We will consider Tarski's work in pure model theory and classical logic. His work in applied model theory—the model theory of various special theories—is discussed by Doner and van den Dries [1987], and McNulty [1986]. (However, the separation of “pure” and “applied” only becomes natural as the subjects mature; so we shall discuss applied model theory at least to some extent in Tarski's earlier work.)

Alfred Tarski (1901–1983) was awarded a Ph.D. in mathematics at Warsaw University in 1924. His teachers included the two leaders of the renowned Polish logic school, the logician-philosophers L. Leśniewski and J. Łukasiewicz. (Very soon Tarski was recognized as the third leader of the school.) Another teacher was the philosopher T. Kotarbiński, to whom Tarski dedicated his collected papers [56m]. Leśniewski was Tarski's thesis advisor; he transmitted to Tarski his interests in the metalanguage and in the theory of definition. Tarski's thesis ([23a], [24]) was about protothetic—the sentential calculus augmented by quantifiable variables ranging over truth functions. Its main result was that all the connectives are definable using only ↔ and ∀. By the same year, 1924, Tarski also had begun his prolific writings in set theory, and had discovered together with S. Banach, the leader of the Polish mathematicians, their famous “paradox” [24d] in measure theory. (For details see Lévy [1987].)

In 1927-29 Tarski held a seminar at Warsaw University on results he obtained in 1926-28. The seminar lay at the heart of what is now called model theory. The brief history of model theory up to that time had begun with the paper of L. Löwenheim [1915].

Let G be a locally compact abelian group, Γ its dual group, and μ its Haar measure. For a function f: G → C, the Fourier transform of f is defined by

for every γ ∈ Γ.

We extend this definition for a function f on G, whose values are pairwise commutable normal operators in a Hilbert space. Then we study harmonic analysis for this extended Fourier transform.

Our method is Boolean valued analysis as introduced in [11] and [12]. Instead of developing the theory in a step-by-step manner, we shall develop a general machinery showing how to transform classical theorems to theorems in our situation.

In Chapter 1, we summarize the basic knowledge on Hilbert space, on Boolean valued model of set theory, and on Boolean valued analysis. In Chapter 2, we develop the theory of integration. Since we deal with unbounded operators as well as bounded operators, we need a new theory of integration. For a separable Hilbert space, the value of our integration coincides with the value of the usual integration with an adequate generalization for unbounded operators.

In Chapter 3, we establish machinery for our transfer principle and carry out the transformation of many classical theorems to theorems for our case.

In a recent paper by Mostowski [1] we find an investigation of those formulas of quantification theory which are valid in all domains of individuals, including the empty domain. Mostowski gives a complete set of axioms for such a first order functional calculus (the system is called “”) and a comparison is made with a form of the usual calculus, Church's in [2]. It is pointed out that is much less elegant; in particular, the distributivity laws for quantifiers (e.g., (x){A . B) .{x)A . (x)B) do not hold in general, and likewise the rule of modus ponens does not preserve validity in all cases.

In this paper we show that a not inelegant system is obtained if one modifies Mostowski's approach in two respects; and once this is done a somewhat neater proof of completeness can be given.

The first respect in which we diverge from Mostowski is in the treatment of vacuous quantifiers. For him if p has no free x, then (x)p and (∃x)p are both to have the same value (interpretation) as p1. But this is not the only way to assign values to vacuous quantifications. For when universal quantification is viewed as a generalized conjunction, the formula (x)Fx has the significance of Fa . Fb…. for as many conjunctands as there are individuals in the domain, and if Fx should have the “constant” value p, then (x)p is to mean the conjunction of p with itself for as many times as there are individuals in the domain (compare the arithmetical ).

Working within weak subsystems of second-order arithmetic Z2 we consider two versions of the Baire Category theorem which are not equivalent over the base system RCA0. We show that one version (B.C.T.I) is provable in RCA0 while the second version (B.C.T.II) requires a stronger system. We introduce two new subsystems of Z2, which we call and , and , show that suffices to prove B.C.T.II. Some model theory of and its importance in view of Hilbert's program is discussed, as well as applications of our results to functional analysis.

The results in this paper were motivated by the following result due to R. Solovay.

Theorem 1 (Solovay). Let M be a nonstandard model of Peano's first order axioms P and let I ⊂e M (i.e. ϕ ≠ ⊂ M and I is closed under < and successor). Then for each of the functions we can define J ⊆e I in ‹M, I› such that J is closed under that function. (∣x∣ denotes [log2(x)].)

