Introduction
In 2015 and 2016, around one million migrants and refugees disembarking from Turkey arrived in the European Union (EU), mostly in Greece but also partly in Bulgaria. During some months, up to 200,000 landed on the Greek islands. However, from March 2016 on, due to certain policy interventions, this influx decreased significantly, and by 2017 had gone down to 29,000, similar to the average seen in earlier years. Whilst many were merely in transit through Turkey, many others had stayed in Turkey for some time and either applied for asylum or registered under temporary protection, living and working in the country for a while. Those who left Turkey had been driven either by strong migration network effects (i.e., the attraction of relatives in other countries) or by a lack of opportunities, and thus integration, in Turkey.Footnote
1
Nevertheless, because the majority of migrants and refugees stayed in Turkey, the country is now primarily an immigration country.
This commentary will look at the broader context of migration to, from, and through Turkey. Notably, it will discuss the discrepancy between de jure and de facto integration, as well as the tension between religiously inspired and legally defined concepts. Finally, it will suggest that shortcomings in terms of the integration of migrants and refugees acts as a driver of onward movements, and is thus likely to shape future flows.
Immigration to Turkey
For about ten years now, Turkey has been going through a migration transition, becoming a major destination country for travelers, migrants, and refugees.Footnote
2
Contributing to this process have been the country’s relative political stability—particularly as compared to other countries in the region (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria)—and economic growth, together with a liberal visa regime and relatively open borders within a rather volatile regional environment. Over this period, entries to Turkey have continuously increased, from 19 million in 2006 to 35 million in 2014, when numbers peaked; after this, the numbers dropped sharply, by almost 30 percent, down to 25 million in 2016. This drop can be explained through the combined effect of Russian restrictions on tourism to Turkey in the wake of a minor military conflict; the rise of terrorism; and domestic policies and tensions between Turkey and Germany, with the latter a major source of tourists for the former. All of these factors have deterred international travel and tourism.
At the same time, however, immigration has increased significantly. In 2013, prior to the first major influx of Syrians, there were just under 1 million foreign-born persons in Turkey, mostly of ethnic Turkish origin; about 450,000 registered foreigners, with more than half of these in the country on short-term permits; and an estimated 500,000 or more irregular immigrants.Footnote
3
But due to multiple crises in the wider neighborhood of Europe, the number of people, mostly Syrians, seeking temporary protection in Turkey began to sharply increase, rising from 14,237 in 2012 to 224,664 in 2013 and 1,519,286 in 2014.Footnote
4
By fall 2017, this number had risen to over 3.3 million. Finally, the number of persons in the country under international protection was also steadily increasing, from 3,505 in 2006 to 66,000 in 2016, or 283,000 in cumulative terms.Footnote
5
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also registered 295,401 asylum seekers and refugees.Footnote
6
However, some of the above figures are unreliable, and what is more migration is a rather fluid process. Notably, for instance, around one million people have moved on from Turkey to Greece and the EU. The above figures are thus indicators only. In any case, it seems fair to say that, in 2014, there were approximately 3.6 million persons in Turkey who had not been born there, and by 2017, this had risen to approximately 5.3 million.
However, while such absolute numbers of refugees and immigrants may seem impressive, they are nevertheless quite moderate when compared to the numbers seen in the context of the history of immigration in EU countries. In Turkey, the foreign-born population represents around 6.7 percent of the total population, or 5.3 percent if we deduct presumably ethnic Turkish foreign-born persons. This is considerably less than the average of over 10 percent (54.5. million) in the EU, where the proportion of the immigrant population ranges from a low of 1.6 percent in Poland to a high of 18.2 percent in Austria. Other differences between the EU and Turkey are that, in the latter, the overwhelming majority come from just two or three neighboring or regional countries and belong to the same or a similar religion as Turkish nationals, phenomena that shape local integration challenges. The key features of the migration transition of Turkey are not only the numbers, but in particular the short period of time over which the transition took place: just one decade, from 2006 to 2016. It appears that, since 2006, the number of immigrants has almost quintupled. Turkey thus resembles the cases of certain southern EU member states—notably Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece—which became major immigration countries over periods of from 10 to 20 years. For instance, Italy, which was once a country sending a significant number of guest workers, now hosts 5.9 million regular immigrants in addition to several hundred thousand irregular migrants, amounting to some 10 percent of the population.
Until late 2015, the Turkish government kept its borders largely open to Syrians and Iraqis in need of international protection. Moreover, until March 2016, those who wished to move on to the EU were able to do so with relative ease. However, from November 2015 onward, more controls were introduced such that the number of departures began dropping, and after March 2016, when an EU-Turkey statement on migration restrictions became effective, onward migration almost came to a halt. The government, though, also acknowledged that many actually remained in Turkey, and as a result it introduced new legislation more adequate for an immigration country. Notably, it introduced new laws relating to citizenship, to foreigners and international protection, and to work permits for foreigners, and recently it has even begun to grant citizenship to Syrians and other refugees. Nevertheless, even though a political framework for the integration of foreigners is currently in development, so far there is no national immigrant or refugee integration strategy, nor is there a council of immigrant communities or an established communication structure between the government and immigrants. Instead, integration is left to local governments, who lack the political power and resources to deal adequately with the issue. At this point, civil society has stepped in, and is de facto implementing a limited bottom-up approach.Footnote
7
Nonetheless, as will be shown here, the public remains skeptical about the issue, as indicated by widespread negative attitudes toward foreigners.
Finally, it must also be stated that Turkey does actually have significant experience with the issue of the integration of migrants. On the one hand, millions of Turkish workers and their families have long been migrating abroad, primarily to the EU but also to the United States, Australia, Russia, and elsewhere. In all of these places, they have been subject to the host societies’ particular responses and to their integration policies and those policies’ various successes and failures. On the other hand, Turkey has also experienced significant internal migration and displacement from east to west, partly of ethnic minorities (e.g., Kurds) and partly of rural populations moving into urban environments; this process has resulted in mixed outcomes in terms of integration and exclusion.Footnote
8
All this demonstrates that the Turkish case is not exceptional either in numerical or in temporal terms. Instead, Turkey’s position in the global migration order—that is, in the migration relations of countries—has been rather normalizing, meaning that Turkey, like other economically growing and high-middle or high income countries, inevitably attracts immigration of various kinds. This has been facilitated by Turkey’s international relations—it presents itself to other countries as open and welcoming—and by its economic growth, but also by the domestic labor market, which has come to need labor migrants, due partly to low employment rates for women and partly to the informal economy, which, some scholars have claimed, is becoming increasingly unpopular for Turkish nationals.Footnote
9
Political and social responses to the migration transition
From 2008, Turkey began slowly adapting to the new realities and set up two so-called “bureaus,” one on migration policy and the other on border management. This resulted in a new migration management regime encompassing the 2014 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM; Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü), the 2014 Temporary Protection Regulation, and more recently the 2016 Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection (RWPFTP), which was implemented by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı). In addition, the Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (Başbakanlık Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı, AFAD) was mandated as the principal government agency for the coordination of most matters relating to Syrian refugees.Footnote
10
As a result, the agency previously in charge of such matters—namely, the General Directorate of Security (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü)—was largely deprived of its role in migration management.Footnote
11
And finally, due to the transformation, policy responses are now “not limited to public activities. NGO projects and their practices are also active and [have become] widely common during the last few years.”Footnote
12
The creation of this regime was partly driven by the EU accession process, which has conventionally been analyzed as “Europeanization.” However, I believe that just as important have been domestic national interests—e.g., modernization, attracting mobile people, skills—and foreign policy considerations to prepare Turkey for its new role as a leading country in the region and the world; this is certainly true from 2012 or 2013, when Turkey-EU relations began to turn sour. Hence, endogenous drivers began to prevail over exogenous drivers. In any case, the emerging regime was not exactly comprehensive, but rather multifaceted, resulting in some degree of overlap and competition between diverse ministries and authorities concerning who controls certain policy fields.Footnote
13
Notably, in the field of migrant and refugee integrationFootnote
14
there is a discrepancy between de jure integration (i.e., what is prescribed in policy and law) and de facto integration (i.e., what is put into practice);Footnote
15
this can be conceptualized as an implementation gap. Such discrepancies or gaps may undermine the rule of law, accountability, and ultimately good governance.Footnote
16
What is more, in the case of immigrant integration, such discrepancies can amount to discrimination. Whilst such discrepancies may also be conceptualized as the discrepancy between discourse or policy narrative and practice, analyzing matters of purpose and power, this commentary will only describe the discrepancy in order to identify implementation gaps and the consequences that these have for integration and future migration.
