The SALT I Agreements, concluded in 1972, are assessed with the benefit of several years’ perspective. This study examines the negotiations and agreements from the standpoint of achievements and shortcomings. It finds a number of each, but on balance a substantial positive achievement. SALT I marked a beginning to collaborative efforts at strategic arms control by the two superpowers, and in a number of respects—especially the ABM Treaty—it had a clear and favorable effect in mitigating the arms competition. The main shortcoming was the failure to reach significant restraints on strategic offensive arms, especially a ban on MIRV's at a time when that was still possible. Also, the pursuit of “bargaining chips” for arms negotiations can impede arms control and contribute to arms competition. An “oversell” étente and SALT in 1972 prompted a swing to undervaluing both in the late 1970's. netheless, on balance SALT I was a significant step forward.

The issue of nuclear proliferation is replete with problems to which there are no surefire solutions. In this essay, this troublesome terrain is examined in three different but complementary ways: first, through case studies of the nuclear dealings of the U.S. with India and Pakistan; second, in a broad review of incentives toward and dampers on the spread of nuclear weapons; and third, in terms of implications for national policy.

Soviet regional leaders were modestly successful in their attempts to add local projects to the agenda of forthcoming five-year economic plans at Party Congresses during the Brezhnev era. The volume of local demands expressed in Congress speeches steadily increased from the 24th to the 26th Congresses, as did the frequency of speaker participation in petitioning for investment. This seems to reflect the gradual legitimation of regional consultation in long-range planning and the sharpening politics of stringency of the latter Brezhnev era. While the vast majority of requests were purely provincial in scope, broader regional interests were articulated to an increasing extent at the 25th and 26th Congresses. Requests respecting agriculture were the most frequent, followed by energy and fuels, water resources, and transportation.

A Striking feature of politics in Indonesia, as in some other new states, is the great importance of the government's symbolic activity—gestures, ceremonial, and ritual on the one hand, propaganda and indoctrination on the other. The Indonesian government of the post-1958 period allots immense resources to creating and maintaining particular attitudes and states of mind, in ways which often detract greatly from the effectiveness of its administrative and economic performance. This article describes this symbolic activity and suggests some hypotheses which may help to account for its importance.

IT was once suggested that the basic trait of psychological warfare—and, incidentally, the greatest asset to those that practice it—is its lack of known positive results.1 No satisfactory method has yet been developed to measure the effects of a propaganda campaign on its chosen audience. This characteristic is at once the greatest weakness of propaganda and psychological warfare (how does the operator know whether his effort was well spent or not?) and their greatest strength (if there is no reliable evaluation of the effort, it had better be continued, or even intensified, lest ground be lost).

Observers of Peru since Carleton Beals (1934) have been pre-dicting “fire on the Andes.” When Bolivia began its basic social transformation in 1952, a Peruvian conflagration seemed all the more inevitable. Then, in 1962, what appeared to be Peru's version of the Sierra Maestra phase of “the revolution” began in the densely populated mountainous areas of the south.

INTERNATIONAL relations, as a subject of instruction, has flourished more in the United States than elsewhere and more in recent years than ever before. What forces explain its growth and its present shape? How have methods of teaching it been affected by the goals of the teacher, by his relation to research, and by the formal organization of international studies in American colleges and universities? To what extent is the American experience so rooted in uniquely American conditions that it is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere? These questions will be considered in turn.

The comparative analysis of past and present systems as an approach to the study of international politics has been subjected to its first major test. It can be said at once that the effort is a most creditable one. The approach promises to become increasingly attractive with time. Much of the theoretical writing that uses the data of international politics is becoming the preserve of specialists in abstract theory. And the student committed primarily to international politics and to theory only insofar as it helps order and apprehend significant problems of international politics here and now is quite naturally attracted to the historical perspective. History can be used to illuminate the evolving structural features of contemporary relations and it provides some relief from the politics of the Cold War, which are becoming progressively routinized.

Five recent books reveal the beginnings of important new work in conceptualizing the place of human rights concerns in national foreign policies. The moral force of claims of human rights requires that they be given serious consideration in foreign policy. Philosophical analysis also shows that categorical moral distinctions between personal (or civil and political) and economic and social rights must be abandoned. Any justifiable priority for one class of rights must rest on strategic or political, not conceptual or moral, grounds. Since human rights are only one of many foreign policy concerns, tradeoffs with other goals, interests, and values will be necessary. However, human rights and the national interest are often complementary. The “tradeoffs” actually made should be principled, instrumental decisions, rather than apparently ad hoc or cynical sacrifices of human rights.

At recent all-union party congresses, Soviet republic and province leaders have devoted a progressively larger share of their speeches to foreign policy. By the 25th Congress, their remarks had become substantively rich and surprisingly diverse. Does this growing commentary signal an expansion of the Soviet foreign-policy making arena? After comparing the data to a series of alternative explanatory models, the author proposes that a model based solely on political ambition provides a promising but ultimately insufficient answer to this question and should be supplemented by a model presuming an increasing interest among regional leaders in influencing policy itself. This conclusion implies that the policy arena has expanded, an interpretation which is reinforced with additional data on the Central Committee's involvement in foreign policy discussions. Possible causes of arena expansion are then considered. However, the data suggest few concrete implications for the content of Soviet foreign policy.

