On 21 July 1995, Greece ratified the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter the 1982 Convention). The entry into force of a widely accepted and comprehensive law of the sea convention has been a consistent objective of successive Greek administrations since negotiations began over two decades ago. Greece was very active during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III]), voting in favour of the Convention and its Final Act with the intention of ratifying it at a later date. This article discusses the political and substantive context of the Greek ratification of the 1982 Convention by considering its impact upon Greek law of the sea interests and assessing its implications for Greek-Turkish relations in the Aegean Sea.

Traditionally, most arbitration acts provided that an arbitrator could be challenged on the same grounds as those on which judges could be challenged. Thus, arbitrators could be challenged on specific grounds, such as a family relationship with one of the parties or animosity towards one of the parties. The more modern approach is to provide for an open norm for the grounds on which challenges can be brought. This approach finds its origin in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules adopted in 1976. It provides that: “[a]n arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to the justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence”. This standard was received in many other arbitration acts and rules. The standard nowadays being more or less uniform, its interpretation and application are far from easy.

Recently, two disputes involving China's WTO-plus obligations have attracted great attention: China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths. In China – Raw Materials, China resorted to WTO environmental protection exceptions to justify its violation of the export duty elimination obligation outlined in paragraph 11.3 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, which is clearly a WTO-plus obligation. However, China's recourse was rejected by the panel and then by the Appellate Body, as will probably happen in China – Rare Earths. This article looks into the interpretation and finding of the applicability matter in the DSB reports in China – Raw Materials and further discusses the general applicability issue of environmental protection exceptions to the violation of WTO-plus obligations. As rebuttal to the DSB reports, this article argues that omissions or silence in paragraph 11.3 do not necessarily mean rights waiver, especially when the right involved is the essential right to justify the violation pursuant to environmental protection exceptions provided in Article XX(b) and (g) of the GATT. Also, it is illogical to refer to GATT generally when the WTO-plus obligation in paragraph 11.3 does not have any corresponding rules in GATT. More generally, with consideration of the nature of the environmental protection exceptions in Article XX and the conclusion process of the Protocol, as well as with consideration of the sustainable development objective of the WTO and the politically sensitive matters concerned in China – Raw Materials, China should not be deprived of the right to defend its violation of the export duty obligation in China – Raw Materials. Although the discussion in this article is mainly based on China's WTO-plus obligations, its reasoning may also be extensively applied to that of other acceding members if suitable.

This article focuses on the challenges of ‘long-delayed’ prosecutions, that is, criminal prosecutions that begin decades after the conflict, using the experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for Bangladesh (ICT-BD) as a case study. This issue is still an insufficiently discussed topic even though such prosecutions are likely to become more common in the future. The focus of this article is mainly on the legal and broader, transitional justice challenges of long-delayed prosecutions at the ICT-BD. The article examines how such prosecutions have had a contradictory, two-fold effect: on the one hand, they have partially broken the endemic culture of impunity that was allowed to prevail for decades in Bangladesh. On the other hand, however, they have been highly controversial and may have served to deepen alienation of the Islamist opposition in Bangladesh. The article concludes that the question of whether long-delayed prosecutions are desirable for a particular society remains highly context-dependent and, in some cases, mechanisms other than criminal trials may be better suited to dealing with the past.

Military support to Ukraine has been accompanied by debates as to when Western states would find themselves ‘at war’ with Russia. This political and legal discourse reminds us that international law needs concepts to identify who is a party to an international armed conflict. Identifying parties is crucial because the international legal regulation of armed conflict remains, in many ways, structured by reference to party status – even if the legal meaning of being a party today differs significantly from the traditional implications of being ‘at war’. To capture the increasingly complex co-operation patterns of today’s and tomorrow’s wars, this article identifies the contours for a framework of legal criteria for establishing when a state has become a party to an ongoing international armed conflict. To become a party under this framework, a state must knowingly make a contribution to the conflict that is of a character such that it is directly connected to harm caused to the adversary. That contribution must be sufficiently closely co-ordinated with fellow parties to allow for involvement in the decision-making processes regarding co-ordinated military operations. Applying these criteria to key support scenarios, as exemplified in Russia’s war against Ukraine, permits reasonable distinctions, also with a view to future conflicts. More widely, the analysis of party status may enhance our understanding of the architecture of the international legal regulation of armed conflict as a whole, and its ability to respond to the realities of contemporary conflicts.

