Let ℜ be an expansion of a dense linear order (R, <) without endpoints having the intermediate value property, that is, for all a, b ∈ R, every continuous (parametrically) definable function f: [a, b] → R takes on all values in R between f(a) and f(b). Every expansion of the real line (ℝ, <), as well as every o-minimal expansion of (R, <), has the intermediate value property. Conversely, some nice properties, often associated with expansions of (ℝ, <) or with o-minimal structures, hold for sets and functions definable in ℜ. For example, images of closed bounded definable sets under continuous definable maps are closed and bounded (Proposition 1.10).

Of particular interest is the case that ℜ expands an ordered group, that is, ℜ defines a binary operation * such that (R, <, *) is an ordered group. Then (R, *) is abelian and divisible (Proposition 2.2). Continuous nontrivial definable endo-morphisms of (R, *) are surjective and strictly monotone, and monotone nontrivial definable endomorphisms of (R, *) are strictly monotone, continuous and surjective (Proposition 2.4). There is a generalization of the familiar result that every proper noncyclic subgroup of (ℝ, +) is dense and codense in ℝ: If G is a proper nontrivial subgroup of (R, *) definable in ℜ, then either G is dense and codense in R, or G contains an element u such that (R, <, *, e, u, G) is elementarily equivalent to (ℚ, <, +, 0, 1, ℤ), where e denotes the identity element of (R, *) (Theorem 2.3).

Here is an outline of this paper. First, we deal with some basic topological results. We then assume that ℜ expands an ordered group and establish the results mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Some examples are then given, followed by a brief discussion of analytic results and possible limitations. In an appendix, an explicit axiomatization (used in the proof of Theorem 2.3) is given for the complete theory of the structure (ℚ, <, +, 0, 1, ℤ).

It has been proved by S. C. Kleene and David Nelson that the formula

is intuitionistically non-deducible, i.e., non-deducible within the intuitionistic functional calculus.

The aim of this note is to outline a general method which permits us to establish the intuitionistic non-deducibility of many formulas and in particular of the formula (1).

This paper develops in certain directions the work of Meyer in [3], [4], [5] and [6] (see also Routley [10] and Asenjo [11]). In those works, Peano's axioms for arithmetic were formulated with a logical base of the relevant logic R, and it was proved finitistically that the resulting arithmetic, called R#, was absolutely consistent. It was pointed out that such a result escapes incautious formulations of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, and provides a basis for a revived Hilbert programme. The absolute consistency result used as a model arithmetic modulo two. Modulo arithmetics are not ordinarily thought of as an extension of Peano arithmetic, since some of the propositions of the latter, such as that zero is the successor of no number, fail in the former. Consequently a logical base which, unlike classical logic, tolerates contradictory theories was used for the model. The logical base for the model was the three-valued logic RM3 (see e.g. [1] or [8]), which has the advantage that while it is an extension of R, it is finite valued and so easier to handle.

The resulting model-theoretic structure (called in this paper RM32) is interesting in its own right in that the set of sentences true therein constitutes a negation inconsistent but absolutely consistent arithmetic which is an extension of R#. In fact, in the light of the result of [6], it is an extension of Peano arithmetic with a base of a classical logic, P#. A generalisation of the structure is to modulo arithmetics with the same logical base RM3, but with varying moduli (called RM3i here).

In Kripke [8] the first-order intuitionjstic predicate calculus (without identity) is proved semantically complete with respect to a certain model theory, in the sense that every formula of this calculus is shown to be provable if and only if it is valid. Metatheorems of this sort are frequently called weak completeness theorems—the object of the present paper is to extend Kripke's result to obtain a strong completeness theorem for the intuitionistic predicate calculus of first order; i.e., we will show that a formula A of this calculus can be deduced from a set Γ of formulas if and only if Γ implies A. In notes 3 and 5, below, we will indicate how to account for identity, as well. Our proof of the completeness theorem employs techniques adapted from Henkin [6], and makes no use of semantic tableaux; this proof will also yield a Löwenheim-Skolem theorem for the modeling.

