The Communists in Italy, France and Spain have banished the phrase “the dictatorship of the proletariat” from their vocabulary. That does not mean that they have abandoned socialism as an intermediate objective of their policy. They continue to fight for socialism; however, they no longer wish to establish it on the classical pattern through the dictatorship of the “proletariat” but rather through an “advanced form of democracy” in which the institutions and procedures of representative democracy, such as parliament and regular general elections and civil rights and freedoms, are respected and even guaranteed.

There is enormous and unabated interest in Smith's thought partly because he remains—rightly or wrongly—the most important touchstone for the liberal, free-market project. But it is also because his work is so rich and therefore capable of bearing multiple interpretations. In fact, Smith studies is a surprisingly large and competitive field, with its own journal: in 2003 the quantity of secondary literature on Smith could be realistically described as “enough to sink a small boat” (Margaret Schabas, “Adam Smith's Debts to Nature,” in Oeconomies in the Age of Newton, ed. De Marchi and Schabas [Duke University Press, 2003], 1) and today it is even larger. Here are three new books to add to that growing literature; all are important additions.

This article critically examines the widely accepted thesis that because of basic theoretical differences between Hamilton and Madison the Federalist is best read as the product of a “split personality.” An examination of the areas and concerns identified by leading proponents of this thesis (Douglass Adair and Alpheus T. Mason) fails to reveal any significant differences between Hamilton and Madison writing as “Publius.” In fact, this analysis reveals a very close correspondence in their views on the basic principles of the proposed system. These findings strongly support the proposition that the Federalist is a consensual work whose contradictions and tensions reflect more basic difficulties endemic to the proposed system and principles of republicanism rather than theoretical differences between its authors.

This is a political world of power and competition for power, together with, hopefully, the legitimate authority that goes with such power; a world where ability to dominate the will of others is prized either in itself or for other ends. Politics is associated with the quest for power, as an end or means. It is not surprising, therefore, that in looking at those thinkers in the past who have focused on human relationships and organized associations, commentators should be facinated with how they looked at domination, and also, secondarily, how they viewed freedom from such domination (for example, the limits of power). In the measure that these thinkers dealt with politics, one might say, they concerned themselves with power, authority, leadership, and, coincidentally, with freedom. put another way, what is typically “political” about their views about the “political system”; that is, how they looked at the process whereby valued goods are allocated authoritatively. This “system” includes formal, publlic institutional arrangements, such as the “State”, and processes within these institutions, such as “conflict” and“conciliation”.

In Some Thoughts Concerning Education, John Locke intends that gentlemen educated according to his standards quietly dethrone the aristocrats as the model for society. Locke hopes to direct most gentlemen away from a desire to imitate aristocratic manners and toward practical economic goals consistent with the needs of all. The excellent example of the new gentlemen will combine with their good treatment of the lower classes to entice the latter to imitate them. Locke thus hopes to reconcile gentlemen and the common man. Crucial components of this education include a tough physical regimen, the humane treatment of servants, and the re-education of fathers. Locke's educational program supports his political goals in the Second Treatise and is somewhat adaptable to our own democratic age.

This article challenges the prevailing interpretations of Hobbes's thought as providing only minimal protection for the natural right of individuals in political society. Natural right requires the protection of not just the subjects' lives, but their ability to live commodiously, and as a result the protection that natural right receives in political society places substantive constraints on the actions of the sovereign. When those entrusted with sovereign power overstep this constraint, they cease to be sovereign and the former subjects are returned to the state of nature to seek protection as each judges fit. I develop the substance of commodious living more thoroughly than similar analyses and demonstrate that this understanding is not limited to Leviathan but can be found in Hobbes's earlier political work as well.

As Chief of State and head of government, the President is the epicenter of the management of American external relations and the formulation of foreign policy. Not only does he welcome the leaders of other countries who come on summit visits, receive personally the diplomatic emissaries of foreign governments accredited to the United States, and participate in many other formal diplomatic functions, but he also is responsible for executing those segments of the law that pertain to international affairs, for appointing United States diplomats and communicating with other governments, for making treaties, and for initiating and enunciating foreign policy. Addressing himself to the last of these, President Truman cryptically declared: “The President makes foreign policy.” Dean Rusk later commented that this “is not the whole story,” but “it serves very well if one wishes to deal with the matter in five words.”

What is the proper relation of religious moralities—and of moralities generally— to politics, especially to the politics of a society as religiously and morally pluralistic as our own. May a person rely on her religious-moral beliefs in making political choices? In deliberating about political choices with persons who do not share — who may even reject — her religious-moral beliefs? In defending her political choices to such persons? In this article, which is mainly critical rather than constructive, I indicate some basic respects in which the principal contemporary liberal responses to the question of the proper relation of morality to politics are deeply problematic.1 Elsewhere in the work of which this article is a part, my effort is mainly constructive: I elaborate and defend a postliberal conception of the proper relation of moral beliefs, especially religious-moral beliefs, to the politics of a pluralistic society like our own; in particular, I elaborate and defend a conception of the proper relation of religious communities to the religiously and morally pluralistic political community of which they are a part.2

SINCE World War II and particularly in the last decade game theory has acquired broad interest, attention, and application by behavioral scientists. Basically, game theory is an attempt to simulate mathematically a situation of decision-making so as to discover the most rational decision. Situations involving two or more “persons” (that is, sets of individuals, groups or environments with isomorphic interests and/or capabilities) can be simulated. Currently game theory is employed in both university and corporate research for studying problems in the areas of economics, sociology, political science, international relations, and militarydefense strategy.

