During the Twenty-second Plenary Session the Judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) decided to amend eight Rules of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rules).

This article examines the limits that academics from peripheral countries might encounter while trying to influence the decision-making process inside an international organization. Although there are different mechanisms whereby academia might influence non-academic debates, we highlight here the use of policy papers, in order to examine and discuss the non-textual barriers which might be faced by those academics. After an analysis of primary sources this article presents some pragmatic limits in the use of policy papers and discusses the consequences of this condition for the legitimation of international organizations. As such, relevant international organizations still seem to be unresponsive to some initiatives in particular: closed to the spontaneous participation of academia; and not willing to call for contributions from academic communities. This is particularly relevant for contributions from peripheral academia and other non-state actors, who lack the capability to disturb the traditional ideational power exercised by core (Western) countries and by state-centric ideology in current international law.

Abdullah Öcalan's arrival in Turkey in February 1999 followed a prolonged search in Europe for asylum following his expulsion from Syria in late 1998. His coming within Turkish jurisdiction raises questions about the international processes to bring alleged transnational fugitive offenders before the courts. This article looks at the extradition regime within Europe and the alternative methods of rendition that were eventually employed to remove him from Kenya. Extradition law developed during the nineteenth century and is based on ideas of revolution, the principle of nationality and liberal democracy which pervaded that period. The late twentieth century has a different ethos that offers fewer protection to the political revolutionary, but has incorporated international human rights standards. Extradition law straddles the enforcement of criminal law, non-interference in the domestic affairs of another State and international human rights law. The article concludes by examining the demands of international human rights law for the trial in Turkey.

The surrender of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, suspected of having committed genocide, to the Rwanda Tribunal has again been the object of litigation in the US. After his surrender had initially been denied, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has certified his surrender. This decision raised certain questions. On the one hand, it is fortunate that Ntakirutimana will stand trial before the Rwanda Tribunal. However, the assistance of the US with respect to future surrender of war criminals indicted by the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda is by no means certain yet. A concurring and dissenting opinion attached to the decision illustrate that US Judges are still not overly convinced of the constitutionality of the US method of implementing the obligations arising out of the creation of these ad hoc Tribunals.

A critical analysis, considering first, the legal competence and propriety of the Court in giving an opinion pursuant to the dispute settlement machinery of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of United Nations, whereby advisory jurisdiction over disputes of the UN is equated to contentious jurisdiction between consenting states; and second, the effect in municipal law of a state's obligation to respect the UN Secretary-General's certificate that a UN expert is entitled to immunity from legal process. The Court preserves resort to local courts but requires communication of the UN certificate and immunity to be dealt with expeditiously as a preliminary issue.

The familiar critical claim that propositions of international law cannot be both objective and normative casts a long shadow over international legal theory. The claim relies on the conjunction of two ideas: first, that the truth-conditions of any proposition of international law will include some element of evaluative judgement (about the right or the good) that gives the proposition its normative character, and, second, that evaluative judgements cannot be objectively true or false. International lawyers have two main strategies for defending their discipline against this sceptical challenge. A more modest strategy would accept that legal objectivity and normativity are incompatible and attempt to sidestep the sceptical critique by abandoning the claim to normativity. A second and more ambitious strategy would resist the sceptical challenge by disputing the plausibility of its attack on the objectivity of evaluative judgements. This strategy would rely on the claim that objectivity and normativity are not mutually incompatible and that the aim of producing an account of international law that displays both features is realistic. My aim in this paper is to show that there exists at least one version of this second strategy that can succeed against the sceptical challenge. I argue that scepticism about values is incoherent and, therefore, that the opposition between the objectivity and the normativity of international law is illusory. Setting such scepticism aside will allow international lawyers to concentrate fully on the substantive normative questions that drive theories of international law and on the values that provide the best account of its content.