In this paper we formulate a notion similar to o-minimality but appropriate for the p-adics. The paper is in a sense a sequel to [11] and [5]. In [11] a notion of minimality was formulated, as follows. Suppose that L, L+ are first-order languages and + is an L+-structure whose reduct to L is . Then + is said to be -minimal if, for every N+ elementarily equivalent to +, every parameterdefinable subset of its domain N+ is definable with parameters by a quantifier-free L-formula. Observe that if L has a single binary relation which in is interpreted by a total order on M, then we have just the notion of strong o-minimality, from [13]; and by a theorem from [6], strong o-minimality is equivalent to o-minimality. If L has no relations, functions, or constants (other than equality) then the notion is just strong minimality.

In [11], -minimality is investigated for a number of structures . In particular, the C-relation of [1] was considered, in place of the total order in the definition of strong o-minimality. The C-relation is essentially the ternary relation which naturally holds on the maximal chains of a sufficiently nice tree; see [1], [11] or [5] for more detail, and for axioms. Much of the motivation came from the observation that a C-relation on a field F which is preserved by the affine group AGL(1,F) (consisting of permutations (a,b) : x ↦ ax + b, where a ∈ F \ {0} and b ∈ F) is the same as a non-trivial valuation: to get a C-relation from a valuation ν, put C(x;y,z) if and only if ν(y − x) < ν(y − z).

The jump a′ of a degree a is defined to be the largest degree recursively enumerable in a in the upper semilattice of degrees of unsolvability. We examine below some of the ways in which the jump operation is related to the partial ordering of the degrees. Fried berg [3] showed that the equation a = x′ is solvable if and only if a ≥ 0′. Sacks [13] showed that we can find a solution of a = x′ which is ≤ 0′ (and in fact is r.e.) if and only if a ≥ 0′ and is r.e. in 0′. Spector [16] constructed a minimal degree and Sacks [13] constructed one ≤ 0′. So far the only result concerning the relationship between minimal degrees and the jump operator is one due to Yates [17] who showed that there is a minimal predecessor for each non-recursive r.e. degree, and hence that there is a minimal degree with jump 0′. In §1, we obtain an analogue of Friedberg's theorem by constructing a minimal degree solution for a = x′ whenever a ≥ 0′. We incorporate Friedberg5s original number-theoretic device with a complicated sequence of approximations to the nest of trees necessary for the construction of a minimal degree. The proof of Theorem 1 is a revision of an earlier, shorter presentation, and incorporates many additions and modifications suggested by R. Epstein. In §2, we show that any hope for a result analogous to that of Sacks on the jumps of r.e. degrees cannot be fulfilled since 0″ is not the jump of any minimal degree below 0′. We use a characterization of the degrees below 0′ with jump 0″ similar to that found for r.e. degrees with jump 0′ by R. W. Robinson [12]. Finally, in §3, we give a proof that every degree a ≤ 0′ with a′ = 0″ has a minimal predecessor. Yates [17] has already shown that every nonzero r.e. degree has a minimal predecessor, but that there is a nonzero degree ≤ 0′ with no minimal predecessor (see [18]; or for the original unrelativized result see [10] or [4]).

We show that one can solve Post's Problem by constructing generic sets in the usual set theoretic framework applied to tiny universes. This method leads to a new class of recursively enumerable sets: r.e. generic sets. All r.e. generic sets are low and simple and therefore of Turing degree strictly between 0 and 0′. Further they supply the first example of a class of low recursively enumerable sets which are automorphic in the lattice ℰ of recursively enumerable sets with inclusion. We introduce the notion of a promptly simple set. This describes the essential feature of r.e. generic sets with respect to automorphism constructions.

The purpose of this paper is an axiomatic study of the interrelations between certain continuity properties. We deal with principles which are equivalent to the statements “every mapping is sequentially nondiscontinuous”, “every sequentially nondiscontinuous mapping is sequentially continuous”, and “every sequentially continuous mapping is continuous”. As corollaries, we show that every mapping of a complete separable space is continuous in constructive recursive mathematics (the Kreisel-Lacombe-Schoenfield-Tsejtin theorem) and in intuitionism.