This year the scholarly world celebrates the four hundredth birthday of Francis Suarez, perhaps the brightest star in the scholarly heavens of Spain's Siglo de Oro and the greatest master of the second flowering of Scholasticism, a flowering which began with the works of Francis de Vittoria. Suarez' life is that of the teacher, the prodigious writer, and of the religious, devoted to students, to study, and to the religious life as a member of the then still young Societas Jesu. In contradistinction to Saint Robert Bellarmine, he published only a few controversial books in the theological and political disputes of his time. His reputation was established by his exhaustive, systematic representation of the Philosophia Perennls and of Theology.

A close examination of early and modern American constitutional interpretation reveals that there has been an essential change in the manner in which the Constitution is interpreted. When that comparison takes the form of a comparison between very early Supreme Court decisions and very recent ones the difference is relatively clear—at least that there is a difference. To some extent, what some of the differences are is observable. For instance, the overt balancing of interests (those of state and individual) in modern civil liberties cases is quite different from the character of earlier Supreme Court decisions.

My object in this paper is to compare two texts in the history of ideas which are, on the face of it at least, very different from one another. John Henry Cardinal Newman's Development of Christian Doctrine remains one of the classic expositions of an evolutionary thesis; T. S. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions already ranks as a near-classic statement of a revolutionary case. The contrast is, I think, not quite as stark as may appear at first sight: though Kuhn writes of revolutions, his concern, no less than Newman's, is nevertheless with “development”; and though his subject matter is the history of science, his concern too is, or once was, with “dogma.” What I most want to stress, however, is not this verbal correspondence, which may as it stands be intriguing rather than convincing, but a series of substantive parallels which flow from a mode of argument common to both these texts: the extensive use of political imagery in defining the structures of ideas in question and in explaining the character of their history.

Philippe buchez is best known for his work as a founder of social Catholicism and as an advocate of workers' associations. As a man of varied interests Buchez brought to the consideration of industrial problems a knowledge of contemporary ideas and a theory of history to support his own solutions. His Introduction à la science de l'histoire provides an example of what has been called the “Idolization of History”:

It is no mean paradox that the idolization of HISTORY should have been the outcome of and sequel to the collapse of concrete historic continuity embodied in organized religion, national tradition, local custom and social hierarchies of long standing.

This article presents an interpretation of Francis Bacon's History of Henry the Seventh. Recently Bacon's History has been described in terms of its role in transmitting paradigms of republican thought to Harrington, whose “classical republicanism” so importantly influenced later English and American political thought. Thus Bacon, who was of course not himself a republican, is now described as having contributed to the classical republican doctrine of civic virtue. I argue that the History in no way fits such republican paradigms, or that it can only insofar as Bacon's essential teaching in that work is misunderstood. Rather than unwittingly pointing to some conception of civic virtue, Bacon's History self-consciously describes modern politics as grounded on the inescapable necessity of material acquisition. I argue that Bacon's politics are modern because they look to the conquest of nature and are critical of all specific political attachments, including republicanism.

For more than a century there have been among the learned those who have tried to extend the outlook and the methods of the natural sciences to the study of man and to the behavior of human societies. Their efforts have raised issues which are of vital concern in the thermonuclear age which we have entered.

Radio Havana? Quotations from Chairman Mao? A black liberation group pamphlet? Wrong. These are excerpts from Roman Catholic publications in Latin America. Still regarded by many as one of the bulwarks of the status quo, the Latin-American Church has undergone a startling transformation in the last five years which has moved its official thinking and portions of its elite leadership significantly to the left.

A Few years ago an editor was beaten in Uganda for using the “wrong” forms of the Luganda tongue, which somewhat earlier had been “standardized.” This incident reflects the emotionalism surrounding language issues in the emergent African countries, so desperately seeking a common medium for internal and external communication.

The Jordan River has recently become one of the most politically important and controversial rivers of the present day. Ever since the late 1950's, when the Arabs became fully aware of Israel's determination to implement her long-range plans to divert Jordan River water to irrigate the Negev, UN and Western officials concerned with Middle Eastern affairs have looked forward with great foreboding to the time when the first major stage of Israel's project would near its completion, for they expected this to produce another Middle Eastern crisis. Arab-Israeli tension over the water question has grown steadily and began to reach alarming proportions by late 1963 and early 1964. Fortunately the decision of the Arab leaders, in an unprecedented summit meeting held in January, 1964, to use means other than military force to frustrate Israel's water diversion plans precluded any immediate threat of an armed conflict between the contending parties. Nevertheless, because the fundamental disagreements remain unresolved, there is great likelihood that, for a long time to come, the world will find the Middle Eastern water dispute a potentially explosive situation. But few Westerners are adequately awareof the many complex and serious ramifications that are actually involved. In the past, even UN and Western officials tended oversimplify and overlook many aspects of this controversy and naively sought to deal with it on a technical and economic level despite the fact that the primary obstacles were emotional and political in nature.