In this paper we shall be concerned with questions regarding decision problems for certain classes of sentences (without quantifiers) of various kinds of algebra. In the first section we shall establish a result of a general nature, which enables one, in a number of cases, to reduce a decision problem of the type considered to a somewhat simpler problem. In the second section we formulate a rather broad sufficient condition for the existence of a decision method for sentences without quantifiers; and in the last section we show that this condition holds of lattices.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. In §1 and §2 which are largely expository we develop the known theory of ℵ1-categoricity in terms of strongly minimal sets. In §3 we settle affirmatively Vaught's conjecture that a complete ℵ1-categorical theory has either just one or just ℵ0 countable models, and in §4 we present an example which serves to illustrate the ideas of §3.

As far as we know the only work published on strongly minimal sets is that of Marsh [3]. The present exposition goes beyond [3] in showing that any ℵ-categorical theory has a principal extension in which some formula is strongly minimal.

Definition 1. For a set S and a cardinal κ,

In particular, 2ω denotes the power set of the natural numbers and not the cardinal 2ℵ0. We regard 2ω as a topological space with the usual product topology.

Definition 2. A set S ⊆ 2ω is Ramsey if there is an M ∈ [ω]ω such that either [M]ω ⊆ S or else [M]ω ⊆ 2ω − S.

Erdös and Rado [3, Example 1, p. 434] showed that not every S ⊆ 2ω is Ramsey. In view of the nonconstructive character of the counterexample, one might expect (as Dana Scott has suggested) that all sufficiently definable sets are Ramsey. In fact, our main result (Theorem 2) is that all Borei sets are Ramsey. Soare [10] has applied this result to some problems in recursion theory.

The first positive result on Scott's problem was Ramsey's theorem [8, Theorem A]. The next advance was Nash-Williams' generalization of Ramsey's theorem (Corollary 2), which can be interpreted as saying: If S1 and S2 are disjoint open subsets of 2ω, there is an M ∈ [ω]ω such that either [M]ω ⋂ S1 = ∅ or [M]ω ∩ S2 = ⊆. (This is halfway between “clopen sets are Ramsey” and “open sets are Ramsey.”) Then Galvin [4] stated a generalization of Nash-Williams' theorem (Corollary 1) which says, in effect, that open sets are Ramsey; this was discovered independently by Andrzej Ehrenfeucht, Paul Cohen, and probably many others, but no proof has been published.

We are often told, correctly, that modern logic originated with Frege. For Frege clearly depicted polyadic predication, negation, the conditional, and the quantifier as the bases of logic; moreover, he introduced the idea of a formal system, and argued that mathematical demonstrations, to be fully precise, must be carried out within a formal language by means of explicitly formulated syntactic rules.

Consequently Frege has often been read as providing all the central notions that constitute our current understanding of quantification. For example, in his recent book on Frege [1973], Michael Dummett speaks of ”the semantics which [Frege] introduced for formulas of the language of predicate logic.” That is, “An interpretation of such a formula … is obtained by assigning entities of suitable kinds to the primitive nonlogical constants occurring in the formula … [T]his procedure is exactly the same as the modern semantic treatment of predicate logic” (pp. 89–90). Indeed, “Frege would therefore have had within his grasp the concepts necessary to frame the notion of the completeness of a formalization of logic as well as its soundness … but he did not do so” (p. 82).

This common appraisal of Frege's work is, I think, quite misleading. Even given Frege's tremendous achievements, the road to an understanding of quantification theory was an arduous one. Obtaining such understanding and formulating those notions which are now common coin in the discussion of logical systems were the tasks of much of the work in logic during the nineteen-twenties.

This expository paper contains a list of 102 problems which, at the time of publication, are unsolved. These problems are distributed in four subdivisions of logic: model theory, proof theory and intuitionism, recursion theory, and set theory. They are written in the form of statements which we believe to be at least as likely as their negations. These should not be viewed as conjectures since, in some cases, we had no opinion as to which way the problem would go.

In each case where we believe a problem did not originate with us, we made an effort to pinpoint a source. Often this was a difficult matter, based on subjective judgments. When we were unable to pinpoint a source, we left a question mark. No inference should be drawn concerning the beliefs of the originator of a problem as to which way it will go (lest the originator be us).