De jure integration of foreigners and refugees
In Turkey, all legally resident foreign nationals are assigned a Foreigner Identification Number (FIN; Yabancı Kimlik Numarası), with biometric and other details stored on the DGMM’s intranet site “Göc.Net”. In 2014–2015, persons under temporary protection, notably Syrians, were registered by the DGMM as per Article 22 of the temporary provision of the Temporary Protection Regulation of October 22, 2014. In the course of this process, such persons were issued a Temporary Protection Identification Card displaying the FIN, which then serves to facilitate access to all government services and is thus the key measure facilitating de jure integration.
Under Turkish law, all children, including foreign nationals, have the right to free language and vocational courses offered by public education centers administered by the Provincial Directorates of Education (İl Millî Eğitim Müdürlükleri); to basic education for 12 years; and to higher education opportunities. One alternative to these are the private Syrian schools that have been categorized as “temporary education centers.” There, however, education is usually subject to a fee. All of these matters were first clarified by AFAD Circular No. 2014/4 on the Administration of Services to Foreigners under the Temporary Protection Regime, and by the Ministry of Education Circular No. 2014/21 on Education Services for Foreign Nationals, dating to September 23, 2014.Footnote
17
Foreigners staying in the country regularly for more than 90 days, and thus in possession of a residence permit, are required to obtain private health insurance. Persons under temporary protection, as clarified by Article 27 of AFAD Circular No. 2014/4 and the Ministry of Health’s directive on Healthcare Services to Be Provided to Temporary Protection Beneficiaries (November 4, 2015), have free access to health care.Footnote
18
However, apart from emergency medical conditions, this access is limited to the province in which persons under temporary protection are registered. Hence, this represents yet another type of geographic limitation, this time one that impinges on integration.
The 2003 Law (No. 4817) on the Work Permit for Foreigners (LWPF) requires all foreigners seeking employment to obtain a work permit, with the system being administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Initially, Syrians—in other words, the majority of foreigners in Turkey—had almost no access to the formal labor market, which meant that formal economic integration was legally barred. But in the meantime there came into force the Regulation on the Work Permit of Refugees under Temporary Protection of January 2016, which provided employers with the opportunity to apply for permission to employ refugees, though refugees can also apply for an independent work permit. However, employment rights are restricted to the province of registration in this field as well, thereby imposing yet another geographical limitation. Foreigners, including persons under temporary protection, in principle have the same rights as nationals to set up a business in Turkey and to open bank accounts, which are crucial issues for regular employment and for running a business.Footnote
19
While persons under temporary protection are free to settle anywhere in the country, refugees are dispersed to so-called satellite cities on a no-choice basis. With regards to accommodation, neither the LFIP nor the Temporary Protection Regulation provide for accommodation, with Article 8.3 only vaguely stating that persons “may […] be accommodated in a special section of a current temporary accommodation centers [sic] or in a separate temporary accommodation center or in places to be determined by the governorates for humanitarian reasons.”Footnote
20
Such centers are semi-closed, as according to Article 8.5 “temporary accommodation center management may grant permission to [persons under temporary protection] for leaving [sic] the temporary accommodation centers for a short period of time in case of emergencies or upon the request of a public institution and organization.”Footnote
21
Such centers are set up and run by AFAD in cooperation with Turkish Red Crescent (Türk Kızılayı). In addition, unaccompanied minors are taken into state or foster care.Footnote
22
Prior to the large-scale influx of displaced persons to Turkey, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)—an assessment of migrant integration policies in terms of the labor market, education, family reunification, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination—found “that Turkey’s legal framework is slightly unfavorable for integration and ranks below the other MIPEX countries, scoring only 24-out-of-100 points.”Footnote
23
Whether these countries and their policies are actually comparable, however, is quite another matter.
De facto integration of foreigners and refugees
As of December 2016, of the registered 872,536 school-age Syrian children, only 491,896 were actually attending school, with 367,330, or 42 percent, not in school.Footnote
24
This illustrates how large a proportion of these children had still not been integrated into the educational system. There are also temporary education centers teaching a modified Syrian curriculum in the Arabic language; such centers, however, do not facilitate integration but rather offer a parallel structure, as mentioned in the following paragraph as well, and in any case these are expected to be gradually phased out over the next few years. At universities, the number of Syrian students amounted to 14,750. The government—notably the Ministry of National Education (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, MEB)—has, however, set up and since “strengthened the status and capacity of the Education in Emergencies and Migration Unit”Footnote
25
to address shortcomings regarding access to education.
In terms of health care, it has been reported that, since 2011, 967,000 Syrians have received in-patient treatment.Footnote
26
However, various actors are more critical of such treatment than what this figure may initially suggest. Language has been identified as a key barrier in the delivery of health services,Footnote
27
and in addition, many Syrians have moved to cities other than the ones where they are officially registered, which actually excludes them from receiving most health care.Footnote
28
By 2016, the Ministry of Health (Sağlık Bakanlığı) had established 64 migrant health centers, and plans to establish another 250 as well.Footnote
29
Nevertheless, strictly speaking, such measures do not in fact integrate foreigners into Turkey’s mainstream social systems, but instead segregate them into specialized systems. Hence, while the intention may be good, the implementation does not actually facilitate integration.
As for labor, prior to the large-scale influx of displaced persons, the OSCE found that the employment rate of immigrants in Turkey was well below the national average, which was considered “particularly worrying,” as unemployment was significantly higher, suggesting that they were particularly “badly affected.”Footnote
30
Of the approximately 5.3 million foreigners and refugees in 2015,Footnote
31
only 73,500 were granted work permits, and of these, only 13,300 were Syrians.Footnote
32
As a result, just 2.4 percent of all foreigners and refugees have access to and are integrated into the regular labor market. That is to say, nearly 97 percent are excluded from the regular labor market, and as a consequence, migrants’ and refugees’ labor rights have come to be evaluated in a rather critical manner.Footnote
33
People, then, get pushed into the informal economy.
Another possible path to economic integration is the establishment of businesses. In 2015, “the number of new Syrian companies surpassed 1,600, reaching 2.4 percent of the total new established firms in Turkey,” with the number being 13.1 percent in Gaziantep and a staggering 35 percent in Kilis.Footnote
34
It is also, however, claimed that in Gaziantep “the majority of these Syrian-owned businesses are informal and lack the finance and procedural knowledge to formalize.”Footnote
35
This, in turn, implies that much of this variety of economic integration is in fact informal. Although such a pattern is not dissimilar from Turkish practices overall—31 to 35 percent of the Turkish economy is said to be informalFootnote
36
—it nonetheless upsets Turkish competitors, thereby undermining peaceful cohabitation.Footnote
37
In terms of accommodation, of all persons under temporary protection, only 246,000 are offered accommodation in a camp. Instead, of all persons under international or temporary protection, over 3 million people must find and pay for their own accommodation, often in cities, but also in some rural areas as well.
Clearly, the challenges to integrating foreigners, and refugees in particular, are also shaped by their particular demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Over 1.8 million Syrians are minors, around half are women, and approximately 60,000 are over the age of 65.Footnote
38
Research has shown that there is a substantial correlation between age at the time of migration and social integration: the older people are when they arrive, the lower their later rates of employment, wages, and interaction with the indigenous people.Footnote
39
On the other hand, the amount of segregation increases in tandem with age at the time of migration. What is more, the integration has been found to be gendered,Footnote
40
meaning that migrant women are more likely to be left behind, which creates a negative effect in the long term with regards to the integration chances of their children. Because Turkey ranks well below the EU average in terms of gender equality,Footnote
41
there seems to be little hope that the government will take measures to prevent such negative integration outcomes. Social integration is also impacted by the level of education and skills at the time of arrival. A somewhat older survey by AFADFootnote
42
suggests that around half of those involved in the survey were of low skills, with 15 percent being illiterate. This is quite different from certain EU countries (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands), where Syrians in particular were found to be more likely to be highly educated.Footnote
43
As a result, the integration challenges are higher in Turkey than in some EU countries. This situation also means that refugees are more likely to be integrated into the lower strata of society, and accordingly exposed to all the potential social problems that this entails, such as poverty, illiteracy, poor housing, and health problems.
