Numerous authors have highlighted utilitarian considerations as sources of public support for the European Union, suggesting that support results primarily from cost-benefit calculations of the gains and losses associated with integration. Benefits accrue, not only to different member states, but also to individuals. Within this discussion it is often suggested that the gains and losses are unevenly distributed across social groups, with the higher status groups being privileged and the lower status groups disadvantaged. This paper challenges arguments that assume a clear division between lower social strata and higher social strata in terms of winning and losing in Europeanization; it looks more closely at how Europeans rate the integration process as it affects them personally, and how this influences their support for integration. The results show that socio-economic characteristics cannot fully explain people's perceptions of being winners or losers, and a large proportion of EU citizens do not consider themselves either winners or losers. The paper also demonstrates that the winner/loser self-characterization is indeed a major determinant of support for the EU, but that it only partly coincides with people's socio-economic position.

Why people collaborate to achieve their political objectives is one enduring question in public policy. Although studies have explored this question in low-intensity policy conflicts, a few have examined collaboration in high-intensity policy conflicts. This study asks two questions: What are the rationales motivating policy actors to collaborate with each other in high-intensity policy conflicts? What policy actor attributes are associated with these rationales? This study uses questionnaire data collected in 2013 and 2014 of policy actors from New York, Colorado and Texas who are actively involved with hydraulic fracturing policy debates. The results show that professional competence is the most important rationale for collaborating, whereas shared beliefs are moderately important, and financial resources are not important. Policy actor attributes that are associated with different rationales include organisational affiliation and extreme policy positions. This article concludes with a discussion on advancing theoretical explanations of collaboration in high-intensity policy conflicts.

The ongoing financial turmoil has brought into sharp relief the importance of financial services regulation. Yet, we still know relatively little about how financial regulation is negotiated within the EU, in particular which policy actors are most influential and what are the mechanisms that allow them to exercise influence. This paper addresses these questions using Social Network Analysis (SNA), focusing on the banking regulation network and one core piece of legislation: the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). Of particular interest is the flow of influence among the key actors. Triangulating an in-depth case study with qualitative interview data and social network analysis, this work investigates a number of hypotheses, associating brokerage roles and extroversion with relative influence in the policy making process. We find that influential actors are those that hold key structural positions in this network and by implication appear to have a better understanding of network topography.

This article analyzes the development of environmental regulation in the European Union from the perspective of comparative federalism. It presents a theory of regulatory federalism that explains how the basic institutional structures of federal-type polities shape the development of regulatory policy. The article assesses the theory by systematically comparing the development of environmental regulation in the EU, the US, Canada and Australia. The analysis suggests that the EU's institutional structure encourages the development of a US-style pattern of regulation, characterized by detailed, non-discretionary rules and a litigious approach to enforcement.

Actors with joint beliefs in a decision-making process form coalitions in order to translate their goals into policy. Yet, coalitions are not formed in an institutional void, but rather institutions confer opportunities and constraints to actors. This paper studies the institutional conditions under which either coalition structures with a dominant coalition or with competing coalitions emerge. It takes into account three conditions, i.e. the degree of federalism of a project, its degree of Europeanisation and the openness of the pre-parliamentary phase of the decision-making process. The cross-sectoral comparison includes the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006 with a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results suggest that Europeanisation or an open pre-parliamentary phase lead to a dominant coalition, whereas only a specific combination of all three conditions is able to explain a structure with competing coalitions.

This paper explores the impact of internationalization on the financial services policy subsystem in Canada. It uses subsystem adjustment as a concept to bring some analytical clarity to how exogenous factors like globalisation and international crises may impact existing policy regimes. Based on examination of globalisation-induced banking deregulation (1987–1991) and the current crisis of securitized banking, the paper argues that the strength of this approach is that it integrates endogenous effects of the existing subsystem in explaining policy changes in response to what are normally treated as exogenous shocks. Careful effort needs to be made to differentiate the processes of external systemic perturbations from subsystem spillovers as these two processes of adjustment and policy change can lead to different policymaking dynamics over the long term.

This study offers a sociopolitical perspective on the worldwide diffusion of liberalisation reforms in infrastructure industries. It unpacks the heterogeneity in the extent to which the private sector is allowed to participate in these industries through an analysis of the formation of public-private partnerships in Chinese cities. This study considers the effects of horizontal and vertical diffusion mechanisms on the adoption of different types of public-private partnerships in different infrastructure sectors. An analysis of projects with private participation in 333 Chinese cities between 1992 and 2008 reveals that the spatial effects appear to be significantly modulated when the influence from structurally equivalent peer cities are considered; moreover, the effects of the vertical diffusion mechanisms are moderated by the liberalisation index of the contract forms, and the horizontal diffusion mechanisms are moderated by the marketability of the infrastructure segments.

