

that just as Nietzsche's writing is performative, it is essentially political in that it is driven by the will to power and that, through it, Nietzsche attempts to "dominate" (p. 74), to "seduce" (p. 86), and to "re-found" (p. 78), and not simply to make truth claims. Schotten's assertion that a radically new orientation for thinking demands a radically new politics, however conceived, ignores Nietzsche's claim to the contrary. He declares in *Human, All Too Human* that the most radically liberated thought goes hand in hand with moderate action rather than revolutionary politics. Schotten's book would be aided by more fully addressing Nietzsche's statements about the tension between political accomplishments and those in cultural and intellectual realms. There is also considerable Nietzsche scholarship that denies any political content to his thought. While more recent scholarship has found the political to be more thematic, a sustained effort to argue that Nietzsche's thought is essentially political would be served by addressing the debate. Of course, Nietzsche also makes numerous expressly political claims. Pointing to those is not sufficient for the argument Schotten advances, however, for she does not rely on Nietzsche's expressly political claims for her political argument; instead, she builds on his epistemological, psychological, and physiological statements, using these as a source for political arguments Nietzsche would not himself make.

Schotten goes on to catalogue the ways in which Nietzsche uses the body as a metaphor and health as a category in his articulation of goals. She selects those passages that serve her wish to demonstrate that Nietzsche's vision of health is gendered as masculine and that he essentializes gender. What chapters 4 and 5 do show is Nietzsche's frequent use of bodily categories and bodily symbols for psychic and cultural health. This part of the book will provide a useful resource for those who are interested in further exploration of Nietzsche's attention to bodies and to those investigating the meaning of health in his thought. That Nietzsche uses the body and that embodied thoughts and actions are also gendered is clear. It is far less evident that Nietzsche's attention to body, gender, and sex amounts to fear of emasculation or the effort to exclude the female. For two very different accounts of the fecundity of Nietzsche's treatment of sexual differentiation, one might consider the work of Laurence Lampert and Luce Irigaray. The notion that Nietzsche longs for some kind of self-birth (p. 157) and, with it, the elimination of woman conflates claims by Nietzsche and the dramatic narrative of Zarathustra. One might see the limits of Zarathustra and his solipsistic end as Nietzsche's presentation of the limits of such a teacher.

Schotten concludes from her analysis of Nietzsche's treatment of bodies and gender that he betrays a "fear of becoming" (p. 170), and she attributes his sexual essentializing to this fear and to his inability to accept the flux of becoming. Suggesting ways in which he aims to "become femi-

nine" while at the same time taking him to task for valorizing the masculine, Schotten finds herself caught in a contradiction. Rather than thinking with Nietzsche about how to address the tension between radical undermining and apparent truth claims or about why this tension may remain necessary, she simply claims that the contradiction is the essence of his thought. On this basis, she argues that Nietzsche offers a "revolution in revolution" (p. 172) by resisting the substitution of new truth claims for those he has undermined, thereby leaving strategies of radicalization for others to deploy. She characterizes Christianity as the sole source for "heteronormative sexual and gender moralism" (p. 174) without exploring the relation between Christianity and Plato, a constant theme for Nietzsche, on this score. Instead of resolving textual difficulties on Nietzsche's terms, Schotten simply asserts that Nietzsche's thought "cannot be bent to the yoke of logical coherence" (p. 176) and accepts contradiction as a characteristic of his writing as autobiographical confession. Such a conclusion gives Schotten license to turn to her own "autobiographical" concerns and to the task of "queering Nietzsche." In order to articulate her vision, Schotten engages the debates among Butler, Brown, and Edelman and offers alternatives that are interesting and potentially fruitful but do not rely on her painstaking study of Nietzsche's books. Schotten thus concludes with revolutionary hope of a sort that sees revolutionary hope as futureless, a call to revolution that has no ideal, aim, or purpose, a revolution that is identical to embracing flux, change, and becoming.

Nietzsche's Revolution will take its place in theoretical debates about radical politics, feminism, and queer theory. It will contribute to contemporary political theory because it engages Nietzsche's texts rather than merely leaving his theoretical innovations as an implicit foundation. To Nietzsche scholarship, Schotten's book offers its attention to the body as category and metaphor in Nietzsche's cultural assessments.

On Civic Friendship: Including Women in the State.

By Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 360p. \$89.50 cloth, \$14.75 paper.
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— Daniel Engster, *The University of Texas at San Antonio*

Sibyl Schwarzenbach's *On Civic Friendship* is a work of wide historical reach and big ideas. Its main theses are 1) that civic friendship is a necessary condition for justice in modern democratic states; 2) that modern theorists have for the most part ignored civic friendship, making it "the forgotten problem of modern democratic theory" (p. xiii, emphasis in the original); and 3) that women's ethical reproductive praxis, including caring for infants and children, tending to the sick and elderly, and most generally fostering relations of *philia* (friendship) among individuals, provides an often-neglected basis for reinventing

civic friendship and enhancing justice in modern democratic states.