Perception of integration by the Turkish people
In 2010, a survey by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development revealed that 30.9 percent of Turkish respondents did not want to have immigrants as neighbors—this was the second highest rate of all 34 countries surveyed.Footnote
44
Another study by Balkır and Südaş found that, of the Turkish respondents in the country’s southern coastal area, 61.6 percent preferred not to live in districts populated with foreigners, 63 percent did not want foreigners to buy property, and 61.2 percent did not like the granting of political rights to foreigners.Footnote
45
Many also expressed a belief that settlement by foreigners caused a “degeneration of values” (46.9 percent) and a “degeneration of the native culture” (45.9 percent). In 2014, a Turkish Foreign Policy study stated that “86 percent of the participants argue that no further Syrian refugees should be allowed in the country,” whilst 29.7 percent wanted them to be returned.Footnote
46
Meanwhile, the Turkish Perceptions Survey 2015, conducted by the German Marshall Fund, found that 41 percent of respondents believed there were too many immigrants in Turkey, 84 percent were worried about Syrians and 64 percent about Africans, while 81 percent believed that foreigners do not integrate well.Footnote
47
Such results suggest a largely negative perception of foreigners and refugees in Turkey, and imply that the majority does not appreciate longer-term residence or integration. Speaking rather pointedly about this matter, Güneş A. Aşık has said that “xenophobia is on the rise in Turkey. Everyday rhetoric has shifted from ‘Syrians are our guests’ to vitriol and suspicion.”Footnote
48
This phenomenon points to a clear divide between policy and people. Whereas the central government is positive toward immigration, the people appear to harbor a good deal of concern. Such concerns, however, have so far remained silent, or at least have not yet been either politicized or led to the emergence of xenophobic political parties—not to mention racial violence—as has been the case in many EU countries. Nevertheless, there is a need for this divide to be bridged, or the situation may well explode.
Integration policies à la Turca?
Policy and practice in Turkey are informed by an approach in which the Turkish government has in two ways diverged from the conventional European rights-based approach to refugee reception or immigrant inclusion. First, the largest group—i.e., Syrians—were initially conceptualized as “guests” and not as “refugees,” which was due partly to the emergency situation of large-scale spontaneous arrivals but also partly to the initial absence of comprehensive legislation on the matter. This has been changing, particularly since the LFIP came into force in 2014. Second, the social response has been conceptualized as “harmonization,” which diverges from the conventional concept of “integration” as spelled out, for instance, by the European Commission.Footnote
49
Both government responses have been received with a certain degree of either criticism or puzzlement; however, in what follows, I will not only provide a sketch of this criticism, but also discuss the actual productive potential that such an unconventional approach can have for a social ethical debate. I thus deliberately adopt a non-Orientalist and postcolonial perspective in that I aim to avoid accepting the dominant Western ideas per se, but remain open to non-Western thinking and ethics.
Guests or refugees?
In 2013, Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay insisted “even though their [Syrians’] status is temporary protection, we perceive them as our guests and treat them this way.”Footnote
50
It was further explained that “we hope and the expectation is that the domestic conflict in Syria will cease at once […] and people […] will return to their homes.”Footnote
51
Fuat Oktay, the president of AFAD, added that “we considered standing by the people of neighboring Syria […] as an obligation. Our country has historic, cultural, and neighborly ties with Syria,” and he also went on to mention “help[ing] our neighbors in need” and “our Syrian brothers.”Footnote
52
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, moreover, has addressed Syrians in explicitly Islamic terms by saying, “you are Muhajirun (i.e., the early converts to Islam who emigrated from Mecca to Medina) for us. We, as Ansar (i.e., the helpers and hosts of the Muslim emigrants to Medina), try to take care of our Muhajir brothers with love.”Footnote
53
Thus, the key concepts driving Turkey’s policy response were the notions of “guests,” “brothers,” “brothers and sisters,” “friends,” “Muhajirun,” “neighbors,” and “historic, cultural ties.” This is a fairly eclectic mix of concepts. In 2016, Erdoğan took this approach one step further, announcing that “we are going to help our Syrian friends in offering them the chance, if they want it, to acquire Turkish nationality,” thereby adding to the mix the idea of Syrians being future “citizens.”Footnote
54
Despite this, the reference to the concept of “guests” resembles an earlier tradition in which immigration detention centers were almost cynically referred to as “foreigners’ guesthouses.”Footnote
55
The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) criticized the fact that “as ‘guests’ of the Turkish [s]tate, the Syrian refugees may enjoy de facto protection but their status is open to interpretation and to revocation.”Footnote
56
Şenay Özden argues that “not being granted refugee status is an important factor that increases the vulnerability of Syrians,”Footnote
57
while Ulusoy emphasizes how “‘guests’ [is] a term which has no legal definition or meaning in international asylum law.”Footnote
58
Instead, who is and is not a guest is something determined solely by religious or political leaders. Therefore, lawyers, academics, and civil society reject the notion of “guests,” as it is a concept that can circumvent the codification of rights, accountability, and thus overall the rule of law. Indeed, one might wonder whether this kind of hospitality is as universal as the UNHCR claims, and whether it would, for instance, also be offered were there an influx of large numbers of Christian refugees from, for example, Ukraine. What is more, then, I would add that, inasmuch as the reference to “brothers and sisters” is de facto a reference to the Islamic umma—an imagined transnational community of Muslims that by definition is not universal—it may very well exclude non-Muslims. However, other scholars have argued that the relevant sections of the Qur’an dealing with refugees were meant to include non-Muslims as well as Muslims, and thus may potentially be universal, too.Footnote
59
The same has been found for the Old Testament, notably the Book of Deuteronomy, which, as suggested by Fisch, was to some extent the first refugee convention, as it introduces the ideas of humanity as a collective (family), solidarity, dignity, and inclusion, thereby representing a kind of soft law similar to international law that has right up to the present inspired European policy responses and even hard laws.Footnote
60
However, even though both the de jure and de facto integration of forced migrants in Turkey remains much less than ideal, it is not quite as grim a situation as some commentators would have it. There are, for instance, primary and secondary legislations that provide some legal framework. Basic social services are provided, although as yet these cannot be utilized by all. However, it seems that the issue here is at least partly high demand, resulting in a degree of scarcity of resources and staff. And whilst critics argue that international law, and thus the recognition of Syrians as refugees, would per se entail more rights, less vulnerability, and greater security, numerous reports on the treatment and conditions of refugees in countries that apply such international standards demonstrate quite the opposite. For instance, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights has noticed that “there are alarming trends in the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees, as well as of irregular migrants in all parts of Europe.”Footnote
61
This indicates that the application of international refugee law does not guarantee that displaced persons are treated humanely. Instead, the reception and treatment of refugees often seems to be subject to political considerations on a national level, and thus also to the views of political leaders, rather than to any commitment to universal human rights law.
Therefore, adding (and I consciously say adding) to this discourse a moral dimension—whether informed by religious or philosophical thinking as derived from the Qur’an, the Bible, or Immanuel Kant does not matter—rather resembles a process of ethical reasoning. It thus adds to the debate a principled approach that carries the potential of harnessing politics and power. However, the ultimate test case is not whether or not reference is made to moral or religious as opposed to legal frameworks, but instead whether or not these frameworks are applied in a universal and inclusionary or a politicized—and thus discriminatory and exclusionary—fashion.
Harmonization or integration?
