

has played a key role in China's policy evolution. Zhang offers insights into how economic opening and Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) sparked some domestic support for stronger IP protection and enforcement. Thus, economic coercion is only one part of the story; interest group competition is another crucial driver of Chinese policies.

Whereas foreigners mainly focus on protection and enforcement, Chinese policy makers see IP policies as embedded in the country's broader quest for economic development and the transition to a truly innovation-based economy. For example, Chinese patent professionals refer to "patent work" (p. 54), of which patent protection is only one part. More important for Chinese patent practitioners is "how patent protection can boost foreign trade and promote local economic development" (p. 55). The Chinese government is eager to build its own IP rights industry to promote policies that support the creation of high-quality patents, "apply those patents to benefit the market" (p. 57), and transform science and technology into the economy's primary growth engine (p. 67).

Achieving these goals is a challenge because of uneven support for patent protection across stakeholders. Foreign investors and competitive Chinese firms, such as telecommunications powerhouse Huawei, are strong supporters of protection and enforcement, because their intellectual property bolsters their competitive advantages. Small- and medium-sized Chinese enterprises are ambivalent because they are unable to afford expensive R&D (p. 70). Weak support from China's domestic business community is a substantial barrier to thoroughgoing patent enforcement (p. 82). SOEs are indifferent insofar as their market profits are guaranteed and they do not have to face a fully competitive business environment (p. 70).

Zhang's discussion of Chinese foot-dragging in copyright reform includes insights into how China's censorship policies, ideology, and cultural affairs complicate the economic rationale for copyright protection. The government tries to maintain ideological order, pursue commercial benefits, and protect copyright (p. 113). Its propaganda initiatives constrain cultural production in various ways (pp. 129–130). Zhang quotes a Chinese movie producer: "the copyright infringers hurt my wallet; the government hurts my mind" (p. 134). Again, in the case of copyright, China finds itself sandwiched between foreign pressure and domestic pressure. Domestic actors bristle at the fact that initially foreign copyright holders enjoyed greater protection than Chinese cultural creators (p. 103). China's quest to join the WTO has impelled Chinese copyright reform. Chinese copyright law looks strong on paper, but implementation is quite uneven.

Foreign rights holders and domestic creators of cultural goods prefer strong protection and enforcement, but for the most part Chinese consumers do not. The Chinese public includes sellers and consumers of pirated copyright

products, and the underground markets thrive. As Joe Karaganis demonstrated in *Media Piracy in Emerging Economies* (2011), copyright piracy is really a pricing problem, not a property rights problem. Media piracy is rampant in poorly served markets in which authorized goods are either unaffordable or unavailable. Zhang underscores both pricing and distribution issues, as well as employment and local tax revenue opportunities that militate against a uniformly strong crackdown response from the Chinese government.

Chinese trademark reform has been noteworthy in its domestic roots; trademark issues have not been subject to the intense foreign pressure concerning patents and copyright (p. 172). Yet here, too, Zhang finds uneven domestic support by analyzing the preferences of various societal actors. The government has emphasized that affected businesses should be at the forefront of brand management and trademark enforcement, and Zhang walks the reader through the evolution of China's commitment to product quality control and standards. Domestic scandals involving counterfeit goods that have posed health and safety risks have shocked the public (p. 197), but the quest for short-term profits has compromised a commitment to quality and long-term investments in brand management. Just as in the case of patents, Zhang's research finds that SOEs are indifferent to the implementation of trademark policy. China's laws protect SOEs from antitrust enforcement, and Zhang points to their market-distorting effects as a key reason for uneven trademark enforcement.

Overall, Zhang's book offers important insights into the "many Chinas" that exist and the sometimes clumsy incentive structures that are legacies of its political and economic evolution. Zhang is rather uncritical of strong IP protection and advocates free markets and democracy as the answer to the bottlenecks and obstacles that he highlights throughout the book. Yet the United States' IP regime has been criticized as being overly protective of rights holders at the expense of public welfare; the outcry over the cost of pharmaceuticals is one case in point. Strong IP rights are no guarantee of innovation. Furthermore, given the Chinese Communist Party's wish to keep a strong grip on power, it seems unlikely that Zhang's preferred outcomes will come to pass anytime soon. Yet the book is an excellent contribution to scholarly debate and offers a valuable and nuanced picture of the Chinese political economy.