Proof. Just notice that the cuts defined by

are successively closed under

In view of Theorem 1, the following question was raised by R. Solovay: Can we define J ⊆ I in ‹M, I› such that J is closed under exponentiation? In Theorem 2 we show that the answer is “no”. Theorem 3 is based on Theorem 2 and extends the technique to cuts which are models of subsystems of P.

To prove both theorems we shall need an estimate due to R. Parikh (see [1], especially the proof of Theorem 2.2a). For the sake of completeness, and also to introduce some notation we shall sketch Parikh's estimate in the next section. At all times we shall give the easiest estimates which still work rather than the sharpest ones.

The language of the basic logic of proofs extends the usual propositional language by forming sentences of the sort x is a proof of F for any sentence F. In this paper a complete axiomatization for the basic logic of proofs in Heyting Arithmetic HA was found.

This paper answers some questions which naturally arise from the Spector-Gandy proof of their theorem that the π1 1 sets of natural numbers are precisely those which are defined by a Σ1 1 formula over the hyperarithmetic sets. Their proof used hierarchies on recursive linear orderings (H-sets) which are not well orderings. (In this respect they anticipated the study of nonstandard models of set theory.) The proof hinged on the following fact. Let e be a recursive linear ordering. Then e is a well ordering if and only if there is an H-set on e which is hyperarithmetic. It was implicit in their proof that there are recursive linear orderings which are not well orderings, on which there are H-sets. Further information on such nonstandard H-sets (often called pseudohierarchies) can be found in Harrison [4]. It is natural to ask: on which recursive linear orderings are there H-sets?

In Friedman [1] it is shown that there exists a recursive linear ordering e that has no hyperarithmetic descending sequences such that no H-set can be placed on e. In [1] it is also shown that if e is a recursive linear ordering, every point of which has an immediate successor and either has finitely many predecessors or is finitely above a limit point (heretofore called adequate) such that an H-set can be placed on e, then e has no hyperarithmetic descending sequences. In a related paper, Friedman [2] shows that there is no infinite sequence xn of codes for ω-models of the arithmetic comprehension axiom scheme such that each x n+ 1 is a set in the ω-model coded by xn , and each x n+1 is the unique solution of P(xn , x n+1) for some fixed arithmetic P.

The choice construct (choose x: φ(x)) is useful in software specifications. We study extensions of first-order logic with the choice construct. We prove some results about Hilbert's ε operator, but in the main part of the paper we consider the case when all choices are independent.

In Hilbert and Ackermann [2] there is a simple proof of the consistency of first order predicate logic by reducing it to propositional logic. Intuitively, the proof is based on interpreting predicate logic in a domain with only one element. Tarski [7] and Gentzen [1] have extended this method to simple type theory by starting with an individual domain consisting of a single element and then interpreting a higher type by the set of truth valued functions on the previous type.

I will use the method of Hilbert and Ackermann on Martin-Löf's type theory without universes to show that ¬Eq(A, a, b) cannot be derived without universes for any type A and any objects a and b of type A. In particular, this proves the conjecture in Martin-Löf [5] that Peano's fourth axiom (∀x ϵ N)¬ Eq(N, 0, succ(x)) cannot be proved in type theory without universes. If by consistency we mean that there is no closed term of the empty type, then the construction will also give a consistency proof by finitary methods of Martin-Löf's type theory without universes. So, without universes, the logic obtained by interpreting propositions as types is surprisingly weak. This is in sharp contrast with type theory as a computational system, since, for instance, the proof that every object of a type can be computed to normal form cannot be formalized in first order arithmetic.

Khutoretskii's Theorem states that the Rogers semilattice of any family of c.e. sets has either at most one or infinitely many elements. A lemma in the inductive step of the proof shows that no Rogers semilattice can be partitioned into a principal ideal and a principal filter. We show that such a partitioning is possible for some family of d.c.e. sets. In fact, we construct a family of c.e. sets which, when viewed as a family of d.c.e. sets, has (up to equivalence) exactly two computable Friedberg numberings μ and ν, and μ reduces to any computable numbering not equivalent to ν. The question of whether the full statement of Khutoretskii's Theorem fails for families of d.c.e. sets remains open.

The structure (D, ≤) of the Turing degrees under Turing reducibility is quite complicated. This is true even if we restrict our attention to the substructure (R, ≤) of r.e. degrees. However, the theorems which imply that these structures are complicated all involve ad hoc constructions of sets having the desired reducibility relations. The complexity disappears when we turn to degrees occurring in nature. Of the degrees in R, only 0 and 0′ seem natural. In D, only 0, 0′, 0″, …, 0ω, 0ω+1, … (and on into the transfinite) seem natural. Thus the natural degrees appear to be wellordered, with successors given by Turing jump.

