When I was invited to participate in a symposium designed to consider the possible implications of the theory of punctuated equilibria for the study of political science, I faced the need to reexamine some fundamental questions. These transcended such issues as whether and how frequently the phenomenon referred to as punctuated equilibrium occurred, and whether it might indeed be similar to some phenomena studied by political scientists. Rather, I felt it necessary to establish for myself whether, when, and how any biologically based theory or set of hypotheses could be applied to the realm of the social sciences and what cautions might be demanded by such application.

Kennewick Man, an early Holocene (9,000 years old) skeleton found in Washington State in 1996, has been a lightening rod for political discussion. Due to his alleged Caucasoid features, Kennewick Man controversially called into question who first peopled the Americas. A projectile point lodged in his hip also catapulted him to celebrity status. Spared the quick (within ninety days after an inquiry) repatriation typically required under the 1990 federal Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), Kennewick Man was fully examined by a team of scientists chosen by the government who were forbidden to discuss their findings. Although the team concluded that Kennewick Man has cranial features associated with both Caucasoids and modern Native Americans, he is considered mainly to resemble modern Japanese Ainu, Polynesians, and Southeast Asians, as are other early Amerindian finds. Despite the resolution of early controversies, Kennewick Man continues as a symbol of the ideology of repatriation. In this article, I review the evidence for my belief that, taken to an extreme, the demand to bury aboriginal skeletons, not only in America but also around the world, poses a potentially serious impediment to scientific enquiry.

Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) pose international security threats because of their potential to inflict harm upon humans, crops, livestock, health infrastructure, and economies. Despite the scale of this threat, there are inherent limitations in preventing and controlling EIDs, including the scope of current disease surveillance efforts. All of this leads to the following questions in the context of Mexico's recent swine flu experience: What were the cultural, political, and economic challenges to Influenza A/H1N1 virus response in Mexico? By way of comparison, what can we learn from the U.S. experience in 1976 with A/New Jersey/76 (Hsw1N1), later referred to as H1N1? This article explores the comparative political economy of Mexico's handling of influenza virus A/H1N1 outbreak in 2009. Research provides notable observations—based on the strengths and weaknesses of each country's response—that can be used as a starting point of discussion for the design of effective EIDs surveillance programs in developing and middle-income countries. In the U.S., the speed and efficiency of the 1976 U.S. mobilization against H1N1 was laudable. Although the U.S. response to the outbreak is seldom praised, the unity of the scientific and political communities demonstrated the national ability to respond to the situation. Mexico's strongest characteristics were its transparency, as well as the cooperation the country exhibited with other nations, particularly the U.S. and Canada. While Mexico showed savvy in its effective management of public and media relations, as the article details, political, economic, and cultural problems persisted.

In parliamentary committee oversight hearings on fiscal policy, monetary policy, and financial stability, where verbal deliberation is the focus, nonverbal communication may be crucial in the acceptance or rejection of arguments proffered by policymakers. Systematic qualitative coding of these hearings in the 2010–15 U.K. Parliament finds the following: (1) facial expressions, particularly in the form of anger and contempt, are more prevalent in fiscal policy hearings, where backbench parliamentarians hold frontbench parliamentarians to account, than in monetary policy or financial stability hearings, where the witnesses being held to account are unelected policy experts; (2) comparing committees across chambers, hearings in the House of Lords committee yield more reassuring facial expressions relative to hearings in the House of Commons committee, suggesting a more relaxed and less adversarial context in the former; and (3) central bank witnesses appearing before both the Lords and Commons committees tend toward expressions of appeasement, suggesting a willingness to defer to Parliament.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 bans the development and possession of biological and toxin weapons. Yet the threat that a country may acquire and use biological and toxin weapons (BTW) persists—not all nations are party to the treaty, and doubts remain about the compliance of countries who are. Seventy of the 118 nations who are parties to the treaty met in Geneva from September 9 to 27, 1991, to review the performance of the treaty and to grapple with its weaknesses. This was the third such conference convened since the treaty went into force in 1975. The relatively low level of participation in the Third Review Conference was not the result of any protest, but most likely a reflection of disinterest or neglect.

