Liberal political philosophers such as Locke, Mill, and Tocqueville are on record as defending colonialism, and this has lead to questions of the compatibility of their basic moral principles with their endorsement of imperial policies of land grabs and exploitation. The case of Kant is different. He was sharply critical of colonialism and, as Sankar Muthu has argued, this was based on his deepest moral commitments. The contributors to this volume generally endorse Muthu’s view, which by now has become the consensus in the literature. The authors provide further philosophical reasons for Kant’s critique of colonialism, seeking answers in new interpretations of his concepts including cosmopolitanism, territorial rights, international trade, and the laws of war and peace.
The editors express some hesitation about devoting an entire book to what they admit was a marginal topic within Kant’s body of writings. Kant never wrote an essay on colonialism, and his remarks are scattered in discussions of other topics, such as teleological history and cosmopolitanism. Yet, this narrow focus is in fact timely. Recent years have seen a forceful revival of Kant’s political philosophy, spearheaded by Arthur Ripstein’s book Force and Freedom, which has put Kant on the agenda for a wider political philosophy community. As a result, we now have many good studies on the basic features of Kant’s thought. The time is ripe, therefore, for more targeted studies of smaller features of his philosophy, which in turn can illuminate the system as a whole.
Kant often expressed his views on colonialism in the form of sharp rebuke. In the pamphlet Perpetual Peace, published in 1795, he wrote: “When America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, and so forth were discovered, they were, to them [Westerners], countries belonging to no one, since they counted the inhabitants as nothing.” The Europeans instituted “the cruellest and most calculated slavery.” To those familiar with Kant’s categorical imperative, and his defence of individual rights and popular self-government, such statements should come as no surprise. Yet, there are other aspects of his thought which might have lead one to suspect that he would endorse colonialism. He defended the liberal state as the only legitimate form of government and predicted that it would eventually spread globally (in one place making the enigmatic remark that in the future Europe “will probably someday give laws to all the others.)” He had only disdain for traditional ways of life and considered the tranquil indolence of the happy inhabitants of Tahiti as not more valuable than the life of a flock of sheep. He is on record with many racist statements and defended a civilizational ranking with England and France at the top due to their inborn character.
The authors of the chapters seek to show that Kant’s critique of colonialism had a solid foundation in his legal and political principles. The essays divide along a methodological distinction between the four first chapters, which delve into historical context, and the five following chapters, which remain within Kant’s system. Anthony Pagden starts the volume by setting Kant’s views in the context of ancient Greek and Roman views of colonies and in particular how they were acquired. By contrast to ancient authors, Kant recognized no right of colonial occupation following war, which may only be fought on defensive grounds. Pauline Kleingeld seeks to resolve some apparent contradictions in Kant’s views by showing that those views that would lend support for colonialism (such as the quote about Europe legislating for the world) were abandoned after the French Revolution, which gave Kant greater respect for national self-determination. Likewise, Lea Ypi argues that Kant abandoned an initial support for Western superiority. He had supported aggressive Western commercial ventures with the help of a natural teleology, which he in later years abandoned and replaced with moral emancipation through political and social institutions, which excluded colonial subjection. Sankar Muthu finds in Kant a way for non-Westerners of resisting the onslaught of Western culture and a defence of cultural diversity as an aspect of education into moral universalism. Liesbet Vanhaute provides the first of the predominantly systematic contributions. She explores the principles that enabled Kant to distinguish between legitimate international migration and commerce on the one hand, and imperial imposition on the other. Arthur Ripstein’s illuminating essay analyzes how colonialism is not “just another bad thing that human beings have done to each other” but in violation of rightful juridical relations. He distinguishes between the two wrongs of acquiring colonies through war and subsequently mismanaging them by not ruling on behalf of the inhabitants.
Peter Niesen provides an interpretation of Kant’s cosmopolitan law, which sees it as a response to violations like colonialism, by its extension of protection to non-state polities. Anna Stilz focuses on the apparent paradox that Kant on the one hand accords protection to non-state peoples (such as the native communities of America), yet on the other hand insists that the precondition for a rightful claim over a territory, and to international recognition, is to have the proper legal system of a state. Providing a novel interpretation of “provisional right,” she concludes that it is at the base of the land-claims of native communities and their right to exclude foreigners. The final chapter, by Martin Ajei and Katrin Flikschuh shifts the focus to the colonial mentality of inferiority, resulting from cultural denigration and political tutelage, persisting even after decolonization. They propose that Kant’s cosmopolitan right should be understood as a communicative right, which mandates a certain epistemic modesty in cultural meetings between distant strangers, and which can help to break the spell of the colonial mindset.
Collectively the essays cast welcome light on one area where Kant applied his basic principles, and in the process they reflect much of that light on his foundational ideas. It is to be hoped that more follow the lead of Lea Ypi and Katrin Flickschuh in pursuing more clearly delineated questions within Kant’s political philosophy.
