A Review of the political situation in post-Stalin Russia may well begin with a reflection on its historical uniqueness. Stalin, who sponsored the “Russia first” theme in Soviet propaganda, established a real and momentous “first” for Russia by his own death. Never before had a totalitarian dictator of one of the world powers died, or been put to death, before his totalitarian system collapsed, or came near collapse, in war. Hitler and Mussolini, who lived long enough to bring down their systems in ruins, furnish no parallel.

Oil and gas discoveries in developing countries are often associated with shortsighted economic policies and, in response, with calls to insulate resource management from populist impulses. The authors report on a randomized experiment that tested methods to overcome this apparent tension between sound resource governance and democratic politics. Soon after Tanzania's discovery of major natural gas reserves, the authors invited a nationally representative sample of voters to take part in an intensive public deliberation of policy options, at an event featuring nationally recognized experts and small-group discussions. Democratic deliberation reinforced the public's strong preference for rapid spending of gas revenues, but also increased support for various prudential and economically orthodox measures, such as the independent oversight of gas revenues, limits on government borrowing, and selling gas abroad rather than subsidizing fuel at home. These effects were driven by deliberation per se, rather than a pure information treatment, and show no evidence of contamination by facilitator effects or peer effects in group deliberations.

The article examines Japan's diplomatic style and rhetoric, actual policies, and underlying attitudes toward North-South problems, focusing on her reactions to demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) by the LDCs. The conventional classification of Japan as “right-wing conservative” is shown to be misleading. Her policies are often less conservative than her rhetoric. As a result of her success as a recently developed country, her close observation of the industrialization of Asia's newly industrializing countries, and her status as a still growing latecomer—experienced in “structural adjustments” for her own benefit and faced by growing protectionist pressure from other developed countries—Japan is perhaps the most realistically optimistic of the states concerned about the prospect of the NIEO demands for a “new division of labor” and “structural change.” It is possible that Japan will assume some activist role as a mediator in the North-South dialogue, perhaps in the quiet areas of negotiation and policy formulation rather than in the arena of public diplomacy such as summit meetings.

Three recent works provide the point of departure for assessing the performance of the new profession of policy analysis. Both the scope of the enterprise and the standards it adopts for evaluating policy are found to be excessively narrow. A revised framework for policy analysis is proposed whose scope is broadened to encompass the design of policy-making procedures as well as substantive policy outcomes. Such procedures have a vital impact upon how policy problems are defined and how preferences concerning them are formed. The standards for evaluating policy are expanded to include an explicit consideration of citizenship. All policies and policy-making procedures directly or indirectly affect the capacity for self-government. Therefore they must be judged, at least in part, in terms of how they influence the capabilities of citizens to participate in public life and the willingness of citizens to do so.

Numerous studies of role, employing diverse methodologies in a wide range of social contexts, have accumulated in the social sciences over many decades. The concept of role retains considerable appeal for some who still pursue the goal of a unified theory of behavior for the social sciences, and for many others who discern in the role perspective a major source of concepts and insights on which they may draw eclectically for all manner of social research. Since the 1950s, and especially during the current decade, political scientists have produced studies of role and of role conflict focusing on political and administrative actors caught up in the process of change in various independent African states. Because die number and diversity of these studies are likely to increase in the future, they merit description and evaluation as a group. Both objectives are pursued in this article, with particular reference to three works on politics and administration in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania.

Since the Korean War, United States policies in Asia have gradually developed along the lines of the “containment” doctrine so successfully applied in Europe after 1947. Washington has increasingly seen the problem of Chinese power in Asia in much the same light as that posed by Soviet power in Europe and has behaved as if both threats could be contained by basically the same kinds of responses. In both Asia and Europe, containment measures have reflected a perceived need for complementary interaction between military policies and aid programs in order to prevent aggression by Communist powers and to foster the internal stability of nations in the area. Although difficulties have arisen in seeking the best balance of these components of the containment policy in Europe, most of the essential American objectives in the West have been attained.

The educated American of the middle nineteenth century who took an inventory of his knowledge of the world found himself much more poorly informed on Asia than on Europe. The reason for this is manifest. America's relations with Asia were fragmented and peripheral, trade alone being a major concern. Interaction with Europe proceeded on an entirely different plane: For the New World, Europe was an inexhaustible source of population increase and personal contacts, of monies for economic growth, and of technological, artistic, and educational inspiration.

The human population is the base of human existence. This, when considered, seems an inescapable proposition. But in the minds of most men it must have an absurd remoteness. The process of population has seemed like primordial creation itself, hardly a thing to be touched by mere scruple. Beyond the scope of any deliberation, the peopling of the earth has, for mankind as a whole, remained unquestioned as the earth, an axiom behind which there was no going and from which all proceeded. But according to a relentless gathering of awareness, as witnessed in an abundance of recent writings, it appears that history has marched to a new point. The condition of the world is being modified by a constellation of emergencies, and any observation and reflection on them, any rough glance at the outlines of trends in the life of the world, points to the swelling flood of population as the central reality in every perspective on the future.

Nothing pricks one's curiosity more than the inner operations of a power system. And in the case of Russia the incentive to speculate on “what really goes on” in the councils of the Kremlin is enhanced by the supersecrecy in which the highest level of Soviet politics is enveloped, by the dramatic shifts of policy and sudden displacements of leading personalities, and by a natural apprehension about the operations of a totalitarian regime which may at any moment threaten or transform our daily lives.

Two years have passed since Khrushchev launched his reorganization of Soviet industrial management, the most daring and politically risky venture of a dynamic administration studded with unorthodox and sweeping programs. The vertical ministerial system of industrial management was abolished virtually overnight and replaced by a territorial organization centered in 105 regional economic councils, or sovnarkhozy; thousands of officials scurried off to new jobs in an environment alien to their previous experience; and new command and control channels had to be forged in short order.

