What determines which political actors dominate a country’s news? Understanding the forces that shape political actors’ news coverage matters, because these actors can influence which problems and alternatives receive a nation’s public and policy attention. Across free-press nations, the degree of media attention actors receive is rarely proportional to their degree of participation in the policymaking process. Yet, the nature of this “mis”-representation varies by country. We argue that journalistic operating procedures – namely, journalists’ incentive-driven relationships with government officials – help explain cross-national variance in actors’ media representation relative to policymaking participation. We examine two free-press countries with dramatically different journalistic procedures: United States and Korea. For each, we compare actors’ policymaking participation to news coverage (using all 2008 New York Times and Hankyoreh Daily front-page stories). Although exhibiting greater general discrepancy between actors’ policymaking and media representation, diverse actors are over-represented in United States news; in Korea, governmental actors are dominant.

Evidence of a link between the retrenchment of the welfare state and the expansion of the penal state has sparked a debate about the existence of a nexus. In this study, we critically explore this link by focusing on political parties. First, we argue that welfare and penal policies are likely to follow distinct paths, with left-liberal/green parties pushing for less punitive penal and market-liberal/conservative parties for less generous welfare policy. Second, we only expect a nexus between both policy domains if conservative or “third way” social democratic governments are in power. The former follows a coherent ideology, the latter compensates for welfare retrenchment with tough-on-crime policies. We test these claims quantitatively on a unique dataset covering all changes to welfare and penal legislation in Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom and France between 1990 and 2014 and find our expectations supported except conservative influence on the penal–welfare nexus.

We update past work on the democratic deficit, defined as incongruence between majority public preference and public policy in the American states. We reconsider public opinion and state policy on seven issues related to immigration and health questions. Using original data from the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey as well as new data on state policy and other predictors, we show that these seven issues have distinct qualities from Lax and Phillips’s larger basket of 39 policy questions in different issue areas. From 2008 to 2014, the democratic deficit on these issues diminished somewhat in the presence of a heightened level of issue salience.

Presidential directives are often assumed to be checked only by external actors, like Congress and the courts. But the internal constraints facing presidents can also be substantial. I study a model where a president can induce compliance with a directive by removing some subordinate agents (the appointees) but not others (the careerists), and where the relative contribution of each agent to the directive’s success is unobservable. The model suggests that the formal authority presidents have to issue directives and remove subordinates can advance presidential goals, affording presidents real authority. But real authority is not guaranteed, and the resulting uncertainty can shape presidential decision-making: when to issue a directive, how ambitious to make it, and which agencies to target. To illustrate, I analyse two prominent directives in Clinton’s regulatory planning order, E.O. 12866, showing why they targeted different agencies, despite belonging to the same order, and why compliance has been uneven.

This paper is concerned with the political determinants of the significantly different rates of welfare expenditure which characterise advanced capitalist countries. The research concentrates on the connections between the organization and mobilization of a key political actor pursing social wage benefits – the labour movement – and different levels across nations of welfare provision, including expenditure on health, social security consumption expenditure and social security transfers. The paper uses disaggregated, pooled time series data on welfare provision in 15 OECD countries, 1974–1988, to test the association between more comprehensive welfare state regimes and state structures that facilitate the intervention of organized labour movements in the policy process.

Although energy policy used to be a nonpartisan issue in Congress, partisan conflicts over energy policies are intense these days. To examine how a nonpartisan issue became a highly partisan one, we create and use a new measure of energy policy positions of members of Congress. Our analyses of member behaviour show that, in addition to partisan realignment in the South, energy policy-specific factors – rising oil prices, the climate change debate since 1988, and the salience of energy policy in Congress – are significantly related to increasing party polarisation over energy policy. We also find that the increasing convergence between energy policy and environmental policy has significantly contributed to party polarisation over energy issues. The study thus provides important understanding of this specific policy area as well as insights into the party polarisation literature by demonstrating how policy-specific events and policy convergence transform a nonpartisan issue into a highly partisan one.