With a looming referendum on the secession of South Sudan, the drafters of the Abyei Arbitration Agreement were faced with a complex intra-state dispute and a limited time to resolve it. The parties to the dispute agreed on a procedural regime to govern the arbitration, combining both traditional and innovative provisions on procedural rules, the constitution of the tribunal, the schedule of pleadings, transparency, financing of the proceeding, and the role of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This article examines the key provisions of the Abyei Arbitration Agreement and their implementation during the course of the arbitration, and evaluates the case's significance as procedural precedent for future intra- or inter-state arbitration. The article does not provide an analysis of the substantive findings of the tribunal.

The decisions of international courts and tribunals affect how we read history. Alternative tribunals, such as peoples’ tribunals, attempt to write alternative histories to counter the official versions. This article locates controversies over the Armenian genocide in debates about the relationship between history and international law. It considers ways of reading archives and the role of archives in informing those debates. It compares the Istanbul war crimes trials held in 1919–1920 before the Ottoman Military Tribunals with the Paris session of the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal held in 1984 that dealt with questions of history and memory through the juridical format of a hearing. A century after the events of 1915, the contested historiography of the Armenian genocide influences how international lawyers and historians seek to pass judgment on the past.

After setting out the importance of the notion of an international community in contemporary treaties, International Court of Justice judgments and opinio juris, this paper claims that we need to turn to Cicero's works in order to appreciate a sense of what an international community is. Cicero was the first jurist known to recognize and elaborate a theory of the international community and this through his concept of jus gentium. Cicero's theory of jus gentium, I argue, was neither a positivist theory nor a natural law theory. Instead, jus gentium dwelt in an intermediate position between posited state laws and the laws of nature. I find a problem, however, in that Cicero exempts certain types of society from the guidance and protection of the jus gentium. I document examples of the sort of society so exempted. In order to understand why Cicero exempts such societies from the protection of the jus gentium, I argue, Cicero's theory depends on a primordial condition where human beings, living an animal-like existence, lack a language and reason. Cicero posits that human beings must leap from such a primordial condition into a civilized world where language is shared. Cicero associates a civilized world with communication, deliberation, reason, and law, particularly the jus gentium. His theory of jus gentium thereby hierarchizes societies and begs that we ask whether such a hierarchy remains presupposed in contemporary international law and international legal theory.

This article argues that the operational logic of international investment law, in part, is to tame states by legally requiring that they behave as if they were profit-seeking enterprises. This is suggested by a small set of awards, arising out of contractual disputes, that work a binary between normal contractual behaviour and sovereign acts of public authority behaviour. Non-contractual behaviour is deemed ‘political’ and likely to give rise to liability under investment law strictures. This complements well Hayek’s approach to the rule of law, where, outside of their ‘framework’ functions, states are expected to behave ‘in the same manner as any private person’. In an age of ever-increasing disparity, this renders it more difficult for states and citizens to take up measures that Polanyi associates with the protective counter movements, shielding citizens from the deleterious effects of free markets.

There is no unanimity in the international community about the legality of NATO's use of force in Kosovo in order to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. NATO has acted without Security Council authorization and its arguments for a humanitarian intervention are legally inconsistent. It has set a dangerous precedent. This editorial analyses the legal framework and complexities of the Kosovo crisis and its repercussions on the concept of ‘justified use of force’.

In 2014 Japan’s Cabinet Order No. 302 declared the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (OL) to the west and north of Oki-no-Tori Shima (Area 302). Oki-no-Tori Shima consists of two small, barren, and uninhabitable rocks in the West Pacific. The northern part of Area 302 is broader than what the 2012 recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) specify. A question arises whether Order No. 302 violates Article 76(8) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides that the OL established by a coastal state ‘on the basis of’ the CLCS recommendations shall be final and binding. Another question is the role played by the CLCS in ‘assisting’ the coastal states to delimit their national jurisdiction so as to know where the Area (i.e., the Common Heritage of Mankind under UNCLOS Articles 1(1)(1) and 136) begins. The essential questions arising from Area 302 concern how well the UNCLOS mechanism can perform to safeguard the Common Heritage of Mankind through preventing encroachment thereupon by individual coastal states. This article looks at the context and explores the obligations implied by Article 76(8) for coastal states to ‘follow’ the recommendations in establishing the OL, with special reference to the northern part of Area 302. The article also examines legal consequences arising from a breach of these obligations.

