Frederick George Jackson, the leader of the Jackson-Harmsworth Expedition of 1894–1897, accomplished a great deal during his exploration of Franz Josef Land [Zemlya Frantsa-Iosifa] although his achievements have never been fully acknowledged. Jackson's expedition itself has often been eclipsed by his famous meeting in 1896 with Fridtjof Nansen, absent for 3 years in the Arctic and it has been unfairly coloured by the view that Jackson was no more than an adventurer and sportsman. The research reported in this article evaluates Jackson's plan and management activities. The study developed a set of factors to evaluate his performance arising from a variety of expeditions contemporary with Jackson's. His strong personality and limited personnel managerial experience limited the full extent of what he might have achieved. Yet, Jackson developed a strong exploration model that was based on comprehensive planning, a significant concern for the health and welfare of his companions, the willingness to innovate in a number of activities including sledging, and a commitment to scientific discovery. Although the expedition did not find a route to the North Pole, Jackson confirmed that Franz Josef Land was an archipelago and he gave credence to the consumption of fresh meat as a means of preventing scurvy. One of Jackson's legacies to subsequent explorers was the use of ponies for haulage. He was unable to appreciate the weaknesses in their use and his influence on subsequent Antarctic expeditions often led to undesirable results. But, overall, Jackson was an innovator in a conservative exploration community.

In December 1913 Sir Ernest Shackleton released a prospectus and announced The Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition. His goal was to undertake the first crossing of Antarctica from the Weddell Sea via the polar plateau to McMurdo Sound on the Ross Sea. The journey had already been attempted by Wilhelm Filchner whose ship Deutschland, had become beset in the Weddell Sea ice for nine months in 1912. Shackleton aimed ‘to make all possible scientific observations on [the Trans-Antarctic] journey; to carry on similar work by parties operating from the two bases on the Weddell and Ross Seas [and] to carry on scientific work, and travel unknown portions of the coastline, by the two ships of the expedition’(Shackleton 1913: 3). With Endurance a continental crossing party of six led by Shackleton would begin from the Weddell Sea and a supporting depot laying party led by Nimrod veteran Lieutenant Aeneas L.A. Mackintosh RNR, with the auxiliary barquentine Aurora based in McMurdo Sound. Unbeknown to each party, both experienced problems beyond their control. Endurance was holed and sank in the Weddell Sea and Aurora locked in ice, although damaged, reached New Zealand. Here the ship was repaired and then undertook a relief expedition with Shackleton as a passenger, to McMurdo Sound. In spite of these major setbacks each party conducted valuable scientific observations.

When Shackleton published his book South (Shackleton 1919) on the expedition, compiled with New Zealand journalist and friend Edward Saunders, with exception of accounts on the Ross Sea party sledging and drift of the ship Aurora, no recognition was given to work undertaken by the four Ross Sea party scientists and an assistant. Later publications have focused on the depot-laying, while books on Antarctic science have largely overlooked the science undertaken.

The purpose of this paper is to make this better known, and to give credit to the four scientists involved. The science conducted although primarily concerned with meteorological observations, also covers limited glaciological observations including the ablation of lake ice, solution of glacier ice in salt water, tidal recordings, collection of zoological and other specimens, along with the use of improvised equipment to undertake observations. The science achieved was secondary to the field work. The Ross Sea party science was done however, under conditions not normally conducive for such field work with health issues a major contributing factor. A lack of funding, equipment, personality problems, concern for Aurora and crew, uncertainty of Shackleton's Antarctic crossing and their own relief, led to depression, sleeplessness and insomnia.

Concentrations of calcium and phosphorus were measured in the neonatal dentine of 11 crabeater and 11 Weddell seal postcanine teeth with an energy-dispersive x-ray analyser. The extent of variation in elemental concentrations in different parts of the tooth, differences between species and individuals, and whether variation in elemental concentrations can provide information about dentine deposition mechanisms were assessed. No consistent patterns in elemental deposition in different parts of the tooth were found, but there were differences in concentrations between and within species. Post-natal dentine is composed of layers that appear alternately bright and dark in backscattered electron images. The elemental composition of neonatal dentine was closer to the dark bands than to those that appeared bright. It is suggested that the composition of neonatal dentine is more similar to the dark than the bright layers of dentine because of nutritional stresses that were occurring during mineral deposition.

