This article examines the Colombian peace process since 1982, arguing that the government must strengthen the state and expand its presence into the remote areas in which the leftist guerrillas have established para-statal organisations. The traditionally weak Colombian state has allowed rebel groups to flourish in isolated areas. However, President Ernesto Samper has announced a new initiative that features an ambitious plan to strengthen the state. The plan includes judicial and social reforms that address many of the guerrilla demands, but also threaten to undermine their para-statal organisations. Massive oil discoveries and tax reforms could provide the necessary funding.

Much of the external literature on the Cuban Revolution has been characterised by two dichotomies between ‘exceptionalism’ on the hand and the application of non-Cuban paradigms on the other, and that between Fidel-focussed interpretations and more systemic perspectives. This article examines the evolution of these dichotomies, from initial enthusiasm or condemnation, through an emerging awareness of a historical dimension, a focus on the social revolution, and new disenchantments, to the emergence of a less polemical attention to detail before the post-1991 return to type. In the light of this trajectory, new approaches are suggested to break with these patterns, while acknowledging the challenges for exogenous research.

This article looks at the construction of the Indian by government officials and intellectuals during the Estado Novo (1937–45), and the efforts of indigenous peoples to engage these images. State officials – concerned with national consolidation, territorial defense, and racial pedigree – upheld the Indian as an icon who had made invaluable contributions to Brazilian historical and cultural formation. The proto-patriot, however, could only be fully redeemed through government tutelage. Confronted by an ambiguous state project, indigenous groups demonstrated varied responses.

The origins of the labour movement in Argentina, which date from a period when the country was developing rapidly and had an important place in the world economy, have received little close attention from historians. Generally, the years before 1930 have been neglected in favour of the study of developments associated with Perón and Peronism. Such secondary literature as does exist consists largely of personal memoirs, whose authors were, understandably, parti pris. The more general studies tend to underestimate the extent, variety and sophistication of trade unionism before 1930, and also to contrast the style and ideology of the unions with that of the Peronist labour movement. Most notably, Argentina is widely quoted, along with Spain, as one of the countries where anarchist and/or anarcho-syndicalist ideology and practice dominated the labour movement.

This article studies the unfolding of a broad conservative bloc amidst the politico-cultural battles that took place in Cold War Argentina. Focusing on the unexplored gendered, sexual and generational dimensions of the figure of the ‘enemy within’, the article shows that this figure was at the core of a project which coincided with authoritarian practices emanating from the state and also from segments of civil society. The creation of that figure had significant effects, not only in the political but also in the educational and cultural realms, including the imposition of censorship and the delineation of restrictive sexual policies. Moreover, it conditioned the ways in which political repression developed in the context of 1970s state terrorism.

As the rebels of Guinea-Bissau fought for independence from Portugal, Cuban military instructors stood by their side and Cuban doctors treated their wounds. Joining the rebellion in 1966, and remaining through the war's end in 1974, this was the longest Cuban intervention in Africa before the despatch of troops to Angola in November 1975. It was also the most successful. As the Guinean paper Nõ Pintcha declared, ‘The Cubans' solidarity was decisive for our struggle’. Cuba's contribution to Guinea-Bissau's war of independence is an important and revealing example of Cuban policy in Africa.

In Peru, eradication campaigns targeting coca crops in the Upper Huallaga have dispersed the country's drug trade over vast parts of the Bajo Amazonas region. In order to understand this dispersal it is necessary to map the relocations of coca cultivations or shifts in smuggling routes, but also to examine the array of micro-practices, relations, groups and networks that generate ‘drug flows’. By following different key actors, this article explores the movements of drug lords, smugglers and producers who intersect frontiers, borders and borderlands. This empirical focus is combined with an analysis of the actors’ social ties to other groups to discover the myriad ways in which illegal/legal forces are part of the power arrangements that form the foundation for Peru's drug flows.

Many foreign policy analysts in the United States expected a shift in US policy towards Latin America when George Bush succeeded Ronald Reagan as president. Though Bush had been a loyal supporter of Reagan's policies throughout the preceding eight years, Bush nevertheless seemed more pragmatic than his mentor. Whereas Reagan was the leader of the Republican Party's right wing, Bush was a scion of the East Coast Republican establishment, stronghold of the party's moderate centre.

This article describes the introduction of two social policy programmes aiming to provide adequate nourishment to poor families in Argentina between 1983 and 1990. They were called PAN (Programa Alimentario Nacional), and the Bono Nacional Solidario de Emergencia.

A study of the introduction of social policy measures during these years can help us to understand parts of the value-structure upon which Argentine society is built. Such a study also highlights some of the main social functions that welfare programmes perform in structuring the relationship between the political system and society. Finally, the management of the programmes and the political debate surrounding them illustrate some key features of the Argentine political system and its ability to formulate a coherent social policy project.

The debates concerning the organisation of social welfare schemes, in 1983 as well as in 1989, must be seen in relation to the general structure of the social welfare system in the country. Both by European and Latin American standards, Argentina's first ‘labour laws’ were passed at an early stage.2 However, Argentina never became a ‘Welfare State’ in the sense that all of the population was included. One of the reasons for this is connected with the impotence of the State. Several analysts have underlined the particular weakness of many Latin American States, a consequence of a pronounced corporative logic that dominates the implementation of public policies.3 In fact, the social impact of welfare policies reflects the overall power structure in society in a more clear-cut way than we see in most European Welfare States.4

The term ‘populism’ has been used to describe many of the popular movements that have appeared in Latin America in recent decades. It is an ‘imprecise term’, to use the words of Professor Skidmore, and the large number of definitions available, indicates how imprecise the term, in fact, has become. Definitions of a universal nature are of limited use, for populism seems to vary according to geographical region: the North American populist differs from the Russian populist, who differs from the African populist, who differs from the Latin American populist, and so on. Even when dealing with the specific area of Latin America there is no consistency. Writers disagree on whether Latin American populists are Left- or Right- Wing, anti- or pro-status quo, reformists or opportunists, rigid or flexible with regard to ideology.