We show that Shelah’s Eventual Categoricity Conjecture for successors follows from the existence of class many strongly compact cardinals. This is the first time the consistency of this conjecture has been proven. We do so by showing that every AEC with LS(K) below a strongly compact cardinal κ is < κ-tame and applying the categoricity transfer of Grossberg and VanDieren [11]. These techniques also apply to measurable and weakly compact cardinals and we prove similar tameness results under those hypotheses. We isolate a dual property to tameness, called type shortness, and show that it follows similarly from large cardinals.

Lindenbaum's construction of a matrix for a propositional calculus, in which the wffs themselves are taken as elements and the theorems as the designated elements, immediately establishes two general results: that every prepositional calculus is many-valued, and that every many-valued propositional calculus is also ℵ0-valued. These results are however concerned exclusively with theoremhood, the inferential structure of the calculus being relevant only incidentally, in that it may serve to determine the set of theorems. We therefore ask what happens when deducibility is taken into consideration on a par with theoremhood. The answer is that in general the Lindenbaum construction is no longer adequate and both results fail.

We deal in the following with certain theories S, by which we mean sets of sentences closed under logical deduction. The basic logic is understood to be the classical one, but we place no restriction on the orders of the variables to be used. However, we do assume that we can at least express certain notions from classical first-order number theory within these theories. In particular, there should correspond to each primitive recursive function ξ a formula φ(χ), where ‘x’ is a variable ranging over natural numbers, such that for each numeral ñ, φ(ñ) expresses in the language of S that ξ(η) = 0. Such formulas, when obtained say by the Gödel method of eliminating primitive recursive definitions in favor of arithmetical definitions in +. ·. are called PR-formulas (cf. [1] §2 (C)).

Since Birkhoff and von Neumann [2] a new area of logical investigation has grown up under the name of quantum logic. However it seems to me that many authors have been inclined to discuss algebraic semantics as such (mainly lattices of a certain kind) almost directly without presenting any axiomatic system, far from developing any proof theory of quantum logic. See, e.g., Gunson [9], Jauch [10], Varadarajan [15], Zeirler [16], etc. In this sense many works presented under the name of quantum logic are algebraic in essence rather than genuinely logical, though it is absurd to doubt the close relationship between algebraic and logical study on quantum mechanics.

The main purpose of this paper is to alter this situation by presenting an axiomatization of quantum logic as natural and as elegant as possible, which further proof-theoretical study is to be based on.

It is true that several axiomatizations of quantum logic are present now. Several authors have investigated the so-called material implication α → β ( = ¬α∨(α ∧ β)) very closely with due regard to its importance. See, e.g., Finch [5], Piziak [11], etc. Indeed material implication plays a predominant role in any axiomatization of a logic in Hilbert-style. Clark [4] has presented an axiomatization of quantum logic with negation ¬ and material implication → as primitive connectives. In this paper we do not follow this approach. First of all, this approach is greatly complicated because orthomodular lattices are only locally distributive.

The bounded proper forcing axiom BPFA is the statement that for any family of ℵ1 many maximal antichains of a proper forcing notion, each of size ℵ1, there is a directed set meeting all these antichains.

A regular cardinal κ is called ∑1-reflecting, if for any regular cardinal χ, for all formulas φ, “H(χ) ⊨ ‘φ’” implies “∃δ < κ, H(δ) ⊨ ‘φ’”.

We investigate several algebraic consequences of BPFA, and we show that the consistency strength of the bounded proper forcing axiom is exactly the existence of a ∑1-reflecting cardinal (which is less than the existence of a Mahlo cardinal).

We also show that the question of the existence of isomorphisms between two structures can be reduced to the question of rigidity of a structure.

This paper presents several results whose common element is their connection with Hubert's tenth problem.1 The one that seems most striking (perhaps because it can be stated with a minimum of technical apparatus) is this: there does not exist an algorithm for determining whether or not a polynomial (in n variables) represents every integer.2

In addition, the present paper (i) gives a simple characterization of the diophantine sets (of positive, non-negative, and arbitrary integers), and (ii) gives a rigorous proof of Myhill's theorem [6] that there is no decision method for statements of the form

A positive answer to a question of M. van Lambalgen and D. Zambella whether there exist nonrecursive sets that are low for the class of random sets is obtained. Here a set A is low for the class RAND of random sets if RAND = RANDA.