India's interest in Antarctica dates from 1956, when the Indian government first raised the question of the peaceful use of Antarctica in the UN. Although India began as a strong critic of the Antarctic Treaty System, and, indeed, conducted scientific activities on the continent for two years without being a member of it, India recognised that her interests would be better served by joining the Treaty as a full member.

The article discusses how organisational structure and culture affected the preparations for sledging in three Antarctic expeditions between 1901 and 1904. The central focus is how expedition leaders sought tacit knowledge, ‘the knowledge of how we do things.’ Two organisational types were derived from a study of 36 major polar expeditions. These – the industrial organisation and the innovative organisation – were used to analyse how sledging practices evolved in the British National Antarctic Expedition, German South Polar Expedition, and Scottish National Antarctic Expedition. Robert Falcon Scott, in great part as a result of his naval heritage, did not fully understand the need for and the methods required to gain the operational knowledge required for sledging in Antarctica. He applied the traditional command-and-control system based on naval tradition. Erich von Drygalski and William Speirs Bruce applied Fridtjof Nansen's scientific approach, in which the scientific staffs were integrated into sledging operations. In this approach, every variable that could possibly affect the outcome of the research was incorporated into preparations, much as is the case in classical experimental design. While no attempt is made to judge sledging success in the study, the results clearly indicate the importance of knowing how to use the tacit dimension in sledging. The implications go far beyond sledging and suggest the need for managers to have an intimate understanding of how things work.

At the Arctic Council’s Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik on 20 May 2021, Russia assumed the chairmanship of the council for the second time since its establishment in 1996. Though some Russian analysts and practitioners were skeptical about the usefulness of such a mechanism during the 1980s and 1990s, Russia has become an active contributor to the progress of the Arctic Council (AC). Russia’s first term as chair during 2004–2006 led to the creation of the Arctic Contaminants Action Program as an Arctic Council Working Group. Since then, Russia has served as co-lead of the Task Forces developing the terms of the 2011 agreement on search and rescue, the 2013 agreement on marine oil spill preparedness and response, and the 2017 agreement on enhancing international scientific cooperation. Russia also has participated actively in the creation of related bodies including the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and the Arctic Economic Council whose chairmanships rotate together with the chairmanship of the AC. Now, far-reaching changes in the broader setting are posing growing challenges to the effectiveness of these institutional arrangements. The impacts of climate change in the high latitudes have increased dramatically; the pace of the extraction and shipment of Arctic natural resources has accelerated sharply; great-power politics have returned to the Arctic foregrounding concerns regarding military security. Together, these developments make it clear that a policy of business as usual will not suffice to ensure that the AC remains an important high-level forum for addressing Arctic issues in a global context. The programme Russia has developed for its 2021–2023 chairmanship of the council is ambitious; it proposes a sizeable suite of constructive activities. In this article, however, we go a step further to explore opportunities to adapt the Arctic governance system to the conditions prevailing in the 2020s. We focus on options relating to (i) the AC’s constitutive arrangements, (ii) links between the council and related governance mechanisms, (iii) the role of science diplomacy, and (iv) the treatment of issues involving military security. We conclude with a discussion of the prospect of organising a heads of state/government meeting during the Russian chairmanship as a means of setting the Arctic governance system on a constructive path for the 2020s.

This paper presents the details of lichens and mosses found on whale vertebrae substratum in the Admiralty Bay area, King George Island, Antarctica. Samples were taken in the coastal area at Hennequin Point, a relict of the Antarctic whaling era. The samples were collected from the upper surface of the whale bones found in the study area during the austral summer 2010–2011. A total of 15 lichen and two moss species were found. All species sampled are known in the Admiralty Bay area, both as pioneers and in more advanced succession stages in ice-free areas. These results suggest that the colonisation of whale bones is not new for Antarctic plants, but it is an additional substrate on which these plants can develop. A map showing the distribution of colonised bones and details of the usual substrata for the lichens and mosses found in this study are provided.

