Karl Barth's doctrine of angels has yet to receive sustained scholarly attention. This article begins the work of addressing that omission. In particular, it argues that Barth's unique construal of the angelic being and purpose compels him to propose that the angels have a mediatorial function in the service of God's revelation. While being both necessary to and consistent with Barth's description of the angels’ ontology, this service of mediation contradicts his earlier doctrine of revelation and is superfluous to it.

The notion of human commonness was a key interest of the nineteenth-century theologian-statesman Abraham Kuyper. As an orthodox Calvinist, Kuyper accepted the division of humankind into the categories of ‘elect’ and ‘non-elect’, but he was also convinced that this way of classifying human beings failed to account for the positive contributions of non-Christians. As a political leader, Kuyper was also concerned to enlist his fellow Calvinists in the quest for justice in the larger society and specifically focused on the ways in which Christian worship can nurture a sense of shared humanness that extends beyond the walls of the church. In our contemporary setting, where our loss of an emphasis on a shared humanness is becoming widespread, Kuyper's effort to ground human solidarity in the practices of worship has much to commend it.

This article offers a reading of Richard of St Victor's medieval treatise On the Trinity. It suggests that while Richard interrogates the question of trinitarian personhood in innovative ways, his contribution lies in the way he emphasises how nature influences the criteria for personhood with respect to different modes of existence. Thus, while human personhood shares certain features in common with divine personhood, the two concepts must remain distinguishable with reference to the type of natures they uniquely ‘person’. This conclusion may serve to chastise modern forms of trinitarianism which assume ‘univocity’ of divine and human personhood too hastily.

In their 1920s expatriate theologies, Paul Althaus and Dietrich Bonhoeffer claim to be bound by a conflictual international ‘law’, which mandates violent competition while authorising the strong to displace weaker peoples. We argue that acknowledging such correspondence helps to reveal a surprising turn in their diverging ecclesiological judgements over the 1933 Aryan Paragraph. Ironically, although Althaus holds to the productivity of conflict between peoples, he supports the exclusion of Jewish pastors in Germany as a concession to fragile völkisch identity. In contrast, Bonhoeffer's new pacifist leanings coincide with his incitement to conflict on behalf of Jewish colleagues, overriding the use of Pauline admonition to defer to the ‘weak’ conscience.

This article seeks to offer a theological account of gratitude from a Protestant perspective by arguing that the Christian life is one marked by a covenant of grace and gratitude in which the creature's response of gratitude to divine grace is a participating in that grace, and, as such, is a full recognition of the ways of grace which flow from the divine life to creation. The first section of this article examines this theme in relation to creation from nothing. The second establishes God's electing will as the foundation of God's willing to be for another in creation. The third section examines justification by grace as the soteriological form of God's gracious turning towards the creature in divine mercy. The fourth section sketches the forms of gratitude that one might find in the Christian life as these are brought together in the sacraments of baptism and the eucharist.

Ever since the 1920s, Rudolf Bultmann has been charged with confining theology to philosophy, owing to his naïve adoption of Martin Heidegger's existentialist ontology. Bultmann's personal friendship with Heidegger is well-known, and the presence of Heideggerian concepts throughout his work is impossible to miss. But there is a great deal of confusion over the details of this relationship, and scholars differ widely over what conclusions we ought to draw regarding the nature of Bultmann's work. This article reassesses the Bultmann–Heidegger relationship from three angles. First, I show that the essential elements of Bultmann's theology were already in place before he met or learnt from Heidegger. Second, I argue that Bultmann circumscribes Heidegger's philosophy within a theology of revelation. Third, I demonstrate that his theological programme is, in principle, open to other conceptualities. Since nothing material rests on the appropriation of Heidegger, one cannot accurately call Bultmann a Heideggerian theologian.