If this is true, one would like to prove it. Of course the first problem is to make the concept of naturalness more precise. The following requirements seem plausible: a natural degree should be definable, its definition should relativise to an arbitrary degree, and this relativisation should preserve reducibility relations among natural degrees. Thus to each natural degree c is associated a definable fc: D → D so that fc(0) = c and ∀d(d ≤ fc(d)). Moreover, b ≤ c iff ∀d(fb(d) ≤, fc(d)). To be specific, let us take the definability of fc to mean that fc ∈ L(R).

If P is a property of degrees, we say P holds almost everywhere (a.e.) iff ∃c∀d ≥: c P(d). For f, g: D → D, let f ≤mgiff f(d) ≤ g(d) a.e. Define f′ by f′(d) = f{d)′, and let M = {f: D → D/f ∈ L(R) ∧ d ≤ f(d) a.e.}. The following conjecture is due to D. A. Martin:

Conjecture. M is prewellordered by ≤m. If f ∈ M has rank α in ≤m, then f′ has rank α + 1.

Wiener, in 1914, reduced the theory of relations to that of classes by construing relations as classes of ordered pairs and defining the ordered pair in turn on the basis of class theory alone.1 The definition, as improved by Kuratowski,2 identifies the ordered pair x;y with uxyi(ix U iy).

In terms of Russell's theory of types, x;y in the above sense is two types higher than x and y. Even when we abandon Russell's theory of fixed types of objects in favor of a theory of stratified formulae,3 there is still significance in saying that ‘x;y’ is of type 2 relative to ‘x’ and ‘y’—meaning that a test of the stratification of any context involves assigning a higher number by 2 to ‘x;y’ than to ‘x’ and ‘y’.

We prove that if I is a partially ordered set in a countable transitive model of ZFC then can be extended by a generic sequence of reals ai, i ∈ I, such that is preserved and every ai is Sacks generic over [〈aj: j < i〉]. The structure of the degrees of -constructibility of reals in the extension is investigated.

As applications of the methods involved, we define a cardinal invariant to distinguish product and iterated Sacks extensions, and give a short proof of a theorem (by Budinas) that in ω2-iterated Sacks extension of L the Burgess selection principle for analytic equivalence relations holds.

We define a first-order extension LK(CP) of the cutting planes proof system CP as the first-order sequent calculus LK whose atomic formulas are CP-inequalities ∑i ai · xi ≥ b (xi's variables, ai's and b constants). We prove an interpolation theorem for LK(CP) yielding as a corollary a conditional lower bound for LK(CP)-proofs. For a subsystem R(CP) of LK(CP), essentially resolution working with clauses formed by CP-inequalities, we prove a monotone interpolation theorem obtaining thus an unconditional lower bound (depending on the maximum size of coefficients in proofs and on the maximum number of CP-inequalities in clauses). We also give an interpolation theorem for polynomial calculus working with sparse polynomials.

The proof relies on a universal interpolation theorem for semantic derivations [16, Theorem 5.1].

LK(CP) can be viewed as a two-sorted first-order theory of Z considered itself as a discretely ordered Z-module. One sort of variables are module elements, another sort are scalars. The quantification is allowed only over the former sort. We shall give a construction of a theory LK(M) for any discretely ordered module M (e.g., LK(Z) extends LK(CP)). The interpolation theorem generalizes to these theories obtained from discretely ordered Z-modules. We shall also discuss a connection to quantifier elimination for such theories.

We formulate a communication complexity problem whose (suitable) solution would allow to improve the monotone interpolation theorem and the lower bound for R(CP).

The study of preservation theorems for first order logic was the focus of much research by model theorists in the 1960's. These theorems, which came to form the foundation for classical model theory, characterize first order sentences and theories that are preserved under operations such as the taking of unions or submodels (see Chang and Keisler [5] for a discussion of preservation theorems for first order logic). In current model theoretic research, logics richer than first order logic and applications of logic to other parts of mathematics have assumed the central position. In the former area, preservation theorems are not so important; in the latter, especially in applications to algebra, many of the techniques developed for proving these theorems have been useful.

In this paper I prove several preservation theorems for first order logic which I discovered while investigating the asymptotic growth of classes of finite combinatorial structures. The significance of these theorems lies in their applications to problems in finite combinatorics. Since the applications require combinatorial and analytical techniques that are not pertinent to logical questions discussed here, I shall present them in another paper [7].

