This paper examines policy planning systems in British central-local government relations, and in particular the formal, structured relationship in the local transport policy sector, as a means of exploring the impact in intergovernmental relations of the form of linkage between institutions. This impact is analysed in terms of central government's ability to use the planning system to promote policy processes and promote and regulate policy content in the locality. The use of specific and block grants by central government as a potential instrument of control in relation to policy planning systems is discussed. An examination of limiting cases reveals the importance of local resources in minimising central government influence through the policy planning system, and suggests that institutions will seek to restructure the form of linkage or underlying resources when they see themselves loosing advantage to others.

This paper seeks to explain why Finland, which is further from the main population and productive centres of Europe and arguably more different and more prone to asymmetric shocks than some countries that have chosen to stay out of Stage 3 of EMU, chose to participate. We argue that economically relatively marginal issues affected the choice. How the decision-making process is conducted can be as important as the balance of information on which the decision is based. We also use evidence after the event on how the economy reacts to show that some of the problems hypothesised beforehand have turned out rather more favourably than expected. In particular Finland has experienced a substantial positive asymmetric shock in the ICT sector where membership of EMU has had a very clear positive effect on the impact on the economy. Lastly we offer some limited evidence that membership of EMU itself forces some of the changes to institutions and behaviour that are required to cope with the new pressures.

This research investigates the role of public sector innovation outcomes, e.g. trademark innovation, information and communication technology (ICT), renewable energy, and governance, in the sustainable development of Bangladesh during 1980–2019. Utilising the dynamic autoregressive distributed lag (DARDL) simulation approach, this study divulges a favourable long-term influencing profile of public sector innovation outcomes, i.e. trademark innovation, ICT, and renewable energy on sustainable development, while governance has a heterogeneous impact. Besides, the findings from the DARDL simulations area plots display 10% counterfactual shocks to the public sector innovation outcomes on sustainable development. Furthermore, the Kernel-based regularised least square machine learning algorithm approach used in the study examines the marginal effects of the public sector innovation outcomes on sustainable development for robust findings. Therefore, the policy suggestions are solely concerned with the public sector’s adoption of more innovation dynamics through appropriate policy formulation.

Anti-crime policy is often unresponsive to reductions in crime. To address why, we provide a model and empirical test of how citizens’ anti-crime policy preferences respond to information. Our model shows that preferences for anti-crime policy hinge on expectations about the crime rate: punitive policies are preferred in high crime contexts, whereas social policies are preferred in low crime contexts. We evaluate these expectations through an information experiment embedded in the 2017 Latin American Public Opinion Project survey conducted in Panama. As expected by our theory, a high crime message induced stronger preferences in favour of punitive policies. Unanticipated by our theory, but in line with cursory evidence and survey results, we find that a low crime message did not induce stronger preferences in favour of social policies. These findings are consistent with policy ratcheting: punitive policies increase during periods of high crime and remain in place during periods of low crime.

How do cultural biases, trust in government, and perceptions of risk and protective actions influence compliance with regulation of COVID-19? Analyzing Chinese (n = 646) and American public opinion samples (n = 1,325) from spring 2020, we use Grid–Group Cultural Theory and the Protective Action Decision Model to specify, respectively, cultural influences on public risk perceptions and decision-making regarding protective actions. We find that cultural biases mostly affect protective actions indirectly through public perceptions. Regardless of country, hierarchical cultural biases increase protective behaviors via positive perceptions of protective actions. However, other indirect effects of cultural bias via public perceptions vary across both protective actions and countries. Moreover, trust in government only mediates the effect of cultural bias in China and risk perception only mediates the effect of cultural bias in the United States. Our findings suggest that regulators in both countries should craft regulations that are congenial to culturally diverse populations.

Drawing upon theoretical studies on the policy impact of political parties, this article address cross-national differences in financial policy choice and capital market development in Malaysia and Thailand. An explanatory approach that considers inter-party organisational dimensions in tandem with intra-party structural attributes shows that financial and regulatory policies have varied significantly between Malaysia and Thailand in response to the national configurations of political parties. The different patterns of policy choices, in turn, have led to varied capital market structures and development trajectories. Thus the theoretical literature on the political economy of financial capitalism in developed countries, which stresses the importance of domestic political institutions, has implications for the political underpinnings of financial market reforms in emerging market countries.