A number of recent publications in English (Borgstrom, 1961; Herman, 1964; Helin, 1964; Kravanja, 1964; Shparlinskiy, 1964) have dealt with aspects of the growth of Soviet fisheries since the Second World War. Some of these publications are written from inside the Soviet fishing industry, others by western fisheries specialists. There would be no advantage in covering the same ground again in detail. The object of this paper is to draw attention to certain features of the Soviet industry not very fully considered in the accounts just mentioned. Before this can be done, however, it will be necessary to sketch in, as background, enough indication of the growth to make the rest of the paper comprehensible.

In the 1860's, Svend Foyn laid the foundation of modern whaling in north Norway. In 1904, whaling was prohibited by the Norwegian Storting because fishermen claimed that it was detrimental to the cod fisheries, and, in the same year, whaling was begun in the Antarctic. Most accounts find a causal connection between the two events: whaling was begun in the one place because it had been prohibited in the other. This was not the case, for none of the whaling companies that were stopped from whaling in north Norway turned straightaway to Antarctic waters. The pioneer in 1904 was a completely new Argentine company, and the first three Norwegian companies to start whaling in the Antarctic, between 1905 and 1907, had never been whaling from north Norway. It has also been said that whalers had over exploited the Norwegian Sea by 1904 and that they had, therefore, to find new whaling grounds. But this is not true, either. From the whaling stations on the Norwegian Sea (excluding Norway), 1 427 whales were killed in 1901, 1 614 in 1902, 1 769 in 1903, 1 921 in 1904, and 2 613 in 1905. There was, therefore, a definite increase in the northern catches in precisely the year that Norwegians started whaling in the south. The reason for the development of whaling in Antarctic waters was neither the prohibition of 1904 nor a decease in the catches in the old northern grounds. The reason lay, in facf, partly in a steep fall in the price of whale oil and partly in a newly awakened global interest in the Antarctic continent and Antarctic waters.

In this article, we engage with environmental conflicts on indigenous land through a focus on an attempt to gain social licence to reopen and operate the Biedjovággi mine in Guovdageainnu/Kautokeino in Sápmi, Norway. We argue that mining prospects bring forth ontological conflicts concerning land use, as well as ways to know the landscape and the envisioned future that the land holds. It is a story of a conflict between two different ways of knowing. The paper explores the Sámi landscape through different concepts, practices and stories. We then contrast this to the way the same landscape is understood and narrated by a mining company, through the programmes and documents produced according to the Norwegian law and standards. We follow Ingold’s argument that the Sámi landscape practices are taskscapes, where places, times and tasks are interconnected. These were not acknowledged in the plans and documents of the mining company. We conclude by addressing the tendency of extractive industries to reduce different landscapes in ways that fit with modern understandings, which oppose culture to nature.

By Article 2(e) of the 1951 Treaty of Peace, Japan renounced ‘all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area.’ This paper traces the process by which Australian diplomacy ensured the inclusion of such a provision in the Treaty and assesses the contemporary significance of the article. While in the unlikely event of the breakdown of the Antarctic Treaty System, Japan would be legally entitled to make a territorial claim on the basis of activities undertaken between the conclusion of the Peace Treaty and the coming into force of the Antarctic Treaty, such a claim would likely be weak. It is more probable that the Japanese government would assert that, just as Japan had had no rights to renounce in Antarctica, neither had any of the Antarctic claimants complied adequately with the provisions in international law for territorial acquisition.

Scientific programmes in Antarctica have depended for their fulfilment on small groups of men working in conditions of prolonged social isolation in an alien physical environment. This is true of both early and recent phases of exploration: despite massive advances in technology and, hence, in material comforts and communications over the period, the element of prolonged social isolation remains as a dominant psychological problem. Contrary to the popular image of lonely living conditions and heroic tasks, the Antarctic worker has to cope with the very opposite of loneliness, and his tasks are likely to be mundane and routine. In his work he must adapt to a close, and closed, interpersonal world, and it is with this adaptation that the present article is concerned.