This paper represents a case study in welfare state expansion. It takes an actor-centered point of view and reconstructs the long process which has ultimately led to a compromise solution to the problem of providing long-term care, especially for the elderly. It describes the previously means-tested arrangement of long-term care provision and its shortcomings. Furthermore, it sketches the different stages through which the political debate on this issue has passed during the last twenty years: from the initial phase of defining the “social problem”, to the final stage when the approval of the compromise package became a question of “all or nothing”. The analysis of the politics of long-term care insurance reveals that the difficulties of reaching an agreement mainly resulted from the complex decision-making situation. It was in essence a problem of decision-making under conditions of general uncertainty.

The paper investigates the changes to the Fund's bilateral surveillance policy in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007–09 asking about the factors that caused the quick and deep shift to a systemic surveillance approach. In answering this question, the paper argues that the causes of the quick and deep transformation of IMF surveillance lie in the preceding two decades of incremental accumulation of knowledge and small transformations in policy instruments and organizational practices. In identifying the causes of present policy choices in the lessons drawn from past experience, the paper provides an example of lagged learning because the lessons drawn from the 1990s emerging market crises exerted their full impact only as a response to the global financial crisis. These findings therefore contribute to the literature that aims at showing the importance of temporality and process sequencing to explain policy change.

To design regulatory policies, agencies depend on information from the industries they are tasked to regulate. Therefore, agencies can organise consultations with the aim of obtaining information from different perspectives. This article focuses on stakeholder diversity in agency public consultations. We ask to what extent is information provided by stakeholders other than the regulated sector, such as other business interests, experts or nonbusiness interests? Stakeholder diversity is relevant as it may prevent agencies to become exposed to one-sided information and capture by specialised interests. Are there consultation design factors that foster consultation diversity? Or, is (a lack of) consultation diversity structurally shaped by the context in which an agency operates? Analysing a wide range of public consultations organised by European Union regulatory agencies indicates that most information agencies receive via consultations comes from regulated interests and that the limited participation of nonregulated interests is highly tenacious.

Tax revenue is a function of laws and administration as well as economic activity. Four different theories purport to explain revenue-raising in contemporary Western nations: universal abstractions about economic systems; national culture: tax-specific characteristics; avoiding political costs through political inertia. OECD data on taxation in Western nations since 1955 show that national tax systems do not have sufficient in common to validate universalistic generalizations Tax-specific influences can be identified only for a few major sources of revenue. The inertia persistence of substantial national distinctiveness reflects a non-decision making approach to tax policy by politicians. The strategy is to rely primarily upon revenue-buoyant taxes authorized by past legislation rather than risk the political blame for introducing new taxes to raise large amounts of needed additional revenue.

The article explains economic policy in Germany with a model that takes partisan theory as its starting point, but supplements it with the impact of party competition and veto players. During the 1980s the low internal cohesion of the Christian democrats along with a positive economic performance kept the coalition from introducing coherent reforms. With the loss of the majority in the second chamber, compromises with the opposition were necessary which further diluted reforms with few exceptions. When the government faced worsening economic conditions which put its re-election at risk, it introduced more radical reforms. Because of an opposition majority in the second chamber, however, those reforms ran the risk of failing. In sum, Tsebelis' veto player theory is corroborated with some qualifications, the most important of which is that it must also take into account strategic orientations of actors.

The European social dialogue provides for the signing of collective agreements between employers’ associations and trade unions organised at the European level. Effectiveness to a great extent depends on the shadow of hierarchy, which is cast by the threat of legislative action and by ensuring implementation of collective agreements through public intervention. The need for the shadow is illustrated by the initial priority given to statutory agreements and the problems of implementation of more recent non-statutory agreements. While the shadow of hierarchy is important to ensure the effectiveness of social dialogue, social dialogue procedures are not characterised by strong principal-agent relationships. In particular, non-statutory agreements stem from a bottom-up private sector-inspired tradition of industrial relations. Even in the case of statutory agreements, the European Commission, as principal, does not appoint the agent and the delegation is implicit rather than explicit. Moreover, successful delegation entirely depends on whether the agents reach agreement between themselves. While the Commission could revoke delegation if Community objectives are not realised and by setting statutory criteria for implementing an agreement, its room for manoeuvre is limited for reasons of political pragmatism.

Government economic development programmes provide opportunities for firms to leverage financial incentives for business expansion and relocation. This article examines the ability of these incentives to promote employment. Using establishment-level data from the state of Kansas as well as original firm-level survey data, I evaluate the effectiveness of financial incentives in creating jobs through recipient firms. My findings from the establishment-level data indicate that incentive programmes have no discernable impact on firm expansion, measured by job creation. In addition, the survey data suggest that incentive recipients highly recommend this programme to other firms, but few firms actually increased their employment in Kansas because of these incentives; similarly, very few firms would have left the state if they had not benefited from this programme. Thus, incentives have little impact on the relocation or expansion decisions of firms.

