Sibyl Schwarzenbach's On Civic Friendship is a work of wide historical reach and big ideas. Its main theses are 1) that civic friendship is a necessary condition for justice in modern democratic states; 2) that modern theorists have for the most part ignored civic friendship, making it “the forgotten problem of modern democratic theory” (p. xiii, emphasis in the original); and 3) that women's ethical reproductive praxis, including caring for infants and children, tending to the sick and elderly, and most generally fostering relations of philia (friendship) among individuals, provides an often-neglected basis for reinvigorating civic friendship and enhancing justice in modern democratic states.
Schwarzenbach develops her argument in Part I (Chapters 2–4) by focusing on some key figures in the history of political thought: Aristotle, Locke, and Marx. From Aristotle, she draws the insight that political friendship is a vital component of justice. It makes citizens more willing to accept the “give and take” of everyday communal life and “holds states together” with mutual goodwill and a willingness to do things for others. Aristotle, however, conceived of political friendship narrowly as a relation among independent, similarly situated men, and failed to appreciate the important role of women's ethical reproductive praxis in fostering the capacity for friendship among citizens. If Aristotle's insights regarding friendship are to be made more consistent and applicable to contemporary affairs, Schwarzenbach argues, women must be included in the state. In particular, the idea of political friendship must be expanded to include the possibility of friendship in difference, and women's ethical reproductive praxis must be recognized as a central expression and constituent of political friendship.
If Aristotle originally set discussions of political friendship off on the wrong foot, Locke is largely responsible for jettisoning them from the modern liberal tradition. Although Locke's Two Treatises contain the kernel of an idea of civic friendship, he largely disposed of these elements in dispensing with the two limitations on private property accumulation. Marx's attempt to reawaken a conception of civic friendship in the form of worker solidarity failed, in turn, according to Schwarzenbach, because of his near-exclusive focus on production and neglect of social labor and intersubjective relationships.
In Part II (Chapters 5–8), the author uses her definition of civic friendship to outline a feminist-democratic conception of the state. She begins by discussing John Rawls's difference principle, and argues that it focuses too much on material redistribution. Drawing on her idea of civic friendship, she proposes a strong interpretation of the difference principle that endorses worker control and management of firms, or market socialism, as a necessary component of democratic justice. In Chapter 6, she provides a brief analysis of American constitutional history in order to argue for the superiority of a system of proportional representation over simple majority rule in promoting friendship among citizens. In Chapter 7, she argues that civic friendship is a better foundation for a feminist theory of the state than other feminist theories such as care theory, and endorses community care centers and mandatory universal national service for young people as a third plank of her state theory. In her final chapter, Schwarzenbach extends her concept of civic friendship to relations among states and argues for the superiority of international philia over some recent cosmopolitan proposals.
The most obvious objection to the author's argument is that civic friendship is no longer possible in modern nation-states. Schwarzenbach counters this objection, however, by noting that the large size of modern nation-states is not necessarily a hindrance to civic friendship. As opposed to personal friendship, civic friendship does not require close emotional connections but can be expressed through institutions and laws (e.g., market socialism, proportional representation, and national service). The greater diversity of modern states is likewise not a concern as long as we take as our goal not the more stringent political friendship envisioned by Aristotle, with its concern for the moral character of others, but a more tolerant form of civic friendship that aims at friendship in difference, equality, and rights.
Other questions remain nonetheless. As Schwarzenbach herself admits, her notion of civic friendship across differences stretches the definition of friendship pretty thinly (p. 247). Her notion of civic friendship ultimately seems akin to what other democratic theorists have referred to as a generalized trust in others. The author, however, does not mine the literature on trust in developing her theory. Indeed, while some scholars (e.g., Bo Rothstein) have argued that universal welfare policies are a significant manifestation and source of generalized trust in others, Schwarzenbach barely mentions universal welfare policies in discussing how states might embody and foster civic friendship. This would seem an oversight of her theory.
A second question relates to the author's endorsement of market socialism. She repeatedly criticizes other thinkers (e.g., Rawls) for remaining too tied to the acquisitive model of production, and outlines her defense of market socialism as a direct challenge to capitalist private property relations. Yet contemporary Marxists such as Bertell Ollman have criticized market socialism on the grounds that the competitive market (not private property) is the main source of animosity and acquisitiveness among people in capitalist societies. He claims that a shift to worker-controlled and owned firms will not overcome the competitive animosity among workers but merely shift it to the firm level. Ollman may be mistaken on this point, but his argument at least gives one reason to wonder if Schwarzenbach goes far enough in her call for market socialism. His critique raises the question of whether the competitive market system itself is compatible with civic friendship.
A final question relates to the practical realizability of Schwarzenbach's proposals. She suggests at several points that women's entry en masse into politics and economics opens up the possibility for the realization of a new politics of civic friendship (pp. 20–21, 137–38, 166, 168, 267–68). While she is careful to note that the transformative powers of women stem not from their nature but from their traditional responsibility for the ethical reproductive activities of society, and acknowledges that her account of ethical reproductive praxis is a “selective abstraction” (pp. 14, 155–56), she nonetheless appears at times to overstate the reformist potential of most women. Even if many women may bring to politics an intimate knowledge of ethical reproductive activity, they may nevertheless construe their ethical responsibilities narrowly, believing that each family should take care of its own. This narrow vision of ethical reproductive responsibility not only does not support a broad ideal of civic friendship but can actually be an impediment to it. Schwarzenbach might have given more attention to the question of how women's ethical insights can be broadened to better support her reform proposals.
These criticisms notwithstanding, On Civic Friendship is an important book. Scholars of Aristotle, Locke, Marx, and Rawls will find fresh and challenging interpretations of these thinkers' ideas. Feminists will find a well-developed proposal for a feminist theory of the state. Democratic theorists will find a provocative defense of the importance of civic friendship for democratic justice. Overall, this book is a testament to how, in the hands of a creative and capable scholar, the study of the history of political thought can yield valuable insights about important contemporary questions such as the preconditions and nature of democratic justice.