It is shown that axiomatic extensions of intuitionistic propositional calculus defining univocally new connectives, including those proposed by Gabbay, are strongly complete with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras with additional operations. In all cases, the double negation of such a connective is equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. Thus, under the excluded third law it collapses to a classical formula, showing that this condition in Gabbay's definition is redundant. Moreover, such connectives can not be interpreted in all Heyting algebras, unless they are already equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. These facts relativize to connectives over intermediate logics. In particular, the intermediate logic with values in the chain of length n may be “completed” conservatively by adding a single unary connective, so that the expanded system does not allow further axiomatic extensions by new connectives.

The set of all words in the alphabet {l, r} forms the full binary tree T. If x ∈ T then xl and xr are the left and the right successors of x respectively. We consider the monadic second-order language of the full binary tree with the two successor relations. This language allows quantification over elements of rand over arbitrary subsets of T. We prove that there is no monadic second-order formula ϕ*(X, y) such that for every nonempty subset X of T there is a unique y ∈ X that satisfies ϕ*(X, y) in T.

In the Symposium on Hilbert's Program to which the following was contributed, I was asked to talk about the metamathematical aspects of Hilbert's Program (H.P.), while the other two speakers (Simpson and Prawitz) were to deal with the mathematical and philosophical aspects respectively. However, more so than for other foundational schemes, these three aspects of H.P., both as originally conceived and in its subsequent developments, are intimately linked.

Here I shall survey a body of proof-theoretical results stemming from H.P., but organized in a way that is closely tied to various reductive foundational aims, albeit going beyond those advanced by Hilbert. I believe this view of reductive proof-theory (not original with me) helps one to better understand what has been achieved thereby than other, more familiar accounts.

We deal here with two modal logics, GL and Grz, that are known to have interesting arithmetical interpretations connected with the notion of provability. GL is the extensiom of K (or K4) by the schema □(□ A → A) → □ A, and Grz is the extension of S4 by □(□(A → □A) →A) → □A. GL is also known to be sound and complete with respect to the class of all Kripke models that are transitive, irreflexive and well founded. Grz bears the same relation to the corresponding reflexive models. We refer the reader to [1] for a full exposition of the subject. (See also [4], [2], [6].)

In §I we develop a sequential calculus for both GL and Grz and give a semantical proof that both systems admit cut-elimination. (Incidentally, this provides an easy proof of the semantical completeness of the two systems.) With respect to GL this yields a correction of an error in [2].

In §II we show that cut-elimination fails for QGL (the extension of GL to a language with quantifiers). We further show that, despite this failure, QGL still has some of GL's interesting properties (e.g., the disjunction property). We also show, using fixed-point techniques, that similar properties obtain if we take as semantics for QGL the arithmetical interpretation extended in the obvious way.

We want to thank Professor H. Gaifman for his help while working on the subject.

In [4] Alonzo Church introduced an elegant and expressive formulation of type theory with λ-conversion. In [8] Henkin introduced the concept of a general model for this system, such that a sentence A is a theorem if and only if it is true in all general models. The crucial clause in Henkin's definition of a general model ℳ is that for each assignment φ of values in ℳ to variables and for each wff A, there must be an appropriate value of A in ℳ. Hintikka points out in [10, p. 3] that this constitutes a rather strong requirement concerning the structure of a general model. Henkin draws attention to the problem of constructing nonstandard models for the theory of types in [9, p. 324].

We shall use a simple idea of combinatory logic to find a characterization of general models which does not directly refer to wffs, and which is easier to work with in certain contexts. This characterization can be applied, with appropriate minor and obvious modifications, to a variety of formulations of type theory with λ-conversion. We shall be concerned with a language ℒ with extensionality in which there is no description or selection operator, and in which (for convenience) the sole primitive logical constants are the equality symbols Qoαα for each type α.