Structural similarities have been noted between Dietrich Bonhoeffer's account of ethical responsibility and more recent accounts advocated by philosophers who emphasise responsibility to alterity. Yet, there remains one stubborn difference between Bonhoeffer and these philosophers: his unequivocal embrace of strongly cataphatic speech. This raises the following question: it is possible for contemporary Christian ethicists and theologians to enlist Bonhoeffer in the aim of reconceiving an ethic of responsibility to the ‘other’ when Bonhoeffer himself relies on such concrete, exclusive language? This article will argue that attention to Martin Luther's defence of theological assertions provides a lens through which the performative force of Bonhoeffer's cataphatic language can be better understood as a particular and traditional use of language that teaches an ethical posture of epistemic humility.

This article uses Hans Frei's famous image of the ‘eclipse’ of biblical narrative to explore the link between situating the book of Daniel historically and grasping its theological point(s). The critical/conservative stand-off over the book of Daniel is rehearsed by way of key agenda-setting Victorian voices, and it is then argued that Frei's perspective allows the reader to move on from assessing descriptive accuracy towards focusing on ascriptive purpose(s). Various examples of how such an ascriptive approach might clarify Daniel are considered, including specific attention to the complexities of Daniel 11’s problematic relationship to what did and did not happen to Antiochus Epiphanes.

For Paul, where is Jesus now? The Apostle's Christ-mysticism provides one important clue to his sense of continued personal presence, but this coexists with an important eschatological dialectic that involves absence as much as presence. Moreoever, straightforward sublimation in terms of the Holy Spirit in no way exhausts the register of Jesus’ personal presence for Paul, which also finds specific application in repeated visionary experiences, as well as in the church gathered for worship, baptism, and eucharist. The dialectic of absence and presence appears on the one hand personally attuned in the assurance of Paul's Jesus that ‘My grace is sufficient for you’ (2 Cor 12:7), but it is also eschatologically and spatially articulated in the promise that ‘the Lord is near’ (Phil 4:5).

Recent debate over the question whether ’amôn in Proverbs 8:30 should be rendered in a passive or active sense is helpful for illuminating the nature of the interaction between theology and exegesis in biblical interpretation. This essay offers an assessment of this debate with a view towards clarifying its christological significance, arguing that the semantics and syntax of Proverbs 8:30, as well as the theological frame of reference established by verses 22–31, exert an ‘ontological pressure’ upon our understanding of divine identity in Proverbs 8. These considerations offer an alternative avenue of approach to the poem that honours the Old Testament's commitment to monotheism, while also allowing the Old Testament's own presentation to shape our understanding of the character of the Lord’s oneness.

The debate concerning the apocalyptic Paul has been narrowly focused on the continuity/discontinuity of historical events in his writings, but if this question is to be considered theologically, it must be seen to concern a specific or localised part of God's relationship with creation, as classically understood in terms of ‘providence’. Because it informs all talk of God's involvement with the cosmos, providence establishes necessary linkages between otherwise separate concepts. Relocating the debate within the framework of providence allows the seemingly irreconcilable claims made on each side to be relativised, such that each may be seen as valid when understood to represent distinct areas within a bigger account of the relationship of God and cosmos. At the same time, this recognition necessarily constrains the language with which the claims ought to be made. All of this provides a safeguarded space within which the details of the Pauline texts can be considered without the risk of naïve naturalisation.

Since Augustine, western medieval thinkers have largely identified ‘simplicity’ as the most fundamental feature of the divine nature. Although the western tradition of thinking about God has often been regarded as relatively continuous, I will demonstrate in this paper that a separate line of thought developed amongst early thirteenth-century Franciscan thinkers. This new tradition stressed God's immensity or infinity. In doing so, I will argue, it instigated a fundamental shift in the way of conceiving the nature of God that holds profound promise for reconciling factions in systematic theology today, particularly between classical theists and panentheists.

Distinctive Lutheran and Reformed theologies of the relationship between Word and Spirit influenced the history of Protestant exegesis of 1 Corinthians 2:13, which states, ‘we speak not in words taught by human wisdom, but in those taught by the Spirit’. The interpretation of the time of the Spirit's teaching (past or present) and the identity of the words taught (scripture or preaching/teaching) are seen to depend upon and develop these respective Lutheran and Reformed theologies. The essay concludes with a brief evaluation of the adequacy of these interpretations in light of the divine economy and some ecumenical considerations.

