This article grew out of a more detailed study of all tried cases of homicide in Western Nigeria from 1966 to 1972. While reading more than I00 court transcripts and trial opinions, I was struck by what seemed an inordinately large number of accused with symptoms which westerners associate with mental or emotional illness. I was also conscious of judges being forced to apply an awkward, and at best difficult, standard for the determination of criminal insanity with sparse direct evidence and, in many cases, without the help of expert testimony.

In a recent article in this Journal, Vol. VII, No. 4, December 1970, on ‘Developing Countries and International Trade’, Leslie Stein attempts to provide an alternative explanation of the international relations between the developed and underdeveloped countries. He asserts that I argued, in my earlier discussion of ‘International Trade and the Developing Countries’ in Vol. VII, No. 2, July 1969, that the existing trade relations between the centre and the periphery are ‘a major cause’ of the latter's poverty. Consequently, I was led to recommend measures leading to less reliance on the external sector and, more specifically, a programme of ‘heavy industrialisation’. Since Dr Stein feels not only that my policy proposals are detrimental to the interests of the periphery, but also that the statistical findings and the theoretical discussions from which they are derived contain both errors and omissions, he is led to propose an alternative formulation of the international division of labour, which, in his view, benefits the periphery.

The Sudan is the largest country in Africa and ranks as one of the poorest, with an estimated income per capita of U.S.$400 in 1983.1 It is predominantly rural and sparsely inhabited, with an estimated total population in 1985 of 21.6 million, of whom as many as almost half are younger than 15 while only three per cent are aged 65 and over.2 The crude birth rate approaches 50 per thousand and the annual growth rate of the population is likely to be about three per cent.3 Harsh environmental and poor sanitation conditions contribute to a relatively high incidence of morbidity and infant mortality, with severe diarrhoeal diseases as a major cause of ill-health and child death. Life expectancy at birth is currently estimated to be only 48 years, while the infant mortality rate is put at 118 per thousand live births.4

Israel shares the distinction, together with only a handful of other nations, of being a ‘newsworthy’ country. Even before the recent war, hardly a week passed without at least a reference to Israel in either the daily or periodical press. Various American, British, and European weeklies consistently carry articles on Israel. On a per capita basis, probably no other country receives as much world press attention as Israel. Yet, despite this profuseness of printed material, very few articles and fewer books present competent analyses of the Israeli polity and foreign policy.

What Southern Africa will look like a generation from now is an immediate problem for the South African Government's top policy makers, who realise the precarious nature of apartheid. These planners have rejected both the do-nothing approach of the right-wing elements (e.g. the Republican Party) in South Africa and the multi-racial society solution pressed by Mrs Helen Suzman, the only Member of Parliament of the (relatively) left-wing Progressive Party. Between these two alternatives a host of partition schemes have been advocated, and one of them has been accepted: the ‘Bantustan’ proposals. By geographical isolation of each of the non-White ethnic groups into separate homelands or ‘Bantustans’, leaving the remainder of the territories of South Africa and South-West Africa to the Whites, the Nationalist Government is proceeding to change the face of Southern Africa.

The ultimate reality in culture change… hinges on the fact that corresponding institutions in two cultures satisfy analogous needs in different ways and with different techniques; but in the process they have to use the same human and natural resources: land, capital, labor, politically organized force, the impulses of human reproduction, and also the standardized emotions, values and loyalties specific to each culture. – Bronislaw Malinowski, Dynamics of Culture Change (New Haven, 1945), p. 71.

In Togo, the opposition movement behind the anti-government protests that broke out in 2017–2018 appears to reflect a greater role for Islam in politics. Tikpi Atchadam, leader of the Parti National Panafricain, was the preeminent figure in the movement, having built a solid grassroots base among his fellow Muslims. This article examines the unique role that Muslim leaders played in these protests, as well as the Faure Gnassingbé regime's strategic response. The ruling party made spurious claims against Muslim opponents, associating them with a dangerous wave of political Islam. I argue that by portraying Atchadam as the leader of a radical ethnic and religious movement with Islamist goals, Faure Gnassingbé and his supporters sought to weaken this emerging challenger and deter members of the public from backing calls for political change. The strategy also helped garner support from Western countries while simultaneously driving a wedge between Muslim community leaders.

The connection between economic growth and population growth has been considerably played down by economists in the last hundred years, whereas eighteenth- and nineteenth-century economists seldom discussed development without considering the effect of population growth. The earlier writers were not unanimous – as they are not today – on the optimum size and rate of growth of population and its effect on the gross national product per capita.

