Civil wars occur in some countries at some times and not in other countries at other times. This articleexamines how the potential for large-scale external intervention can prevent civil wars. The authorargues that intervention by external states in civil war can be so overwhelming that it reduces one side’s probability of victory to essentially zero. When dissidents expect this type of intervention on the side of government, they anticipate no chance of achieving success through violence and do not initiate civil wars. When governments anticipate this type of intervention on their behalf, they feel protected from internal threat and are less constrained in their dealings with their populations. This repression increases grievances, leading dissidents to engage in strategies of dissent other than civil war. The authortests three implications of this argument-that states in more hierarchical relationships will experience civil war at lower rates, be more repressive, and experience other forms of dissent at higher rates-and finds strong support for it.

This essay reviews two sets of books that explore the origins and dynamics of Southeast Asia's growth and economic transformation. One set of books utilizes a structuralist framework and emphasizes the role of the state in creating a (now) powerful capitalist class. The other set of books utilizes an institutionalist framework to explain how new patterns of private/public sector collaboration have resulted in rapid economic growth. The authors point to weaknesses in both approaches and to areas where the two approaches can be fruitfully synthesized. They also offer suggestions for future research.

The empirical literature on mass privatization in the postcommunist context emphasizes the preferences and power of interest groups in order to account for the design of privatization. This approach has been consistent with mainstream theories of property rights formation that focus on the self-interested, rationally calculated pursuit of wealth and/or power as the motivation behind the development of new ownership arrangements. Absent from these theories, however, are the ideological and cognitive components in the creation of property rights systems. This lacuna is extremely problematic when considering the postcommunist privatization experience in which specific ideologies—such as anticommunism, liberalism, pro- or anti-Westernism, and nationalism—have profoundly influenced the particular form that new property institutions have taken. This article explores how ideology interacts with the distribution of power and the formation of material interests in society. After considering the shortcomings of strictly material-based theories of property regime change, the article suggests four mechanisms by which ideology determines the design and implementation of privatization programs in postcommunist countries.

Does the enumeration of ethnic, racial, and/or religious categories on national household censuses increase the likelihood of conflict? The authors propose a theory of intergroup relations that emphasizes the conflictual effects of institutionalizing boundaries between social identity groups. The article investigates the relationship between counting and various forms of conflict with an original, global data set that classifies the type of enumeration used in more than one thousand census questionnaires in more than 150 countries spanning more than two centuries. Through a series of cross-national statistical analyses, the authors find a robust association between enumeration of ethnic cleavages on the census and various forms of competition and conflict, including violent ethnic civil war. The plausibility of the theory is further demonstrated through case study analysis of religious conflict in India.

Until the early 1970s many scholars believed that the process of economic modernization would result in the decline of ethnic political activity throughout the world. This melting pot modernization perspective failed on both theoretical and empirical grounds. After its collapse, scholars promoted a new conflictual modernization approach, which argued that modernization brought previously isolated ethnic groups into conflict. Although this approach accounted for the origins of ethnic conflict, it relied too heavily on elite motivations and could not account for the behavior of ethnic political movements. In the last five years, scholars have tried to develop a psychological approach to ethnic conflict. These scholars see conflict as stemming from stereotyped perceptions of differences among ethnic groups. This approach fails to analyze the tangible group disparities that reinforce these identifications and that may serve as the actual catalysts for ethnic political conflict. The conflictual modernization approach is reinvigorated by applying it to the cases of ethnic conflict in Canada and Belgium. In both of these countries the twin processes of economic modernization and political centralization intensified ethnic conflict while stripping ethnic movements of the romantic cultural ideologies and institutional frameworks that could provide these movements with some long-term stability. Thus, by integrating the modernization approach with a resource mobilization perspective we can develop theories that can account for ethnic conflict throughout the world.

Many primitive peoples have political systems which are very much like the international political system. If the characterization of world politics as mere “anarchy” is an exaggeration, surely anarchy moderated or inhibited by a balance of power is a fairly accurate description of the rivalry between sovereign nation-states. The Nuer, a primitive African people, have been described as living in an “ordered anarchy” which depends on a “balanced opposition of political segments.” It is commonplace to describe the international system as lacking a government, so that “might makes right.” “In Nuerland legislative, judicial and executive functions are not invested in any persons or councils”; hence, throughout the society, “the club and the spear are the sanctions of rights.”