Schwarzenbach develops her argument in Part I (Chapters 2–4) by focusing on some key figures in the history of political thought: Aristotle, Locke, and Marx. From Aristotle, she draws the insight that political friendship is a vital component of justice. It makes citizens more willing to accept the “give and take” of everyday communal life and “holds states together” with mutual goodwill and a willingness to do things for others. Aristotle, however, conceived of political friendship narrowly as a relation among independent, similarly situated men, and failed to appreciate the important role of women’s ethical reproductive praxis in fostering the capacity for friendship among citizens. If Aristotle’s insights regarding friendship are to be made more consistent and applicable to contemporary affairs, Schwarzenbach argues, women must be included in the state. In particular, the idea of political friendship must be expanded to include the possibility of friendship in difference, and women’s ethical reproductive praxis must be recognized as a central expression and constituent of political friendship.

If Aristotle originally set discussions of political friendship off on the wrong foot, Locke is largely responsible for jettisoning them from the modern liberal tradition. Although Locke’s *Two Treatises* contain the kernel of an idea of civic friendship, he largely disposed of these elements in dispensing with the two limitations on private property accumulation. Marx’s attempt to reawaken a conception of civic friendship in the form of worker solidarity failed, in turn, according to Schwarzenbach, because of his near-exclusive focus on production and neglect of social labor and intersubjective relationships.

In Part II (Chapters 5–8), the author uses her definition of civic friendship to outline a feminist-democratic conception of the state. She begins by discussing John Rawls’s difference principle, and argues that it focuses too much on material redistribution. Drawing on her idea of civic friendship, she proposes a strong interpretation of the difference principle that endorses worker control and management of firms, or market socialism, as a necessary component of democratic justice. In Chapter 6, she provides a brief analysis of American constitutional history in order to argue for the superiority of a system of proportional representation over simple majority rule in promoting friendship among citizens. In Chapter 7, she argues that civic friendship is a better foundation for a feminist theory of the state than other feminist theories such as care theory, and endorses community care centers and mandatory universal national service for young people as a third plank of her state theory. In her final chapter, Schwarzenbach extends her concept of civic friendship to relations among states and argues for the superiority of international *philia* over some recent cosmopolitan proposals.

The most obvious objection to the author’s argument is that civic friendship is no longer possible in modern nation-states. Schwarzenbach counters this objection, however, by noting that the large size of modern nation-states is not necessarily a hindrance to civic friendship. As opposed to personal friendship, civic friendship does not require close emotional connections but can be expressed through institutions and laws (e.g., market socialism, proportional representation, and national service). The greater diversity of modern states is likewise not a concern as long as we take as our goal not the more stringent political friendship envisioned by Aristotle, with its concern for the moral character of others, but a more tolerant form of civic friendship that aims at friendship in difference, equality, and rights.

Other questions remain nonetheless. As Schwarzenbach herself admits, her notion of civic friendship across differences stretches the definition of friendship pretty thinly (p. 247). Her notion of civic friendship ultimately seems akin to what other democratic theorists have referred to as a generalized trust in others. The author, however, does not mine the literature on trust in developing her theory. Indeed, while some scholars (e.g., Bo Rothstein) have argued that universal welfare policies are a significant manifestation and source of generalized trust in others, Schwarzenbach barely mentions universal welfare policies in discussing how states might embody and foster civic friendship. This would seem an oversight of her theory.

A second question relates to the author’s endorsement of market socialism. She repeatedly criticizes other thinkers (e.g., Rawls) for remaining too tied to the acquisitive model of production, and outlines her defense of market socialism as a direct challenge to capitalist private property relations. Yet contemporary Marxists such as Bertell Ollman have criticized market socialism on the grounds that the competitive market (not private property) is the main source of animosity and acquisitiveness among people in capitalist societies. He claims that a shift to worker-controlled and owned firms will not overcome the competitive animosity among workers but merely shift it to the firm level. Ollman may be mistaken on this point, but his argument at least gives one reason to wonder if Schwarzenbach goes far enough in her call for market socialism. His critique raises the question of whether the competitive market system itself is compatible with civic friendship.

