We consider here the pure functional calculus of first order as formulated by Church.

Church, l.c., p. 79, gives the definition of the validity of a formula in a given set I of individuals and shows that a formula is provable in if and only if it is valid in every non-empty set I. The definition of validity is preceded by the definition of a value of a formula; the notion of a value is the basic “semantical” notion in terms of which all other semantical notions are definable.

The notion of a value of a formula retains its meaning also in the case when the set I is empty. We have only to remember that if I is empty, then an m-ary propositional function (i.e. a function from the m-th cartesian power Im to the set {f, t}) is the empty set. It then follows easily that the value of each well-formed formula with free individual variables is the empty set. The values of wffs without free variables are on the contrary either f or t. Indeed, if B has the unique free variable c and ϕ is the value of B, then the value of (c)B according to the definition given by Church is the propositional constant f or t according as ϕ(j) is f for at least one j in I or not. Since, however, there is no j in I, the condition ϕ(j) = t for all j in I is vacuously satisfied and hence the value of (c)B is t.

We study the computability-theoretic complexity and proof-theoretic strength of the following statements: (1) “If is a well-ordering, then so is ”, and (2) “If is a well-ordering, then so is φ(α, )”, where ∝ is a fixed computable ordinal and φ represents the two-placed Veblen function. For the former statement, we show that ω iterations of the Turing jump are necessary in the proof and that the statement is equivalent to over RCA0. To prove the latter statement we need to use ωα iterations of the Turing jump, and we show that the statement is equivalent to . Our proofs are purely computability-theoretic. We also give a new proof of a result of Friedman: the statement “if is a well-ordering, then so is φ(, 0)” is equivalent to ATR0 over RCA0.

We study the expressive power in the finite of the logic Fixed-Point+Counting, the extension of first-order logic which is obtained through adding both the fixed-point constructor and the ability to count.

To this end an isomorphism preserving (‘generic’) model of computation is introduced whose PTime restriction exactly corresponds to this level of expressive power, while its PSpace restriction corresponds to While+Counting. From this model we obtain a normal form which shows a rather clear separation of the relational vs. the arithmetical side of the algorithms involved.

In parallel, we study the relations of Fixed-Point+Counting with the infinitary logics and the corresponding pebble games.

The main result, however, involves the concept of an arithmetical invariant. By this we mean a functor taking every finite relational structure to an expansion of (an initial segment of) the standard arithmetical structure. In particular its values are linearly ordered structures. We establish the existence of a family of arithmetical invariants with the following properties:

• The invariants themselves can be evaluated in polynomial time.

• A class of finite relational structures is definable in Fixed-Point+Counting if and only if membership can be decided in polynomial time on the basis of the values of one of the invariants.

• The invariant r classifies all finite relational structures exactly up to equivalence with respect to the logic

We also give a characterization of Fixed-Point+Counting in terms of sequences of formulae in the : It corresponds exactly to the polynomial time computable families (φn)n ∈ ω in these logics.

Towards a positive assessment of the expressive power of Fixed-Point+Counting, it is shown that the natural extension of fixed-point logic by Lindström quantifiers, which capture all the PTime computable properties of cardinalities of definable predicates, is strictly weaker than what we get here. This implies in particular that every extension of fixed-point logic by means of monadic Lindström quantifiers, which stays within PTime, must be strictly contained in Fixed-Point+Counting.

A method is presented for constructing natural deduction-style systems for propositional relevant logics. The method consists in first translating formulas of relevant logics into ternary relations, and then defining deduction rules for a corresponding logic of ternary relations. Proof systems of that form are given for various relevant logics. A class of algebras of ternary relations is introduced that provides a relation-algebraic semantics for relevant logics.

In this paper we mainly study preservation theorems for two fragments of the infinitary languages Lκκ, with κ regular, without the equality symbol: the universal Horn fragment and the universal strict Horn fragment. In particular, when κ is ω, we obtain the corresponding theorems for the first-order case.

