

enforced intellectual property rights made this system a fetter on the very forces of production it had fostered.

Anchordoguy then supports her argument with case studies in Japanese high-technology industries. In telecommunications, the reluctance of NIT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company) to fire workers and abandon longtime suppliers, and the reluctance of the government to abandon NIT in favor of foreign companies, created “obsolete institutions” (p. 65). In computer hardware, attempts to build a domestic industry produced the world’s fastest computer, but left Japan still importing more than it exports. In semiconductors, government subsidies for big companies succeeded until the late 1980s, but then failed in a crisis of global supply. In the software industry, Anchordoguy admits, the picture is more mixed. The Japanese videogame industry revived an American industry that had imploded in the early 1980s, and Nintendo and Sony maintain a leading presence even in the face of Microsoft: She says this is because they developed in a freewheeling mode largely outside state corporatism. Elsewhere, she finds a lack of flexibility and innovation. Overall, she faults Japan’s system for protectionism, cozy corporate–state relations, accommodation with trade unions, and a reliance on incremental change.

This is a scrupulously researched, readable study, and it provides a wealth of information about the operations of contemporary Japanese capitalism. But there are major questions to be raised about its overall perspective. Anchordoguy’s argument is based on an unfavorable comparison of communitarian capitalism with the supposedly free market neoliberalism of the United States. If Japanese capitalism is quasi-capitalism, then American capitalism, supposedly focused on “competition and efficiency, encoded on neoclassical economic and rational choice theory” (p. 7), would be the real thing. The author says that Japan need not become a “clone” of the United States, and carefully notes that the sacrifice of community and worker interests to those of corporate owners and shareholders is “inconsistent with Japan’s historical experience and values” (p. 234). Nonetheless, she thinks Japan’s deviations from neoliberal doxa calls for “reprogramming” (the term is reminiscent of dubious cures for cult members). And the program it should get with is the Washington consensus model of deregulation, privatization, and trade liberalization, moving toward a social order “more flexible, market-driven, and less equalitarian” (p. 65).

This argument, however, is eroded by her avoidance of the “elephant in the room” of supposedly free market U.S. capitalism—military Keynesianism. Far from being a model of laissez-faire dynamism, the U.S. high-technology sector grew out of and has flourished on the massive support of a military–industrial complex. This complex incubated the computer industry and the Internet (see Paul Edwards, *The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse*

*in Cold War America*, 1997). Today, with the Pentagon budget pushing \$500 billion annually, this military matrix lavishly supports corporations involved in surveillance, smart weapons, advanced robotics, and all kinds of more routine computing requirements. The contrast between state-supported communitarian capital and free market capital is largely mythological. The real contrast is between welfare-state and warfare-state capitalism. And, apparently, the warfare state is better for business.

Moreover, while American high-tech capital has recently been more profitable than Japan’s, the question of its long-term success, even by market criteria, is uncertain. Huge budget and trade deficits and slowing growth hardly seem a recommendation for the U.S. model as a whole. And if one steps outside the box of *homo economicus*, the questions become more acute. It is far from clear that the social and environmental costs of stagnation in Japan are any higher than those of fast-growth U.S. capital. Some years ago, Tessa Morris-Suzuki (*Beyond Computopia: Information, Automation and Democracy in Japan*, 1988) analyzed Japan’s unique trajectory within a critical perspective on the overall costs of information capitalism. A similar breadth of perspective would have been welcome in this study. As I write, the news is out that for the first time, Toyota has overtaken General Motors as the world’s largest car manufacturer. This is bad news for Anchordoguy’s argument on two counts. First, it suggests that the neoliberal model may not be as superior to Japanese communitarian capitalism as she suggests. But, second, since cars are a major contributor to a planetary crisis of climate change, it reminds us that market buoyancy is not the best measure of system success. Neither communitarian nor neoliberal capital has a good answer to the contradictions between profit and socioenvironmental sustainability. Detailed and informative as this study is, evaluation of different forms of capitalism, American or Japanese, calls for a wider and more deeply critical vision.

#### **After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States.**

Edited by Lowell W. Barrington. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006. 306p. \$75 cloth, \$29.95 paper.  
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— Edward W. Walker, *University of California, Berkeley*

As the editor states clearly in the introduction, the central question taken up in this useful volume is “What happens to nationalism after independence?” Its premise is that most scholarship on nationalism has attempted to trace or explain the emergence of the popular sentiments of solidarity that account for the formation of national consciousness, the rise of nationalism as a modern and highly potent political ideology, and the contribution of nationalism to the proliferation of states. Although there are excellent case studies of postindependence nationalisms in individual countries, less comparative and theoretical attention

has been paid to conceptualizing and explaining variation in the intensity and character of nationalism in newly independent states.

