The most recent as well as the most comprehensive book on the statistics of the Atlantic slave trade has been written by Professor Philip D. Curtin. The Atlantic Slave Trade, A Census is a work which applies modern techniques and sophisticated analysis to the very difficult historical problem of the magnitude of the Atlantic slave trade. As Curtin himself states: ‘The dimensions of the nineteenth century slave trade have always been a matter of controversy — political controversy at the time and historical controversy since’. Professor Curtin's book will not put an end to the controversy, but it does suggest further areas for research. More work needs to be done on the historical sources from which the statistics of the slave trade are derived. This article examines the main sources available for assessing the importation of slaves into Cuba from 1790 to 1867 and analyses the statistics which these sources yield in the light of Curtin's conclusions.

Research on the politics of skills formation in Latin America is severely underdeveloped. This article offers a novel characterisation of the supply of skills in the region or ‘skills supply profiles’, taking inspiration from the comparative capitalisms literature. We identify four configurations of skills supply profiles – universalising, dual academic-oriented, dual VET-oriented and exclusionary – and analyse their historical dynamics. By doing this, we challenge general assessments of Latin America's skills formation systems as pertaining to one overarching type. This sets the stage for a deeper understanding of the politics of skills in the region and their connection with different development alternatives.

Abandonment has become a performative idiom in Andean Peru, where it retains its purchase despite the investments of the state. Local development is tied to the desire to be governed. In spite of prolonged state presence, the villages’ relationship to authorities is continuously and persistently figured as one of abandonment: villages are abandoned because someone is deliberately holding them in such unfortunate conditions. To figure abandonment in village politics is to draw on this idiom as an effective means of both communicating the historical experience of governance and putting forward morally grounded claims to local authorities. The idiom of abandonment is therefore both effective and affective as a critique of governance and a claim to citizenship.

Constitutional issues are once again being considered from sociological and political perspectives, after many years of strictly juridical approaches. This renewed interest stems from both theoretical and practical concerns, raised by the multiplication of liberalisation and democratisation processes around the globe, as well as from the need to update and deepen the democratic content of stable democracies.

Contemporary ‘dependency’ writers have attributed the origins of most of Latin America's past and present economic problems to the expansion of European capitalism in the nineteenth century. It led to the formation of alliances between local elites and powerful foreign interests, giving the latter participation in policy making. The main tenet of the ‘dependency school’ is that the economic policies derived from this alliance, and the alliance itself, were detrimental to ‘national’ development, since they inhibited the growth of the non-export oriented activities of the economy.

In the last three decades, the economic history of Paraguay has been subject to an intense reexamination. It has been claimed that the state in Paraguay led a ‘spectacular industrialisation effort’ in the second half of the nineteenth century and that this effort was prematurely truncated by war. One author, for example, has stated that

From 1852 on, free circulation on the river Paraná permitted a rapid increase of exports, mostly under state control. The resources thus freed were devoted to the development of the modern manufacture of industrial goods and plant: iron and steel, engineering, shipbuilding, brickmaking, etc. A railway and a telegraph were installed without incurring an external debt. The experiment was nevertheless spoiled by the war with the ‘Triple Alliance’ (1864–1870), which opposed Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay to Paraguay, and resulted in the demographic and economic collapse of the country.

From 1910 to 1927 workers in the Mexican cotton textile industry took advantage of the larger surrounding revolution to create a revolution of their own. Based on a significant and persistent challenge to workplace authority, millhands radically transformed the labour regime in Mexican industry. Although owners combated the workers' rebellion, they never inflicted a decisive defeat. As a consequence, the conditions of work in Mexican mills improved dramatically. Among the advancements workers fought for, and obtained, were a sharp reduction in the working day from fourteen hours to eight, mandated medical care for work-related accidents and illnesses and union control of hiring and firing. The latter included the union shop and a system of tripartite boards that made it virtually impossible to fire workers who enjoyed union support. The new labour regime reflected changes in the formal and informal institutions of work, but its final institutionalisation empowered unions more than the rank and file workers who fought to change the social relations of work.

This article recognises the paucity of scholarly work on environmental governance in Latin America. More specifically, it is hypothesised that community-based forest management in Mexico serves as an ideal case of ecologically beneficial and democratic decision-making, or ecological democracy. After introducing some of the relevant literature, this hypothesis is tested through a comparison of two indigenous forest-based communities in Oaxaca's Sierra Norte. Four key themes primarily emerged from semi-structured interviews, participant observation and other data collection techniques: local governance, equitable decision-making, forest management and environmental awareness. In comparing these two Mexican communities, this article aims to extend ideas of ecological democracy by linking empirical findings to political ecology theory and community forestry literature. While it is true that ecological democracy in Mexico has been facilitated under certain socio-cultural conditions, it is concluded that it can be simultaneously hindered. The empirical findings provide an analytical framework for subsequent research on ecological democracy in Latin America.