The International Criminal Court is empowered by its constituent instrument to request its states parties to identify, trace, freeze, and seize assets ‘after a warrant of arrest or a summons has been issued … having due regard to the strength of the evidence and the rights of the parties concerned’. This article critically examines the approach adopted by the Court to requesting such protective measures at the pre-trial phase, reflecting on how the rights and interests of the primary stakeholders implicated by this process: (i) accused persons, (ii) the Prosecutor, (iii) victims, and (iv) bona fide third parties, are safeguarded and balanced.

A pivotal point in time has been reached in the ongoing negotiations under the auspices of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) towards the adoption of regulations for the commercial exploitation of mineral resources in the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction. The ISA has a mandate to ensure that activities in the Area, legally designated as ‘common heritage of humankind’, are carried out for the benefit of humankind as a whole. Yet, there is a growing sense of unease with the potential imminence of the commercial exploitation phase, and concern that the implementation of all components of the common heritage principle, including its environmental and distributive ambitions, will be compromised in the interest of a handful of industry stakeholders. This article dives under the surface of these tensions by asking how the public interest in a global commons can become constructed in a way that conflates diverse and opposing interests in favour of value extraction by the private sector, revealing the ambivalent role of international law in the process. It uses the concept of ‘false necessity’ to question the apparent urgency and inevitability of commercial exploitation, more specifically to the extent it obscures and pre-empts more inclusive conceptions of ‘benefit’ for humankind. By shifting the focus from the much-debated risks of deep seabed mining to the notion of benefit, the article illuminates the inherent contradictions and distributional asymmetries obscured by the conflated yet purportedly universal conception of public interest in exploitation.

This article critically examines the concept of ethnic cleansing in light of the ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Croatia v. Serbia. It suggests that the lack of overt reference to it in the Genocide Convention constitutes a significant lacuna in judicial recognition and protection of atrocities committed in both the Former Yugoslavia and more generally, which the ICJ categorically refused to address. Having examined how the ICJ attempted to conceptualize ethnic cleansing as evidence of both the actus reus of genocide (particularly in relation to Article II(c) of the Convention) and its mens rea, the article then critically assesses the Court's reasoning in its refusal to rule that a violation of the Convention had taken place in relation to deportation and forcible transfer. The article then concludes by contending that the Court simply failed to provide a much-needed and workable precedent to properly include ethnic cleansing within the legal and factual matrix of genocide.

The principles of classical international economic law, as it developed during the 19th and the first part of the 20th century, were based upon the three fundamentals of freedom, legal equality, and reciprocity. UNGA resolutions 3201(S-VI) and 3281(XX1X) of 1974 embody the legal principles upon which a new international economic order (NIEO) should be based. These principles in their turn are based upon the three N1EO fundamentals of protection of the economic interests of developing countries, preferential treatment of developing countries, and non-reciprocity in the relationship between developed and developing countries. The present study investigates to what extent these three NIEO fundamentals have become implemented in the legal practice of a notorious classical institution, the GATT, and have thereby passed the border between UNGA recommendations and binding law. It concludes that, although GATT practice reveals a substantial effort to give implementation to the NIEO fundamentals, so far it has provided developing contracting parties with only few true preferential rights.

The law is implicated in many of the relations that produce inequality and precarity in the global economy. It contributes in different ways to the unequal bargaining power between states, capital, and labour. One way that has attracted less attention so far relates to how the law accelerates economic relations. This article examines the role of law in the global economy not by focusing on the international economic institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Union (EU) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but on the transactions that plug maquila workers and freelancers into the global economy. The argument is that the speed of these economic relations favours those who command international production, creating what Hartmut Rosa calls a ‘frenetic standstill’. Importantly, the law can also contribute to changing these bargaining dynamics by slowing down some of these transactions and facilitating their territorial re-embedding. This strategy, however, requires a better understanding of the role of law in transnational networks of contracts as well as more state and non-state international co-ordination: The opposite of nationalist attitudes, such as Brexit and Trump’s trade policy.