The condensed detachment rule, or ruleD, was first proposed by Carew Meredith in the 1950's for propositional logic based on implication. It is a combination of modus ponens with a “minimal” amount of substitution. We shall give a precise detailed statement of rule D. (Some attempts in the published literature to do this have been inaccurate.)

The D-completeness question for a given set of logical axioms is whether every formula deducible from the axioms by modus ponens and substitution can be deduced instead by rule D alone. Under the well-known formulae-as-types correspondence between propositional logic and combinator-based type-theory, rule D turns out to correspond exactly to an algorithm for computing principal type-schemes in combinatory logic. Using this fact, we shall show that D is complete for intuitionistic and classical implicational logic. We shall also show that D is incomplete for two weaker systems, BCK- and BCI-logic.

In describing the formulae-as-types correspondence it is common to say that combinators correspond to proofs in implicational logic. But if “proofs” means “proofs by the usual rules of modus ponens and substitution”, then this is not true. It only becomes true when we say “proofs by rule D”; we shall describe the precise correspondence in Corollary 6.7.1 below.

This paper is written for readers in propositional logic and in combinatory logic. Since workers in one field may not feel totally happy in the other, we include short introductions to both fields.

We wish to record thanks to Martin Bunder, Adrian Rezus and the referee for helpful comments and advice.

Presburger arithmetic is the first-order theory of the natural numbers with addition (but no multiplication). We characterize sets that can be defined by a Presburger formula as exactly the sets whose characteristic functions can be represented by rational generating functions; a geometric characterization of such sets is also given. In addition, if p = (p1, . . . , pn) are a subset of the free variables in a Presburger formula, we can define a counting function g(p) to be the number of solutions to the formula, for a given p. We show that every counting function obtained in this way may be represented as, equivalently, either a piecewise quasi-polynomial or a rational generating function. Finally, we translate known computational complexity results into this setting and discuss open directions.

Questions about the constructive or effective character of particular arguments arise in several areas of classical mathematics, such as in the theory of recursive functions and in numerical analysis. Some philosophers have advocated Lewis's S4 as the proper logic in which to formalize such epistemic notions. (The fundamental work on this is Hintikka [4].) Recently there have been studies of mathematical theories formalized with S4 as the underlying logic so that these epistemic notions can be expressed. (See Shapiro [7], Myhill [5], and Goodman [2]. The motivation for this work is discussed in Goodman [3].) The present paper is a contribution to the study of the simplest of these theories, namely first-order arithmetic as formalized in S4. Following Shapiro, we call this theory epistemic arithmetic (EA). More specifically, we show that EA is a conservative extension of Hey ting's arithmetic HA (ordinary first-order intuitionistic arithmetic). The question of whether EA is conservative over HA was raised but left open in Shapiro [7].

The idea of our proof is as follows. We interpret EA in an infinitary propositional S4, pretty much as Tait, for example, interprets classical arithmetic in his infinitary classical propositional calculus in [8]. We then prove a cut-elimination theorem for this infinitary propositional S4. A suitable version of the cut-elimination theorem can be formalized in HA. For cut-free infinitary proofs, there is a reflection principle provable in HA. That is, we can prove in HA that if there is a cut-free proof of the interpretation of a sentence ϕ then ϕ is true. Combining these results shows that if the interpretation of ϕ is provable in EA, then ϕ is provable in HA.

We study topological constructions in the recursion theoretic framework of the lattice of recursively enumerable open subsets of a topological space X. Various constructions produce complemented recursively enumerable open sets with additional recursion theoretic properties, as well as noncomplemented open sets. In contrast to techniques in classical topology, we construct a disjoint recursively enumerable collection of basic open sets which cannot be extended to a recursively enumerable disjoint collection of basic open sets whose union is dense in X.

In this paper we show that in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) sets of reals are determinate.

Before proceeding to the proof it will be helpful to consider some previous work in this area. The first major result was obtained by Gale and Stewart [3] who showed that in ZF open games are determinate. This was then successively improved by Wolfe [4] to (and so of course ) and then by Morton Davis [1] to . The results of Morton Davis further showed that countable unions of sufficiently ‘simple’ determinate sets are also determinate. At this time, however, sets did not appear sufficiently simple for this method to be applied in order to get determinacy.

The next major advance was made by D. A. Martin who showed, using indiscernibles, that with large cardinal assumptions games are equivalent to certain open games (i.e., player I (II) has a winning strategy for the game iff I (II) has a winning strategy for the open game). Thus, by the Gale–Stewart result, games are determinate. Martin's result also showed that under these large cardinal assumptions sets are sufficiently simple for the Morton Davis method to be applied to them.