Democracy in China: The Coming Crisis. By Jiwei Ci. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019. 432p. \$45.00 cloth. doi:10.1017/S1537592720001760

— Joseph Fewsmith , Boston University
fewsmith@bu.edu

I am not usually inclined to endorse discussions of Chinese democratization, because it seems to me that such a change is likely far from happening and may not happen at all. But

Jiwei Ci's book is a fascinating and thoughtful meditation on the subjects of legitimacy, democracy, and the forces that might change China. As the title suggests, this book takes inspiration from Alexis de Tocqueville's classic, *Democracy in America*. At first, one bristles at putting China in a Tocquevillian framework, but Jiwei Ci draws a comparison between China and the United States by arguing that the Chinese revolution, whatever its intent, has brought about a "equality of conditions" in the sense that there are no legitimate divisions between the citizenry on the one hand and the rulers on the other. There is no aristocracy, such as France faced in Tocqueville's day. And as revolutionary ideology has faded, there are no longer "class enemies." One of Professor Ci's chief theses is that the equality of conditions in society cannot long coexist with an authoritarian state. Just as Tocqueville saw democratic society sweeping away the aristocracies of Europe, Professor Ci sees societal democracy sweeping away authoritarian rule in China—and doing so within the foreseeable future. As he puts it, given that no one is born to a special status, "social equality... produces a momentum... that is well-nigh irresistible" (p. 115).

The crux of the first part of Professor Ci's book revolves around the concept of legitimacy. The legitimacy in which Professor Ci is primarily interested is "revolutionary legitimacy," which might be defined as the "right to rule" that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won with its victory in the Civil War in 1949. It is difficult to define when that sort of legitimacy will run out. Certainly, the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) drained much of it. Tiananmen drained more of it, and the simple passage of time, which has taken the revolutionary leaders with it, has drained yet more. Yes, China has done well economically, but "performance legitimacy" cannot, Ci argues, replace revolutionary legitimacy, although it can prolong its life (or shorten it if it proves negative). Deng's reforms really were new wine in old bottles: they imported economic and other reforms while preserving, perhaps even enhancing, the party's structure. But that leaves a democratic society facing off against the raw and illegitimate forces of the state. Can the CCP survive the passing of the current leadership? Ci is skeptical.

Given the Tocquevillian origins of this philosophical exploration of China's legitimacy, it is surprising that Ci has not given more attention to civil society and China's associational life (Tocqueville's *pouvoirs intermédiaire*). Traditional China never developed the sort of voluntary associations mediating between state and society that Tocqueville observed in America, and the current state in China has been particularly harsh on such associations (the crackdown on human rights lawyers in July 2015 is a vivid case in point). Ci hopes that the current state will move to create conditions for the emergence of an "autonomous civil society" (p. 283), but here I fear that Ci's hopes come up against not only the current regime

but also a long imperial history that has never legitimized autonomous society. The absence of freedom of association, speech, press, and religion points to more than an incomplete process: it suggests a different relationship between society and state, and especially the weakness of law, than Tocqueville witnessed or that exists in contemporary democracies.

Ci's dissection of legitimacy issues in China is a philosophical treatise that raises important questions, but it would also be useful to cite empirical work that suggests that the legitimacy of the CCP is not as weak as Ci suggests. For instance, Bruce Dickson has explored the sources of support for the regime that are balanced against the uses of suppression. Overall, Dickson argues, the regime is more stable than many of its critics suggest (*Dictator's Dilemma*, 2016). Similarly, Wenfang Tang has used public opinion polling to suggest that support for the regime is remarkably high (*Populist Authoritarianism*, 2016). In the current moment, "performance legitimacy" and propaganda seem to be working surprisingly well.

If the CCP's legitimacy problems are explored with subtlety and sophistication, I have more difficulty with Professor Ci's proposition that democracy is the only response that will bring state and society together. Although democracy is certainly compatible with Chinese culture, as Taiwan proves, there is a very long legacy that goes in the opposite direction, as the weakness of *pouvoirs intermédiaire* in traditional China suggests. The imperial system over many dynasties adopted the "avoidance system," whereby imperial officials could not serve in their native areas so as to avoid corruption and favoritism. From time to time, scholars would argue that officials should represent their native places—the places they know best of all. But the imperial court would always reject such proposals out of fear of the centripetal forces that might be unleashed. The idea of representation was rejected by China's traditional political culture and is rejected now by the current system. China has preferred strong vertical rule over autonomous society and representation. Professor Ci recognizes this but believes that democracy would be compatible with a strong vertical system, which has always held China together.

That may be so but getting there would be difficult. One would run into legitimacy issues again, unless one can imagine a reasonably fair and legitimate election system springing up more or less overnight, as well as a legal system with a fair court system.