This review of recent books on Zaire examines how the changing salience of the issues of ethnicity, class, and the state exhibit shifts in academic perspectives and especially in perceptions of how best to account for and articulate the characteristics of political life in contemporary Zaire. The authors' views on the dynamics of class formation within a situation of increasing socioeconomic inequality and state decline raise questions about how or to what degree the Mobutu regime has managed to institutionalize a kind of “authority” and “political order” over the past twenty years. The case of Zaire challenges the meaning of “institutionalization” because the most clearly identifiable practices in Zaire have centered on finding efficient means for appropriating whatever political and economic resources are at hand.

According to Soviet military theorists, the war aims of a government determine not only the scale of military action and diplomatic alliances, but the “moral-political factor,” the extent to which soldiers and civilians regard a war as “just” and support the policy of their government. Soviet theorists caution that if both soldiers and civilians regard a war as “unjust,” the government runs a greater risk of military setbacks. If such setbacks occur, domestic opposition to the war may develop and domestic tensions that existed prior to the war may become exacerbated. In pursuing “unjust” war aims, a government risks “moral-political” threats to the morale of its troops, the stability of its home front, and the legitimacy of the regime.

Primarily by reference to the writings of Charles E. Merriam, the impact of the Chicago school of political scientists on the study of world politics is assessed. Differences between that school's pragmatist pluralism and political realism are examined, as are differences between Merriam's ideal of cross-cutting human associations in a world of shared power and that of advocates of world government. Better adjusted personalities and international civic education would in Merriam's Utopia of science and reason lighten the task of governance within and between states, but he recognized the difficulty of achieving a warless world so long as “the antagonism of value systems which run below the obvious surface of the world” continues.

To regard Socialism and Communism as Siamese twins is an error, wilful or genuine, which rarely troubles American thinking on foreign politics now. It cannot be said, however, that the shadow of the confusion has been entirely dispelled. Some groups, influential in the making and execution of American foreign policy, appear to be gravely disturbed by what they term the development of the welfare state in western Europe. At a time—they argue—when the United States requires strong partners in the common attempt to defend large parts of the non-Soviet world against Communist expansion, the spread of welfare-state practices weakens western Europe economically as well as politically. The development of the welfare state is said to lessen the capacity of countries for raising productivity and hence for standing on their own feet in their economic dealings with the outside world and also for mounting substantial defense efforts. Since a less progressive and adaptable economy will frustrate expectations of income and economic security, political stability and morale are alleged to suffer. This effect, as well as the abridgment of democratic freedoms perceived to follow from abandoning the liberal economy, is believed to make such countries more susceptible to Communist subversion. These misgivings are not aroused by the behavior of all the western European nations. It is rather the United Kingdom, the three Scandinavian countries, and the Netherlands which are identified with the evolution of the welfare state, while economic liberalism is perceived to have a more abiding hold in Belgium, France, Italy, and western Germany.

Family planning programs have encountered limited success not only because of our incomplete understanding of the sociocultural context of fertility decisions, but because the bureaucratic structures entrusted with the organizing task are overextended. Since the implementing agencies are themselves a complex part of the wider society in which they operate, there are important advantages to using an open systems perspective in the analysis of the problems of organizing for transactions with the client population. The status quo in family planning does not have to be maintained. Within political systems one can try to increase the organizational capacity to translate policies into action, or one can devise policies which recognize organizational constraints. In order to accomplish either or both of these objectives, a fresh approach to both action and research is necessary.

Political interpretations of Germany have shifted from their traditional concern over its instability and aggressiveness to an appreciation of West Germany's newly found stability and peacefulness. But the penchant of the Bonn Republic for stability creates new political problems in a world that experiences accelerating rates of political and economic changes.

Five years ago the Comintern loomed once again as a spectre on the European horizon with the founding in Poland, September 1947, of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties of the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia (expelled June 1948), France, and Italy. It has since become both fashionable and convenient to identify the “Cominform” with all aspects of international Communist activity, ranging from the most general of policy directives to an isolated Communist-led strike. The indiscriminate identification of “Cominform” with international Communist activity provides the layman with a convenient stereotype which spares him the trouble of further inquiry. For the student of Communism, however, this lack of precision merely results in obscuring the actual role of the Cominform, as it is known to us, and more particularly, its function within the configuration of various covert and overt instrumentalities of the international Communist movement. To speak, for example, of a “Cominform” policy of collectivization or of a “Cominform” purge trial in the Balkans, or to suggest by “Cominform” the whole web of controls of national Communist parties maintained by the USSR is to ascribe a role and importance to the Cominform that it simply does not have. For without minimizing the importance of the function the Cominform has come to discharge, it may be said that its role is essentially that of a central, but by no means the most important, propaganda instrument of the international Communist movement, designed primarily to provide public guidance and information to the leadership of various national Communist parties. Thus Pravda and the USSR radio broadcasts furnish daily guidance to the international Communist movement, and the World Federation of Trade Unions is continuously engaged in attempting to bring trade union activity in line with Communist policy.

The immediate causes of the current crisis in socialism are the highly authoritarian and extremely hierarchical political and economic structures created by Leninism. Yet the collapse of state socialism also appears to be part of a more general crisis of socialism, a crisis that includes even its potentially more democratic variants. At the core of this broader crisis lies the diminishing appeal of the publicly owned enterprise, an institution that has always been central to the very definition of socialism, but whose economic advantages are called into question by the recent and rapid development of global markets in factors of production and especially in assets. Consequently, communism's demise by no means signifies a victory for either democratic socialism or even social democracy.