Article 96 of the 2014 LFIP explains that “harmonization” (uyum) means “mutual harmonization between foreigners, applicants and international protection beneficiaries and the society [sic].”Footnote
62
Ali Zafer Sağıroğlu explains that “the term ‘integration’ is deliberately not used to avoid its partly negative associations stemming from the experiences of Turkish immigrants in the EU.”Footnote
63
In the LFIP, “harmonization” nowhere receives further clarification, and thus remains rather nebulous. However, the DGMM’s website states that harmonization is “neither assimilation nor integration. Immigration is the harmonization of society as a result of mutual understanding,” and goes on to say that “an immigrant-focused approach” will be taken so as “to equip [immigrants] with the knowledge and skills to be independently active in all areas of social life.”Footnote
64
The key concepts involved here are “understanding,” “mutuality,” “mutual adaptation,” ideas of empowerment, and “reciprocity.” However, this amounts more to a preamble or philosophical underpinning than to any sort of policy. Thus far, this has been only vaguely translated into policy, such as “attend[ing] courses where the basics of political structure, language, legal system, culture and history of Turkey as well as their rights and obligations are explained [and] […] courses related to access to public and private goods and services, access to education and economic activities [and so on].”Footnote
65
Moreover, the 1989 Law (No. 3294) on the Promotion of Social Assistance and Solidarity has had its provisions and assistance extended to foreigners as well, which is relevant inasmuch as it extends the principle of solidarity to immigrants. Solidarity is commonly understood as unity, particularly among individuals sharing a common interest or interests, and it further implies mutual support among the members of a group as well as collective responsibility.Footnote
66
Hence, the application of the concept of solidarity to this law suggests that the law rests on the notion of a collective of the people in Turkey that would literally include foreigners—or at least, such is the promise.
However, thus far, scholars have remained skeptical of the concept of harmonization. For instance, Ahmet İçduygu has responded to the concept with reservation, while Rebecca Kilberg and Kılıç Kanat and Kadir Üstün, among others, simply translate the concept as integration.Footnote
67
Meral Açıkgöz and Hakkı Onur Arıner suggest that harmonization has “a more innocuous meaning in Turkish and therefore better reflects the aim of the Turkish approach which is to understand the indigenous-migrant interaction as a dynamic two-way relationship in which migrants are not confined to a passive role regarding issues which relate to them.”Footnote
68
Some more critical commentators have even suggested that the “harmonization” approach is not an altruistic one but rather a “tactical boon” in a political game.Footnote
69
In any case, within the context of immigration, the concept of harmonization differs from conventional concepts such as integration, acculturation, or assimilation, and thus provides an opportunity for fresh thinking. I will take this opportunity to reflect on the concept of harmony and then to investigate where it sits within the wider debate.
From ancient times to the modern era in Europe and Asia, the concept of harmony can be found in the works of thinkers as diverse as Confucius, Aristotle, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Mohandas Gandhi. This implies that it is a relatively universal concept. In philosophy it refers to the opposite of conflict and chaos and suggests coherence and order. For Plato, harmony rests on individuals’ “set of duties [and] obligations to the community” that, if fulfilled, “result in a harmonious whole.”Footnote
70
This is thought to be based on a “symmetric relationship” that subsequently results in “unity within diversity.”Footnote
71
This theme can also be found in Chinese philosophy, which stipulates that conflict, through a dialectic process of harmonization, ultimately leads to a higher level of harmony.Footnote
72
Thus, within this framework, harmony means “mutual complementation and mutual support between the two [conflicting elements], so that each depends on the other for strength, actuality, productivity, and value.”Footnote
73
In other words, two elements depend on one another—which resonates with the metaphor of “brothers and sisters” used to describe the relationship between Turks and Syrians—in order to create a harmonious whole. To return to the issue of migration and integration, social harmony might thus also be understood as the social cohesion of different elements that nevertheless depend on one another.Footnote
74
This initial sketch is sufficient to argue that the application of the concept of harmony to social responses to the arrival of immigrants has the potential to fuel a fruitful debate, and so should not be discarded too swiftly.
The concept of “harmonization” also diverges from the key concepts used in the international debate on host/migrant interaction. These concepts are integration, multiculturalism, and assimilation, and they differ from one another in terms of their varying degrees of mutuality within the adaptation process, and thus also in terms of how they envisage power relations.Footnote
75
All three of these models or concepts, it should be noted, are frequently considered imperfect, both in principle and with regards to their actual implementation. In many receiving countries, immigrants are legally or structurally treated unequally and hence discriminated against, and as a result they suffer from unemployment, underachieving in education, poor housing, and political underrepresentation, as well as, in the worst cases, from overpolicing, racism, and racial violence. All of these lead on to alienation, segregation, exclusion, and self-exclusion, which in turn undermines solidarity and social cohesion. Therefore, all three models have been somewhat discredited, and indeed Ted Cantle even argues that “we need to be able to talk about race and diversity in a new way.”Footnote
76
One more recent response in this vein is the idea of interculturalism. Unlike multiculturalism—which builds on the preservation of culture, a static notion of identity, the centrality of culture for relationships, and the co-existence of different cultures—interculturalism rests on the idea of multifaceted identities, multifaceted relationships, and the interaction between or among cultures, while simultaneously recognizing social cohesion and common humanity.Footnote
77
Some of this seems to resemble the idea of “harmonization,” notably the principles of “mutuality” and “reciprocity,” which resonate with the principles contained in the inter- prefix in interculturalism. Moreover, the emphasis on commonality that is prevalent in the current Turkish discourse’s use of ideas such as “neighbors” and “brothers and sisters” echoes interculturalism’s call to emphasize commonality as opposed to difference.Footnote
78
As a final point, acquiring citizenship is considered the highest level of legal integration, one that leads to better social integration and thus on to “full integration.”Footnote
79
Turkey has gradually moved on from the principle of ius sanguinis (citizenship by descent from a citizen parent) to the principle of ius soli (citizenship by birth or residence in the territory of the country as granted by the authorities), as was regulated in 2009’s Turkish Citizenship Law (No. 5901). İçduygu believes that “with a trembling debate on the acquisition of citizenship for Syrians, it seems that Turkish policy makers mainly, and the Turkish public partially, have passed a threshold. After a long engagement on the immediate humanitarian needs of refugees under the temporary protection scheme, the incorporation of refugees into Turkish society has become seen as crucial.”Footnote
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In line with these changes, in May 2017 some of the first Syrians were granted citizenship.Footnote
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Conclusion
Turkey is going through stages similar to those seen in many other new immigration countries, though at an accelerated pace. With regards specifically to the arrival of Syrians, the country went through three phases: first, a phase of emergency; second, a phase of large-scale onward migration; and third, a stage of closed borders, consolidation, and integration.Footnote
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Generally speaking, in most countries there is first a phase of disbelief, ignorance, or even denial; second, a period of legal adjustment to the new realities, and thus a degree of structural integration paired with some public resentment; and third, ideally, a period of deeper and sustainable integration. For instance, it took Germany 40 years to acknowledge that it was an immigration country, while Turkey has only been experiencing the migration transition for around 10 to 15 years now. As such, any analysis and assessment should take into account the temporality of the emergence of Turkey’s social, policy, and philosophical responses, and ought to abstain from too quick judgements.
It seems fair to suggest that Turkey’s initial treatment of refugees as guests helped to moderate public opinion and generate a certain amount of acceptance; this, I believe, worked relatively well during the first and second phases. However, the attraction of irrational responses—such as those inspired by religion—also lies in the imperfection of the rationalism of a rights-based approach,Footnote
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as in the case of the failure by many EU countries to treat refugees in a humane fashion. Even so, since it has become clear that the Syrian crisis is in fact a protracted displacement situation, a more rights-based approach along with one that goes beyond the temporary protection rhetoric would prove more adequate. Ethical or religious reasoning may inspire, but in a modern state it should not replace the rule of law. Furthermore, the authoritarian and arbitrary policy of the current Turkish leadership raises doubts about future protection of refugees.
Finally, because displaced persons from other countries currently residing in Turkey are “both refugees fleeing their countries due to civil war, as well as active economic agents looking for opportunities to work or invest,” they respond to the constraints and opportunities around them.Footnote
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While many have now been in the country for long periods of time, smaller numbers still continue to move on to the EU. The future of these movements depends on three domestic factors; namely, the economic, political, and social capacity of Turkey to “harmonize” host communities and immigrants in both legal and practical terms. Still, it remains to be seen whether this results in innovative inclusionary and humane policies that would eliminate inequality and allow people to actually settle in Turkey, or in further shortcomings in terms of the integration of migrants and refugees that would continue to drive onward migration.
