahan et al. Reference Kahan, Peters, Dawson and Slovic2013). As a result, Duarte et al. argue that liberals and conservatives are nothing more than two sides of the same coin – with one side disliking Muslims and gun control in parallel to the other side's dislike of Christian fundamentalists and genetically modified foods.

Conservative attitudes toward liberals and liberal concepts (and liberal attitudes toward conservatives and conservative concepts) are certainly important to study, but they are not all that matters. In truth, the telling comparisons involve the contrasting responses and behaviors of liberals and conservatives when they are not being exposed to politically charged stimuli. For example, compared to liberals, individuals with conservative issue preferences register significantly greater physiological responses (and directed attention) to startling noises and negative imagery (Dodd et al. Reference Dodd, Balzer, Jacobs, Grusczynszki, Smith and Hibbing2012; Oxley et al. Reference Oxley, Smith, Alford, Hibbing, Miller, Scalora, Hatemi and Hibbing2008); compared to conservatives, liberals are more likely to seek out information even if it may be undesirable (Shook & Fazio Reference Shook and Fazio2009); and, compared to conservatives, liberals consistently register lower preference for closure (Jost et al. Reference Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway2003).

Liberals may dislike their political opponents just as much as conservatives do, and they may be just as willing to twist reality to validate their biases, but this does not alter the fact that liberals and conservatives experience and process the world in remarkably different fashions. Ironically, if Duarte et al. acknowledged this gross asymmetry, it would heighten their central message, since fundamental differences make it all the more important for social scientists to be sensitive to both types.

On the other hand, the existence of these bedrock differences suggests explanations for the paucity of conservative social scientists that Duarte et al. may find disquieting. As Pinker (Reference Pinker2002) points out, compared to liberals, conservatives are more likely to believe that the human condition is flawed, easily understandable, and not readily remediable; ergo, conservatives tend to perceive social programs and social research as unnecessary and/or counterproductive. Combine these perceptions of the human condition with conservatives' reservations about uncertain information searches (Shook & Fazio Reference Shook and Fazio2009) and situations with insufficient closure (Jost et al. Reference Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway2003), both of which are hallmarks of science and especially social science, and it becomes even more apparent that conservative misgivings regarding the social sciences can be traced to the nature of the enterprise.

The prevailing liberal orthodoxy in many academic disciplines discourages conservatives from signing on, and the solutions proposed in the target article may help . . . a little. A larger change would require significant increases in the number of conservatives who want to spend their adult lives as social scientists, and, given the topics investigated in the modern social sciences, this is unlikely even if the climate became more welcoming. Achieving greater ideological balance in the social sciences will take much more than alerting liberal academics to the existence of imbalance; it will take coming to terms with the fundamentally different (and occupationally relevant) predispositions of conservatives and liberals.

References

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