## **Review of *Kant and Colonialism***. by Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi, 2014. New York: Oxford University Press. 256p. $74.00.

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Liberal political philosophers such as Locke, Mill, and Tocqueville are on record as defending colonialism, and this has lead to questions of the compatibility of their basic moral principles with their endorsement of imperial policies of land grabs and exploitation. The case of Kant is different. He was sharply critical of colonialism and, as Sankar Muthu has argued, this was based on his deepest moral commitments. The contributors to this volume generally endorse Muthu's view, which by now has become the consensus in the literature. The authors provide further philosophical reasons for Kant's critique of colonialism, seeking answers in new interpretations of his concepts including cosmopolitanism, territorial rights, international trade, and the laws of war and peace.

The editors express some hesitation about devoting an entire book to what they admit was a marginal topic within Kant's body of writings. Kant never wrote an essay on colonialism, and his remarks are scattered in discussions of other topics, such as teleological history and cosmopolitanism. Yet, this narrow focus is in fact timely. Recent years have seen a forceful revival of Kant's political philosophy, spearheaded by Arthur Ripstein's book *Force and Freedom*, which has put Kant on the agenda for a wider political philosophy community. As a result, we now have many good studies on the basic features of Kant's thought. The time is ripe, therefore, for more targeted studies of smaller features of his philosophy, which in turn can illuminate the system as a whole.

Kant often expressed his views on colonialism in the form of sharp rebuke. In the pamphlet *Perpetual Peace*, published in 1795, he wrote: "When America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, and so forth were discovered, they were, to them [Westerners], countries belonging to no one, since they counted the inhabitants as nothing." The Europeans instituted "the cruellest and most calculated slavery." To those familiar with Kant's categorical imperative, and his defence of individual rights and popular self-government, such statements should come as no surprise. Yet, there are other aspects of his thought which might have lead one to suspect that he would endorse colonialism. He defended the liberal state as the only legitimate form of government and predicted that it would eventually spread globally (in one place making the enigmatic remark that in the future Europe "will probably someday give laws to all the others.)" He had only disdain for traditional ways of life and considered the tranquil indolence of the happy inhabitants of Tahiti as not more valuable than the life of a flock of sheep. He is on record with many racist statements and defended a civilizational ranking with England and France at the top due to their inborn character.

The authors of the chapters seek to show that Kant's critique of colonialism had a solid foundation in his legal and political principles. The essays divide along a methodological distinction between the four first chapters, which delve into historical context, and the five following chapters, which remain within Kant's system. Anthony Pagden starts the volume by setting Kant's views in the context of ancient Greek and Roman views of colonies and in particular how they were acquired. By contrast to ancient authors, Kant recognized no right of colonial occupation following war, which may only be fought on defensive grounds. Pauline Kleingeld seeks to resolve some apparent contradictions in Kant's views by showing that those views that would lend support for colonialism (such as the quote about Europe legislating for the world) were abandoned after the French Revolution, which gave Kant greater respect for national self-determination. Likewise, Lea Ypi argues that Kant abandoned an initial support for Western superiority. He had supported aggressive Western commercial ventures with the help of a natural teleology, which he in later years abandoned and replaced with moral emancipation through political and social institutions, which excluded colonial subjection. Sankar Muthu finds in Kant a way for non-Westerners of resisting the onslaught of Western culture and a defence of cultural diversity as an aspect of education into moral universalism. Liesbet Vanhaute provides the first of the predominantly systematic contributions. She explores the principles that enabled Kant to distinguish between legitimate international migration and commerce on the one hand, and imperial imposition on the other. Arthur Ripstein's illuminating essay analyzes how colonialism is not "just another bad thing that human beings have done to each other" but in violation of rightful juridical relations. He distinguishes between the two wrongs of acquiring colonies through war and subsequently mismanaging them by not ruling on behalf of the inhabitants.

Peter Niesen provides an interpretation of Kant's cosmopolitan law, which sees it as a response to violations like colonialism, by its extension of protection to non-state polities. Anna Stilz focuses on the apparent paradox that Kant on the one hand accords protection to non-state peoples (such as the native communities of America), yet on the other hand insists that the precondition for a rightful claim over a territory, and to international recognition, is to have the proper legal system of a state. Providing a novel interpretation of "provisional right," she concludes that it is at the base of the land-claims of native communities and their right to exclude foreigners. The final chapter, by Martin Ajei and Katrin Flikschuh shifts the focus to the colonial mentality of inferiority, resulting from cultural denigration and political tutelage, persisting even after decolonization. They propose that Kant's

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cosmopolitan right should be understood as a communicative right, which mandates a certain epistemic modesty in cultural meetings between distant strangers, and which can help to break the spell of the colonial mindset.

