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Open access

Contents

Page 12 of 14

Article

  • Does Neuroplasticity Support the Hypothesis of Multiple Realizability?

  • Amber Maimon, Meir Hemmo
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    31 January 2022, pp. 107-127
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  • It is commonly maintained that neuroplastic mechanisms in the brain provide empirical support for the hypothesis of multiple realizability. We show in various case studies that neuroplasticity stems from preexisting mechanisms and processes inherent in the neural (or biochemical) structure of the brain. We argue that not only does neuroplasticity fail to provide empirical evidence of multiple realization, its inability to do so strengthens the mind-body identity theory. Finally, we argue that a recently proposed identity theory called Flat Physicalism can be enlisted to explain the current state of the mind-body problem more adequately.

Measurement

  • On Measurement Scales: Neither Ordinal Nor Interval?

  • Cristian Larroulet Philippi
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 929-939
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  • There is a received view on measurement scales. It includes both a classification of scales (nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio) and a set of prescriptions regarding measurement inferences. This article casts doubt on the adequacy of this received view. To do this, I propose an epistemic characterization of the ordinal/interval distinction, that is, one in terms of researchers’ beliefs. This novel characterization reveals the ordinal/interval distinction as too coarse grained and thus the received view as too restrictive of a framework for measurement research.

Research Article

  • What Caused the Bhopal Gas Tragedy? The Philosophical Importance of Causal and Pragmatic Details

  • Brian J. Hanley
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 616-637
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  • In cases in which many causes together bring about an effect, it is common to select some as particularly important. Philosophers since Mill have been pessimistic about analyzing this reasoning because of its variability and the multifarious causal and pragmatic details of how it works. I argue Mill was right to think these details matter but wrong that they preclude philosophical analysis of causal selection. I show that analyzing the pragmatic details of scientific debates about the important causes of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy can illuminate causal reasoning about disasters and shed new light on causality and causal selection.

Values, Policy, and Social Epistemology

  • Political Legitimacy in the Democratic View: The Case of Climate Services

  • Greg Lusk
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 991-1002
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  • Wendy S. Parker and I have advanced an inductive-risk approach to the provision of climate information that relies on the contextual values of information users. This approach aims to improve the effectiveness of climate information in social decision making. The approach’s emphasis on user values, however, conflicts with the so-called democratic view: if scientists employ contextual values, they ought to employ democratically endorsed values to preserve political legitimacy. This article draws on deliberative democratic theory to resolve the conflict, demonstrating that whether user values are legitimate to employ depends on the way labor is divided across deliberative moments.

Articles

  • Model Evaluation: An Adequacy-for-Purpose View

  • Wendy S. Parker
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 457-477
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  • According to an adequacy-for-purpose view, models should be assessed with respect to their adequacy or fitness for particular purposes. Such a view has been advocated by scientists and philosophers alike. Important details, however, have yet to be spelled out. This article attempts to make progress by addressing three key questions: What does it mean for a model to be adequate-for-purpose? What makes a model adequate-for-purpose? How does assessing a model’s adequacy-for-purpose differ from assessing its representational accuracy? In addition, responses are given to some objections that might be raised against an adequacy-for-purpose view.

Research Article

  • Presidential Address, PSA 2016: An Epistemology of Scientific Practice

  • C. Kenneth Waters
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 585-611
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  • Philosophers’ traditional emphasis on theories, theoretical modeling, and explanation misguides research in philosophy of science. Articulating and applying core theories is part of scientific practice, but it is not the essence of scientific practice. Insofar as science has an essence, it is to systematically investigate and learn about what is not yet understood. This lecture analyzes genetics to articulate a broad-practice-centered approach to philosophy of science. It concludes by arguing that this approach can lead to richer, deeper, and more useful philosophies of science, philosophies that can better inform science policy and the public’s understanding of science.

  • Deidealization: No Easy Reversals

  • Tarja Knuuttila, Mary S. Morgan
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 641-661
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  • Deidealization as a topic in its own right has attracted remarkably little philosophical interest despite the extensive literature on idealization. One reason for this is the often implicit assumption that idealization and deidealization are, potentially at least, reversible processes. We question this assumption by analyzing the challenges of deidealization within a menu of four broad categories: deidealizing as recomposing, deidealizing as reformulating, deidealizing as concretizing, and deidealizing as situating. On closer inspection, models turn out much more inflexible than the reversal thesis would have us believe, and deidealization emerges as a creative part of modeling.

Articles

  • Extrapolation of Experimental Results through Analogical Reasoning from Latent Classes

  • Gerdien G. van Eersel, Gabriela V. Koppenol-Gonzalez, Julian Reiss
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 219-235
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  • In the human sciences, experimental research is used to establish causal relationships. However, the extrapolation of these results to the target population can be problematic. To facilitate extrapolation, we propose to use the statistical technique Latent Class Regression Analysis in combination with the analogical reasoning theory for extrapolation. This statistical technique can identify latent classes that differ in the effect of X on Y. In order to extrapolate by means of analogical reasoning, one can characterize the latent classes by a combination of features and then compare these features to features of the target.

Other

  • Masthead

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, p. i
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Research Article

  • Modeling: Neutral, Null, and Baseline

  • William C. Bausman
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 594-616
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  • Two strategies for using a model as “null” are distinguished. Null modeling evaluates whether a process is causally responsible for a pattern by testing it against a null model. Baseline modeling measures the relative significance of various processes responsible for a pattern by detecting deviations from a baseline model. When these strategies are conflated, models are illegitimately privileged as accepted until rejected. I illustrate this using the neutral theory of ecology and draw general lessons from this case. First, scientists cannot draw certain conclusions using null modeling. Second, these conclusions follow using baseline modeling, but doing so requires more evidence.

Other

  • Masthead

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, p. i
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  • Masthead

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, p. i
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Correction

  • Erratum

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, p. 325
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Other

  • Referees for Philosophy of Science

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 326-333
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  • Masthead

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, p. i
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  • Masthead

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, p. i
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Correction

  • Erratum

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, p. 175
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Front Matter

  • PSA volume 87 issue 5 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, p. f1
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  • PSA volume 87 issue 4 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, p. f1
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Research Article

  • The Volterra Principle Generalized

  • Tim Räz
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2022, pp. 737-760
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  • Michael Weisberg and Kenneth Reisman argue that the Volterra Principle can be derived from multiple predator-prey models and that, therefore, the Volterra Principle is a prime example for robustness analysis. In the current article, I give new results regarding the Volterra Principle, extending Weisberg’s and Reisman’s work, and I discuss the consequences of these results for robustness analysis. I argue that we do not end up with multiple, independent models but rather with one general model. I identify the kind of situation in which this generalization approach may occur, and I analyze the generalized Volterra Principle from an explanatory perspective.

Page 12 of 14