The U.S. Army conducts the Biological Defense Research Program to provide medical protection for U.S. military personnel against the threat of biological weapons. The unclassified medical research program is consistent with the Biological Weapons Convention, which prohibits the production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons, and encourages the international exchange of scientific and medical information on the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases. The program is the source of secondary benefits to civilian public health in the form of vaccine and drug development, diagnostic capability, and contributions to the world body of knowledge on infectious diseases. As the executive agent for the program, the Army submits descriptions of the work conducted under the program to Congress as part of its budget request, and provides numerous other responses to Congressional scrutiny of the program. Internal monitoring of the program is conducted from the perspectives of safety, compliance with regulatory agencies, quality assurance, and close administrative and technical oversight of contracts.

In a recent issue of Politics and the Life Sciences Mark Walker presented a compelling proposition for reducing evil in the world via an interdisciplinary program he calls the “Genetic Virtue Project” (GVP). As Walker explains, the purpose of the GVP is “to discover and enhance human ethics using biotechnology genetic correlates of virtuous behavior.” PLS subsequently published several critiques of this proposal. While most of these critiques focused on conventional doubts about the technical feasibility or the ethics of such interventions, the more fundamental concern revealed by both Walker's proposal and its critiques is in the largely unquestioned assumption that more morality is necessarily better. Human history is marked by a gradual if uneven extension of moral concern to increasingly distant others, which many take as evidence of the rationality of morality. There is substantial evidence, though, that this expansion is fundamentally biological in origin and therefore not ultimately limited by rationality. Because these expanding moral feelings feel so good to us, we are incapable of perceiving the danger from their ever-expanding focus, in particular from the sincere but increasingly maladaptive collective policies they will engender. Utilizing the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche as a platform, the feasibility of different natural and cultural responses to this impending crisis of caring are examined, none of which are found capable of counteracting this expanding morality. Instead, the best hope for a successful response to this dangerous expansion of caring is actually a sort of reverse GVP, in which the biological mechanisms for this unchecked moral expansion are manipulated via genetic engineering to dial back this expansion. However, the likelihood of actually implementing such an admittedly counterintuitive and controversial program within an increasingly democratized world is doubtful. Ultimately, if we are unable to overcome this betrayal by our best intentions, where does that leave us as a species?

This research note addresses a gap in the public administration literature by arguing that a political Darwinism was present in the intellectual origins of American administrative theory. By examining the arguments of Woodrow Wilson, this article demonstrates that Darwinism complemented the German political thought that contributed to the establishment of America’s administrative state. The application of Darwinian evolutionary biology to politics was a vital element of Wilson’s reconceptualization of the state as a living organism. Darwinism was a key rhetorical tool employed by Wilson in his argument against the Constitution’s separation of powers. This note finds that Darwinism was present in the early stages of public administration theory in Wilson’s argumentation and persists today in the public administration literature. It concludes by sketching out an agenda for further research on Darwinism’s influence on public administration.

Vice President Thomas R. Marshall has been criticized for not acting more aggressively to exercise presidential powers and duties after President Woodrow Wilson suffered a stroke in October 1919 which compromised his ability to discharge his office for much of the remainder of his term. Yet Marshall faced formidable constraints in the constitutional, political, institutional, and factual context in which he operated. This paper examines these constraints on Marshall's political behavior. His conduct becomes understandable when viewed in the context of those inhibiting factors. The paper also considers the impact of the presidential inability provisions of the subsequently ratified Twenty-Fifth Amendment which renowned Wilson scholar Arthur Link suggested would have made no difference. While questioning the practicality of that counter-factual, the paper argues that the Amendment would have been helpful but suggests that a Wilson-like situation, if one could be imagined in modern times, could present a relatively taxing challenge to our constitutional system.

From a biologist's perspective, social behavior includes any behavior that involves at least two actors. By this definition, social behavior can include aggregation in slime molds, the colony structure of the eusocial insects, or the coordinated efforts of humans across vast distances to successfully land on the moon. The diversity of this range of behavior shares one driving force: natural selection. While natural selection acts at the level of phenotype (e.g., morphology, metabolism, behavior) the ultimate unit of natural selection is the gene contained in DNA-the object of inheritance. The relationship between DNA and social behavior is uncovered in the field of sociogenomics, defined as the mechanistic study of genes, gene products, and gene × gene interaction networks supporting emergent social behaviors.

What struck me most forcefully in Townsend's critique (this issue) was a pattern he observed: A large preponderance of the changes he documented in Sulloway's numeric or graphic descriptions of data resulted in improvements. The later data point was almost always a better fit to Sulloway's predictions than the earlier one. Townsend suggested that further analysis would be appropriate, which made me wonder why he stopped where he did, without doing any statistical tests on his findings. A possible next step would be to calculate the likelihood that the observed proportion of changes in the confirming direction occurred by chance alone.

Written declarations have been identified as one of the most useful tools in determining a nation's potential for a biological warfare capability. Declarations are defined as mandatory reports (provided on a periodic basis) that describe various aspects of a state's biological infrastructure, including both academic and governmental programs. Specifically included are descriptions of facilities, summaries of research projects, and other information considered relevant to making an evaluation of that country's capabilities. Notifications of specific events of interest are also considered as part of the required declaration. As part of the confidence-building measures (CBMs) of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), between 25 and 30 of the State Parties have been providing written declarations for a number of years. With specific regard to the Iraqi experience, the government of Iraq was required (under the auspices of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687) to provide specific declarations about any and all facilities potentially associated with their biological warfare program. UNSCOM inspectors have the responsibility of verifying the accuracy of the information provided by Iraq in declarations.

In recent years many scholars in political science have begun to employ the data of the life sciences in their studies. The emerging field of biopolitics is now an identifiable scholarly pursuit. The question now arises as to how that pursuit can and should be taught.

This article describes several courses which I have offered in the past few years in which I have attempted to integrate political philosophy and biopolitics. Course content, along with student and peer reaction are discussed, as are the advantages and disadvantages of interdisciplinary collaboration. This approach is rejected in favor of a design which would begin with a departmental core of courses which would then provide a base for inter-institutional collaboration among students and faculty.

This article explores long-term issues and problems that have seriously undermined the U.S. Chemical Testing Program established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Toxic Substances Control Act. This program is meant to gather information needed to protect human health and the environment from damaging exposure to toxic chemicals. Despite seemingly broad and impressive authority under the statute, there are a number of inherent difficulties, as well as substantial political constraints, that impede comprehensive oversight of chemicals in U.S. commerce. The article discusses several approaches that EPA has adopted to overcome statutory and political limitations and increase chemical testing information. The most recent and promising of these efforts has involved international negotiations to harmonize testing approaches with OECD nations and to cooperate on an agenda that will better share the testing burden on an international level.

At the cutting edge of research in biotechnology is the production of special genetically engineered organisms for use in an open, agricultural environment. We argue that the standard approaches to risk assessment and management employed by regulatory agencies are inadequate to the task of properly assessing the advisability of such experiments, as well as the even more significant prospect of widespread commercial use of genetically engineered organisms in agriculture. Given the current lack of sufficient information with which to make competent assessments of the risks involved and the extreme difficulties which are likely to inhibit attempts to gain such information in a timely fashion, we conclude that a compelling case for deliberate release programs has not been made.