Introduction
In 2015 and 2016, around one million migrants and refugees disembarking from Turkey arrived in the European Union (EU), mostly in Greece but also partly in Bulgaria. During some months, up to 200,000 landed on the Greek islands. However, from March 2016 on, due to certain policy interventions, this influx decreased significantly, and by 2017 had gone down to 29,000, similar to the average seen in earlier years. Whilst many were merely in transit through Turkey, many others had stayed in Turkey for some time and either applied for asylum or registered under temporary protection, living and working in the country for a while. Those who left Turkey had been driven either by strong migration network effects (i.e., the attraction of relatives in other countries) or by a lack of opportunities, and thus integration, in Turkey.Footnote 1 Nevertheless, because the majority of migrants and refugees stayed in Turkey, the country is now primarily an immigration country.
This commentary will look at the broader context of migration to, from, and through Turkey. Notably, it will discuss the discrepancy between de jure and de facto integration, as well as the tension between religiously inspired and legally defined concepts. Finally, it will suggest that shortcomings in terms of the integration of migrants and refugees acts as a driver of onward movements, and is thus likely to shape future flows.
Immigration to Turkey
For about ten years now, Turkey has been going through a migration transition, becoming a major destination country for travelers, migrants, and refugees.Footnote 2 Contributing to this process have been the country’s relative political stability—particularly as compared to other countries in the region (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria)—and economic growth, together with a liberal visa regime and relatively open borders within a rather volatile regional environment. Over this period, entries to Turkey have continuously increased, from 19 million in 2006 to 35 million in 2014, when numbers peaked; after this, the numbers dropped sharply, by almost 30 percent, down to 25 million in 2016. This drop can be explained through the combined effect of Russian restrictions on tourism to Turkey in the wake of a minor military conflict; the rise of terrorism; and domestic policies and tensions between Turkey and Germany, with the latter a major source of tourists for the former. All of these factors have deterred international travel and tourism.
At the same time, however, immigration has increased significantly. In 2013, prior to the first major influx of Syrians, there were just under 1 million foreign-born persons in Turkey, mostly of ethnic Turkish origin; about 450,000 registered foreigners, with more than half of these in the country on short-term permits; and an estimated 500,000 or more irregular immigrants.Footnote 3 But due to multiple crises in the wider neighborhood of Europe, the number of people, mostly Syrians, seeking temporary protection in Turkey began to sharply increase, rising from 14,237 in 2012 to 224,664 in 2013 and 1,519,286 in 2014.Footnote 4 By fall 2017, this number had risen to over 3.3 million. Finally, the number of persons in the country under international protection was also steadily increasing, from 3,505 in 2006 to 66,000 in 2016, or 283,000 in cumulative terms.Footnote 5 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also registered 295,401 asylum seekers and refugees.Footnote 6 However, some of the above figures are unreliable, and what is more migration is a rather fluid process. Notably, for instance, around one million people have moved on from Turkey to Greece and the EU. The above figures are thus indicators only. In any case, it seems fair to say that, in 2014, there were approximately 3.6 million persons in Turkey who had not been born there, and by 2017, this had risen to approximately 5.3 million.
However, while such absolute numbers of refugees and immigrants may seem impressive, they are nevertheless quite moderate when compared to the numbers seen in the context of the history of immigration in EU countries. In Turkey, the foreign-born population represents around 6.7 percent of the total population, or 5.3 percent if we deduct presumably ethnic Turkish foreign-born persons. This is considerably less than the average of over 10 percent (54.5. million) in the EU, where the proportion of the immigrant population ranges from a low of 1.6 percent in Poland to a high of 18.2 percent in Austria. Other differences between the EU and Turkey are that, in the latter, the overwhelming majority come from just two or three neighboring or regional countries and belong to the same or a similar religion as Turkish nationals, phenomena that shape local integration challenges. The key features of the migration transition of Turkey are not only the numbers, but in particular the short period of time over which the transition took place: just one decade, from 2006 to 2016. It appears that, since 2006, the number of immigrants has almost quintupled. Turkey thus resembles the cases of certain southern EU member states—notably Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece—which became major immigration countries over periods of from 10 to 20 years. For instance, Italy, which was once a country sending a significant number of guest workers, now hosts 5.9 million regular immigrants in addition to several hundred thousand irregular migrants, amounting to some 10 percent of the population.
Until late 2015, the Turkish government kept its borders largely open to Syrians and Iraqis in need of international protection. Moreover, until March 2016, those who wished to move on to the EU were able to do so with relative ease. However, from November 2015 onward, more controls were introduced such that the number of departures began dropping, and after March 2016, when an EU-Turkey statement on migration restrictions became effective, onward migration almost came to a halt. The government, though, also acknowledged that many actually remained in Turkey, and as a result it introduced new legislation more adequate for an immigration country. Notably, it introduced new laws relating to citizenship, to foreigners and international protection, and to work permits for foreigners, and recently it has even begun to grant citizenship to Syrians and other refugees. Nevertheless, even though a political framework for the integration of foreigners is currently in development, so far there is no national immigrant or refugee integration strategy, nor is there a council of immigrant communities or an established communication structure between the government and immigrants. Instead, integration is left to local governments, who lack the political power and resources to deal adequately with the issue. At this point, civil society has stepped in, and is de facto implementing a limited bottom-up approach.Footnote 7 Nonetheless, as will be shown here, the public remains skeptical about the issue, as indicated by widespread negative attitudes toward foreigners.
Finally, it must also be stated that Turkey does actually have significant experience with the issue of the integration of migrants. On the one hand, millions of Turkish workers and their families have long been migrating abroad, primarily to the EU but also to the United States, Australia, Russia, and elsewhere. In all of these places, they have been subject to the host societies’ particular responses and to their integration policies and those policies’ various successes and failures. On the other hand, Turkey has also experienced significant internal migration and displacement from east to west, partly of ethnic minorities (e.g., Kurds) and partly of rural populations moving into urban environments; this process has resulted in mixed outcomes in terms of integration and exclusion.Footnote 8
All this demonstrates that the Turkish case is not exceptional either in numerical or in temporal terms. Instead, Turkey’s position in the global migration order—that is, in the migration relations of countries—has been rather normalizing, meaning that Turkey, like other economically growing and high-middle or high income countries, inevitably attracts immigration of various kinds. This has been facilitated by Turkey’s international relations—it presents itself to other countries as open and welcoming—and by its economic growth, but also by the domestic labor market, which has come to need labor migrants, due partly to low employment rates for women and partly to the informal economy, which, some scholars have claimed, is becoming increasingly unpopular for Turkish nationals.Footnote 9
Political and social responses to the migration transition
From 2008, Turkey began slowly adapting to the new realities and set up two so-called “bureaus,” one on migration policy and the other on border management. This resulted in a new migration management regime encompassing the 2014 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM; Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü), the 2014 Temporary Protection Regulation, and more recently the 2016 Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection (RWPFTP), which was implemented by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı). In addition, the Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (Başbakanlık Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı, AFAD) was mandated as the principal government agency for the coordination of most matters relating to Syrian refugees.Footnote 10 As a result, the agency previously in charge of such matters—namely, the General Directorate of Security (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü)—was largely deprived of its role in migration management.Footnote 11 And finally, due to the transformation, policy responses are now “not limited to public activities. NGO projects and their practices are also active and [have become] widely common during the last few years.”Footnote 12 The creation of this regime was partly driven by the EU accession process, which has conventionally been analyzed as “Europeanization.” However, I believe that just as important have been domestic national interests—e.g., modernization, attracting mobile people, skills—and foreign policy considerations to prepare Turkey for its new role as a leading country in the region and the world; this is certainly true from 2012 or 2013, when Turkey-EU relations began to turn sour. Hence, endogenous drivers began to prevail over exogenous drivers. In any case, the emerging regime was not exactly comprehensive, but rather multifaceted, resulting in some degree of overlap and competition between diverse ministries and authorities concerning who controls certain policy fields.Footnote 13 Notably, in the field of migrant and refugee integrationFootnote 14 there is a discrepancy between de jure integration (i.e., what is prescribed in policy and law) and de facto integration (i.e., what is put into practice);Footnote 15 this can be conceptualized as an implementation gap. Such discrepancies or gaps may undermine the rule of law, accountability, and ultimately good governance.Footnote 16 What is more, in the case of immigrant integration, such discrepancies can amount to discrimination. Whilst such discrepancies may also be conceptualized as the discrepancy between discourse or policy narrative and practice, analyzing matters of purpose and power, this commentary will only describe the discrepancy in order to identify implementation gaps and the consequences that these have for integration and future migration.
