empire. Nothing reveals more about his world than the impact on it of the Holy Places controversy that provoked the Crimean War. For Ottoman statesmen, Orthodox–Catholic controversy in Palestine signified a diplomatic choice between France as protector of the Catholics and Russia as protector of the Orthodox, not a choice over which to hesitate. For Vogorides, in contrast, favoring the Catholics, a small community in the empire, was an unbelievable affront to the Orthodox Christians – 16 million, he reckoned – whose real protector to Vogorides' thinking was the Ottoman state (163–166).

Compelling in argument, the book is not without error. Philliou dates the founding of the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte first to 1833 (7), then correctly to 1821 (93). Too many assertions are footnoted to whole books without specific page references. Asserting that the Ottomans appointed Phanariots as ambassadors by the early 1800s (30), she cites my books, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, 1980) and Ottoman Civil Officialdom (Princeton, 1989) without page citations; I cannot find mention of such appointments in my sources. The original of Dante's Divine Comedy was in Italian, not Latin (170). The French ambassador did not refer to the Ottoman government as that of "Her Highness" (127). Diplomatic convention ascribed princely rank to the grand vezir, making him "Son Altesse." French-language correspondence redounds with feminine terms (Altesse, Excellence, pronominally Elle) that refer to male dignitaries. Philliou's Ottoman Turkish also errs. "Holiday gifts" (26) would not have been 'aidiye but 'idiye; tevarid (105) should be tevarüd; killeri hümayunum (195, n. 60), should be kiler-i hümayunum. She quotes an original Ottoman document without identifying the source (220, n. 35). Most historians date the Tanzimat to 1839; Philliou treats it as beginning in 1856 (139). Ottomans admitted non-Muslims into official service after 1856; I have seen no evidence of the quotas Philliou mentions (168, 173).

As with some photographs, the focus of this book is not altogether exact, but the picture is memorable.

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Raymond Kubben, *Regeneration and Harmony: Franco-Bavarian Relations in the Revolutionary Era, 1795–1803*, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011. Pp.790. \$212.00 (ISBN 978-9-004-18558-6). doi:10.1017/S0738248011000782

This book, the first in a new series, *Studies in the History of International Law*, will be welcomed by scholars interested in the relationship between

revolutionary France and a sister republic. The author bases his study on an impressive array of archival materials in Paris, The Hague, Milan, and Bern but strangely does not examine those available in Britain. This omission is particularly striking given the British connection to and interest, both strategic and commercial, in the United Provinces. In particular, although Kubben extensively discusses Malmesbury's various missions, he never looks at the critically important Malmesbury papers in Winchester or London. Also, the bibliography does not include classics, such as Geikie and Montgomery's The Dutch Barrier, 1705–1719 (1930), Gilbert's The 'New Diplomacy' of the Eighteenth Century (1951), Roider's Baron Thugut and Austria's Response to the French Revolution (1987), Harris' Diaries and Correspondence (1844) or Letters (1870), or Parry's Consolidated Treaty Series (1969). Given those caveats, this book is impressive and exhaustive in its detailed coverage of the various *pourparlers* and démarches between the Batavians and the French during the Revolutionary Wars, and in underscoring the difference between the rhetoric of sister republics and the reality of French exploitation. The editor of the series argues that this book is a study of "international law in action" (xii), but rather it is an analysis of how the French revolutionaries consistently disregarded international law. The author's intent is "to elucidate the interaction between law and power in international relations" (19), but again more accurately, he analyzes the relationship between the rhetoric of law and the reality of power.

This book is not for the uninitiated; it includes both too much detail and too little. For example, the author surveys the international system before the Revolution that most scholars will know but does not explain Belissa's theory of the "instrumentalization" of sister republics or the various coups in the Batavian republic or the French role in such. More information on the Batavian Revolution and the protagonists would have been helpful, as would a short section on what happened to the revolutionaries after the final defeat of the French. Those not interested in the various theoretical discussions of what constitutes an alliance or hegemony, or in the rhetorical questions that the author insists that he will not address, can skip the first ninety-eight pages. There are stylistic problems: the frequent use of colloquial expressions such as "Kill the goose that laid the golden eggs" (179, 182), "smelled a rat" (343, 352), set the wrong tone; some sentences such as "the 1756 diplomatic revolution de facto ended the ratio of the barrier system" (149) and "French officials emitted discrepant signals" (321) are unintelligible; and the unduly long, often half-page quotations clog the narrative.

According to Kubben, the purpose of the sister republics was to create a protective *glacis* around France that was "part of the redefinition of French security policy" (118). Although Kubben argues that the annexation of the United Provinces was unlikely, it is not clear why he thinks so, as the

French had annexed the Austrian Netherlands. Equally strange is his contention that "the United Provinces confined themselves to defending their existing territories" (147), when he devotes a considerable number of pages to the Dutch attempt to expand their Eastern borders and annex Prussian lands. Even less credible is his view that the treaty of alliance was not a Diktat. These critiques aside, specialists will turn to this work in order to understand the basic asymmetry in relations between the two republics and its consequences. The French annexed Dutch lands, insisted on a large indemnity, stationed troops in the Batavian Republic and provisioned them at Batavian expense (about one-third of the annual budget). And these are allies? The author also underscores the patriots' desperation for French support, especially a strong military presence as a deterrent to Prussian aggression and domestic opposition. In turn, the French exploited factionalism to control Dutch politics even though many must have agreed with Carnot, who argued that he had no time for "so-called patriots interested only in the expulsion of their personal enemies...." (T.C. W. Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars*, 170). The British position that the Dutch lands were in effect an occupied territory was the ugly reality. As General Sauviac stated: "Holland has done nothing to avoid being classed among the general order of our conquests..." (T.C.W. Blanning, The French Revolutionary Wars, 170). The Batavians were routinely excluded, for example, from international congresses such as Campo Formio and Lille, and were forced to accede to the preliminaries before they were admitted to the Amiens conferences. All too predictable contentions arose over the condominium over Flushing. More than anything else, the book underscores the truth of the dictum, in the revolutionary era as earlier: "Gallicus amicus sed non vicinus."

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Fariba Zarinebaf, *Crime and Punishment in Istanbul, 1700–1800*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011. Pp. 304. \$55.00 cloth (ISBN 978-0-520-26220-1); \$22.95 paper (ISBN 978-0-520-26221-8). doi:10.1017/S0738248011000794

Here is a highly readable and informative account of Ottoman social and legal history. Zarinebaf's examination of the relationship between law and urban life in early modern Ottoman Istanbul draws upon a wealth of materials. The author is a natural storyteller who allows the words of judges and plaintiffs,