This book, the first in a new series, Studies in the History of International Law, will be welcomed by scholars interested in the relationship between revolutionary France and a sister republic. The author bases his study on an impressive array of archival materials in Paris, The Hague, Milan, and Bern but strangely does not examine those available in Britain. This omission is particularly striking given the British connection to and interest, both strategic and commercial, in the United Provinces. In particular, although Kubben extensively discusses Malmesbury's various missions, he never looks at the critically important Malmesbury papers in Winchester or London. Also, the bibliography does not include classics, such as Geikie and Montgomery's The Dutch Barrier, 1705–1719 (1930), Gilbert's The ‘New Diplomacy' of the Eighteenth Century (1951), Roider's Baron Thugut and Austria's Response to the French Revolution (1987), Harris’ Diaries and Correspondence (1844) or Letters (1870), or Parry's Consolidated Treaty Series (1969). Given those caveats, this book is impressive and exhaustive in its detailed coverage of the various pourparlers and démarches between the Batavians and the French during the Revolutionary Wars, and in underscoring the difference between the rhetoric of sister republics and the reality of French exploitation. The editor of the series argues that this book is a study of “international law in action” (xii), but rather it is an analysis of how the French revolutionaries consistently disregarded international law. The author's intent is “to elucidate the interaction between law and power in international relations” (19), but again more accurately, he analyzes the relationship between the rhetoric of law and the reality of power.

This book is not for the uninitiated; it includes both too much detail and too little. For example, the author surveys the international system before the Revolution that most scholars will know but does not explain Belissa's theory of the “instrumentalization” of sister republics or the various coups in the Batavian republic or the French role in such. More information on the Batavian Revolution and the protagonists would have been helpful, as would a short section on what happened to the revolutionaries after the final defeat of the French. Those not interested in the various theoretical discussions of what constitutes an alliance or hegemony, or in the rhetorical questions that the author insists that he will not address, can skip the first ninety-eight pages. There are stylistic problems: the frequent use of colloquial expressions such as “Kill the goose that laid the golden eggs” (179, 182), “smelled a rat” (343, 352), set the wrong tone; some sentences such as “the l756 diplomatic revolution de facto ended the ratio of the barrier system” (149) and “French officials emitted discrepant signals” (321) are unintelligible; and the unduly long, often half-page quotations clog the narrative.

According to Kubben, the purpose of the sister republics was to create a protective glacis around France that was “part of the redefinition of French security policy” (118). Although Kubben argues that the annexation of the United Provinces was unlikely, it is not clear why he thinks so, as the French had annexed the Austrian Netherlands. Equally strange is his contention that “the United Provinces confined themselves to defending their existing territories” (147), when he devotes a considerable number of pages to the Dutch attempt to expand their Eastern borders and annex Prussian lands. Even less credible is his view that the treaty of alliance was not a Diktat. These critiques aside, specialists will turn to this work in order to understand the basic asymmetry in relations between the two republics and its consequences. The French annexed Dutch lands, insisted on a large indemnity, stationed troops in the Batavian Republic and provisioned them at Batavian expense (about one-third of the annual budget). And these are allies? The author also underscores the patriots' desperation for French support, especially a strong military presence as a deterrent to Prussian aggression and domestic opposition. In turn, the French exploited factionalism to control Dutch politics even though many must have agreed with Carnot, who argued that he had no time for “so-called patriots interested only in the expulsion of their personal enemies. …” (T.C. W. Blanning, The French Revolutionary Wars, 170). The British position that the Dutch lands were in effect an occupied territory was the ugly reality. As General Sauviac stated: “Holland has done nothing to avoid being classed among the general order of our conquests. …” (T.C.W. Blanning, The French Revolutionary Wars, 170). The Batavians were routinely excluded, for example, from international congresses such as Campo Formio and Lille, and were forced to accede to the preliminaries before they were admitted to the Amiens conferences. All too predictable contentions arose over the condominium over Flushing. More than anything else, the book underscores the truth of the dictum, in the revolutionary era as earlier: “Gallicus amicus sed non vicinus.”