De jure integration of foreigners and refugees
In Turkey, all legally resident foreign nationals are assigned a Foreigner Identification Number (FIN; Yabancı Kimlik Numarası), with biometric and other details stored on the DGMM’s intranet site “Göc.Net”. In 2014–2015, persons under temporary protection, notably Syrians, were registered by the DGMM as per Article 22 of the temporary provision of the Temporary Protection Regulation of October 22, 2014. In the course of this process, such persons were issued a Temporary Protection Identification Card displaying the FIN, which then serves to facilitate access to all government services and is thus the key measure facilitating de jure integration.
Under Turkish law, all children, including foreign nationals, have the right to free language and vocational courses offered by public education centers administered by the Provincial Directorates of Education (İl Millî Eğitim Müdürlükleri); to basic education for 12 years; and to higher education opportunities. One alternative to these are the private Syrian schools that have been categorized as “temporary education centers.” There, however, education is usually subject to a fee. All of these matters were first clarified by AFAD Circular No. 2014/4 on the Administration of Services to Foreigners under the Temporary Protection Regime, and by the Ministry of Education Circular No. 2014/21 on Education Services for Foreign Nationals, dating to September 23, 2014.Footnote 17
Foreigners staying in the country regularly for more than 90 days, and thus in possession of a residence permit, are required to obtain private health insurance. Persons under temporary protection, as clarified by Article 27 of AFAD Circular No. 2014/4 and the Ministry of Health’s directive on Healthcare Services to Be Provided to Temporary Protection Beneficiaries (November 4, 2015), have free access to health care.Footnote 18 However, apart from emergency medical conditions, this access is limited to the province in which persons under temporary protection are registered. Hence, this represents yet another type of geographic limitation, this time one that impinges on integration.
The 2003 Law (No. 4817) on the Work Permit for Foreigners (LWPF) requires all foreigners seeking employment to obtain a work permit, with the system being administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Initially, Syrians—in other words, the majority of foreigners in Turkey—had almost no access to the formal labor market, which meant that formal economic integration was legally barred. But in the meantime there came into force the Regulation on the Work Permit of Refugees under Temporary Protection of January 2016, which provided employers with the opportunity to apply for permission to employ refugees, though refugees can also apply for an independent work permit. However, employment rights are restricted to the province of registration in this field as well, thereby imposing yet another geographical limitation. Foreigners, including persons under temporary protection, in principle have the same rights as nationals to set up a business in Turkey and to open bank accounts, which are crucial issues for regular employment and for running a business.Footnote 19
While persons under temporary protection are free to settle anywhere in the country, refugees are dispersed to so-called satellite cities on a no-choice basis. With regards to accommodation, neither the LFIP nor the Temporary Protection Regulation provide for accommodation, with Article 8.3 only vaguely stating that persons “may […] be accommodated in a special section of a current temporary accommodation centers [sic] or in a separate temporary accommodation center or in places to be determined by the governorates for humanitarian reasons.”Footnote 20 Such centers are semi-closed, as according to Article 8.5 “temporary accommodation center management may grant permission to [persons under temporary protection] for leaving [sic] the temporary accommodation centers for a short period of time in case of emergencies or upon the request of a public institution and organization.”Footnote 21 Such centers are set up and run by AFAD in cooperation with Turkish Red Crescent (Türk Kızılayı). In addition, unaccompanied minors are taken into state or foster care.Footnote 22
Prior to the large-scale influx of displaced persons to Turkey, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)—an assessment of migrant integration policies in terms of the labor market, education, family reunification, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination—found “that Turkey’s legal framework is slightly unfavorable for integration and ranks below the other MIPEX countries, scoring only 24-out-of-100 points.”Footnote 23 Whether these countries and their policies are actually comparable, however, is quite another matter.
De facto integration of foreigners and refugees
As of December 2016, of the registered 872,536 school-age Syrian children, only 491,896 were actually attending school, with 367,330, or 42 percent, not in school.Footnote 24 This illustrates how large a proportion of these children had still not been integrated into the educational system. There are also temporary education centers teaching a modified Syrian curriculum in the Arabic language; such centers, however, do not facilitate integration but rather offer a parallel structure, as mentioned in the following paragraph as well, and in any case these are expected to be gradually phased out over the next few years. At universities, the number of Syrian students amounted to 14,750. The government—notably the Ministry of National Education (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, MEB)—has, however, set up and since “strengthened the status and capacity of the Education in Emergencies and Migration Unit”Footnote 25 to address shortcomings regarding access to education.
In terms of health care, it has been reported that, since 2011, 967,000 Syrians have received in-patient treatment.Footnote 26 However, various actors are more critical of such treatment than what this figure may initially suggest. Language has been identified as a key barrier in the delivery of health services,Footnote 27 and in addition, many Syrians have moved to cities other than the ones where they are officially registered, which actually excludes them from receiving most health care.Footnote 28 By 2016, the Ministry of Health (Sağlık Bakanlığı) had established 64 migrant health centers, and plans to establish another 250 as well.Footnote 29 Nevertheless, strictly speaking, such measures do not in fact integrate foreigners into Turkey’s mainstream social systems, but instead segregate them into specialized systems. Hence, while the intention may be good, the implementation does not actually facilitate integration.
As for labor, prior to the large-scale influx of displaced persons, the OSCE found that the employment rate of immigrants in Turkey was well below the national average, which was considered “particularly worrying,” as unemployment was significantly higher, suggesting that they were particularly “badly affected.”Footnote 30 Of the approximately 5.3 million foreigners and refugees in 2015,Footnote 31 only 73,500 were granted work permits, and of these, only 13,300 were Syrians.Footnote 32 As a result, just 2.4 percent of all foreigners and refugees have access to and are integrated into the regular labor market. That is to say, nearly 97 percent are excluded from the regular labor market, and as a consequence, migrants’ and refugees’ labor rights have come to be evaluated in a rather critical manner.Footnote 33 People, then, get pushed into the informal economy.
Another possible path to economic integration is the establishment of businesses. In 2015, “the number of new Syrian companies surpassed 1,600, reaching 2.4 percent of the total new established firms in Turkey,” with the number being 13.1 percent in Gaziantep and a staggering 35 percent in Kilis.Footnote 34 It is also, however, claimed that in Gaziantep “the majority of these Syrian-owned businesses are informal and lack the finance and procedural knowledge to formalize.”Footnote 35 This, in turn, implies that much of this variety of economic integration is in fact informal. Although such a pattern is not dissimilar from Turkish practices overall—31 to 35 percent of the Turkish economy is said to be informalFootnote 36 —it nonetheless upsets Turkish competitors, thereby undermining peaceful cohabitation.Footnote 37
In terms of accommodation, of all persons under temporary protection, only 246,000 are offered accommodation in a camp. Instead, of all persons under international or temporary protection, over 3 million people must find and pay for their own accommodation, often in cities, but also in some rural areas as well.
Clearly, the challenges to integrating foreigners, and refugees in particular, are also shaped by their particular demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Over 1.8 million Syrians are minors, around half are women, and approximately 60,000 are over the age of 65.Footnote 38 Research has shown that there is a substantial correlation between age at the time of migration and social integration: the older people are when they arrive, the lower their later rates of employment, wages, and interaction with the indigenous people.Footnote 39 On the other hand, the amount of segregation increases in tandem with age at the time of migration. What is more, the integration has been found to be gendered,Footnote 40 meaning that migrant women are more likely to be left behind, which creates a negative effect in the long term with regards to the integration chances of their children. Because Turkey ranks well below the EU average in terms of gender equality,Footnote 41 there seems to be little hope that the government will take measures to prevent such negative integration outcomes. Social integration is also impacted by the level of education and skills at the time of arrival. A somewhat older survey by AFADFootnote 42 suggests that around half of those involved in the survey were of low skills, with 15 percent being illiterate. This is quite different from certain EU countries (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands), where Syrians in particular were found to be more likely to be highly educated.Footnote 43 As a result, the integration challenges are higher in Turkey than in some EU countries. This situation also means that refugees are more likely to be integrated into the lower strata of society, and accordingly exposed to all the potential social problems that this entails, such as poverty, illiteracy, poor housing, and health problems.