The choice of these problems was based on five criteria. Firstly, we are only including problems which call for the truth value of a particular mathematical statement. A second criterion is the extent to which the concepts involved in the statements are concepts that are well known, well denned, and well understood, as well as having been extensively considered in the literature. A third criterion is the extent to which these problems have natural, simple and attractive formulations. A fourth criterion is the extent to which there is evidence that a real difficulty exists in finding a solution. Lastly and unavoidably, the extent to which these problems are connected with the author's research interests in mathematical logic.

We introduce a reducibility preordering between classes of countable structures, each class containing only structures of a given similarity type (which is allowed to vary from class to class). Though we sometimes work in a slightly larger context, we are principally concerned with the case where each class is an invariant Borel class (i.e. the class of all models, with underlying set = ω, of an Lω1ω sentence; from this point of view, the reducibility can be thought of as a (rather weak) sort of Lω1ω-interpretability notion). We prove a number of general results about this notion, but our main thrust is to situate various mathematically natural classes with respect to the preordering, most notably classes of algebraic structures such as groups and fields.

We show that the variety of Heyting algebras has finitary unification type. We also show that the subvariety obtained by adding it De Morgan law is the biggest variety of Heyting algebras having unitary unification type. Proofs make essential use of suitable characterizations (both from the semantic and the syntactic side) of finitely presented projective algebras.

One might fairly say that the very meaning of our subject has changed since Hilbert introduced it under the name Beweistheorie (it was meant to be the principal tool for formulating Hubert's general conception of how to analyze mathematical reasoning). Specifically, the roles of the two principal elements of proof theory, namely the intuitive proofs accepted and the formal proofs (or derivations) studied, have turned out to be quite different from what Hilbert thought. In his view the hard work had been done in the discovery of formalization, and what remained was the study of certain given formal systems.

The following system is an extension of the Lewis calculus S2 to include quantification.

Cantor's second ordinal number class is perhaps the simplest example of a set of mathematical objects which cannot all be named in one language. In this paper we shall investigate a system of names for a segment of the first and second number classes in relation to decision problems. The system, except for one minor difference, is the one studied by Markwald in [12]. In our system ordinals are named by natural numbers from a set W via recursive well-orderings of subsets of the natural numbers.

The decision problems will be related to the hyperarithmetical hierarchy of Davis [2], [3] and Kleene [8]. This hierarchy is indexed by ordinal notations from Kleene's system S3 [4], [6], [9], in which ordinals are named by natural numbers from a set O, partially well-ordered ([12] p. 138) by a relation a≤Ob; O and ≤O are defined inductively by applications of the successor and limit operations. As results of this investigation, we shall (i) answer negatively Markwald's question [12] Theorem 12 whether his set “W” is arithmetical by showing that it is not even hyperarithmetical, (ii) obtain a new proof of the main result of Kleene [10] that every predicate expressible in both the one-function-quantifier forms of [8] is recursive in Hα for some aεO, (iii) answer affirmatively the question raised by Davis [2], [3] whether all the Church-Kleene constructive ordinals are uniqueness ordinals, and (iv) solve the function-quantifier analog of Post's problem [15]. Strong use will be made of the well-orderings that can be constructed from one-function-quantifier predicates as in [9].

General syntax, the formal part of the general theory of signs, has as its basic operation the operation of concatenation, expressed by the connective ‘⌢’ and understood as follows : where x and y are any expressions, x⌢y is the expression formed by writing the expression x immediately followed by the expression y. E.g., where ‘alpha’ and ‘beta’ are understood as names of the respective signs ‘α’ and ‘β’, the syntactical expression ‘alpha⌢beta’ is a name of the expression ‘αβ’.

Tarski and Hermes have presented axioms for concatenation, and definitions of derivative syntactical concepts. Hermes has also related concatenation theory to the arithmetic of natural numbers, constructing a model of the latter within the former. Conversely, Gödel's proof of the impossibility of a complete consistent systematization of arithmetic depended on constructing a model of concatenation theory within arithmetic.

