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Volume 65 - October 1990

Contents

Page 3 of 5

Discussion

  • The Compatibility of Justice and Kindness

  • Daniel Putman
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    30 January 2009, pp. 516-517

  • In ‘Virtue and Character’ A. D. M. Walker claims that kindness and justice are incompatible in certain important ways and that a person can be kind or just without possessing the other virtue. Walker argues that virtues must lead to ‘effective and intelligent action’ and that a virtue ceases to exist if ‘it leads to violation of the minimal requirements of any other virtue’. On this view kindness and justice function independently to produce effective action. Kindness requires a direct caring for the individual in particular circumstances, while justice involves a commitment to impartiality that abstracts from an individual's situation. Walker argues that, as long as the minimal requirements of other virtues are met, one can be kind without weighing considerations of justice. He cites with approval kind behaviour which human beings learn as young children. Such behaviour may be a deeply engrained personality trait, and the individual passing through different situations in life may have no need to consider questions of justice. ‘He will merely need to be able to recognize and respond to certain types of considerations as overriding the values promoted by kindness’.

New Books

Discussion

  • Wittgenstein on Frazer's Golden Bough

  • Costis M. Coveos
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    30 January 2009, pp. 518-521

  • One of Wittgenstein's latest remarks on Frazer begins as follows:

    Hier scheint die Hypothese erst der Sache Tiefe zu geben. Und man kann sich die Erklärung des seltsamen Verhältnisses von Siegfried und Brunhild im unsren Nibelungenlied erinnern. Nämlich, daß Siegfried Brunhilde schon früher einmal gesehen zu haben scheint. (Here it seems as though it were the hypothesis that gives the matter depth. And we may remember the explanation of the strange relationship between Siegfried and Brunhilde in our Nibelungenlied, namely that Siegfried seems to have seen Brunhilde before.)

New Books

Discussion

New Books

Page 3 of 5