The broad contours of Augustine's critique of Stoic virtue theory in De civitate dei 19.4 finds a fascinating analogue in Theodor Adorno's theory of immanent critique: Augustine ‘enters’ into Stoic virtue theory and criticises it from its own postulates, illustrating the striking implausibility of Stoic orthodoxy when lived out in concreto and the absurd, but logical, conclusions to which one is necessarily carried by Stoic ethics. Through this deconstruction, Augustine clears a space to propose his own virtue ethic. Augustine maintains that a Stoic virtue ethic fails to deliver on its promised eudaimonistic ends because it lacks a robust eschatological vision. For Augustine, the Christian faith offers a more viable virtue ethic.

The article addresses controversial questions related to Robert N. Bellah's Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age (2011), and the sequel, The Axial Age and its Consequences (2012). Discussed is the difference between the macro-historical hypothesis of an axial age and more abstract aspects of axiality. Critical questions are raised about whether Bellah's theory of the emergence of religion in play and ritual does not underestimate the cognitive functions of pre-axial religion. Finally, Bellah's project raises questions as to the creative transitions taking place in post-axial epochs, not least due to the development of canonical traditions in the first centuries ce, and to the emergence of concepts of autonomous individuals in early modernity.

Soteriological participation in God, variously termed theosis, divinisation or deification commands widespread interest across the spectrum of Christian theology. A key difficulty is how to maintain the creator–creature distinction, while bridging it to gain intimacy. Jonathan Edwards provides a Reformed perspective on this conversation, by way of his distinction between the incommunicable divine essence and the communicable divine fullness. This article clarifies this distinction by evaluating its coherence and exploring whether it divorces God's immanent and economic life. It argues that distinguishing two forms of participation – methexis verses koinonia – clarifies coherence and shows that it does not divide God's being from act.

This discussion of the interaction between Thomas F. Torrance and Karl Barth first highlights how and why the doctrine of justification binds them together theologically, since each theologian applies this doctrine relentlessly to all aspects of theology. The article then explores how their views of religion illustrate their thinking. Finally, it considers two areas of disagreement between Barth and Torrance regarding the issue of subordination within the doctrine of the Trinity and the possibility of natural theology.

This article argues that Herman Bavinck's organic worldview allows him to use classical and modern thinkers in an eclectic yet theologically principled manner. To vindicate this claim, the article observes Bavinck's self-conscious comments regarding the task of Reformed catholicity, his use of Schleiermacher and Augustine to construct a theological account of self-consciousness, and his resituating of Thomistic motifs within an organic framework in his epistemology. In so doing, the article suggests that Bavinck's catholicity is broader than previously observed, thus generating a different way of interpreting Bavinck's use of thinkers who are often thought to be in tension.

Modern conversations between the natural sciences and theology on the human soul have not so far engaged extensively with relevant debates in the early church. Contemporary neuroscience tends to operate within a monistic paradigm, often referred to as ‘physicalism’, that understands human mental activity entirely in naturalistic terms. While there is ongoing scientific debate about the degree to which human consciousness can be reduced entirely to biology, physicalism is often cited as making traditional religious belief in the soul obsolete, or at least modifying it significantly. The Apollinarian question of whether Jesus has a soul therefore reappears. This article considers the contemporary relevance of the Apollinarian controversy, suggesting that fourth-century insights possess key points of contact with the modern non-reductive physicalist position and thus raising important considerations for the science–theology conversation on the soul.

This article examines S. Bulgakov's treatise ‘Sofiologiia smerti’ (‘Sophiology of Death’), which has been relatively neglected by scholars. Death is a topic that recurs with some frequency throughout Bulgakov's writings; that it merited its own study indicates the importance that he attached to the topic. The article provides a biographical, cultural and intellectual context for the treatise, as well some comments on its literary features. Bulgakov's use of sophiology and kenotic theology to explore the process of dying and the fact of death itself come under review. His reflections on human death and dying lead Bulgakov to explore how the Son of God experienced death and the involvement of the Trinity itself in that experience. Christ becomes fully human when he dies, and his death is the pattern for all human death.