Perception of integration by the Turkish people
In 2010, a survey by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development revealed that 30.9 percent of Turkish respondents did not want to have immigrants as neighbors—this was the second highest rate of all 34 countries surveyed.Footnote 44 Another study by Balkır and Südaş found that, of the Turkish respondents in the country’s southern coastal area, 61.6 percent preferred not to live in districts populated with foreigners, 63 percent did not want foreigners to buy property, and 61.2 percent did not like the granting of political rights to foreigners.Footnote 45 Many also expressed a belief that settlement by foreigners caused a “degeneration of values” (46.9 percent) and a “degeneration of the native culture” (45.9 percent). In 2014, a Turkish Foreign Policy study stated that “86 percent of the participants argue that no further Syrian refugees should be allowed in the country,” whilst 29.7 percent wanted them to be returned.Footnote 46 Meanwhile, the Turkish Perceptions Survey 2015, conducted by the German Marshall Fund, found that 41 percent of respondents believed there were too many immigrants in Turkey, 84 percent were worried about Syrians and 64 percent about Africans, while 81 percent believed that foreigners do not integrate well.Footnote 47 Such results suggest a largely negative perception of foreigners and refugees in Turkey, and imply that the majority does not appreciate longer-term residence or integration. Speaking rather pointedly about this matter, Güneş A. Aşık has said that “xenophobia is on the rise in Turkey. Everyday rhetoric has shifted from ‘Syrians are our guests’ to vitriol and suspicion.”Footnote 48
This phenomenon points to a clear divide between policy and people. Whereas the central government is positive toward immigration, the people appear to harbor a good deal of concern. Such concerns, however, have so far remained silent, or at least have not yet been either politicized or led to the emergence of xenophobic political parties—not to mention racial violence—as has been the case in many EU countries. Nevertheless, there is a need for this divide to be bridged, or the situation may well explode.
Integration policies à la Turca?
Policy and practice in Turkey are informed by an approach in which the Turkish government has in two ways diverged from the conventional European rights-based approach to refugee reception or immigrant inclusion. First, the largest group—i.e., Syrians—were initially conceptualized as “guests” and not as “refugees,” which was due partly to the emergency situation of large-scale spontaneous arrivals but also partly to the initial absence of comprehensive legislation on the matter. This has been changing, particularly since the LFIP came into force in 2014. Second, the social response has been conceptualized as “harmonization,” which diverges from the conventional concept of “integration” as spelled out, for instance, by the European Commission.Footnote 49 Both government responses have been received with a certain degree of either criticism or puzzlement; however, in what follows, I will not only provide a sketch of this criticism, but also discuss the actual productive potential that such an unconventional approach can have for a social ethical debate. I thus deliberately adopt a non-Orientalist and postcolonial perspective in that I aim to avoid accepting the dominant Western ideas per se, but remain open to non-Western thinking and ethics.
Guests or refugees?
In 2013, Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay insisted “even though their [Syrians’] status is temporary protection, we perceive them as our guests and treat them this way.”Footnote 50 It was further explained that “we hope and the expectation is that the domestic conflict in Syria will cease at once […] and people […] will return to their homes.”Footnote 51 Fuat Oktay, the president of AFAD, added that “we considered standing by the people of neighboring Syria […] as an obligation. Our country has historic, cultural, and neighborly ties with Syria,” and he also went on to mention “help[ing] our neighbors in need” and “our Syrian brothers.”Footnote 52 President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, moreover, has addressed Syrians in explicitly Islamic terms by saying, “you are Muhajirun (i.e., the early converts to Islam who emigrated from Mecca to Medina) for us. We, as Ansar (i.e., the helpers and hosts of the Muslim emigrants to Medina), try to take care of our Muhajir brothers with love.”Footnote 53 Thus, the key concepts driving Turkey’s policy response were the notions of “guests,” “brothers,” “brothers and sisters,” “friends,” “Muhajirun,” “neighbors,” and “historic, cultural ties.” This is a fairly eclectic mix of concepts. In 2016, Erdoğan took this approach one step further, announcing that “we are going to help our Syrian friends in offering them the chance, if they want it, to acquire Turkish nationality,” thereby adding to the mix the idea of Syrians being future “citizens.”Footnote 54
Despite this, the reference to the concept of “guests” resembles an earlier tradition in which immigration detention centers were almost cynically referred to as “foreigners’ guesthouses.”Footnote 55 The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) criticized the fact that “as ‘guests’ of the Turkish [s]tate, the Syrian refugees may enjoy de facto protection but their status is open to interpretation and to revocation.”Footnote 56 Şenay Özden argues that “not being granted refugee status is an important factor that increases the vulnerability of Syrians,”Footnote 57 while Ulusoy emphasizes how “‘guests’ [is] a term which has no legal definition or meaning in international asylum law.”Footnote 58 Instead, who is and is not a guest is something determined solely by religious or political leaders. Therefore, lawyers, academics, and civil society reject the notion of “guests,” as it is a concept that can circumvent the codification of rights, accountability, and thus overall the rule of law. Indeed, one might wonder whether this kind of hospitality is as universal as the UNHCR claims, and whether it would, for instance, also be offered were there an influx of large numbers of Christian refugees from, for example, Ukraine. What is more, then, I would add that, inasmuch as the reference to “brothers and sisters” is de facto a reference to the Islamic umma—an imagined transnational community of Muslims that by definition is not universal—it may very well exclude non-Muslims. However, other scholars have argued that the relevant sections of the Qur’an dealing with refugees were meant to include non-Muslims as well as Muslims, and thus may potentially be universal, too.Footnote 59 The same has been found for the Old Testament, notably the Book of Deuteronomy, which, as suggested by Fisch, was to some extent the first refugee convention, as it introduces the ideas of humanity as a collective (family), solidarity, dignity, and inclusion, thereby representing a kind of soft law similar to international law that has right up to the present inspired European policy responses and even hard laws.Footnote 60
However, even though both the de jure and de facto integration of forced migrants in Turkey remains much less than ideal, it is not quite as grim a situation as some commentators would have it. There are, for instance, primary and secondary legislations that provide some legal framework. Basic social services are provided, although as yet these cannot be utilized by all. However, it seems that the issue here is at least partly high demand, resulting in a degree of scarcity of resources and staff. And whilst critics argue that international law, and thus the recognition of Syrians as refugees, would per se entail more rights, less vulnerability, and greater security, numerous reports on the treatment and conditions of refugees in countries that apply such international standards demonstrate quite the opposite. For instance, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights has noticed that “there are alarming trends in the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees, as well as of irregular migrants in all parts of Europe.”Footnote 61 This indicates that the application of international refugee law does not guarantee that displaced persons are treated humanely. Instead, the reception and treatment of refugees often seems to be subject to political considerations on a national level, and thus also to the views of political leaders, rather than to any commitment to universal human rights law.
Therefore, adding (and I consciously say adding) to this discourse a moral dimension—whether informed by religious or philosophical thinking as derived from the Qur’an, the Bible, or Immanuel Kant does not matter—rather resembles a process of ethical reasoning. It thus adds to the debate a principled approach that carries the potential of harnessing politics and power. However, the ultimate test case is not whether or not reference is made to moral or religious as opposed to legal frameworks, but instead whether or not these frameworks are applied in a universal and inclusionary or a politicized—and thus discriminatory and exclusionary—fashion.
Harmonization or integration?