Since the end of the cold war internal conflicts have received unprecedented attention. Of special interest has been the effort of neorealists to employ an approach traditionally used to explain interstate conflict to make internal war understandable. While neorealism has been useful in explaining the behavior of groups in anarchic conditions, it is inadequate in explaining internal wars occurring in states that retain a strong government and that stem from motives other than power and security. Neorealism also does little to explain how anarchy is created in the first place and what can be done to restore central control. Another approach offers “bad leaders” as a proximate cause of internal war. There is much to this explanation, but more work needs to be done in understanding just what makes leaders “bad” and whether leaders have the latitude to be “good.” Finally, the diverse nature of internal wars has frustrated efforts to develop an overall means of settling them. At a point in which armed conflict has become almost exclusively an internal affair, useful generalizations for causes and cures remain elusive.

A recent wave of deep empirical research provides a solid basis for a comparative reassessment of the role of coalitions in the politics of market reform in Latin America in the 1990s. This research confirms earlier findings that interest groups and distributional coalitions were not major protagonists in either antireform or proreform coalitions. The new research goes further empirically into analyzing the origins of interests, especially business interests, and finds them to be much more ambiguous and dynamic than assumed in earlier studies. Consequendy, other factors, especially organizations and the evolving macroeconomic context, were stronger influences on preferences regarding reform. Given the relative weakness of interest group coalitions, the article provides a typology and preliminary analysis of other kinds of coalitions—electoral, legislative, and policy—that have become more central to reform politics. These other types of coalitions still require further theoretical elaboration and empirical investigation in order to determine how they can best be deployed to illuminate reform politics.

Explanations of the growth of the newly industrializing countries (NICs) by neoclassical economists and dependency theorists neglect the role of politics in shaping development strategies. Different social configurations, state structures, and ideas about development help explain the divergent policy choices made by the export-oriented East Asian NICs—Korea and Taiwan—and the more “inward-looking” countries of Latin America, particularly Mexico and Brazil. These different strategic choices, in turn, account for variations in the patterns of external “dependency” that characterize countries in the two regions.

The world we live in happens to be a diversified, highly partitioned space. The surface of the earth is partitioned in a great many ways: politically and physically, economically and culturally. The political divisions are the raison d'être of international relations; the variety of thedifferent parts of the earth's surface is the raison d'être of geography. If the earth were uniform—well polished, like a billiard ball—there probably would not be any such science as geography, and international relations would be much simpler. Because the general principles of geology, geophysics, botany, or economics do not apply in the same way throughout the different compartments existing on the earth, geographical studies appeared and were useful, cutting across the abstraction of the topical disciplines and attempting a scientific analysis of regions and their interrelations.

Foreign policy has been radically transformed by the revolutionary processes of modernization not only in the societies composing the Atlantic region, but wherever high levels of modernization exist. There is a quality about modernization that dissolves the effects of what have generally been considered the major determinants of foreign policy, whether these determinants are based on ideology and type of political system (democratic versus totalitarian foreign policies, for example), or power and capability (great-power versus smallpower policies). Wherever modernized societies exist, their foreign policies are more similar to each other than they are to the foreign policies of nonmodernized societies, regardless of the scale of the society or its type of government.

The literature on the political economy of developing nations has focused attention upon the weakness and vulnerability of the nation-state and its limited ability to deal with and effectively alter the dominant forces of the international economy. Despite common international structures, however, the empirical pattern of foreign ownership and control of the means of production varies in newly industrializing nations. Domestic political structures and alternative state strategies may therefore have a significant impact on the pattern of foreign ownership and on the degree of control that foreign capital may exert on a developing economy.

The author examines the principal legal and bureaucratic mechanisms utilized by the South Korean state to regulate the domestic economy's interaction with international capital, as well as the impact of these mechanisms upon domestic production patterns. The South Korean case demonstrates that, through the formulation and implementation of appropriate policy, the state in a developing nation possesses the capacity to shape the pattern of interaction with international economic forces. Legal and bureaucratic mechanisms have facilitated an industrial development that is predominantly owned and effectively controlled by Korean nationals.

The literature on international political economy explains foreign economic policies by integrating systemic, state, and societal features. Theoretical approaches to national security, however, have tended to extract the state from its societal context. An adequate conceptualization of security policy must integrate both systemic forces and the domestic political economy.

One way of integrating these concerns is by examining the state's strategies for mobilizing those financial, productive, and human resources considered necessary for national security.

This article examines the political economy of the state's mobilization of resources for national security, called “war preparation,” and proposes a framework for investigation that consists of three elements: (i) the objectives of state managers, (2) the constraints on the state, and (3) the policies of the state for mobilizing its required resources. Based upon these considerations, some tendencies in the government's war preparation strategies are suggested. The utility of this framework is explored through an empirical examination of Israel between 1967 and 1977. The study demonstrates how Israel's war preparation strategies were shaped by the state's domestic and security objectives, the domestic political economy, and systemic constraints and opportunities.