A long time ago I received a letter from Rex Stout inviting me to join the Authors' Guild, a letter no doubt sent to all who had books published. I didn't join because I didn't think of myself primarily as a writer, but as an aspiring scholar who merely set out the results of investigations that, so to speak, wrote themselves. Writing was incidental, not essential. Some years later a similar letter arrived. By then, having spent several hours a day writing most days, I joined. I had become a writer, if not by accomplishment, at least by occupation. Only recently, however, have I thought of myself as a writer by vocation, as a person who cares about the quality and craft of writing as inseparable from the content of whatever I am trying to communicate. Indeed, for me, writing has become an integral part of thinking.

In the extensive literature on the rules versus discretion debate three related, but logically distinct, areas of debate are frequently confused: the active versus passive policy debate, the rules versus discretion debate proper, and the open-loop (i.e. fixed) rule versus closed-loop (i.e. contingent) rule debate. Section 2 of this paper examines the nature of and interrelations between these three areas of debate. In section 3 the contributions of economic analysis to the debate are explored in an apolitical framework, in particular, the arguments for rules proposed by Friedman and Kydland and Prescott are assessed. Section 4 extends this framework to take into account the political dimension and the rules versus discretion debate is viewed as a cost-benefit problem involving both political and economic factors. A general conclusion is that since the rules versus discretion debate is an exercise in political economy, the debate cannot be properly assessed in the sterile apolitical framework of pure economic analysis.

Scholars have hotly debated the structure of group engagement in policymaking. Two aspects of this conversation are examined here. First, some claim that the “explosion” of organised interests brings with it increasing fragmentation but also policy “balkanisation”. Others suggest increasing fragmentation, but with overlap between subsectors. A second area of this debate concerns the existence and number of “central” or “core” groups. Although existing studies show that, in aggregate, there is no more policy specialisation among United Kingdom organised interests, we do not know whether this means that there are fewer or more central groups. In this article, we utilise public policy consultations in Scotland over a continuous 25-year period, and the tools of network analysis, to examine the above propositions. We find that the expanding system of policy consultation is not associated with more balkanisation or with a decline of central policy actors that span policy communities.

Are the systems of collective labor relations in member countries of the European Communities converging towards a common European system of industrial relations? In this paper the hypothesis is put forward that the national systems have not been converging in the past and probably will not do so in the immediate future. The analysis is based on changes in procedural rules of collective labor relations and on data on labor unions, strikes, wage structure, and government employment.

Since day-to-day implementation of exchange-rate policy has been neglected in the literature on international monetary relations, U.S. and Japanese intervention policies in the post-Bretton Woods period are analyzed. The determinants of Japanese intervention policy are clearly identified: international coordination and U.S. intervention increase the amount of Japanese intervention. A strong tendency to ‘lean against the wind’ and some indication of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy exist as well. On the other hand, U.S. intervention policy is more elusive. There is some evidence, however, that Japanese and German intervention as well as the Louvre Accord and Democratic administrations led to larger amounts of U.S. intervention. Some interpretations are offered as to why it is difficult to unravel U.S. policy.

Starting from the relative success of the Austrian economy in the 1970s the problems of industrial policy and the position of industrial policy in the context of economic policy are examined. Policies directed towards improving the industrial structure have had a lower priority than policies aimed at producing sufficient total economic growth to avoid unemployment and disputes over the distribution of the GNP. The structure of Austria's foreign trade shows that Austria still has not achieved the industrial structure appropriate for a small industrial country in an exposed geographical position. In Austria the problems of industry are regarded as legitimate affairs of government and, although there is criticism of the details of government intervention, the economic responsibility which is conferred on the government is an extensive one. Austria's political culture exhibits both consociationalist traits, with most laws being passed with the support of the two big parties,, and ‘social partnership’ in the form of voluntary co-operation between the unions and employers' associations. The political consensus means that discussion tends to revolve round technical rather than fundamental issues of industrial policy. Since the early 1970s the preservation of full employment has become the dominating industrial policy goal of the Austrian government; as a result, policy is mainly reactive rather than proactive. Fiscal investment aids are by far the most important industrial policy instrument, though their use has been criticised. There are also direct expenditure schemes, aimed at particular sectors as well as the general stimulation of investment; these aids have also been criticised. The prospects for the introduction of industrial policies more focussed on qualitative changes in industrial structure are not considered good, but political stability seems assured.