The universal Horn fragment of first-order logic (with equality) has been extensively studied; for references see [10], [7] and [8]. But the universal Horn fragment without equality, used frequently in logic programming, has received much less attention from the model theoretic point of view. At least to our knowledge, the problem of obtaining preservation results for it has not been studied before by model theorists. In spite of this, in the field of abstract algebraic logic we find a theorem which, properly translated, is a preservation result for the strict universal Horn fragment of infinitary languages without equality which, apart from function symbols, have only a unary relation symbol. This theorem is due to J. Czelakowski; see [5], Theorem 6.1, and [6], Theorem 5.1. A. Torrens [12] also has an unpublished result dealing with matrices of sequent calculi which, properly translated, is a preservation result for the strict universal Horn fragment of a first-order language. And in [2] of W. J. Blok and D. Pigozzi we find Corollary 6.3 which properly translated corresponds to our Corollary 19, but for the case of a first-order language that apart from its function symbols has only one κ-ary relation symbol, and for strict universal Horn sentences. The study of these results is the basis for the present work. In the last part of the paper, Section 4, we will make these connections clear and obtain some of these results from our theorems. In this way we hope to make clear two things: (1) The field of abstract algebraic logic can be seen, in part, as a disguised study of universal Horn logic without equality and so has an added interest. (2) A general study of universal Horn logic without equality from a model theoretic point of view can be of help in the field of abstract algebraic logic.

c.c.c. posets are characterised in terms of -generic conditions. This characterisation can be applied to get simple proofs of many facts about c.c.c. forcing including Con(MA + ┐CH).

This paper studies definability within the theory of institutions, a version of abstract model theory that emerged in computing science studies of software specification and semantics. We generalise the concept of definability to arbitrary logics, formalised as institutions, and we develop three general definability results. One generalises the classical Beth theorem by relying on the interpolation properties of the institution. Another relies on a meta Birkhoff axiomatizability property of the institution and constitutes a source for many new actual definability results, including definability in (fragments of) classical model theory. The third one gives a set of sufficient conditions for ‘borrowing’ definability properties from another institution via an ‘adequate’ encoding between institutions.

The power of our general definability results is illustrated with several applications to (many-sorted) classical model theory and partial algebra, leading for example to definability results for (quasi-)varieties of models or partial algebras. Many other applications are expected for the multitude of logical systems formalised as institutions from computing science and logic.

Anyone who reads Aristotle, knowing something about modern logic and nothing about its history, must ask himself why the syllogistic cannot be translated as it stands into the logic of quantification. It is now more than twenty years since the invention of the requisite framework, the logic of many-sorted quantification.

In the familiar first-order predicate logic generality is expressed by means of variables and quantifiers, and each interpretation of the system is based upon the choice of some class over which the variables may range, the only restriction placed on this ‘domain of individuals’ being that it should not be empty.

Theories of classification distinguish classes with some good structure theorem from those for which none is possible. Some classes (dense linear orders, for instance) are non-classifiable in general, but are classifiable when we consider only countable members. This paper explores such a notion for classes of computable structures by working out a sequence of examples.

We follow recent work by Goncharov and Knight in using the degree of the isomorphism problem for a class to distinguish classifiable classes from non-classifiable. In this paper, we calculate the degree of the isomorphism problem for Abelian p-groups of bounded Ulm length. The result is a sequence of classes whose isomorphism problems are cofinal in the hyperarithmetical hierarchy. In the process, new back-and-forth relations on such groups are calculated.

The following remarks apply to many functional calculi, each of which can be variously axiomatized, but for clarity of exposition we shall confine our attention to one particular system Σ. This system is to have the usual primitive symbols and formation rules of the pure first-order functional calculus, and the following formal axiom schemata and formal rules of inference.

Axiom schema 1. Any tautologous wff (well-formed formula).