When things go wrong, and the government may be to blame, the public support enjoyed by elected executives is vulnerable. Because attribution of responsibility is often not straightforward, elected executives can influence citizens’ evaluations of their performance through presentational strategies, or explanatory frames which describe their roles in the management of the crisis. We examine the effectiveness of two ubiquitous presentational strategies: blame claiming, where the executive accepts responsibility, and blame deflecting, where the executive shifts blame to others. Using survey experiments incorporating stylised and real-world stimuli, we find that blame claiming is more effective than blame deflecting at managing public support in the aftermath of crises. In investigating the underlying mechanism, we find that blame claiming creates more favourable views of an executive’s leadership valence. While elected executives are better off avoiding crises, we find that when they occur, “stopping the buck” is a superior strategy to deflecting blame.

This study focuses on how voters and politicians rationally select a preferred policy-making venue (Politician or Agency), and its implications for the principal-agent relationship between voters and politicians in a representative democracy. This study allows for incomplete information, as well as solving for the comparative static conditions pertaining to the extent that a politician's policy-making venue choices mirror those preferred by a representative voter. The comparative static results highlight when a politician (1) chooses the representative voter's preferred policy-making venue (Active or Passive Political Responsiveness); (2) is able to choose freely either policy-making venue without committing agency loss (Political Discretion); and (3) willing to deviate from the representative voter's preferred policy-making venue (Political Shirking). In contrast to the study by Spence, this study analytically demonstrates that one cannot infer that the benefits accrued from agency policy-making will necessarily exceed those from electoral institutions.

This paper attempts to place the role of defense spending within the overall context of the budgetary process. Using an extended version of the ‘Competing Aspirations Level Model’ based on the behavioral theory of decision-making, major budgetary aggregates, total spending, defense spending, exhaustive civilian expenditures, and capital outlays, are modelled as outcomes of independently generated aspirations, based on parochial organizational and environmental influences, and a reconciliation process reflecting the bargaining power of budgetary agents. An empirical assessment of the model's performance is conducted using the experience of thirteen national governments, including seven western industrialized states and six developing states. The results of this statistical analysis suggest that the model provides a useful basis for understanding and comparing budgetary processes and outcomes.

Germany's economic resilience, even in the face of the extreme pressures of unification, cannot be explained by the neoclassical economic approach. Its social market institutions induce the major actors in the political economy to negotiate over the terms of economic and political adjustment in such a fashion as to diffuse innovative new organizational and institutional practices broadly and thoroughly throughout the economy and polity. The reorganization of the financial sector and the spread of new forms of workplace organization and corporate governance are used to illustrate this dynamic. The paper concludes with implications for how we think about regulation.

In retrospect, I think that the fate that befell the social indicators ‘movement's rich array of economic statistics and related measures were simply inadequate indicators of emerging developments and issues under prevailing conditions of rapid social change and severe social strains. The felt need was for more adequate monitoring and reporting of social conditions and processes – implying a need to develop improved measures of these phenomena, together with expanded data collection capabilities. Thus the dual goals of the social indicators movement were apparent from the start: to establish an improved social reporting capability as soon as possible, and to encourage longer-term research and development in the general area of social, measurement and model-building. It may be helpful, therefore, to consider the outcome of these two efforts separately.

In the agenda-setting process, prior to the decision-making process, there is a predecisional process whereby some issues are systematically blocked by powerful actors from being placed on the formal agenda. These issues are termed “nondecisions”. This article argues that the predecisional process exists not only at the issue level but also at the level of problem definitions. Because of the empirical challenge of studying problem definitions that are not on the formal agenda, the article suggests examining problem definitions that were on the formal agenda and then disappeared from it. Such problem definitions can be termed nondecisions when their disappearance is due to latent power mechanisms, such as anticipated reactions or information control. The article tests these arguments using two American policy cases: prescription drug prices and child care. In so doing, it sheds light on the predecisional process and expands our understanding of the politics of problem definitions.

A type of conventional wisdom has developed among many scholars that industrialized countries with independent central banks produce lower relative inflation rates than countries that do not have these institutions. We argue that the relative importance of central bank independence for fighting inflation changed fundamentally from the 1970s to the 1980s as a result of experiences in the advanced industrialized democracies, which led both Right and Left governments to move toward more neo-liberal macroeconomic policies. As governments made price stability more of a priority, the anti-inflationary effects of independent central banks would become much less pronounced. This hypothesis is tested and confirmed in the study in a multi-variate regression analysis using data from eighteen industrialized democracies.