Substructural fuzzy logics are substructural logics that are complete with respect to algebras whose lattice reduct is the real unit interval [0, 1]. In this paper, we introduce Uninorm logic UL as Multiplicative additive intuitionistic linear logic MAILL extended with the prelinearity axiom ((A → B) ∧ t) V ((B → A)∧ t). Axiomatic extensions of UL include known fuzzy logics such as Monoidal t-norm logic MIX and Gödel logic G, and new weakening-free logics. Algebraic semantics for these logics are provided by subvarieties of (representable) pointed bounded commutative residuated lattices. Gentzen systems admitting cut-elimination are given in the framework of hypersequents. Completeness with respect to algebras with lattice reduct [0, 1] is established for UL and several extensions using a two-part strategy. First, completeness is proved for the logic extended with Takeuti and Titani's density rule. A syntactic elimination of the rule is then given using a hypersequent calculus. As an algebraic corollary, it follows that certain varieties of residuated lattices are generated by their members with lattice reduct [0, 1].

This paper is the third in a series collectively entitled Formal systems of intuitionistic analysis. The first two are [4] and [5] in the bibliography; in them I attempted to codify Brouwer's mathematical practice. In the present paper, which is independent of [4] and [5], I shall do the same for Bishop's book [1]. There is a widespread current impression, due partly to Bishop himself (see [2]) and partly to Goodman and the author (see [3]) that the theory of Gödel functionals, with quantifiers and choice, is the appropriate formalism for [1]. That this is not so is seen as soon as one really tries to formalize the mathematics of [1] in detail. Even so simple a matter as the definition of the partial function 1/x on the nonzero reals is quite a headache, unless one is prepared either to distinguish nonzero reals from reals (a nonzero real being a pair consisting of a real x and an integer n with ∣x∣ > 1/n) or, to take the Dialectica interpretation seriously, by adjoining to the Gödel system an axiom saying that every formula is equivalent to its Dialectica interpretation. (See [1, p. 19], [2, pp. 57–60] respectively for these two methods.) In more advanced mathematics the complexities become intolerable.

In [8] J. A. Robinson introduced a complete refutation procedure called resolution for first order predicate calculus. Resolution is based on ideas in Herbrand's Theorem, and provides a very convenient framework in which to search for a proof of a wff believed to be a theorem. Moreover, it has proved possible to formulate many refinements of resolution which are still complete but are more efficient, at least in many contexts. However, when efficiency is a prime consideration, the restriction to first order logic is unfortunate, since many statements of mathematics (and other disciplines) can be expressed more simply and naturally in higher order logic than in first order logic. Also, the fact that in higher order logic (as in many-sorted first order logic) there is an explicit syntactic distinction between expressions which denote different types of intuitive objects is of great value where matching is involved, since one is automatically prevented from trying to make certain inappropriate matches. (One may contrast this with the situation in which mathematical statements are expressed in the symbolism of axiomatic set theory.).

We consider the problem about the length of proofs of the sentences saying that there is no proof of contradiction in S whose length is < n. We show the relation of this problem to some problems about propositional proof systems.

Since the Hilbert substitution method has been applied by Ackermann to the formalism Z of number theory in [3], we shall give the no-counter-example interpretation for extensions (c) of Z, e.g. Zμ. The work required on top of Ackermann's investigations to check conditions (α) and (β), consists only in a suitable definition of a class of recursive functional. The verification of (γ) and (δ) is much more difficult, and requires the ideas of paras. 32 and 33 in the preceding section.

Cook and Reckhow defined a propositional formulation of the pigeonhole principle. This paper shows that there are Frege proofs of this propositional pigeonhole principle of polynomial size. This together with a result of Haken gives another proof of Urquhart's theorem that Frege systems have an exponential speedup over resolution. We also discuss connections to provability in theories of bounded arithmetic.

In this paper I shall give a solution of the decision problem for the Lewis systems S2 and S4; i.e., I shall establish a constructive method for deciding whether an arbitrary given sentence of one of these systems is provable. The method is laborious to apply, since, in order to decide by means of it whether a given sentence is provable, it is necessary to construct a (usually very large) finite matrix. The argument will perhaps be of general interest, however, because it does not seem to depend too closely on the special features of these particular systems, so that it may be possible to apply it in order to solve the decision problem for other such systems.

Section II presents the decision method for S2, and Section III for S4. In Section IV, I shall establish a certain correspondence between S4 and topology, which will provide a solution for a decision problem in topology; this correspondence also enables us to settle a previously unsolved problem with regard to the Lewis systems.