Why and how do societies transform the environmental rules of economic development, or fail to do so? This article compares the experiences of Chile and Peru in the regulation of smelting activities between 1990 and 2010. Air pollution from smelters in Chuquicamata and La Oroya, each emblematic of the two countries’ mining industries, did not give rise to nationally destabilising protest. Nevertheless, despite the absence of pressing discontent with pollution, the environmental rules for mining could still be improved as a result of policy network activism and through highly idiosyncratic institutional channels. The analysis shows that policy entrepreneurship for Chuquicamata was enhanced by a national institutional environment that favoured bureaucratic autonomy, while parallel action for La Oroya was constrained by a political economy of state weakness and elite disregard.

Interest in geopolitics in England, the United States, and many other countries became dormant following World War II in reaction to the expansionistic geopolitik of Hitlerian strategists. Its re-awakening is only recently apparent. However, this approach has maintained its influence and vitality in South America's Southern Cone, particularly in Argentina, Chile and Brazil, where military governments predominate, the United States is more distant, and particular national problems encourage traditional geopolitical solutions. Among these Latin American countries, Brazil's geopolitics is the most developed and extensive.

The current productive restructuring in Central America is creating significant changes in the region's labour markets. New sectors of tradeables are emerging which, from the point of view of labour, cannot be characterised as formal. Indeed, formal employment is currently in a state of decline while the informal sector is redefining its internal heterogeneity. This article focuses on the new expressions of informality. Three scenarios are identified: the economy of poverty, subcontracting, and the agglomeration of small dynamic enterprises. Various analytical aspects are considered in each of these three scenarios: the context of the globalisation process; the type of informality; the resources which are mobilised; the challenges faced; and the identities generated. The analysis is based on the evidence supplied by three case studies. The first refers to the former public employees of Managua (Nicaragua) who, in the aftermath of state reforms, presently pursue informal activities. The second example concerns a group of women in the community of Puente Alto (Honduras) who work as subcontracted producers for an industrial export firm. Sarchí, Costa Rica's principal artisan centre, illustrates the third scenario.

People of African descent in Costa Rica form a marginalised and geographically concentrated minority group. The limited interest that academics have shown towards people of African descent is a reflection of their position in Costa Rican society. National histories consistently ignore the contributions of West Indian immigrants to the economic and social development of modern Costa Rica. Moreover, the existing literature on people of African descent in Costa Rica fails to document properly West Indians' efforts to integrate into Hispanic society. As a result, several misconceptions continue to exist about the evolution of the West Indian community in Costa Rica.

It was in Algeria that Cuba's involvement in Africa began. Until the overthrow of President Ben Bella in 1965, Algeria was Cuba's closest friend on the continent. Cuba provided both military and civilian assistance not only to the Algerian republic but also, before their victory, to the rebels of the Algerian National Liberation Front. Using Cuban documents, as well as US documents and interviews with protagonists, this article examines Cuba's relationship with Algeria in 1961–5. It is a relationship that clashes with the image of Cuban foreign policy – cynical ploys of a client state – that prevails not only in the United States but also in many European capitals.

Banks in Porfirian Mexico widely engaged in the practice of making long-term loans to their own directors, a practice known as ‘auto-prestamo’. This was neither pernicious nor fraudulent. Rather, Porfirian banks behaved as the financial arms of extended kinship and personal business groups. These groups used banks to raise impersonal capital for their diversified enterprises and give their partnerships a more permanent institutional base. Investors in these banks knew full well that they were investing in the businesses of a particular group and developed sophisticated techniques to monitor bank directors. However, because entry into banking was severely restricted under Porfirian law, the system concentrated economic power in a few hands and contributed to Mexico's oligopolistic industrial structure.

This article assesses the political and socio-economic consequences of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) in Honduras. The analysis deploys several techniques, including poverty narratives, stakeholder analysis and taxonomy analysis, and is also based on quantitative and qualitative data, including socio-economic indicators, PRS spending execution and interviews with stakeholders. It argues that in Honduras the PRS constituted a missed opportunity to expand the political space in which poverty reduction plans are formulated and to deliver pro-poor growth. The inclusion of multiple actors with different interests, capacities and influence led to an emphasis on constructing consensus, but this was too imprecise to enable a clear set of priorities to be articulated, let alone a pro-poor growth agenda. The article concludes that by unilaterally shifting the growth pillar of the PRS towards infrastructure investments and trade integration, Honduras may have sacrificed an opportunity to support a truly participatory democratic process leading to effective pro-poor policies.