Collectively the essays cast welcome light on one area where Kant applied his basic principles, and in the process they reflect much of that light on his foundational ideas. It is to be hoped that more follow the lead of Lea Ypi and Katrin Flickschuh in pursuing more clearly delineated questions within Kant's political philosophy.

**Deliberative Mini-Publics: Innovating Citizens in the Democratic Process**. Edited by Kimmo Grönlund, André Bächtiger and Maija Setälä. Colchester: ECPR Press, 2014, 255p.
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There was a time when mini-publics were considered the exemplar of deliberative practice. A forum composed of a diverse set of randomly selected individuals exchanging reasons to determine the best course of action is regarded as a corrective to democratic deficits in "traditional" forms of political participation. A lot has been written about the virtues of these forums—from Archon Fung's landmark piece in 2003 which first registered the term "mini-publics" in the vocabulary of deliberative studies (Archon Fung, "Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 11[September 2003]: 338–367) to a series of monographs showcasing the nuts and bolts of designing, implementing and evaluating deliberative forums.

The growing interest in deliberative systems, however, places the study of mini-publics at a crossroads. Today, debates about the function of mini-publics in relation to formal institutions and the broader public sphere have started to take root, particularly in the context of sharp critiques against the legitimacy and impact of mini-publics as discrete sites of deliberation.

And so it is timely that it after a decade of what John Dryzek (*Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance,* 2012) calls the "institutional turn" in deliberative studies that a comprehensive edited collection on mini-publics comes to fruition. The sheer volume of publications on the subject demands a clear and systematic inventory of the conceptual, methodological and empirical developments in the literature, as well as the trajectory of mini-publics research after the "systemic turn." On this task, the book has been successful. Each of the chapters focuses on basic yet provocative themes, starting with Ryan and Smith's critical review of various definitions of mini-publics (pp. 9–26). The subsequent sections are devoted to the design and outcomes of these forums while the final chapters imagine the functions of mini-publics in the wider deliberative system.

The book speaks to a wide range of audience. It is accessible to those who are after a concise introduction to lessons learned after years of studying mini-publics. That design matters is one of these lessons. Claudia Landwehr's (pp. 77–92) discussion on the role of "impartial intermediaries" or facilitators in deliberative forums brings up a number of recurrent but not insurmountable issues in mini-publics. The challenge of domination persists even in inclusive deliberative forums, where more eloquent participants can take control of the conversation. Landwehr provides practical insight on interventions facilitators can make to surface other participants' voices and, in turn, enrich the range of discourses considered in the course of deliberations. Didier Caluwaerts and Dimokritos Kavadias's (p. 135–156) study on deliberation in deeply divided societies also offers a way out of possible tensions when people who have strongly held views deliberate. The chapter enumerates several design decisions made in a deliberative experiment in Belgium, from selecting a venue that is not considered "hostile territory" to asking participants to follow stringent decision-making rules. This experiment reveals that that citizens whose views vastly differ on contentious issues in Belgium can engage in high quality deliberation, disproving the impression that deeply divided societies can only be stable if citizens remain passive subjects (p. 151). Marlene Gerber and Andre Bächtiger's study of Europolis, on the other hand, presents a different story where diverse views ended up generating "gentlemanly conversation" instead of "vigorous contestation" which poses its own set of issues (p. 115–134). Indeed, no two mini-publics are alike and different lessons for democratic practice emerge in each case.

Beyond these practical lessons, however, the book offers insight into ongoing theoretical debates about the functions of mini-publics in the broader deliberative system. The discussion of these debates, however, is not overt and instead, takes shape in the reflective rather than proselytizing tone evident in each chapter. Deliberative democrats have been critiqued for placing too much emphasis on the role of mini-publics, such that it limits the "ecumenical attitude towards different approaches to deliberative democracy" (e.g. Cristina Lafont, "Deliberation, Participation, and Democratic Legitimacy: Should Deliberative Mini-publics Shape Public Policy?" in *Journal of Political Philosophy* 23 [March 2015]: 40–63). The contributions in this volume demonstrate, albeit indirectly, that such criticism is debating a strawman. The literature that takes a positive view of mini-publics is far from being evangelical and instead, they are driven by a constant negotiation of the appropriate relationship between mini-publics and other institutions and practices of democracy. James Fishkin reflects on this question, asking about the "points of connection" between Deliberative Polls and mechanisms for electoral competition (p. 33). Niemeyer (p. 177–202) and Calvert and Warren (p. 203–224) posit various possibilities for mini-publics to act not as decision-makers but as knowledge

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