In treating of this system, I shall use the notation of Lewis, with the single exception that I shall use the symbol “≣”, instead of Lewis's symbol “=”, for strict equivalence. I shall use the symbol “=” to denote identity. Thus “p≣q” is a formula of S2, while “x=y” is the statement asserting that x and y are identical. I shall refer to the rules, primitive sentences and theorems of S2 by the names and numbers used by Lewis. Whenever a theorem stated by Lewis involves the symbol “=”, I shall of course suppose that this symbol has been replaced throughout by “≣”: thus, for example, I shall take 19.82 to be “(◇p∨◇q) ≣ ◇(p∨q)”, instead of “(◇p∨◇q) ≣ ◇(p∨q)”.

Die Gründe, die C. I. Lewis [5], [6] bewogen haben, neben der gewöhnlichen Implikation eine strikte Implikation einzuführen, sind bekannt. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird aus ähnlichen Gründen eine strenge Implikation eingeführt, die jedoch einen engeren Begriff darstellt als die strikte Implikation. Mit einer Arbeit von Arnold Schmidt [7] hat meine nur geringe Berührungspunkte, da der Verfasser sich mit der strikten Implikation beschäftigt. Für diese wird ein relativ einfaches Axiomensystem angegeben und gezeigt, wie man durch geeignete Definitionen von Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit bei eventueller Hinzufügung von Zusatzaxiomen die bekannten Systeme des Modalitätenkalküls erhält. Den Hauptteil meiner Arbeit bildet die Einführung meines Implikationsbegriffs; im zweiten Teil der Arbeit komme ich dann auf dieser Basis auch zu einer Einführung der Modalitäten.

Um die Art der Einführung des Kalküls zu motivieren, wollen wir kurz auf das eingehen, das uns mehr oder weniger deutlich vorschwebt, wenn wir von der strengen Implikation sprechen. Die strenge Implikation, die wir durch A → B wiedergeben, soll ausdrücken, daß zwischen A und B ein logischer Zusammenhang besteht, daß der Inhalt von B ein Teil des Inhaltes von A ist, oder wie wir es sonst ausdrücken wollen. Das hat mit der Richtigkeit oder Falschheit von A und B nichts zu tun. So würde man die Allgemeingültigkeit einer Formel A → (B → A) ablehnen, da sie den Schluß von A auf B → A einschließt und da die Richtigkeit von A nichts damit zu tun hat, ob zwischen B und A ein logischer Zusammenhang besteht.

The basic concept underlying probability theory and statistics is a function assigning numerical values (probabilities) to events. An “event” in this context is any conceivable state of affairs including the so-called “empty event”—an a priori impossible state. Informally, events are described in everyday language (e.g. “by playing this strategy I shall win $1000 before going broke”). But in the current mathematical framework (first proposed by Kolmogoroff [Ko 1]) they are identified with subsets of some all-inclusive set Q. The family of all events constitutes a field, or σ-field, and the logical connectives ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘not’ are translated into the set-theoretical operations of intersection, union and complementation. The points of Q can be regarded as possible worlds and an event as the set of all worlds in which it takes place. The concept of a field of sets is wide enough to accommodate all cases and to allow for a general abstract foundation of the theory. On the other hand it does not reflect distinctions that arise out of the linguistic structure which goes into the description of our events. Since events are always described in some language they can be indentified with the sentences that describe them and the probability function can be regarded as an assignment of values to sentences. The extensive accumulated knowledge concerning formal languages makes such a project feasible. The study of probability functions defined over the sentences of a rich enough formal language yields interesting insights in more than one direction.

Our present approach is not an alternative to the accepted Kolmogoroff axiomatics. In fact, given some formal language L, we can consider a rich enough set, say Q, of models for L (called also in this work “worlds”) and we can associate with every sentence the set of all worlds in Q in which the sentence is true. Thus our probabilities can be considered also as measures over some field of sets. But the introduction of the language adds mathematical structure and makes for distinctions expressing basic intuitions that cannot be otherwise expressed. As an example we mention here the concept of a random sequence or, more generally, a random world, or a world which is typical to a certain probability distribution.