Charles IV's rule over the Spanish empire has often been decried as neglectful and reactionary. In a recent article, however, I argued that such descriptions were not accurate, maintaining that the early years of the reign pushed forward many institutional innovations and showed a marked concern for colonial affairs. This is not to say, of course, that the death of Charles III produced no change; but the critical facts were that economic policy-making continued to be based on the colonial compact and that the crown remained as committed to providing economic benefits to Spanish agriculture and manufacturing as to securing relief for the Peninsular treasury.1 Although 1788–9 may properly be characterized as a moment of truth for Spain, one which brought to the surface conflicting interests and ideologies, the Peninsula's transformation by the Bourbon Reforms was not so deep nor the government's circumstances so dire as to upset the political balance.

In the thirty years between 1950 and 1980, Latin America experienced rapid growth. During this period, output expanded at an annual rate of 5.5% with per capita increases averaging 2.7% a year. Table 1 provides country details. The star is clearly Brazil, whose share in regional product increased from less than a quarter to more than a third. At the other extreme are two groups: the Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay), whose mid-century leading position in the region was eroded by below average performance; and a group of smaller countries, including several in Central America. On average, Latin America's record, viewed from an immediate post-World War II perspective, is impressive. It far exceeded the target of the Alliance for Progress implemented in 1961, which called for an annual rate of 2% per capita. It also compared very favourably with European per capita income growth in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, which was 1.3% from 1850 to 1900 and 1.4% between 1900 and 1950. Long-term US economic growth has been at 1.8%.

Yet two factors combine to make the 1950–80 Latin American growth performance seem less positive. One is its dramatic reversal in the 1980s, a period in which GDP per capita fell by 8.3%. By 1989, with the exception of Brazil, Chile, Colombia and the Dominican Republic, per capita GDP had fallen below its 1980 level. At the extreme, Venezuela, Nicaragua and El Salvador show levels below those attained in 1960. The 1980s have truly been a lost decade and thus one tends to underestimate the earlier achievement.

‘By studying political parties we imply that the party is a meaningful unit of analysis. Yet we go above the party as a unit, for we also study the party system. By the same token we can go below the party as a unit and study, thereby, the party subunits.’1 This statement by Giovanni Sartori, while published in 1976, might well have been a beacon for budding stasiologists of the early 1960s — certainly for those with a particular interest in Latin America. Following upon such Western European—orientated classics as the works of Maurice Duverger, Sigmund Neumann and Alfred Diamant,2 there seemed genuine intellectual impetus to produce significant scholarship on the parties of what were then customarily termed either the developing or the ‘non—western’ polities. For Latin America, the time appeared ripe for conceptual progress. To be sure, there was justification in remarking that the study of parties in the region was relatively new, while ‘methodo—logical accomplishments have been primitive’.3 Yet this condition was presumably transitory.

In the years to follow there were more serious exploratory efforts, and in time a modest number of case—studies began appearing.4 When the cyclical alternation of democratic and dictatorial regimes began to swing toward the latter by the early 1970s, however, scholarly interest dropped off. More generally, stasiological research went into decline.5 For students of Latin America, only the recent trend toward democratisation has stimulated a revival of interest in parties, campaigns and elections.6 Thus Lorenzo Meyer, for instance, described parties as institutions necessary ‘to channel the energies of social movements, labour unions, and other antiauthoritarian forces present at the beginning of the re—emergence of civil society’.7

Historians have long grappled with the problem of defining the precise nature of eighteenth-century Mexican society. Not only was the confused tangle of racial types which resulted from the three centuries of miscegenation vitally important in establishing social status, but special corporations further divided the population into privileged groups and jurisdictions. Society was split into three general categories: ethnic whites, criollo (American-born) and gachupín (European-born); Indians; and finally the castas (castes) who belonged to the many racial permutations.

The ‘Peronist Left’ has become one of the chief actors in the often violent drama of Argentine politics today. It is the object of this article to place the events of the more recent past, at least since the return of Peronism to power in 1973, within the framework of the development of the ‘Peronist Left’ since the fall of Perón in 1955. Obviously the article makes no claim to be a comprehensive treatment of the subject. Such a treatment could only be part of a much more extensive study of the Argentine working class and the Peronist movement. In particular, the article concentrates on an analysis of the political ideology of the different currents that have made up the ‘Peronist Left’ since 1955, whilst recognizing that this ideology must ultimately be seen in the far wider context of the social and economic development of Argentine society. The first part will highlight the main features of this Left in the 1955–73 period and analyze the main currents within it. In the second part of the paper the events of the last two to three years will be looked at within this context.