Axiom schema 2. (a) A ⊃ B, where A is any wff, a and b are any individual variables, and B arises from A by replacing all free occurrences of a by free occurrences of b.

Axiom schema 3. (a)(A ⊃ B)⊃(A⊃ (a)B). where A and B are any wffs, and a is any individual variable not free in A.

Rule of Modus Ponens: applies to wffs A and A ⊃ B, and yields B.

Rule of Generalization: applies to a wff A and yields (a)A, where a is any individual variable.

A formal proof in Σ is a finite column of wffs each of whose lines is a formal axiom or arises from two preceding lines by the Rule of Modus Ponens or arises from a single preceding line by the Rule of Generalization. A formal theorem of Σ is a wff which occurs as the last line of some formal proof.

This paper resolves 3 problems left open by R. M. Robinson in [3].

We recall that the set of primitive recursive functions is the closure under (i) substitution (or “composition”), and (ii) recursion, of the set P consisting of the zero, successor and projection functions (see any textbook, for instance p. 120 of [2]).

A reader coming anew to the recent work on languages which contain their own truth predicates may be perplexed by the simple question of where to begin. A first approach to the literature suggests a field which is alive and busy with investigations heading in many different directions, but there is much less indication of how various pieces fit together. There are at least two sources of this confusion. First, the literature is large and diffuse (as befits a subject which goes back over 2000 years); Visser's survey [33] aptly describes the literature as “vast but scattered, repetitive, and disconnected.” Moreover, recent interest in the field has led to a proliferation of research and publication; it seems that almost any issue of any philosophical logic journal from the mid-1980s contains some article on the topic. The second reason, in part a consequence of the first, is that while a typical article in print usually presents a good internal motivation, with clear reference to its immediate intellectual antecedents, its place in the broader picture may not be so easily discerned. The problem can be especially acute in presentations of axiomatic approaches, because decisions on certain basic questions can lie hidden in the formal and notational details which abound in any axiomatization.

In fact, though, the recent research on methods for handling self-referential truth can be seen as a body of work which is very well structured, one in which a few fundamental decisions suffice to locate any particular approach in its appropriate place on the landscape. My goal is to describe this structure and in particular to stress a few critical forks in the road, which will be the recurring metaphor throughout this paper. I will also pay particular attention to pointing out where the interesting technical and mathematical questions lie.

We construct a weak second-order theory of arithmetic which includes Weak König's Lemma (WKL) for trees defined by bounded formulae. The provably total functions (with -graphs) of this theory are the polynomial time computable functions. It is shown that the first-order strength of this version of WKL is exactly that of the scheme of collection for bounded formulae.

The notion of a recursive function with type-2 arguments was introduced by Kleene [4]. Soon E, the type-2 object that introduces numerical quantification, began to play a central role in the development of the theory. First, Kleene [4, XLVIII] proved that the hyperarithmetical functions are exactly the functions recursive in E. Later, Gandy [1, p. 14] proved the existence of a selection operator recursive in E (that is, some ψ(х, ), partial recursive in E, having the property that, if {х}(y, ) converges for some y, then ψ(х, ) converges and is such a y).

In the twenties Brouwer established the well-known continuity theorem “every real function is locally uniformly continuous,” [3, 2, 5]. From this theorem one immediately concludes that the continuum is indecomposable (unzerlegbar), i.e., if ℝ = A ∪ B and A ∩ B = ∅ (denoted by ℝ = A + B), then ℝ = A or ℝ = B.

Brouwer deduced the indecomposability directly from the fan theorem (cf. the 1927 Berline Lectures, [7, p. 49]).

The theorem was published for the first time in [6], it was used to refute the principle of the excluded middle: ¬∀x ∈ ℝ (x ∈ ℚ ∨ ¬x ∈ ℚ).