A final question relates to the practical realizability of Schwarzenbach’s proposals. She suggests at several points that women’s entry en masse into politics and economics opens up the possibility for the realization of a new politics of civic friendship (pp. 20–21, 137–38, 166, 168, 267–68). While she is careful to note that the transformative powers of women stem not from their nature but from their traditional responsibility for the ethical reproductive activities of society, and acknowledges that her

account of ethical reproductive praxis is a “selective abstraction” (pp. 14, 155–56), she nonetheless appears at times to overstate the reformist potential of most women. Even if many women may bring to politics an intimate knowledge of ethical reproductive activity, they may nevertheless construe their ethical responsibilities narrowly, believing that each family should take care of its own. This narrow vision of ethical reproductive responsibility not only does not support a broad ideal of civic friendship but can actually be an impediment to it. Schwarzenbach might have given more attention to the question of how women’s ethical insights can be broadened to better support her reform proposals.

These criticisms notwithstanding, *On Civic Friendship* is an important book. Scholars of Aristotle, Locke, Marx, and Rawls will find fresh and challenging interpretations of these thinkers’ ideas. Feminists will find a well-developed proposal for a feminist theory of the state. Democratic theorists will find a provocative defense of the importance of civic friendship for democratic justice. Overall, this book is a testament to how, in the hands of a creative and capable scholar, the study of the history of political thought can yield valuable insights about important contemporary questions such as the preconditions and nature of democratic justice.

Political Representation. Edited by Ian Shapiro, Susan C. Stokes, Elisabeth Jean Wood, and Alexander S. Kirshner. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 380p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592711002544

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What factors can make the relationship between representative and represented a democratic one? How much scope for variation is there within political representation before its democratic veneer wears thin? In varied ways, these questions anchor each of the contributions to this volume. Taken together, the chapters do not add up to a systematic intervention into current debates on political representation—they differ widely in tone, breadth, and assumptions—but the qualities of several of them vindicate the editors’ claim that the book makes genuine advances in the theory of political representation.

The book consists of 13 chapters, grouped into five sections: “Representation before Representative Democracy,” “Theories of Political Representation,” “Representation and Inherited Justice,” “What Role for Representative Quotas?” and “Preferences, Persuasion, and Democratic Representation.” The sections offer us a set of provocative glimpses into, and critiques of, the deceptively simple axis linking representative and represented. Representation need not be democratic, of course; and few would label Hobbes’s famous account as such. David Runciman’s elegant contribution builds a “Hobbesian theory of democratic representation” on the idea that citizens authorize and judge

government on its actions when it ‘personates’ the state as a whole. Stepping outside the electoral link, Mark Knights offers a fascinating glimpse into how representation as it developed in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain was “a participatory process involving, on occasion, a good deal of direct political activity” (p. 37). His chapter is the one place in this book where nonelectoral representation is canvassed explicitly and taken seriously as a democratic practice; more account of contemporary theories that step outside the electoral frame, such as Paul Q. Hirst’s in *Associative Democracy* (1994), would have brought greater engagement with one lively theme in current theoretical debates about representation. Philip Pettit’s “Varieties of Public Representation” offers a clear breakdown of types of representation, resonant in key ways with recent work by Jane Mansbridge (“Rethinking Representation,” *American Political Science Review* 97 [2003]: 515–28), not least in the overlap between his “interpretive representation” and Mansbridge’s “gyroscopic representation.” Pettit joins a body of current work that updates, multiplies, and arguably deepens Pitkinian views of the roles that representatives can and do play in speaking for—or claiming to speak for—constituents.

Clarissa Rile Hayward and Courtney Jung both remind us that represented identities and interests are not natural or fixed, but are often constructed products of power politics and structural inequality. Their differing responses to this fact pose insightful challenges to representatives (Hayward) and represented (Jung) alike. In the longest and most detailed argument in the book, Mahmood Mamdani traces the continuing status of Native Americans as “both citizens and wards of the United States” (p. 159). For the chapter’s authoritative historical sweep and its implicit assertion that indigenous politics deserves a central place in contemporary critiques of political representation, the author and editors deserve our appreciation; at the same time, neither Mamdani nor his fellow contributors draw explicitly on the rich implications of his analysis for what democratic representation of or by indigenous people in settler states can mean today.

The subject of electoral or selection quotas, especially for women, has been on the fault line of debates around descriptive and substantive representation for some years. Shireen Hassim’s nuanced account shows that quotas for women are no easy fix for inequalities in women’s representation where electoral, party, and broader social structures hinder it. Andrew Rehfeld provides a more general theoretical argument that any restrictive qualifications for representative office must clear a high justificatory hurdle (it could be argued that in countries such as France and Belgium, the issue of quotas has indeed gone through exhaustive public debate—in some places, at least, the argument may have been won).

Remaining contributors ask important, persisting questions about media, money, instability, and elitism in our