Integragation has been a topical issue in inter-state relations in post-independence Africa.1 The most radical of the three suggested strategies is to bid for immediate continental economic and political integration.2 A more popular view is to seek a gradualist approach to pan-African unity via regional economic co-operation;3 this could range from a free trade area, customs union, common market, and economic community, to ultimate political fusion.4 The third, less-studied strategy is for African states to lay the basis for regional economic integration, and even ultimate continental unity, through functional co-operation, for example, in transport, industrial development, trade, and monetary policy.5 This article examines the prospects and problems of co-operation on a regional basis, with particular reference to West Africa, in a specific economic field – namely, seaport development. See Map I, page 399, below.

Although the number of Africanists in Poland has never been large, a scholarly interest in Africa has long existed in this country. Among the scholars of the older generation, the most prominent were: L. Krzywicki, a sociologist with a wide interest in social change and development, who published several studies on the transition from traditional to modern societies, with special attention to Africa; J. Czekanowski, who was among the first explorers of Rwanda and other Interlacustrine kingdoms, publishing several extensive studies both in German and Polish; and B. Malinowski, who later established himself in Great Britain.

Africa's rôle in the international economic order during the last five years has been changing, if in any direction, for the worse. The impact of African statesmen in the negotiations for a new order has been marginal, despite the symbolic presence of General Obasanjo from Nigeria at the Jamaica summit of January 1979. Yet in many quarters, these trends have not been recognised for the vital sign they are: symptoms of the weakness of African states in the creation of new institutions to govern our fragmented international economic system.

WHAT are the economic conditions for attaining Uganda's ambitious development goal, the doubling of income per capita in 15 years? My purpose here is to discuss the logic of five major structural changes which may be regarded as necessary for a substantial acceleration of Uganda's rate of economic growth. Since each of these changes would require energetic government policies to bring it about within the time- span considered, they can also be thought of as key elements of development strategy. I hope that the logic of these structural changes may be suggestive also for other countries at a somewhat similar stage of development, particularly in Africa.

The frustrated aspirations of most Africans for a significantly better life following independence have evoked considerable attention. A growing number of scholars are accounting for the situation in terms of a set of loosely connected propositions contained in the ‘underdevelopment theory’,, at the core of which is the idea that colonialist/neocolonialist countries have created the conditions of underdevelopment by:

(i) encouraging the entry of foreign investment which extracted/extracts a significant proportion of the surplus produced;

(ii) fostering a commercial bourgeoisie which failed/fails to use its profits for productive investment purposes; and

(iii) promoting an indigenous class which acted/acts in the interest of the imperial power to perpetuate the condition of underdevelopment.

The Recent resumption of popular protest signals a new phase in South Africa's internal opposition, characterised notably by the rising political engagement of black labour unions and their federations. Membership in these unions has reached over a million workers, reflecting the dramatic expansion of South Africa's industrial manufacturing sector in the last 20 years. With severe restrictions placed on the leading national and local political organisations since 1985, the unions have developed beyond their initially narrow concerns for their members into the forefront of opposition to established economic and political order. As a result, class consciousness and working-class organisation have increasingly been combined with, and taken precedence over, previous conceptions of opposition based on racial and national identity. This development has exacerbated both remaining ideological divisions and pressures for united action within the union movement.

Soviet relations with the countries of black Africa have been of considerable interest to many western scholars. They have examined extensively the history of these relations, their shifting doctrinal bases, and the many formidable problems Soviet policy-makers have encountered in the pursuit of their stated objectives.1 A frequently overlooked aspect is the scholarly research of a group of Africanists whose activities appear to be inextricably linked with overall Soviet efforts in Africa.

How sensibly can one talk of industrial sociology in a non-industrial continent? Industrial sociology has been called the ‘special’ sociology whose task should be to carry through scientifically the analyses of the social relationships and interactions present within the industrial organisation in all its theoretical depth and breadth.1 Raif Dahrendorf, for instance, in Industrie und Betriebssoziologie (Berlin, 1962), whilst accepting industrial sociology as one of the ‘special’ sociologies, makes the reservation that it is concerned with the industrial society. But since the whole process of industrialisation was a historical one, the limitation of industrial sociology to any specific period must be an open question, especially since every kind of society requires the production of goods and services through industrial organisation. Elsewhere I have questioned the premises and validity of Dahrendorf's assertion;2 but it must be admitted that in its present form this special sociology has little or no meaning for the pre-industrial societies largely because they have not yet been exposed to it as a scientific tool. Nevertheless, sociological researches in pre-industrial societies can demonstrate the operational use of industrial sociological categories, such as performance efficiency and incentives, managerial techniques, industrial commitment, and the effect of industrial work on personality, as will be shown below by surveying the work of C. H. Northcott, W. Elkan, and Y. Glass in pre-industrial societies of Africa.