I am not usually inclined to endorse discussions of Chinese democratization, because it seems to me that such a change is likely far from happening and may not happen at all. But Jiwei Ci’s book is a fascinating and thoughtful meditation on the subjects of legitimacy, democracy, and the forces that might change China. As the title suggests, this book takes inspiration from Alexis de Tocqueville’s classic, Democracy in America. At first, one bridles at putting China in a Tocquevillian framework, but Jiwei Ci draws a comparison between China and the United States by arguing that the Chinese revolution, whatever its intent, has brought about a “equality of conditions” in the sense that there are no legitimate divisions between the citizenry on the one hand and the rulers on the other. There is no aristocracy, such as France faced in Tocqueville’s day. And as revolutionary ideology has faded, there are no longer “class enemies.” One of Professor Ci’s chief theses is that the equality of conditions in society cannot long coexist with an authoritarian state. Just as Tocqueville saw democratic society sweeping away the aristocracies of Europe, Professor Ci sees societal democracy sweeping away authoritarian rule in China—and doing so within the foreseeable future. As he puts it, given that no one is born to a special status, “social equality... produces a momentum... that is well-nigh irresistible” (p. 115).
The crux of the first part of Professor Ci’s book revolves around the concept of legitimacy. The legitimacy in which Professor Ci is primarily interested is “revolutionary legitimacy,” which might be defined as the “right to rule” that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won with its victory in the Civil War in 1949. It is difficult to define when that sort of legitimacy will run out. Certainly, the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) drained much of it. Tiananmen drained more of it, and the simple passage of time, which has taken the revolutionary leaders with it, has drained yet more. Yes, China has done well economically, but “performance legitimacy” cannot, Ci argues, replace revolutionary legitimacy, although it can prolong its life (or shorten it if it proves negative). Deng’s reforms really were new wine in old bottles: they imported economic and other reforms while preserving, perhaps even enhancing, the party’s structure. But that leaves a democratic society facing off against the raw and illegitimate forces of the state. Can the CCP survive the passing of the current leadership? Ci is skeptical.
Given the Tocquevillian origins of this philosophical exploration of China’s legitimacy, it is surprising that Ci has not given more attention to civil society and China’s associational life (Tocqueville’s pouvoirs intermédiare). Traditional China never developed the sort of voluntary associations mediating between state and society that Tocqueville observed in America, and the current state in China has been particularly harsh on such associations (the crackdown on human rights lawyers in July 2015 is a vivid case in point). Ci hopes that the current state will move to create conditions for the emergence of an “autonomous civil society” (p. 283), but here I fear that Ci’s hopes come up against not only the current regime but also a long imperial history that has never legitimized autonomous society. The absence of freedom of association, speech, press, and religion points to more than an incomplete process: it suggests a different relationship between society and state, and especially the weakness of law, than Tocqueville witnessed or that exists in contemporary democracies.
Ci’s dissection of legitimacy issues in China is a philosophical treatise that raises important questions, but it would also be useful to cite empirical work that suggests that the legitimacy of the CCP is not as weak as Ci suggests. For instance, Bruce Dicksen has explored the sources of support for the regime that are balanced against the uses of suppression. Overall, Dicksen argues, the regime is more stable than many of its critics suggest (Dictator’s Dilemma, 2016). Similarly, Wenfang Tang has used public opinion polling to suggest that support for the regime is remarkably high (Populist Authoritarianism, 2016). In the current moment, “performance legitimacy” and propaganda seem to be working surprisingly well.
If the CCP’s legitimacy problems are explored with subtlety and sophistication, I have more difficulty with Professor Ci’s proposition that democracy is the only response that will bring state and society together. Although democracy is certainly compatible with Chinese culture, as Taiwan proves, there is a very long legacy that goes in the opposite direction, as the weakness of pouvoirs intermédiare in traditional China suggests. The imperial system over many dynasties adopted the “avoidance system,” whereby imperial officials could not serve in their native areas so as to avoid corruption and favoritism. From time to time, scholars would argue that officials should represent their native places—the places they know best of all. But the imperial court would always reject such proposals out of fear of the centripetal forces that might be unleashed. The idea of representation was rejected by China’s traditional political culture and is rejected now by the current system. China has preferred strong vertical rule over autonomous society and representation. Professor Ci recognizes this but believes that democracy would be compatible with a strong vertical system, which has always held China together.
That may be so but getting there would be difficult. One would run into legitimacy issues again, unless one can imagine a reasonably fair and legitimate election system springing up more or less overnight, as well as a legal system with a fair court system.
Throughout modern Chinese history, political disputes have been settled with one side winning and the other side losing completely, because notions of political compromise have not been accepted by political actors. And without compromise, a democratic culture cannot come into being. A quarter-century ago, Liu Zaifu and Li Zehou published a book called Farewell to Revolution (Gaobie geming). Their argument was that a revolutionary spirit ran through China’s political struggles throughout the twentieth century and that it was finally time to jettison this tradition. The book had to be published in Hong Kong, because it undermined the legitimacy of the then-current system. It still does today, so it remains a sensitive book. From the current regime’s point of view, this sensitivity reflects concern about any questioning of its revolutionary tradition and its fear that its revolutionary legitimacy has run out. But readers should also be concerned that Liu and Li were right about Chinese politics. Would the political actors who might be unleashed by any collapse of the CCP really turn to the ballot box as Professor Ci hopes, or would they be inclined to settle differences forcefully? I am not optimistic.
Ci Jiwei has written a complex and thoughtful book, though there is a sense of optimism running through it that I am afraid I cannot share.