In international human rights law, the notion of due diligence concerns a qualifier of behaviour to realize human rights protection, including the protection against non-state actor interferences. However, the question remains what due diligence obligations of states in the context of non-state actor interferences exactly entail in international human rights law. The present article aims to address this matter by comparing case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) with that of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). Using a working model of due diligence that has been introduced in recent scholarly work, this article further explores this model and attempts to give further meaning to its two paradigms: ‘regulation’ and ‘risk management’. In that way, it maps out the relevant elements of this foundational concept that lies at the heart of human rights protection.

On 22 November 1996, the Council of the European Union adopted a framework regulation and agreed to joint action to ‘protect’ the interests of the European Union and its citizens against the extraterritorial application of legislation by non-member states. These measures were adopted in response to the extraterritorial application of certain measures by the United States, concerning trade with and investment in Cuba, as well as investment in Iran and Libya. These United States measures apply to all natural and legal persons irrespective of their nationality, residency, or place of activity. Thus, even nationals of a member state of the European Union residing and active in the European Union must comply with the United States measures. The enactment of this legislation marks a new episode in the on-going battle between the United States and the European Union over the frontiers of a state's (or an international organization's) jurisdiction to prescribe. This time, however, the European Union counteracted by the adoption of measures which can partly be characterized as retorsion measures and partly as countermeasures. The adoption of these measures by the European Union raises questions with respect to the legitimacy of the retorsion measures and the legality of the countermeasures.

With the rise of a new generation of investment policies, upgrading existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs) is of significant interest to states. China has upgraded 28 per cent of its investment treaties in various ways. Two investment arbitration tribunals and one highest court at the seat of arbitration have recently rendered decisions favouring the application of old Chinese BITs over the upgraded ones. China's experience with upgrading BITs may provide general policy discourse and direction for other countries planning to upgrade their BITs. Using China's experience, this article categorizes different methods of upgrading BITs into the Coexistence Model (parties to an old BIT join existing or new free trade agreements or a regional investment agreement), the Replacement Model (replace an old BIT with a new one), the Amendment Model (amend an old BIT by a protocol) and the Joint Interpretation Model (make a diplomatic announcement to interpret a BIT). This article also discusses the benefits and challenges of each model and concludes with directions for future BIT upgrading.

In this article we adopt a political economic lens to analyse the revival of the concept of ecocide in present international legal scholarship and practice. The current campaign to codify the crime of ecocide under international criminal law represents the epitome of a problem-solving approach, which conceives of the law as external to society and as a corrective to its evils. Yet, a large body of critical literature has drawn attention to the constitutive role of international law and to the problems with its depoliticized approach when it comes to tackling global injustices. We build upon this diverse scholarship to illuminate how the technical, acontextual, and ahistorical legal debate on the codification of ecocide ends up normalizing the violent structures of extractive capitalism and its hierarchies. Further, we situate the proposed crime within the wider context of how international law regulates and constitutes the natural world. Drawing on critiques of sustainable development and of business and human rights discourse, we argue that the ‘imbroglio’ of ecocide, in its current legal definition, lies in presenting ecological preservation and devastation as simultaneously legitimate aims. The article ultimately raises the question of the role of international law in progressive political agendas, a question that could not be more pressing in times of entangled socio-ecological-economic disruptions.

This essay focuses on the (non)application of the precautionary principle in the Hormones Case. It concludes that the finding of the Appellate Body that the precautionary principle, as such, cannot overrule the explicit wording of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement is debatable, if a similar principle or concept were to exist in health law – a line of thought that is not pursued by the Appellate Body in its consideration of the precautionary principle. In addition, the article includes considerations about the problems that arises if substantive unity is sought in a procedurally non-unified system for international dispute settlement.