Throughout modern Chinese history, political disputes have been settled with one side winning and the other side losing completely, because notions of political compromise have not been accepted by political actors. And without compromise, a democratic culture cannot come into being. A quarter-century ago, Liu Zaifu and Li Zehou published a book called *Farewell to Revolution* (*Gaobie*

geming). Their argument was that a revolutionary spirit ran through China's political struggles throughout the twentieth century and that it was finally time to jettison this tradition. The book had to be published in Hong Kong, because it undermined the legitimacy of the then-current system. It still does today, so it remains a sensitive book. From the current regime's point of view, this sensitivity reflects concern about any questioning of its revolutionary tradition and its fear that its revolutionary legitimacy has run out. But readers should also be concerned that Liu and Li were right about Chinese politics. Would the political actors who might be unleashed by any collapse of the CCP really turn to the ballot box as Professor Ci hopes, or would they be inclined to settle differences forcefully? I am not optimistic.

Ci Jiwei has written a complex and thoughtful book, though there is a sense of optimism running through it that I am afraid I cannot share.

Mobilizing the Marginalized: Ethnic Parties without Ethnic Movements. By Amit Ahuja. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 266p. \$99.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592720001693

— Adam Ziegfeld , Temple University
awz@temple.edu

Vibrant labor movements have long sustained strong workers' parties, and a nascent environmental movement in Europe gave birth to green parties. Presumably then, social movements aimed at improving the lot of marginalized ethnic groups should bolster the fortunes of ethnic parties targeting those groups. Not so, argues Amit Ahuja in his exciting new book, *Mobilizing the Marginalized*. Ahuja's study of Dalits—a collection of castes defined by the historical experience of untouchability and formally termed “Scheduled Castes” by the Indian government—starts with a puzzle. The places in India where social movements first addressed Dalit marginalization have, so far, produced unsuccessful Dalit ethnic political parties. In contrast, Dalit ethnic parties thrive in places where such movements have been largely absent.

In this puzzle lies an answer. The process of social mobilization forces all political parties to take Dalits seriously: to actively solicit their votes, to include them in party networks, and to invoke their symbols and stories during campaigns. Faced with multiple parties that earnestly court their support, Dalits split their votes across many parties, depriving would-be Dalit ethnic parties of enough votes to succeed. Unexpectedly, therefore, Dalit social movements undermine the electoral prospects for Dalit parties.

Instead, Dalit parties arise in places where they have historically been un(der)mobilized and existing parties have done little to truly incorporate Dalit voters. When

Dalit parties emerge in areas that lack Dalit social movements, they compare favorably to existing parties, and Dalits shift their votes en masse to Dalit parties. Ahuja further argues that mobilization through social movements has produced far better social and economic outcomes for Dalits than has political mobilization by Dalit parties. After all, when Dalits vote as a bloc for a Dalit party, they are captive clients. Because all parties see their vote choice as a foregone conclusion, Dalits are poorly positioned to make demands on other parties or even hold their own parties accountable. Implementation of pro-Dalit policies also suffers when a Dalit party loses power. Empirically, the book compares four Indian states: two with historically strong Dalit movements and weak Dalit parties (Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu) and two with weak or absent Dalit social movements but some of India's strongest Dalit parties (Bihar and Uttar Pradesh).

Mobilizing the Marginalized does a number of things exceptionally well. First, it presents a theoretical argument about the link between ethnic social movements and ethnic political parties that is logical and persuasive yet not immediately obvious. From one chapter to the next, the book methodically tracks its theoretical argument. It first details variation in levels of Dalit social mobilization and the immediate consequences of such mobilization. It next shows how those political implications shape levels of Dalit bloc voting, which in turn explain the success of Dalit parties. The book then examines the welfare implications of Dalit social mobilization versus Dalit political mobilization into ethnic parties.

Much of what makes Ahuja's argument so persuasive lies in the book's second strength: its simultaneous grounding in the relevant comparative literatures (on social movements and marginalized groups) and the empirical reality of Dalit politics in India. For instance, Ahuja frequently references the well-developed literature on African-American politics in the United States. At the same time, the book remains intimately tied to its subject, never feeling as though it is trying to fit an elegant theoretical claim onto unfamiliar terrain. Indeed, even though the book's organization follows the argument's theoretical logic, Ahuja manages to do justice to his cases, providing rich descriptive accounts that will satisfy readers with a keen interest in Dalit politics in his four case-study states.

Third, since “political scientists who examine electoral and party mobilization pay little attention to social mobilization, while sociologists who study social movements often neglect political parties” (p. 7), the book embarks on an important intellectual enterprise that crosses disciplinary boundaries. No wonder, then, that Ahuja arrives at an argument differing from much prior research that emphasizes how social movements sustain, rather than undermine, allied political parties. Finally, Ahuja expertly relies on an eclectic array of evidence, ranging from public