The role in public policy of organizations—broadly defined to include bureaucratic and corporatist, as well as autonomous, organized interests—merits attention as a form of political participation characteristic of a wide variety of societies. Various forms of corporatism have emerged in recent years to play an increasingly important role in most West European societies. In Japan and the United States, organized interests are still mediated primarily by the political parties, but in these countries also there is an increasing reliance on organizational participation. Organized interests play an important role in contemporary authoritarian states, and provide a common denominator for comparisons with other political systems. Special cases of organizational participation that have received considerable attention include the role of the military as a form of bureaucratic politics in many countries, and the decision-making function of organizations in the international system. A better understanding of organizational participation as the most appropriate basis for the comparative study of contemporary political systems calls for further research along several lines: for example, the direct influence of organized interests on governments; the interaction of corporatist and autonomous organizations with bureaucracies; comparisons of organizational participation in societies with differing institutional heritages; and the role of organizations in the international system.

What are Chinese scholars writing about internal developments in the Soviet Union? Are they positive or negative in their assessments of each stage of Soviet history, from the early leadership of Lenin to the recent accession of Gorbachev? What are the consequences that changing Chinese attitudes are likely to have for Sino-Soviet relations? After a quarter-century of the Sino-Soviet split, foreign observers no longer need to grasp at tiny straws of information, or to rely solely on a small number of official documents and authoritative articles. The study of new, published sources can add substantially to our understanding of international perceptions in the socialist world, and can bring us nearer to the elusive goal of learning about debates on foreign policy in communist-led countries. Academic journals and books from the late 1960s in the Soviet Union, and from 1979 in China, present an impressively detailed and intriguingly lively literature on the problems of socialism in the other country. Having previously examined Soviet writings on China, I will introduce Chinese publications on the Soviet Union in this article.

In the second half of the seventeenth century, European philosophers began to regard the enlightenment of ignorant and prejudiced people as a means of reducing persecution and of promoting just and reasonable government. In international affairs, the first dramatic application of this doctrine occurred during the wars of the French Revolution when diplomacy, the traditional form of elite communication, was supplemented by missionary appeals to the common man on the enemy side. Since that time, the technology of communication has greatly improved; ever larger literate masses of the population participate in politics and war; the social homogeneity of the political elites in various nations has been lost, and in the West the ideas of liberty and equality have been drained of their revolutionary power.

In the last forty years, Germany has had three radically different political systems. In each case, the party system, better than any other single index, reflects the style of politics of that period. The highly splintered, multiparty system of Weimar mirrors perfectly the extreme ideological dissension and radicalism of postwar German politics. The one-party system of the Third Reich epitomizes the attempt to destroy the individual's traditional social ties and then to absorb him totally in a coordinated movement. Finally, the two-party system of Bonn reflects the growing social and political consensus concerning the more pragmatic and concrete political goals of postHitlerian Germany. Although these three political systems are intimately related, the main question for us is why the democratic party systems of Weimar and Bonn are so different. The party systems are unintelligible, however, without an understanding of the patterns of pressure-group politics as well.

Although the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has been in existence for nearly two decades, the political aspects of its activities have received scant attention. Most of the literature on IBRD operations has been written by economists, who quite naturally emphasize the economic aspects. Political scientists, to the extent that they have discussed it at all, have described most of its operations as removed “from the sphere of international or domestic politics.” The purpose of the following analysis is to determine in what respects the activities of the International Bank may be described as “political.” Such a determination would be useful in three ways. First, it would, it is hoped, stimulate research on international organizations as actors in international politics; second, it would require revision of the standard explanations of the evolution of international development aid programs; and third, it would aid in evaluating the argument for more multilateral aid which assumes that such aid is “nonpolitical.”

This article problematizes the social structure of ethnic groups to account for variation in insurgent mobilization within and across ethnic groups. Relying on network-based approaches to social structure, it argues that insurgent mobilization is constrained by the structural connectivity of the ethnic group, a measure of the extent to which subethnic communities—neighborhoods, villages, clans, and tribes—are socially connected internally and with each other. In agrarian societies, structural connectivity is traced to religion. On the basis of unique data on rebel recruitment from the Mizo insurgency in India and microlevel variations in changes associated with the spread of Christianity among Mizos, the author demonstrates that enhanced structural connectivity resulting from a network of highly centralized churches and institutions under the Welsh Presbyterian Mission significantly bolstered insurgent recruitment. Semistructured interviews of Mizo insurgents and ethnographic evidence from the neighboring Meitei and Naga ethnic insurgencies further support the argument and the casual mechanism.

The period since the end of the Second World War has now exceeded in length the period between the two World Wars. The time has thus perhaps come when it is possible to attempt an overall comparison of the two periods, of the types of threat to stability that arose in each, and of the differing strategies adopted to meet these.

The interwar period is associated in the popular mind with the attempt to pursue peace through a policy of “appeasement.” This is the term traditionally used, primarily by hostile critics, and principally after the event, to describe the policy aimed to conciliate, rather than to coerce, those powers dissatisfied with the existing status quo. The policies so described, as is now generally recognized, were adopted by most of the governments concerned not primarily through crass refusal to face the facts of the situation or to summon the resolution necessary for active resistance.

Both the public and the academic response to terrorism has been ahistorical, exaggerated, and closely associated with congenial political postures; moreover, the academic perspective is conditioned by the nature of individual philosophy. The books under review examine the subject from several points of view, in which the conventional means of social scientists have been wielded to mixed advantage. Since there are no agreed definitions, no accepted limits to the subject, and no very effective academic approach, the situation seems unlikely to improve dramatically in the near future.