The indecomposability of ℝ is a peculiar feature of constructive universa, it shows that ℝ is much more closely knit in constructive mathematics, than in classically mathematics. The classically comparable fact is the topological connectedness of ℝ. In a way this characterizes the position of ℝ: the only (classically) connected subsets of ℝ are the various kinds of segments. In intuitionistic mathematics the situation is different; the continuum has, as it were, a syrupy nature, one cannot simply take away one point. In the classical continuum one can, thanks to the principle of the excluded third, do so. To put it picturesquely, the classical continuum is the frozen intuitionistic continuum. If one removes one point from the intuitionistic continuum, there still are all those points for which it is unknown whether or not they belong to the remaining part.

We develop canonical rules capable of axiomatizing all systems of multiple-conclusion rules over K4 or IPC, by extension of the method of canonical formulas by Zakharyaschev [37]. We use the framework to give an alternative proof of the known analysis of admissible rules in basic transitive logics, which additionally yields the following dichotomy: any canonical rule is either admissible in the logic, or it is equivalent to an assumption-free rule. Other applications of canonical rules include a generalization of the Blok–Esakia theorem and the theory of modal companions to systems of multiple-conclusion rules or (unitary structural global) consequence relations, and a characterization of splittings in the lattices of consequence relations over monomodal or superintuitionistic logics with the finite model property.

This is the first of a sequence of papers in which we will develop a foundation for the theory of computation based on a precise, mathematical notion of abstract algorithm. To understand the aim of this program, one should keep in mind clearly the distinction between an algorithm and the object (typically a function) computed by that algorithm. The theory of computable functions (on the integers and on abstract structures) is obviously relevant to this work, but we will focus on making rigorous and identifying the mathematical properties of the finer (intensional) notion of algorithm.

It is characteristic of this approach that we take recursion to be a fundamental (primitive) process for constructing algorithms, not a derived notion which must be reduced to others—e.g. iteration or application and abstraction, as in the classical λ-calculus. We will model algorithms by recursors, the set-theoretic objects one would naturally choose to represent (syntactically described) recursive definitions. Explicit and iterative algorithms are modelled by (appropriately degenerate) recursors.

The main technical tool we will use is the formal language of recursion, FLR, a language of terms with two kinds of semantics: on each suitable structure, the denotation of a term t of FLR is a function, while the intension of t is a recursor (i.e. an algorithm) which computes the denotation of t. FLR is meant to be intensionally complete, in the sense that every (intuitively understood) “algorithm” should “be” (faithfully modelled, in all its essential properties by) the intension of some term of FLR on a suitably chosen structure.

We examine several conditions, either the existence of a rank or a particular property of þ-forking that suggest the existence of a well-behaved independence relation, and determine the consequences of each of these conditions towards the rosiness of the theory. In particular we show that the existence of an ordinal valued equivalence relation rank is a (necessary and) sufficient condition for rosiness.

We investigate extensions of Heyting's predicate calculus (HPC). We relate geometric properties of the trees of Kripke models (see [2]) with schemas of HPC and thus obtain completeness theorems for several intermediate logics defined by schemas. Our main results are:

(a) ∼(∀x ∼ ∼ϕ(x) Λ ∼∀xϕ(x)) is characterized by all Kripke models with trees T with the property that every point is below an endpoint. (From this we shall deduce Glivenko type theorems for this extension.)

(b) The fragment of HPC without ∨ and ∃ is complete for all Kripke models with constant domains.

We assume familiarity with Kripke [2]. Our notation is different from his since we want to stress properties of the trees. A Kripke model will be denoted by (Aα, ≤ 0), α ∈ T where (T, ≤, 0) is the tree with the least member 0 ∈ T and Aα, α ∈ T, is the model standing at the node α. The truth value at α of a formula ϕ(a1 … an) under the indicated assignment at α is denoted by [ϕ(a1 … an)]α.

A Kripke model is said to be of constant domains if all the models Aα, α ∈ T, have the same domain.