International human rights law (IHRL) offers potential responses to the consequences of climate change. However, the focus of IHRL on territorial jurisdiction and the causation-based allocation of obligations does not match the global nature of climate change impacts and their indirect causation. The primary aim of this article is to respond to the jurisdictional challenge of IHRL in the context of climate change, including its indirect, slow-onset consequences such as climate change migration. It does so by suggesting a departure from (extra)territoriality and an embrace of global international cooperation obligations in IHRL. The notion of common concern of humankind (CCH) in international environmental law offers conceptual inspiration for the manner in which burden sharing between states may facilitate international cooperation in response to global problems. Such a reconfiguration of the jurisdictional tenets of IHRL is central to enabling a meaningful human rights response to the harmful consequences of climate change.

There is a critical research gap regarding the trade and animal welfare interface: we do not know, empirically, what the impact of trade on animal welfare is. This gap exists, in part, as a result of the paternalism of international trade law and the underdevelopment of global animal law. This article addresses, firstly, the collision of dichotomous trade and animal welfare priorities in legal and political systems. It then explores attempts at reconciliation by the World Trade Organization and the European Union. This involves an investigation of the impact of trade on animal welfare. This impact is categorized into four component parts: (i) open markets, (ii) low animal-welfare havens, (iii) a chilling effect, and (iv) lack of labelling. Case studies from the European Union are examined. Thirdly, the article critiques trade law and policy as ill-suited primary drivers of global governance for animals. Global animal law is identified as a promising alternative, although its early development has been unduly affected by international trade law.

Big Data is now permeating environmental law and affecting its evolution. Data-driven innovation is highlighted as a means for major organizations to address social and global challenges. We present various contributions of Big Data technologies and show how they transform our knowledge and understanding of domains regulated by environmental law – environmental changes, socio-ecological systems, sustainable development issues – and of environmental law itself as a complex system. In particular, the mining of massive data sets makes it possible to undertake concrete actions dedicated to the elaboration, production, implementation, follow-up, and adaptation of the environmental targets defined at various levels of decision making (from the international to the subnational level).

This development calls into question the traditional approach to legal epistemology and ethics, as implementation and enforcement of rules take on new forms, such as regulation through smart environmental targets and securing legal compliance through the design of technological artefacts. The entry of Big Data therefore requires the development of a new and specific epistemology of environmental law.

At first blush, normative arguments justifying representation of future generations and nature appear to rest on contradictory values. This article argues, however, that there are strong synergies between these discourses. Arguments for institutions for future generations based on human rights are compared with justifications for proxy representation of nature based on ecological justice, Indigenous ecological justice and socio-ecological justice. Case studies involving the Welsh Commissioner for Future Generations, the Aotearoa New Zealand Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, and ascribing legal personality to rivers in Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand, are presented to demonstrate that representing future generations and nature reflect mutually supporting values. Building on these synergies is vital for reform efforts.

There is no hope for international environmental law to be an engine for global social change when it can no longer provide a compelling account of itself. This article presents a theoretical framework, constructed from the works of Michel Foucault, capable of tracing this loss of descriptive capacity, as well as the resultant prescriptive confusion. The analysis examines the challenges posed by the triptych of biodiversity, biotechnology and neoliberalism housed under the idea of genetic gold, and calls for attention to micro-politics, in the shape of the apparatuses for the production of environmental subjectivity that operate outside the formal structures of the international legal sphere. The trope of genetic gold is revealed as an obsolete attempt to protect a fixed idea of biodiversity based on an outdated conception of environmental value. In response, the author argues for a mature confrontation with the end(s) of international environmental law.

‘Communities’ – whether local, regional, or transnational – can provide an essential force in the protection of our global underwater cultural heritage (UCH). As an issue of low political concern, with its protection vulnerable to externalities and compliance weaknesses, UCH forms an ideal test case for exploring governance solutions without reliance on the state. It is also an area where communities are increasingly integrated within governance models. This article examines the theoretical justification for reducing reliance on top-down laws to protect natural and cultural heritage, exploring Ostromian arguments for greater community self- and co-regulation. Using this theoretical framework, it highlights numerous advantages of community-oriented governance in the management of a complex global concern, such as UCH protection, and underscores the role and importance of the appropriate design of meta-regulation in steering communities towards wider public objectives. The article also identifies where communities or ‘networks’ have provided important additional protection for UCH, and discusses further policy mechanisms – such as community buy-in, incentivization, and self-regulation – which could help to facilitate community-led governance in the future.