The creation of agencies is a growing feature of contemporary governance yet key questions about agency autonomy and their influence on policy making remain unanswered. This article operationalises a policy network approach to explore the impact of agentification in three British government departments. It argues that the transfer of resources from departments to agencies created differing power-dependent networks between minister, department and agency. The networks have had both intended and unintended impacts on policy outcomes. Agencies have input to policymaking, the network's level of integration affects how well policies are delivered, networks have developed policy preferences and acted to impede further institutional change. These findings assist in understanding the nature of agencies' autonomy, the diversity of their impact on the policy process, and provide insights for other forms of alternative service delivery.

Researchers examining regulatory enforcement have found that enforcement styles tend to be contextually determined in Western countries, which has resulted in a divergence in regulatory approach at both the national and local levels. Given the dearth of regulation research in non-democratic regimes, this paper makes an initial attempt to fill the gap by studying the impact of regional variations in regulatory enforcement in China. Accordingly, the effects of external support and organizational factors on the preferences for enforcement styles of environmental officials in three Chinese regions were examined. It was found that the strength of these influences on enforcement style dimensions is more variable than was anticipated. Generally, the patterns of relationships for Guangzhou and Chengdu were similar, while those for Dalian appear to reflect its unique environmental, economic and political conditions. Public support appears to promote several dimensions of enforcement style (i.e., education, prioritization, coercion) in Guangzhou and Chengdu; however, in Dalian the influence of government was greater than that of public support. The effects of internal factors were even more variable and probably reflect unique characteristics and priorities within each agency. Overall, the results suggest that caution is warranted when interpreting current findings about China that have used samples from a single region and that enforcement agency directors in nondemocratic regimes must take into account a complex array of contextual factors in attempting to promote a particular style of enforcement.

This article investigates the conditions under which government officials who implement policy integrate the best available science into regulatory practice. It examines the adoption of rapid wetland assessment tools, a type of science policy innovation, by street-level bureaucrats in six US Mid-Atlantic states. These bureaucrats operate in relatively opaque and discretion-laden institutional settings. The analysis of an original survey of state wetland officials shows that these officials are more likely to adopt tools when they have more opportunities to learn tool-related information and practice norms. Bureaucrats’ adoption of this class of science policy innovations appears facilitated by peer communication via network ties, on-the-job experience and incentives and disincentives associated with bureaucrats’ organisational contexts and operating environments.

During the 1990s, some OECD countries succeeded in reducing their budget deficits. The average public debt ratio fell from more than 70 per cent of GDP in 1996 to about 63 per cent of GDP in 2001. Up to now, researchers have mainly focused on the economic effects of these consolidation efforts. This paper answers another question: How can balanced budgets be achieved? By means of a detailed review of nine budget consolidations, the study identifies different roads to successful fiscal adjustments, starting with a critical review of the definition of budget consolidation. We find a pattern on the expenditure side that follows different worlds of the welfare state. On the revenue side however, the tax structure seems to be more path-dependent and mainly driven by long-term developments. In the last section, we show that institutional reforms constitute very important components of budget consolidations.

This paper is about criteria for assessing alternative political institutions in a society committed to popular sovereignty. The issues are classic, and we do not attempt a comprehensive review of the ways in which they run through political and economic thought since Aristotle. An aggregative perspective on political institutions, which describes politics in terms of aggregating exogenous, prior preferences of citizens, is contrasted with an integrative perspective, which describes politics more in terms of the development of preferences within a framework of rights and norms. The evaluation of aggregative processes and institutions highlights questions of efficiency, preferences, and endowments. The evaluation of integrative institutions focuses on questions of competence and integrity. Many of the most influential contemporary discussions of political institutions are based on an aggregative framework that is relatively inattentive to issues of political integration. This contemporary emphasis on metaphors of aggregation, however, represents a phase in a history of oscillation between aggregation and integration in politics and political theory, and there are signs that the emphasis may shift in the next few decades to a greater consciousness of integration. Although the cyclic process is not escaped through awareness of it, such awareness may provide a basis for a more thoughtful approach to the search for appropriate institutions within a political system dedicated to popular sovereignty.

This study assesses the impact nationalism has on public policies in ethno-linguistically divided societies. In particular, focus is on the institutional changes from nation-wide systems to Flemish and Francophone halves in Belgian education and mass media. The explanation is a society-based one, which highlights the impact of society on institutions rather than the more common opposite. Evidence demonstrates the role played by the ethno-linguistic structure in promoting the direction of change. Many issues which divide societies and engender political partisanship were subsumed under the question communautaire until a sufficient degree of congruence between the underlying social structure and political institutions was attained.