Article 96 of the 2014 LFIP explains that “harmonization” (uyum) means “mutual harmonization between foreigners, applicants and international protection beneficiaries and the society [sic].”Footnote 62 Ali Zafer Sağıroğlu explains that “the term ‘integration’ is deliberately not used to avoid its partly negative associations stemming from the experiences of Turkish immigrants in the EU.”Footnote 63 In the LFIP, “harmonization” nowhere receives further clarification, and thus remains rather nebulous. However, the DGMM’s website states that harmonization is “neither assimilation nor integration. Immigration is the harmonization of society as a result of mutual understanding,” and goes on to say that “an immigrant-focused approach” will be taken so as “to equip [immigrants] with the knowledge and skills to be independently active in all areas of social life.”Footnote 64 The key concepts involved here are “understanding,” “mutuality,” “mutual adaptation,” ideas of empowerment, and “reciprocity.” However, this amounts more to a preamble or philosophical underpinning than to any sort of policy. Thus far, this has been only vaguely translated into policy, such as “attend[ing] courses where the basics of political structure, language, legal system, culture and history of Turkey as well as their rights and obligations are explained [and] […] courses related to access to public and private goods and services, access to education and economic activities [and so on].”Footnote 65 Moreover, the 1989 Law (No. 3294) on the Promotion of Social Assistance and Solidarity has had its provisions and assistance extended to foreigners as well, which is relevant inasmuch as it extends the principle of solidarity to immigrants. Solidarity is commonly understood as unity, particularly among individuals sharing a common interest or interests, and it further implies mutual support among the members of a group as well as collective responsibility.Footnote 66 Hence, the application of the concept of solidarity to this law suggests that the law rests on the notion of a collective of the people in Turkey that would literally include foreigners—or at least, such is the promise.
However, thus far, scholars have remained skeptical of the concept of harmonization. For instance, Ahmet İçduygu has responded to the concept with reservation, while Rebecca Kilberg and Kılıç Kanat and Kadir Üstün, among others, simply translate the concept as integration.Footnote 67 Meral Açıkgöz and Hakkı Onur Arıner suggest that harmonization has “a more innocuous meaning in Turkish and therefore better reflects the aim of the Turkish approach which is to understand the indigenous-migrant interaction as a dynamic two-way relationship in which migrants are not confined to a passive role regarding issues which relate to them.”Footnote 68 Some more critical commentators have even suggested that the “harmonization” approach is not an altruistic one but rather a “tactical boon” in a political game.Footnote 69 In any case, within the context of immigration, the concept of harmonization differs from conventional concepts such as integration, acculturation, or assimilation, and thus provides an opportunity for fresh thinking. I will take this opportunity to reflect on the concept of harmony and then to investigate where it sits within the wider debate.
From ancient times to the modern era in Europe and Asia, the concept of harmony can be found in the works of thinkers as diverse as Confucius, Aristotle, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Mohandas Gandhi. This implies that it is a relatively universal concept. In philosophy it refers to the opposite of conflict and chaos and suggests coherence and order. For Plato, harmony rests on individuals’ “set of duties [and] obligations to the community” that, if fulfilled, “result in a harmonious whole.”Footnote 70 This is thought to be based on a “symmetric relationship” that subsequently results in “unity within diversity.”Footnote 71 This theme can also be found in Chinese philosophy, which stipulates that conflict, through a dialectic process of harmonization, ultimately leads to a higher level of harmony.Footnote 72 Thus, within this framework, harmony means “mutual complementation and mutual support between the two [conflicting elements], so that each depends on the other for strength, actuality, productivity, and value.”Footnote 73 In other words, two elements depend on one another—which resonates with the metaphor of “brothers and sisters” used to describe the relationship between Turks and Syrians—in order to create a harmonious whole. To return to the issue of migration and integration, social harmony might thus also be understood as the social cohesion of different elements that nevertheless depend on one another.Footnote 74 This initial sketch is sufficient to argue that the application of the concept of harmony to social responses to the arrival of immigrants has the potential to fuel a fruitful debate, and so should not be discarded too swiftly.
The concept of “harmonization” also diverges from the key concepts used in the international debate on host/migrant interaction. These concepts are integration, multiculturalism, and assimilation, and they differ from one another in terms of their varying degrees of mutuality within the adaptation process, and thus also in terms of how they envisage power relations.Footnote 75 All three of these models or concepts, it should be noted, are frequently considered imperfect, both in principle and with regards to their actual implementation. In many receiving countries, immigrants are legally or structurally treated unequally and hence discriminated against, and as a result they suffer from unemployment, underachieving in education, poor housing, and political underrepresentation, as well as, in the worst cases, from overpolicing, racism, and racial violence. All of these lead on to alienation, segregation, exclusion, and self-exclusion, which in turn undermines solidarity and social cohesion. Therefore, all three models have been somewhat discredited, and indeed Ted Cantle even argues that “we need to be able to talk about race and diversity in a new way.”Footnote 76 One more recent response in this vein is the idea of interculturalism. Unlike multiculturalism—which builds on the preservation of culture, a static notion of identity, the centrality of culture for relationships, and the co-existence of different cultures—interculturalism rests on the idea of multifaceted identities, multifaceted relationships, and the interaction between or among cultures, while simultaneously recognizing social cohesion and common humanity.Footnote 77 Some of this seems to resemble the idea of “harmonization,” notably the principles of “mutuality” and “reciprocity,” which resonate with the principles contained in the inter- prefix in interculturalism. Moreover, the emphasis on commonality that is prevalent in the current Turkish discourse’s use of ideas such as “neighbors” and “brothers and sisters” echoes interculturalism’s call to emphasize commonality as opposed to difference.Footnote 78
As a final point, acquiring citizenship is considered the highest level of legal integration, one that leads to better social integration and thus on to “full integration.”Footnote 79 Turkey has gradually moved on from the principle of ius sanguinis (citizenship by descent from a citizen parent) to the principle of ius soli (citizenship by birth or residence in the territory of the country as granted by the authorities), as was regulated in 2009’s Turkish Citizenship Law (No. 5901). İçduygu believes that “with a trembling debate on the acquisition of citizenship for Syrians, it seems that Turkish policy makers mainly, and the Turkish public partially, have passed a threshold. After a long engagement on the immediate humanitarian needs of refugees under the temporary protection scheme, the incorporation of refugees into Turkish society has become seen as crucial.”Footnote 80 In line with these changes, in May 2017 some of the first Syrians were granted citizenship.Footnote 81
Conclusion
Turkey is going through stages similar to those seen in many other new immigration countries, though at an accelerated pace. With regards specifically to the arrival of Syrians, the country went through three phases: first, a phase of emergency; second, a phase of large-scale onward migration; and third, a stage of closed borders, consolidation, and integration.Footnote 82 Generally speaking, in most countries there is first a phase of disbelief, ignorance, or even denial; second, a period of legal adjustment to the new realities, and thus a degree of structural integration paired with some public resentment; and third, ideally, a period of deeper and sustainable integration. For instance, it took Germany 40 years to acknowledge that it was an immigration country, while Turkey has only been experiencing the migration transition for around 10 to 15 years now. As such, any analysis and assessment should take into account the temporality of the emergence of Turkey’s social, policy, and philosophical responses, and ought to abstain from too quick judgements.
It seems fair to suggest that Turkey’s initial treatment of refugees as guests helped to moderate public opinion and generate a certain amount of acceptance; this, I believe, worked relatively well during the first and second phases. However, the attraction of irrational responses—such as those inspired by religion—also lies in the imperfection of the rationalism of a rights-based approach,Footnote 83 as in the case of the failure by many EU countries to treat refugees in a humane fashion. Even so, since it has become clear that the Syrian crisis is in fact a protracted displacement situation, a more rights-based approach along with one that goes beyond the temporary protection rhetoric would prove more adequate. Ethical or religious reasoning may inspire, but in a modern state it should not replace the rule of law. Furthermore, the authoritarian and arbitrary policy of the current Turkish leadership raises doubts about future protection of refugees.
Finally, because displaced persons from other countries currently residing in Turkey are “both refugees fleeing their countries due to civil war, as well as active economic agents looking for opportunities to work or invest,” they respond to the constraints and opportunities around them.Footnote 84 While many have now been in the country for long periods of time, smaller numbers still continue to move on to the EU. The future of these movements depends on three domestic factors; namely, the economic, political, and social capacity of Turkey to “harmonize” host communities and immigrants in both legal and practical terms. Still, it remains to be seen whether this results in innovative inclusionary and humane policies that would eliminate inequality and allow people to actually settle in Turkey, or in further shortcomings in terms of the integration of migrants and refugees that would continue to drive onward migration.