A number of European Union (EU) countries have undertaken thorough reforms in the renewable energy sector over the past years. The regulatory changes have triggered a wave of claims from low-carbon investors asserting that the reforms have diminished or exhausted the economic viability of their investments. Unlike local investors, who typically take legal action before domestic courts, foreign investors have filed arbitration claims in accordance with the Energy Charter Treaty, notably against Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic, resulting in several awards of damages. However, recent developments in EU state aid law seem to restrict the ability of investors to obtain compensation. This article argues that such developments may undermine renewable energy policy, because arbitration enhances the regulatory stability and predictability which low-carbon investments require only if arbitral awards can be enforced effectively. The article examines the different scenarios that may arise out of the interplay between EU law and investment arbitration in the EU and concludes that the European Commission's arguable redrawing of the boundaries of state aid rules to encompass investment arbitration, combined with the EU's general quest to replace investment arbitration with alternative mechanisms of adjudication, may jeopardize climate change mitigation policies.

EU law is teeming with framework norms – ‘laws in progress’. They provide little clarity for those to whom they apply, engendering rule-making in networks to assist those charged with implementing and applying laws at the national level. Taking as its specific focus the particular process through which the concept of an ‘article’ was constructed and constituted in a set of negotiations around the EU Chemicals Regulation, REACH, this article shows that networks not only make framework norms operational but also transform them in the process. The fact that networks have an important role in laying out what the law says throws the effectiveness of traditional forms of accountability in doubt. In particular, judicial control is in need of rethinking in order to accommodate norms that change and the networks that change them. This article suggests looking at the connections between internal peer control and externally operating judicial control as a way to keep up with the progress of laws in progress.

Global common concerns – including combating illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing – necessitate effective global action to avoid displacing illegal practices to under-regulated jurisdictions. The response in international law has therefore included the obligation upon all states to exercise jurisdiction, albeit with varying clarity regarding the existence and scope of duties for each jurisdictional basis. This article argues that, through its non-cooperating third country identification procedure, the European Union (EU) has sought unilaterally to crystalize and promote the implementation of an obligation upon states to exercise extraterritorial active personality-based jurisdiction over their own nationals engaged in IUU fishing. This is demonstrated through an analysis of EU practice relating to Asian states and remains true despite the EU's non-cooperating third country identification procedure only formally targeting flag, port, coastal, and market states. The EU and Asian states have improved their laws governing nationals engaged in IUU fishing, but concerns over legal certainty arise.

The year 2020 proved to be a clarion call for global society. There is no longer doubt that increasingly we are experiencing unpredictable events, known as ‘black swans’, ranging from pandemics to financial meltdowns. One of the ’climate black swans’ against which experts have cautioned is the financial crisis caused by climate change. In this context, the Australian case of McVeigh v. Retail Employees Superannuation Trust for the first time tested climate risk and the fiduciary duties of retail pension funds. Settled in November 2020, the case has already raised the bar for climate risk practice in pension funds. In particular, McVeigh suggests that courts, as well as out-of-court settlements, may articulate a duty, rather than grant permission, for pension funds to consider climate-related financial risk in their investment decisions.

The article builds on McVeigh to ask two questions. Firstly, what is the role of climate change litigation in promoting climate regulation by pension funds? Secondly, what is the relative importance of pension funds for the risk management of climate-related financial risk via due diligence compared with risk assessment via disclosure? Fundamentally, the article explains climate-related financial risk as a cultural phenomenon and argues that a discussion on pension fund fiduciary duties must consider disclosure in addition to due diligence. It argues that McVeigh articulated the need for a normative approach to pension fund disclosure duties and an extension of the field of climate-related risk disclosure to embrace climate-related risk due diligence.

This article examines the manner in which ‘macro’ legal analysis can potentially assist in overcoming some of the issues that are faced in the understanding and development of global environmental governance (GEG). It argues that the analysis of law through separate and distinct disciplines – such as environmental law, trade law, corporate law, and human rights law – results in what this article refers to as ‘micro’ legal analysis. As such, it contends that this can have the effect of creating obstacles in the development of coherent and effective legal and policy choices related to the protection of the environment. It illustrates these arguments with examples of practical problems that have arisen from the separation of legal issues in practice and provides the theoretical underpinnings, based on the critique of international lawyers, for the application of ‘macro’ legal analysis. In other words, it argues for a form of analysis that would consider the entire range of relevant legal disciplines in a unitary process. It then provides a methodology for the development and application of ‘macro’ legal analysis in relation to environmental issues. Finally, it considers the potential that this approach could have within the field of GEG and comments on the implications that it could have for the way in which lawyers are trained in the future.

Since the Escazú Agreement entered into force in 2021, many have looked forward to the realization of its goal of further entrenching environmental democratic rights and enabling sustainable development in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region. The severe environmental and related human rights challenges in the region have caught global attention, and the Agreement is most timely in its pursuit of contributing to addressing the situation. This article assesses the quality of, and the extent to which, the right of the public to participate in environmental decision-making processes under the Escazú Agreement can enable the regime to achieve its goal, and how best this right might be strengthened where necessary. This assessment is executed within the context of local peculiarities of the LAC region and good practice in the field, as reflected in the Aarhus Convention and the UNEP Bali Guidelines. The study finds that while aspects of the participatory right regime in the Escazú Agreement are sound – and align with or go beyond existing good practice – some key provisions require improvement in order to increase the effectiveness of the Agreement.

