As the editor states clearly in the introduction, the central question taken up in this useful volume is “What happens to nationalism after independence?” Its premise is that most scholarship on nationalism has attempted to trace or explain the emergence of the popular sentiments of solidarity that account for the formation of national consciousness, the rise of nationalism as a modern and highly potent political ideology, and the contribution of nationalism to the proliferation of states. Although there are excellent case studies of postindependence nationalisms in individual countries, less comparative and theoretical attention has been paid to conceptualizing and explaining variation in the intensity and character of nationalism in newly independent states.

The volume includes two summary chapters—an introduction by the editor, Lowell Barrington, and a conclusion by Ronald E. Suny. The remaining chapters are divided into two sections. The first section deals with “postcolonial” nationalisms, with chapters on Malaysia (Diane K. Mauzy), Rwanda (John F. Clark), and Somalia (Peter J. Schraeder), and the second section deals with “postcommunist” nationalisms, with chapters on Lithuania (Terry D. Clark), Ukraine (Taras Kuzio), Armenia (Razmik Panossian), and Georgia (Stephen Jones). Each of the two sections begins with a general chapter, the first by Joshua Forrest (“Nationalism in Postcolonial States”) and the second by Ian Bremmer (“The Post Nations after Independence”).

The introduction by Barrington provides a reasoned analysis of the concepts of “nation” and “nationalism,” a necessary exercise for an edited volume in which contributors are asked to take up a conceptually difficult explanandum. Barrington defines nations as “collectivities united by shared cultural features (such as language, myths, and values) and the belief in the right to territorial self-determination” (p. 7). He thus insists that nations are different from “ethnic groups” (a category he does not define) in that the latter claim a right to some measure of control (“self-determination”) over a particular territory. Moreover, the nation is both a subjective and an objective category in that “shared cultural features” can be objectively defined—a nation is not, for Barrington, any group that simply considers itself a nation. Suny, in my view convincingly, takes issue with this claim, arguing that what is important is not objectively defined cultural attributes but, rather, a belief in the existence of those shared attributes by the group's members. For Suny, whether cultural attributes are in fact “shared” is a subjective rather than an objective question. I would add that any two groups will be culturally different if culture is understood as an objective category, at least to some degree. These differences aside, both seem to agree that “nationalism” is best treated as both a belief/ideology and a movement.

Barrington goes on to offer a convincing defense of the well-known, and much criticized, conceptual distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism, at least as ideal types. He then identifies five possible variants of postindependence nationalism: 1) external-territory-claiming nationalism; 2) sovereignty-protecting nationalism; 3) civic “nation-building” nationalism; 4) ethnic “nation-protecting” nationalism; and 5) “co-national-protecting” nationalism (Suny offers a sixth variant, diaspora nationalism). For both Barrington and Suny, these variants, like the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism, are not exclusive. Rather, they typically coexist, or compete with one another, and their relative weight changes over time.

The Barrington chapter provides the framework for the volume's empirical chapters. Is his overview of postcolonial nationalisms, Forrest identifies three causal factors that help explain variation in nationalism's postindependence character and intensity—whether particular ethnic groups were favored in the colonial period, the strength of ethnic conceptions of the nation prior to independence, and traditional solidarities and beliefs. Mauzy argues that in Malaysia, the late-colonial-era nationalism was associated almost exclusively with the Malay majority. It has since evolved—albeit in fits and starts—into a more inclusionary nationalism that treats the presence of Chinese and Indians as more or less legitimate, although elites can still “raise ethnic fears and ignite Malay nationalism … for political advantage” (p. 63). She accounts for this change as a product of increased sociopolitical and economic security for the Malays, which has made them more willing to accept minorities as part of the national family, even if Malays remain first among equals.

In Rwanda, there was no clear majority nationalism. Instead, Clark argues, “dual nationalisms”—separate Hutu nationalism and Tutsi nationalism—emerged during the colonial period. While these dual nationalisms usually did not deny the legitimacy of the presence of the other in the country, they made conflicting claims to control of the state. What transformed political competition into genocide was the self-interested behavior of elites.

Again, a very different picture emerges in the Schraeder chapter on the Somali case. Schraeder describes the declining appeal of ethnic nationalism despite Somalia's extreme homogeneity—there are almost no linguistic minorities in the country. Somalia nevertheless succumbed to civil war in the late 1970s, when the dominant line of cleavage proved to be traditional kinship groups (clans) and regional solidarities. The Somali case, I should note, raises questions about the analytical usefulness of the categories “ethnic group” and “nation.” How is the violence among Somali clans different in terms of etiology or consequence from so-called ethnic violence between Hutus and Tutsis—people who speak the same language and occupy more or less the same territory—or from “ethno-national violence” between Serbs and Croats?

The chapter by Bremmer that opens the section on postcommunist nationalism succinctly describes the diversity of nationalisms in the 15 successor states. He argues that “the Russian factor” has in many cases tempered ethnic nationalism in many of the successor states, in part because Russia's political and economic weight has often led a pragmatic effort to accommodate significant Russian and Russophone populations. The primary exceptions have been the Baltic states, where the impetus behind the move to a more civic form of nationalism has come from the pull of Europe, rather than the push of Russia, as well as Georgia, which has had to deal with two Russian-supported secessionist statelets within its territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and as a result has very tense relations with Moscow.

In the chapter on Lithuania, Clark echoes Bremmer, describing the evolution of Lithuanian nationalism from overwhelmingly ethnic in the late Soviet period to a more civic stance, and he ascribes it primarily to the desire to join NATO and the European Union. Kuzio argues in the next chapter that Ukraine has also witnessed a pragmatic evolution from a muted ethnic to a more civic form of nationalism (though he assigns “civic” a somewhat different meaning from the other contributors), and he defends the state's ongoing efforts to support linguistic Ukrainization as restitutive justice in order to overcome past “wrongs” committed against the Ukrainian language and culture. Panossian argues that in Armenia, the ability of ethnic nationalism to mobilize Armenians has again diminished since independence and a return to “normal politics,” although it is difficult to assert that the Armenian state has embraced a more civic understanding of the nation because there are no longer significant minority populations in the country. Finally, Jones argues that “‘ethnic’ passions of Georgians have waxed and waned, depending on political and economic circumstances,” but that as in Armenia “the issues that dominate Georgian newspapers today are not nationalist ones” (p. 266). Georgia will not, however, adopt a more civic form of nationalism, despite pressure from Europe, “largely because Georgia's own national minorities find this unacceptable” (p. 268).

This is a very useful and well-written volume that should be in the library of any serious student of comparative nationalism. It offers cogent discussions of key concepts, a useful analytical framework, some testable hypotheses (notably the general trend toward a more inclusionary conception of the nation after independence and claims about factors that explain that trend or its absence), and a good deal of well-researched empirical material. Most importantly, it invites further comparative analysis of an important but understudied question—what happens to nationalism after independence.