Since 2001, financial agents, country-risk analysts and credit rating agencies have considered Mexico to be a solvent or low-risk country. This article seeks to answer the question of whether Mexico has ceased to be an emerging market economy. Therefore, the aim of the article is to provide an overview of the factors that lie behind this positive view of Mexico. We believe the answer to this question is affirmative. The positive change in the export structure, a healthier financing of the external sector deficit and the change in the production structure support the hypothesis that Mexico is no longer a risky economy. And, therefore, Mexico is not subjected to the severe macroeconomic crises proper to traditional emerging market economies. Other elements, however, also mean Mexico cannot yet be described as an economy exempt from macroeconomic risks.

In 1970 Leslie Bethell argued that the Brazilian slave trade was ended by British pressure. Since then others have pointed to slaveholders’ fears of insurrection and of yellow fever. This article addresses the issue by reviewing Brazilian slavery, the African trade and yellow fever. Its analysis of sources and context leads it to question revisionist arguments. Moreover, while it supports Bethell on the centrality of British pressure, it goes beyond his appreciation of internal Brazilian political affairs. It provides greater specificity, clarifying the key importance of political history, the structure of state-society relations and the significance of the Brazilian leadership of the time.

Commemorating the expulsion of Portuguese troops from Salvador, Bahia, on 2 July 1823, the Dois de Julho festival represented Bahian society collectively and marked differences of national origin, class, and race. It challenged the Brazilian state's official patriotism by articulating a regional identity, and through its commemoration of the independence-era popular mobilisation, presented a story of Brazil's origins that contradicted the official patriotism which celebrated Emperor Pedro I as Brazil's founder. Dois de Julho's popularity and durability, moreover, suggest a significant and socially-broad engagement with the imperial state, which cannot be considered a remote and alien entity to the urban population.

The literature on American foreign policy tends to emphasize nonstructural (national security, ideological, strategic, bureaucratic, etc.) factors in seeking to account for the differing U.S. government responses to nationalist movements that challenge for and/or capture state power in the Third World. In those instances where structural (e.g. economic) factors are acknowledged to be significant, they are still generally accorded a secondary role in the shaping of policy actions. As a result, most interpretations are rooted in discrete policy actions linked to particular and time-bound events unrelated to any core concept that could serve as an organizing principle (e.g. a theory of capital expansion) for understanding the observed continuities in U.S. policy over historical time. In contrast, this study contends that a focus on the interface between permanent (economic) and short-term (non-economic) objectives provides a more adequate explanation of U.S. imperial state policy in specific conjunctures. It is proposed that while ‘national security’ concerns, strategic interests, ideological outlooks and bureaucratic conflicts may directly influence Washington's policy toward Third World nationalism, these factors must also be understood in a context in which they converge, or are intertwined, with underlying long-term economic concerns (investment, trade relations, access to strategic raw materials, etc.)

This article is about the role of civil society after violent conflict. It argues that the transformations that civil society organisations (CSOs) make are more ambiguous than supporting donors and NGOs presume. The article analyses how, ten years after the 1996 peace agreements, Guatemalan CSOs deal with agrarian conflict. It discusses in detail the case of a church-related organisation assisting peasants with agrarian conflicts and the challenges it faced in defining its strategies. The article argues that supporting donors and NGOs should stop seeing the difficulties of organisational change in post-conflict situations exclusively in terms of the internal incapacities of civil society. Instead, they should re-politicise their analyses and focus on the importance of broader social and political processes in post-conflict settings for the strategic options open to CSOs.

According to Barrington Moore ‘the process of modernization begins with peasant revolutions that fail’.1 Most historians of Mexico would agree that the nineteenth century opened with such an agrarian insurrection – the Insurgency – and yet it is indisputable that modernisation was a long time coming. Indeed, for many years the conventional view was that it took another such agrarian rising, the Mexican Revolution of 1910–20, to finally break the ‘feudal’ hold on the countryside and usher in a belated phase of modernisation.

During its brief tenure of office, the Kennedy Administration introduced several changes in United States policy toward Latin America. One change had to do with recognition of governments (practically speaking, military regimes) that seized power by ousting constitutionally selected governments. The stance taken by the Kennedy Administration was that the United States would not recognize such regimes or extend assistance to them. The intent or objective of the policy was to encourage and protect democratic institutions and processes. President Kennedy regarded a democratic environment as essential for the attainment of the kind of change sought through the Alliance for Progress.

This article examines the unusual public security reform process that took place in Panama in the wake of the US military invasion of December 1989. The changes to the Panamanian security forces that ensued were in equal part a ‘demilitarisation’ process, a police reform and an (imposed) transition to democracy where the political domination of the Panamanian security forces came to an abrupt end. Deploying the concepts of demilitarisation, professionalisation and depoliticisation, the article evaluates the political role and activities of police forces and the nature of their relationship with the main Panamanian political actors through to the present Torrijos administration. It then assesses the implications for wider political processes, suggesting that explanations for the success or failure of reform are unlikely to be found in the examination of the design and implementation of the reform itself, but that broader political processes must be analysed in order to understand the dynamic that underpins it.