Climate change is a global environmental problem which has been addressed primarily at the multilateral level. However, national, supranational, and even subnational action on the issue has also sprung up. At the subnational level, California (United States) and Acre (Brazil) offer an interesting example of how domestic policies may be linked in order to address climate change. Based on a memorandum of understanding concluded in 2010, these two states have been working towards the possible linkage of their respective climate change policies, in essence providing a pathway for using emissions offset credits that are generated in Acre through reductions of forest-based emissions in the Californian cap-and-trade programme. Taking into account that this is an ongoing process, this commentary provides a general overview of the issue from the perspective of international law.

This article makes the case for the obligation to conserve plant biodiversity to be classified as a common concern of humankind, to justify and indeed prescribe limitations on private intellectual property rights over plants and related processes. Within the biodiversity regime, the notion of ‘common concern of humankind’ subjects the permanent sovereignty of states over natural resources to the interests of humanity. It shifts the obligations of states from managing their own plant biodiversity towards conserving it on behalf of humankind. In contrast, TRIPS requires states to protect private intellectual property rights with little discretion to adequately balance them with public interests. This creates a dichotomy. This article argues that rather than mobilizing state sovereignty as rhetoric to distract from addressing common concerns of humankind, it should be constructed as a concept capable of facilitating these very concerns.

This article categorizes and evaluates how regulatory regimes conceptualize plastics, and how such conceptualizations affect the production, consumption, and disposal of plastics. Taking a doctrinal and policy-oriented approach, it identifies four ‘frames’ – that is, four distinct and coherent sets of meanings attributed to plastics within transnational regulation – namely, plastics as waste to be managed; a material to be prevented; a good (or waste) to be traded freely; and inputs or outputs in production-consumption systems. Based on this analysis, three significant deficiencies in the transnational regulation of plastics are identified: the failure to frame plastics in terms of environmental justice and human rights issues; insufficient focus on plastics prevention (rather than management); and the role of law in reinforcing its production and consumption.

In 2008, Ecuador recognized rights of nature (RoN) in its Constitution. Since then, RoN have been relied upon in judicial decisions 55 times in Ecuador. Following years of ad hoc treatment of RoN by Ecuador's government and courts, its Constitutional Court selected various cases to establish binding jurisprudence in respect of RoN. In doing so, the Constitutional Court and various provincial courts in Ecuador have clarified the content of RoN, including specific criteria for determining RoN violations and the relationship between RoN and other constitutional rights, including community and economic rights related to development. Moreover, the courts are imposing sanctions on RoN violators, including the state and powerful commercial sectors. This article shows how Ecuadorian court decisions are changing RoN from a vague, abstract concept into a set of specific standards for how to balance RoN with various human rights and existing environmental law in order to implement sustainable development in an integrated and holistic manner that does not sacrifice ecosystem functioning. In doing so, the article contributes to the emerging literature on how new environmental law norms are constructed as they are put into practice, as well as the important role that judges play as norm entrepreneurs.

The rapid and widespread establishment of domestic environmental courts and tribunals raises important questions regarding their implications for international environmental law and global environmental governance. I use an interdisciplinary, multi-method approach to consider the capacity of domestic environmental courts to identify and apply norms and principles of international environmental law in domestic opinions. I first review existing literature, identifying jurisdiction, judicial discretion, and a court's position in a legal system as key institutional determinants of this capacity. I then develop a typology of domestic environmental courts and tribunals, which suggests that, all else being equal, a court with national geographic jurisdiction that also enjoys attributes of broad subject-matter jurisdiction and discretion may be expected to be best equipped to implement norms and principles of international environmental law. Next, I integrate existing assessments of environmental court presence with original outreach and web research to identify all countries which possess environmental courts, and assess a subset of eight existing national-level institutions. The analysis of this subset highlights the diversity of institutional models that can incorporate theorized best practices. Based on these findings, I draw several theoretical conclusions: specifically (i) the relevance of environmental court research to individual- and institutional-level analysis in transnational and international environmental law, (ii) the need for further legal-institutional analysis in global environmental governance scholarship, and (iii) the opportunity for further interdisciplinary analysis of the role of domestic courts in environmental governance.

The Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) signifies a shift in how the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) manifests in the international climate change regime. Unlike the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement does not enshrine differentiated substantive mitigation obligations for developed and developing countries. However, an increasingly proceduralized variant of the CBDR principle, which facilitates regard for the interests of developing countries with respect to treaty implementation yet does not guarantee favourable substantive outcomes for these states, is evident in the emerging regime. The experience of the International Maritime Organization’s climate change regime provides a cautionary tale with respect to procedurally oriented differentiation that is not reinforced by effective processes to ensure that developed states honour their finance and technology transfer commitments. Accordingly, this article posits that strong accountability mechanisms are required to transform opportunities for procedural differentiation in the Paris Agreement into a robust framework for procedural regard for the interests of developing states.