This article addresses the prosecution of service members by the United States for the commission of war crimes, specifically whether or not the offences charged in such cases can truly be considered ‘war crimes’. The answer has implications in terms of application of the complementarity provision of the Rome Statute, as well as the stigmatic effect that is avoided when the United States prosecutes ordinary criminal offences rather than war crimes.

For weeks, the air strikes that NATO executed in defence of the ‘safe area’ of Sarajevo were ‘hot news’. The fact that NATO would, eventually, execute these strikes had seemed inevitable for some time. The well-informed observer had sufficient indications to this effect via television and the newspapers. However, the media, and all of the debates in national parliaments, have never, or have scarcely, addressed the legal basis for these strikes. At first sight, this appeared to be a relatively simple question, since NATO repeatedly stressed that it was acting on a mandate from the UN Security Council. At a second glance, however, the legal basis of the NATO actions gives rise to a number of questions for which the answers are less easy to ascertain.

The article discusses the complicated situation of post-German cultural property held within Poland’s borders after the Second World War. On 2 August 1945, ‘the Big Three’ decided a new layout of power within Europe. They reached an agreement that Silesia, Pomerania, the Free City of Danzig (Gdańsk), and part of East Prussia (Regained Territories) along with all the property which had been left on site, should be a part of Poland. One of the post-war priorities of the Polish Government was to regulate the legal status of post-German cultural property left within these newly-delineated borders. Although the Second World War ended in 1945, there was still a threat that the majority of post-German property could be devastated, destroyed, or even looted. There are some documented cases where such cultural property was seized inter alia by the Red Army and then transported to Russia. Since 1945, Russian museums have exhibited many of these pieces of art. This article addresses the question concerning the legal status of post-German cultural property in light of public international law. Furthermore, the article responds to the question, whether Poland is entitled to restitution of post-German cultural property looted from the Regained Territories.

Classical international law was characterised by its insistence on the state as a sovereign who within its borders had no equal and thus permitted no interference in its acts. States were the only subjects of international law. All other entities were objects of the law which was inevitably dominated and dictated by states. Modern international law has seen a drastic shift from these views. For instance, legal theory now recognises other subjects of the international regime. States have yielded parts of their sovereign powers to personalities like international organisations. To a certain extent, natural and legal persons have found a place in the emerging international law. It must be emphasised, however, that this position of the latter does not go unchecked. States still regulate the activities of other international legal personalities. States are also seen jealously guarding their status as the prime subjects of international law.

On 1 July 1997 the People's Republic of China recovered Hong Kong in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 19 December 1984. On the same day, China announced the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) formally established and functioning as of 1 July 1997.

Books and Articles in the Field of the Prevention and Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (Winter 2003–4) Compiled by Ingrid KostConservator, Peace Palace Library, The Hague.

Matthias and I clearly agree on a great deal: a voluntarist approach to defining public international law is unsatisfactory; any rule of recognition in international law must provide a basis for a link between legality and legitimacy; one of the central contributions that law can make to international society is procedural in nature. However, our respective positions on the utility of a binary distinction between law and not-law have significant impacts on our approaches. We are both concerned, I think, with preserving the autonomy of politics – with ensuring that politics (or, more specifically, international public authority) do not come to be invaded by law. My own concern with preserving the autonomy of law leads me to two conclusions with which Matthias would take issue: that international public authority must be constituted by law; and that the rules which those authorities administer must be treated differently, depending on whether or not they meet a set of formal criteria that legal rules must satisfy. I will also address Matthias's discussion of Lon L. Fuller's internal morality of law and Benedict Kingsbury's concept of publicness in international law. I believe that both sets of concepts may be useful to Matthias's argument and deserve further attention. First, however, I would like to explore what it means, or could mean, to cut off the head of the king.