Four types of regimes of historic importance appeared in Europe between the two world wars: pluralist democracy, social or corporatist democracy, traditional dictatorship, and fascism. The vast body of literature that has grown up around them has rarely cast these political orders as historical alternatives to each other, however. When it has done so, it. has normally cast pluralist democracy as the alternative to fascism. Most commonly, this has taken the form of contrasts between Germany and Britain, and has been accompanied by the question, why was Germany not like Britain? Yet, pluralist democracy such as appeared in Britain was actually the least relevant alternative between the wars, for the possibility of stabilizing it where it did not already exist had been foreclosed by World War I. Where liberal parties had failed to establish responsible parliamentary institutions before the war, it would prove impossible to stabilize a pluralist democracy afterward. Henceforth, stabilization would require corporatism—in either its fascist or social democratic variant—rather than pluralism.

Opinion poll and behavioral evidence indicates that public resistance to the growth of taxation and state expenditure has increased significantly during the last decade in many advanced industrial democracies. This paper examines trends in the magnitude, composition, and consequences of taxation and government spending in relation to cross-national patterns of popular opposition to the expansion of the welfare state in five European industrial societies. The evidence suggests that the politically optimal system of taxation and expenditure relies heavily on indirect and programmatic taxes rather than on direct, general-revenue levies, and channels state resources toward cash transfers to households rather than into labor-intensive public consumption.

In the past three decades, the Suharto regime has presided over the rapid industrialization of Indonesia and the development of its capital-owning classes. A complex relationship between state and capital has emerged, based upon structural factors (the need to maintain investment, economic growth, and a revenue base) as well as instrumental factors (the involvement of officials in business as state managers of capital and private investors). Recently, however, significant tensions have emerged between the interests of the regime and its officials on the one hand, and the interests of various elements of the capital-owning classes on the other, in response to broader structural pressures for economic change.

These tensions and pressures are a challenge to the pact of domination between state officials and their corporate allies, the system monopolies and protection from which corporate capital emerged, and the nature of political domination exerted by officials over the state apparatus. Although the growing social and economic power of the capital-owning classes is not being converted into formal instrumental control over the state apparatus, economic strategies and political and economic alliances are being restructured, resulting in important shifts in the nature of Indonesian authoritarianism.

States interested in reducing the level of arms competition with a rival can employ a variety of strategies designed to promote cooperation. We examine the ability of three important strategies—unilateral action, tacit bargaining, and negotiation—to reduce the intensity of arms races motivated by different patterns of preferences and complicated by different sources of uncertainty. The latter include strategic misrepresentation, imperfect intelligence, problems of interpretation, and problems of control. Examples are drawn from 19th- and 20th-century arms races that did not result in war.

Weber's understanding of bureaucracy, despite substantial qualification and revision, remains the dominant paradigm for the study of administration and formal organizations. We continue the process of revision by accepting his ideal-typical concepts of bureaucratic and patrimonial administration, but subject them to theoretical and historical reinterpretation and application. Our reading of historical change as it relates to bureaucracy leads us to question Weber's interpretations. His conceptualization of bureaucracy in terms of rational-legal-authority and formal rationality fails to take account of the existence and use of power within and outside of organizations, and of the persistence of patrimonial features. The use of power produces conflict and pathologies. When these serve the legitimate values and interests of participants and actors in the organizational environment, they can have benign consequences. The persistence of patrimonial features, rather than signalling the survival of dysfunctional atavisms, can promote administrative effectiveness by mitigating conflict and promoting organizational loyalty, discipline, and efficiency.

This article examines the paradox of how federal political institutions are created: how can a state-building core be unyielding enough to forge a union but accommodating enough to grant federal concessions to subunits? A comparison of the trajectories of national unification in nineteenth-century Germany and Italy indicates that the formation of federations does not come about exclusively through voluntary “contract”; instead, coercion and cooperation go hand in hand in the formation of all states, including federations. Whether the outcome is federal or unitary depends on the level of subunit infrastructural capacity at the moment of founding.

The article finds that where the constituents of a potential federation are parliamentary and well governed, they can deliver the benefits of state formation, assuring their continued existence in a federation. Where such subunits are patrimonial and poorly governed, they are absorbed within a unitary model of governance. This institutional explanation supplements accounts emphasizing the cultural sources of federalism and revises arguments that only militarily weak founding cores make federal concessions to their constituents.