Cross-subsidization is a frequent topic in public debates and often stigmatized in the wake of deregulation. Public monopolies increasingly find themselves operating not only in regulated markets, but in non-regulated markets where they are accused of illegally using resources from the regulated market to stifle competition. Similar anticompetitive allegations can be made against private multiservice firms with market power. However, definitions of cross-subsidization are many and this affects the debate about the issue and possible strategic motives behind cross-subsidization, its possible consequences for competition, and measures that might be taken against it. This paper organizes definitions that regulators are likely to encounter into three types involving cost transfer, temporary loss or permanent loss. Based on these distinctions, a novel classification framework is developed according to underlying motivation and consequences for competition. The four cases arising from the framework are subsequently discussed in terms of relevancy for public and private firms, and consequences for competition and welfare.

This paper discusses the prospects of Greece, Portugal and Spain completing stage 1 of the Delors plan. Much of the academic literature on the removal of capital controls seeks to extend the experience of the ERM countries in the 1980s. We argue that its applicability for southern Europe is not straightforward, because these countries have not had the same experience of operating the ‘old’ ERM with capital controls, and examine the implications for these countries of removing capital controls for macroeconomic, and especially, fiscal policy. Intermediate institutional arrangements may be necessary and we consider how EC-wide measures may help these countries in this transitional phase. For the next phase of European integration, the focus of the EC should be on developing appropriate public institutions at the European level to promote positive integration.

There are good reasons to suppose that the non-poor will infiltrate welfare programmes originally targeted on the poor. This paper discusses this phenomenon of ‘creeping universalisation’ and provides a number of possible explanations for it. Evidence is used from Australia to show that creeping universalisation does indeed occur, and to test the competing explanations. It is concluded that the most likely explanation for the phenomenon is individual behavioural responses: that is, the non-poor respond to the imposition of a means-test by re-arranging their affairs, legitimately or illegitimately, so as to pass the test.

California and Washington recently replaced traditional partisan elections with nonpartisan “top-two” election procedures. Some reform advocates hoped that voters would behave in a way to support moderate candidates in the primary stage; the limited evidence for this behaviour has led some scholars to conclude that the reform has little chance to change meaningful policy outcomes. Yet we find that the nonpartisan procedure has predictable and disparate political consequences: the general elections between two candidates of the same party, called copartisan general elections, tend to occur in districts without any meaningful crossparty competition. Furthermore, copartisan elections are more likely to occur with open seats, when a new legislator will begin building a network of relationships. The results, viewed through the lens of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, suggest that opportunities exist for coalitional rearrangement over time.

A common finding in the literature is that social investment policies are broadly popular among citizens but still politically difficult to implement. This article provides a partial answer to this puzzle by exploring the fiscal trade-offs associated with such a recalibration. Based on survey data from eight Western European countries, it first explores citizens’ fiscal policy preferences with regard to the preferred size of the public sector and the distribution of spending across different subsectors. These preferences are then shown to be significantly associated with attitudes towards fiscal trade-offs regarding the expansion of social investment policies. The results reveal a political dilemma for policy-makers keen on expanding social investment: People who traditionally support a large public sector and more welfare state spending tend to oppose redistributing spending towards social investment, whereas support for such a recalibration is higher among those who have a sceptical view on public spending.

This study examines the relationships between e-government service quality, perceived value, satisfaction, and loyalty toward e-government services. Survey data were collected from 340 randomly selected e-government service users in Vietnam. The results reveal that (1) e-government service quality consists of five dimensions: ease of interaction, fulfillment, citizen care, security and privacy, and trustworthiness; (2) among the five dimensions of e-government service quality, only trustworthiness and fulfillment are significantly related to perceived value; however, trustworthiness has a stronger association with perceived value than does fulfillment; and (3) both perceived value and satisfaction are positively associated with loyalty. The results indicate that the e-government can create value for the citizens by improving service quality, which may help satisfy citizens’ needs and build their loyalty.

This article argues that public opinion on retirement is related to people’s causal beliefs about how labour markets work. Whereas voters do not think that there is an employment trade-off between older and younger workers in some European countries, in others, this is a dominant paradigm. When they believe this trade-off exists, people are more hostile to reforms that lead to longer working lives. The article uses Eurobarometer data to investigate the determinants of this belief – for instance, more people being led to believe in such a trade-off under high levels of labour market regulation. The article then goes on to show that this belief is related to policy preferences about early retirement. Finally, the article illustrates the political consequences of this belief and shows that it affects many policy areas even beyond early retirement.