The volume includes two summary chapters—an introduction by the editor, Lowell Barrington, and a conclusion by Ronald E. Suny. The remaining chapters are divided into two sections. The first section deals with “postcolonial” nationalisms, with chapters on Malaysia (Diane K. Mauzy), Rwanda (John F. Clark), and Somalia (Peter J. Schraeder), and the second section deals with “postcommunist” nationalisms, with chapters on Lithuania (Terry D. Clark), Ukraine (Taras Kuzio), Armenia (Razmik Panossian), and Georgia (Stephen Jones). Each of the two sections begins with a general chapter, the first by Joshua Forrest (“Nationalism in Postcolonial States”) and the second by Ian Bremmer (“The Post Nations after Independence”).

The introduction by Barrington provides a reasoned analysis of the concepts of “nation” and “nationalism,” a necessary exercise for an edited volume in which contributors are asked to take up a conceptually difficult *explanandum*. Barrington defines nations as “collectivities united by shared cultural features (such as language, myths, and values) and the belief in the right to territorial self-determination” (p. 7). He thus insists that nations are different from “ethnic groups” (a category he does not define) in that the latter claim a right to some measure of control (“self-determination”) over a particular territory. Moreover, the nation is both a subjective and an objective category in that “shared cultural features” can be objectively defined—a nation is not, for Barrington, any group that simply considers itself a nation. Suny, in my view convincingly, takes issue with this claim, arguing that what is important is not objectively defined cultural attributes but, rather, a *belief* in the existence of those shared attributes by the group’s members. For Suny, whether cultural attributes are in fact “shared” is a subjective rather than an objective question. I would add that *any* two groups will be culturally different if culture is understood as an objective category, at least to some degree. These differences aside, both seem to agree that “nationalism” is best treated as both a belief/ideology and a movement.

Barrington goes on to offer a convincing defense of the well-known, and much criticized, conceptual distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism, at least as ideal types. He then identifies five possible variants of postindependence nationalism: 1) external-territory-claiming nationalism; 2) sovereignty-protecting nationalism; 3) civic “nation-building” nationalism; 4) ethnic “nation-protecting” nationalism; and 5) “co-national-protecting” nationalism (Suny offers a sixth variant, diaspora nationalism). For both Barrington and Suny, these variants, like the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism, are not exclusive. Rather, they typically coexist, or compete with one another, and their relative weight changes over time.

The Barrington chapter provides the framework for the volume’s empirical chapters. In his overview of postcolonial nationalisms, Forrest identifies three causal factors that help explain variation in nationalism’s postindependence character and intensity—whether particular ethnic groups were favored in the colonial period, the strength of ethnic conceptions of the nation prior to independence, and traditional solidarities and beliefs. Mauzy argues that in Malaysia, the late-colonial-era nationalism was associated almost exclusively with the Malay majority. It has since evolved—albeit in fits and starts—into a more inclusionary nationalism that treats the presence of Chinese and Indians as more or less legitimate, although elites can still “raise ethnic fears and ignite Malay nationalism . . . for political advantage” (p. 63). She accounts for this change as a product of increased sociopolitical and economic security for the Malays, which has made them more willing to accept minorities as part of the national family, even if Malays remain first among equals.

In Rwanda, there was no clear majority nationalism. Instead, Clark argues, “dual nationalisms”—separate Hutu nationalism and Tutsi nationalism—emerged during the colonial period. While these dual nationalisms usually did not deny the legitimacy of the presence of the other in the country, they made conflicting claims to control of the state. What transformed political competition into genocide was the self-interested behavior of elites.

Again, a very different picture emerges in the Schraeder chapter on the Somali case. Schraeder describes the declining appeal of ethnic nationalism despite Somalia’s extreme homogeneity—there are almost no linguistic minorities in the country. Somalia nevertheless succumbed to civil war in the late 1970s, when the dominant line of cleavage proved to be traditional kinship groups (clans) and regional solidarities. The Somali case, I should note, raises questions about the analytical usefulness of the categories “ethnic group” and “nation.” How is the violence among Somali clans different in terms of etiology or consequence from so-called ethnic violence between Hutus and Tutsis—people who speak the same language and occupy more or less the same territory—or from “ethno-national violence” between Serbs and Croats?

The chapter by Bremmer that opens the section on postcommunist nationalism succinctly describes the diversity of nationalisms in the 15 successor states. He argues that “the Russian factor” has in many cases tempered ethnic nationalism in many of the successor states, in part because Russia’s political and economic weight has often led a pragmatic effort to accommodate significant Russian and Russophone populations. The primary exceptions have been the Baltic states, where the impetus behind the move to a more civic form of nationalism has come from the pull of Europe, rather than the push of Russia, as well as Georgia, which has had to deal with two Russian-supported secessionist statelets within its territory (Abkhazia and South

Ossetia), and as a result has very tense relations with Moscow.