Social scientists have begun to uncover links between sleep and political attitudes and behaviors. This registered report considers how diurnal morning-night associations relate to political ideology using data from the Attitudes, Identities, and Individual Differences Study, a large-scale online data collection effort. Measures encompass perceived cultural attitudes and social pressures regarding diurnal preferences and explicit and implicit measures of both morning-night attitudes and morning-night self-concepts. Together, the analyses demonstrate a relationship between morning orientation and conservatism for explicit morning-night self-concepts and, to a lesser extent, explicit morning-night attitudes. This relationship is not present for implicit associations, and associations with perceived cultural attitudes and social pressure are also largely absent. This study reinforces the notion that morningness and eveningness as explicit identities are associated with political ideology.

Local and regional environments have for many centuries been seen as, or as being composed of, “natural resources,” which have generally been considered fully available for human use, irrespective of any use to which other species, purposefully or not, might put them. The global environment has more recently, though less routinely, been seen in this way. I examine full-human-use arguments in three widely credited philosophical traditions: the Judeo-Christian-liberal, the Aristotelian-Cartesian-rationalist, and the utilitarian or neoclassical economic. I find each tradition's full-human-use argument unsatisfactory. I then discuss, and ultimately recommend, an alternative, an all-species-use argument based on Albert Schweitzer's much admired but seldom adopted reverence-for-life ethic. I find revealed by this alternative argument a previously unnamed good, one worthy of honor, protection, and enlargement; I call this good “the commonwealth of life.” In conclusion, I consider important implications of accepting commonwealth-of-life reasoning, including foundational changes in ethics.

The World Commission on Dams marks a moment of real progress in the large-dams controversy. It does so in at least two ways: as a statement of the norms that should govern dam-related decision-making and as a process of dialogue between dam proponents and critics. Whether this progress translates into consistently better dam-related decisionmaking is a question that remains to be answered. Also unanswered is the larger question of whether the WCD experience will prove to be a replicable model for other environment-development controversies. The Commission emerged from a curious situation in which both dam builders and dam critics felt stymied in their ability to achieve their aims, and in which both saw opportunities in the idea of stakeholder dialogue. Such windows of opportunity may prove rare. The skillful leadership and interpersonal dynamics among the commissioners that helped forge a consensus document may be difficult to reproduce.

Background: If successfully implemented and enduring, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) stands to expand health insurance access in absolute terms, reduce inter-group disparities in that access, and reduce exposure to the financial vulnerabilities illness entails. Its durability—meaning both avoidance of outright retrenchment and fidelity to its policy aims—is thus of scholarly interest. Past literature suggests that social constructions of a policy’s beneficiaries may impact durability.

Questions: This paper first describes media portrayals of ACA beneficiaries with an eye toward answering three descriptive questions: (1) Do portrayals depict beneficiaries as economically heterogeneous? (2) Do portrayals focus attention on groups that have acquired new political relevance due to the ACA, such as young adults? (3) What themes that have served as messages about beneficiary “deservingness” in past social policy are most frequent in ACA beneficiary portrayals? The paper then assesses how the portrayal patterns that these questions uncover may work both for and against the ACA’s durability, finding reasons for confidence as well as caution.

Methods: Using manual and automated methods, this paper analyzes newspaper text from August 2013 through January 2014 to trace portrayals of two ACA “target populations” before and during the new law’s first open-enrollment period: those newly eligible for Medicaid, and those eligible for subsidies to assist in the purchase of private health insurance under the ACA. This paper also studies newspaper text portrayals of two groups informally crafted by the ACA in this timeframe: those gaining health insurance and those losing it.

Results: The text data uncover the following answers to the three descriptive questions for the timeframe studied: (1) Portrayals may underplay beneficiaries’ economic heterogeneity. (2) Portrayals pay little attention to young adults. (3) Portrayals emphasize themes of workforce participation, economic self-sufficiency, and insider status. Health status, age, gender, and race/ethnicity appear to receive little attention.

Implications and Conclusions: Existing literature suggests that these portrayal patterns may both support and limit ACA durability. In favor of durability is that ACA beneficiaries are depicted in terms that have been associated with deservingness in past American social policy—particularly being cast as workers and insiders. Yet, the results also give three reasons for caution. First, ACA insurance-losers are also portrayed as deserving. Second, it is unclear how the portrayal patterns found may impact the durability of the ACA’s efforts to cut insurance disparities by age, health status, and especially race/ethnicity. Third, portrayals’ strong casting of beneficiaries as workers, and limited attention to beneficiaries’ economic heterogeneity and to young adults, may do little to help cultivate beneficiary political engagement around the ACA.

American social scientists rarely ever use evolutionary concepts to explain behavior, despite the potential of such concepts to elucidate major social problems. I argue that this observation can be understood as the product of three influences: an ideologically narrowed political liberalism; a fear of “Social Darwinism” as a scientific idea, rather than a scientific apostasy; and a widely believed criticism of evolutionary thinking as deterministic, reductionistic, and Panglossian. I ask what is to be done to encourage social scientists to learn and to apply evolutionary lessons. I answer with four solutions. First, evolutionary social scientists should more effectively educate their non-evolutionary students and colleagues. Second, they should publicize, even popularize, accessible refutations of perennially misleading criticisms. Third, they should more credibly assure skeptics that evolutionary theory not only keeps the “social” in social science but better explains social behavior than can any individual-level theory, such as rational-choice theory. Fourth, they should recall that biology took generations to become Darwinian, and they must understand that the social sciences may take as long to become evolutionary.

The current research climate provides an auspicious opportunity to undertake foundational investigations at the intersection of the natural and social sciences to produce transformative work with broad import for society. A great deal of relevant work examining the genetic, neurobiological and neuropsychological bases of social and political behavior has already taken place. But much of this work has been conducted simultaneously in a variety of different fields and disciplines. In addition to needlessly duplicating some research paradigms, thus wasting time and resources, such efforts have often also lacked a coherent core of social and political models and theories to guide such inquiry. With proper coordination and leverage, such efforts can achieve tremendous gains in terms of harnessing the skills, methods, and models of the natural sciences in service of addressing some of the most destructive and endemic social and political problems which plague our planet.

The emergence of the state and similar forms of large-scale, stratified society from the matrix of primitive egalitarian social relations poses a problem sui generis for political anthropology. On the one hand, since the Neolithic, hierarchical stratification and political domination have evolved in a relatively short time from the patterns of kinship bonds and ephemeral leadership characteristic of primitive society (Service, 1975; Carneiro, 1978). On the other hand, the extent of the division of labor and of hierarchical stratification in even the most primitive corporate political groups is significantly greater than that found in egalitarian bands and tribes. This difference lends support to very specific explanations such as the theories of cataclysmic sociocultural change of political anthropology (Service, 1975:15).

This study examines the cognitive and affective factors of candidate appraisal by manipulating candidate attractiveness and levels of issue agreement with voters. Drawing upon research in evolutionary psychology and cognitive neuroscience, this analysis proposes that automatic processing of physical appearance predisposes affective disposition toward more attractive candidates, thereby influencing cognitive processing of issue information. An experimental design presented attractive and unattractive candidates who were either liberal or conservative in a mock primary election. The data show strong partial effects for appearance on vote intention, an interaction between appearance and issue agreement, and a tendency for voters to assimilate the dissimilar views of attractive candidates. We argue that physical appearance is important in primary elections when the differences in issue positions and ideology between candidates is small.

Analyses of American public opinion about abortion rarely consider what light other cases might shed on the U.S. controversy. This paper argues that there are striking parallels between the politics of abortion in the U.S. and Canada. These parallels extend beyond courts and interest groups; they also apply to public opinion. Gallup data indicate aggregate similarities in how both publics view the legalization of abortion in the last fifteen years, and World Values Survey data show that Americans and Canadians hold similar views about abortion even when the controversy is lifted out of its legal context. Probit analysis demonstrates that the same variables similarly predict where these publics stand on abortion when health and discretionary aspects of the debate are taken into account. Postmaterialist value orientations may provide important clues about what future direction the abortion debate in the U.S. may take.

What causes people to see their political attitudes in a moral light? One answer is that attitude moralization results from associating one’s attitude stance with feelings of disgust. To test the possibility that disgust moralizes, the current study used a high-powered preregistered design looking at within-person change in moral conviction paired with an experimental manipulation of disgust or anger (versus control). Results from the preregistered analyses found that we successfully induced anger but not disgust; however, our manipulation had no effect on moral conviction. Additional exploratory analyses investigating whether emotion and harm predicted increases in moral conviction over time found that neither disgust, anger, nor sadness had an effect on moralization, whereas perceptions of harm did predict moralization. Our findings are discussed in terms of their implications for current theory and research into attitude moralization.