Based on extensive new empirical fieldwork (via a case study of the reform of the territorial State in 2007–2010), this article interrogates the meaning of the prefectoral institution in France. The central puzzle this article addresses is the survival of a pre-democratic institution – the Prefect in – a democratic, decentralizing and Europeanised Republic. Changing conditions have required institutional resilience and adaptation in a period of state restructuring and rescaling. The case study of the prefectures as old institutions is framed using language and tools of new institutionalism across three dimensions: the timing and sequence of decision-making, the logic of appropriateness, and interaction. Beyond the narrow case of the prefectures in France, the article makes the case for combining modes of institutionalist analysis in order to penetrate generalities about the black box of institutions.

Restrictive policies aimed at reducing the likelihood of bank failures during recessions tend to increase the probability of a credit crunch. We examine whether this policy-dilemma is empirically observable, and whether policy-makers concentrate more on preventing bank failures or avoiding a credit crunch. We find that although capital-asset ratios in the total population of US banks in the 1990s are pro-cyclical, the most vulnerable banks (substantially undercapitalized ones) tend to increase their capital-asset ratios during recessions. These findings suggest that policy-makers are indeed experiencing a dilemma, and that they try to balance the relative probabilities of the two evils: they force the weakest banks to improve their capital-asset ratios while mitigating the risk of a credit crunch by accepting a reduction in the capital-asset ratios of less vulnerable banks.

Now that time has passed since the introduction of the euro as a commercial currency, it is possible to assess many arguments made in the abstract during the 1990s about European monetary union. This article shows that the euro zone still falls short as an optimal currency area in most respects. In particular, it undertakes an empirical analysis of the labour market and finds no progress toward flexibility or integration. These results challenge assertions of ‘endogenous currency area’ proponents that the euro area would become optimal ‘after the fact’, and that labour markets would serve as the principal avenue of adjustment. Instead, a ‘rigidity trap’ has developed in the euro area, consisting of relatively tight monetary policy, forced fiscal consolidation, and a risk of deflation in some economies. These conditions have compounded the difficulties of structural adjustment in European labour markets.

Politics of accountability theory contends that policymakers are unlikely to adopt external accountability policies. Contrary to the theory, many countries have adopted external school accountability policies, while Israel has not. The disequilibrium theory of policy selection is used to analyze differences among countries in school accountability policymaking. I find that the symbolic potency of policies helps to explain these differences. The symbolic potency of external school accountability depends on the extent to which school performance is perceived as a problem, the degree to which powerful stakeholders are affected by the problem and some broader political and administrative factors. Where client stakeholders are stirred out of their apathy, the education policy subsystem will adopt school accountability policies. However, preliminary evidence reveals implementation obstacles that may render these policies ineffective.

Systems of policy coordination since 1945 may be classified as rule-governed systems relying on decentralized national decisions (a stylized Bretton Woods system) or discretionary bargaining in which coordination decisions are taken collectively at the international level (e.g. world economic summits). The European Monetary System combines elements of these two models. National attachments to rules cannot be explained solely by the strength of international institutions. A discretionary bargaining model of coordination is more likely to be successful when national leaders share a policy diagnosis that both cuts across economic issue areas and divides their own domestic political coalitions and governments. International organizations may facilitate policy coordination under a rule-based system through provision of resources to ease adjustment costs and rule clarification, and in a discretionary bargaining system by brokering, providing information and model building.

The Internet is a global phenomenon, but the way in which national governments respond to it varies with the political, social and economic context of a country. However, much that is written about the Internet and governance concentrates on a few advanced industrial societies, and especially the United States. Yet the federal and fragmented system of governance in the United States creates obstacles to the use of the Internet, while smaller countries from Estonia to Singapore produce innovations in e-governance. Moreover, even though the United States has more Internet users than any other country today, the growth points in the use of the Internet in the next few years will occur in radically different places, ranging from Russia and Brazil to India and China.

Cross-border commercial activity raises issues in federations where multiple jurisdictions can claim the right to tax the same income. In the United States, this coordination problem is resolved by splitting the tax base according to the geographic distribution of firms’ sales, capital and labour. The weight of each factor is determined on a state-by-state basis, which opens room for competitive legislative behaviour. In this complex issue area, however, policymakers must invest lot of resources to monitor competitors, evaluate policy alternatives and shepherd tax reform through the legislative process. This implies that highly professional legislatures should be more responsive to the policies of nearby states. We consider data on most American states over the period from 1986 to 2013 and find strong evidence of conditional spatial dependence. Our findings suggest that policy diffusion may often be moderated by institutional and political factors.