In the chapter on Lithuania, Clark echoes Bremmer, describing the evolution of Lithuanian nationalism from overwhelmingly ethnic in the late Soviet period to a more civic stance, and he ascribes it primarily to the desire to join NATO and the European Union. Kuzio argues in the next chapter that Ukraine has also witnessed a pragmatic evolution from a muted ethnic to a more civic form of nationalism (though he assigns “civic” a somewhat different meaning from the other contributors), and he defends the state’s ongoing efforts to support linguistic Ukrainization as restitutive justice in order to overcome past “wrongs” committed against the Ukrainian language and culture. Panossian argues that in Armenia, the ability of ethnic nationalism to mobilize Armenians has again diminished since independence and a return to “normal politics,” although it is difficult to assert that the Armenian state has embraced a more civic understanding of the nation because there are no longer significant minority populations in the country. Finally, Jones argues that “‘ethnic’ passions of Georgians have waxed and waned, depending on political and economic circumstances,” but that as in Armenia “the issues that dominate Georgian newspapers today are not nationalist ones” (p. 266). Georgia will not, however, adopt a more civic form of nationalism, despite pressure from Europe, “largely because Georgia’s own national minorities find this unacceptable” (p. 268).

This is a very useful and well-written volume that should be in the library of any serious student of comparative nationalism. It offers cogent discussions of key concepts, a useful analytical framework, some testable hypotheses (notably the general trend toward a more inclusionary conception of the nation after independence and claims about factors that explain that trend or its absence), and a good deal of well-researched empirical material. Most importantly, it invites further comparative analysis of an important but understudied question—what happens to nationalism after independence.

#### **Institutional Capital: Building Post-Communist**

**Government Performance.** By Laura Brunell. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005. 270p. \$59.00. cloth, \$39.00 paper  
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— Louise K. Davidson-Schmich, *University of Miami*

This book makes an important theoretical contribution by opening the “black box” linking social capital and democratic performance. Spurred by Robert Putnam’s observed correlation between social capital and budget promptness (*Making Democracy Work*, 1995), Laura Brunell seeks to explain the causal mechanisms connecting a vibrant civil society to good government performance.

Brunell does so by introducing the concept of “institutional capital,” defined as “the assemblage of institu-

tional traits that permits the state to penetrate civil society and afford itself of its resources and, at the same time, allows civil society to penetrate the state and appropriate public sector resources and state power” (p. 11). Where governments promote civil society and are open to working collaboratively with it, and where a vibrant array of civil society groups are present and are willing and able to work constructively with the state, she argues, “partnership performance” will emerge and democracies will work best. In the absence of either of these conditions, regime performance will be poor or attributable to idiosyncratic individual relationships that she labels “patronage performance.” Rounding out the fourfold table are two mixed outcomes that Brunell designates “statist performance” and “third sector performance.” The former occurs when government is strong and civil society weak, leading to high performance in policy areas where state-controlled resources are most important. The latter results when government is weak but a strong civil society is able to achieve high performance in some policy areas. The author makes an additional important argument: Because civil society may be stronger on some fronts than on others, and because different arms of government may have varying predispositions to engage civil society, regime performance may differ from policy area to policy area even in the same polity at the same time.

To test these theoretical expectations empirically, Brunell spent two years living in Lodz and Krakow, Poland, and studying their policy processes in great detail. *Institutional Capital* paints a fascinating and historical portrait of two very different cities. Drawing on secondary sources, Brunell finds that over the centuries, Krakow enjoyed self-government and a vibrant array of cultural and educational organizations. Despite the best efforts of communist rulers, these groups did not disappear under Soviet rule but were instead joined by well-organized workers. In the later years of communist rule, these organizations worked together with the church to carve out alternative spaces for Krakowites to express themselves. After the fall of communism, Brunell’s own research found, this vibrant array of third-sector organizations continued to thrive, and many—but not all—in the city government were happy to listen to and provide information to these groups. Lodz developed quite differently. The city was traditionally administered by inept outside rulers, and civil society consisted primarily of labor unions and some German and/or Jewish professional associations. The latter were wiped out by World War II. Throughout history, Lodz’s predominantly female textile workers clashed with factory managers, capitalist as well as communist. Brunell found that after Poland democratized, Lodz’s third sector remained less diverse than Krakow’s and that strained state–society relationships continued.

Given these varying stocks of institutional capital, Brunell investigates government performance in three areas: