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Volume 28 - December 2016

Contents

Page 2 of 2

Research Article

  • Fairness and the Strengths of Agents’ Claims

  • NATHANIEL SHARADIN
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    26 January 2016, pp. 347-360

  • John Broome has proposed a theory of fairness according to which fairness requires that agents’ claims to goods be satisfied in proportion to the relative strength of those claims. In the case of competing claims for a single indivisible good, Broome argues that what fairness requires is the use of a weighted lottery as a surrogate to satisfying the competing claims: the relative chance of each claimant's winning the lottery should be set to the relative strength of each claimant's claim. In this journal, James Kirkpatrick and Nick Eastwood have objected that the use of weighted lotteries in the case of indivisible goods is unacceptable. In this article, I explain why Kirkpatrick and Eastwood's objection misses its mark.

  • Treating Others Merely as Means: A Reply to Kerstein

  • LINA PAPADAKI
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    26 May 2015, pp. 73-100

  • At the heart of Kantian theory lies the prohibition against treating humanity merely as a means. Two of the most influential interpretations of what this means are Wood's and O'Neill's. Drawing on these thinkers' ideas, Kerstein formulates two accounts of what is involved in the idea of treating a person merely as a means: the ‘end-sharing’ and ‘possible consent’ accounts. Kerstein's attempt is to show that they are problematic. He introduces his ‘reinforced hybrid account’ to alleviate the problems they face. I argue that the end-sharing and possible consent accounts are not vulnerable to Kerstein's criticism. However, they both face a shortcoming: they fail to support the Kantian conclusion that the prostitute and the servile person are treated merely as means. Through reconstructing these accounts, I surmount this difficulty. Moreover, my proposal helps Kerstein's own account overcome a problem he admits it has, without the need to resort to consequentialism.

  • What's the Point of Self-consciousness? A Critique of Singer's Arguments against Killing (Human or Non-human) Self-conscious Animals

  • FEDERICO ZUOLO
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    15 June 2016, pp. 465-487

  • Singer has argued against the permissibility of killing people (and certain animals) on the grounds of the distinction between conscious and self-conscious animals. Unlike conscious animals, which can be replaced without a loss of overall welfare, there can be no substitution for self-conscious animals. In this article, I show that Singer's argument is untenable, in the cases both of the preference-based account of utilitarianism and of objective hedonism, to which he has recently turned. In the first case, Singer cannot theoretically exclude that a self-conscious being's stronger preferences may only be satisfied by killing another self-conscious being. In the second case, he fails to demonstrate that the rules of ordinary morality, demanding that killing be strictly forbidden, could not frequently be overruled by the principles of esoteric morality. In both cases, his theory cannot solve the classical utilitarian problem of prohibiting the killing of people in secret.

  • Should We Prevent Optimific Wrongs?

  • ANDREAS L. MOGENSEN
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    21 September 2015, pp. 215-226

  • Most people believe that some optimific acts are wrong. Since we are not permitted to perform wrong acts, we are not permitted to carry out optimific wrongs. Does the moral relevance of the distinction between action and omission nonetheless permit us to allow others to carry them out? I show that there exists a plausible argument supporting the conclusion that it does. To resist my argument, we would have to endorse a principle according to which, for any wrong action, there is some reason to prevent that action over and above those reasons associated with preventing harm to its victim(s). I argue that it would be a mistake to value the prevention of wrong acts in the way required to resist my argument.

Front Cover (OFC, IFC) and matter

  • UTI volume 28 issue 3 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    26 July 2016, pp. f1-f3
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Research Article

Book Review

Research Article

  • Roberts on Depletion: How Much Better Can We Do for Future People?

  • MARK E. GREENE
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    16 July 2015, pp. 108-118

  • Suppose that Depletion will reduce the well-being of future people. Many of us would like to say that Depletion is wrong because of the harm to future people. However, it can easily be made to seem that Depletion is actually harmless – this is the non-identity problem. I discuss a particularly ingenious attempt by Melinda Roberts to attribute a harm to Depletion. I will argue that the magnitude of Roberts's harm is off target by many orders of magnitude: it is just too tiny to explain the intuitive wrong of Depletion.

Book Review

Back Cover (IBC, OBC) and matter

  • UTI volume 28 issue 3 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    26 July 2016, pp. b1-b6
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Book Review

Front Cover (OFC, IFC) and matter

  • UTI volume 28 issue 2 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    28 April 2016, pp. f1-f3
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  • UTI volume 28 issue 4 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    02 November 2016, pp. f1-f3
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  • UTI volume 28 issue 1 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    10 February 2016, pp. f1-f3
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Back Cover (IBC, OBC) and matter

  • UTI volume 28 issue 4 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    02 November 2016, pp. b1-b2
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  • UTI volume 28 issue 2 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    28 April 2016, pp. b1-b5
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  • UTI volume 28 issue 1 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    10 February 2016, pp. b1-b9
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