Constitutional theorizing typically employs a bi-level analytical framework wherein the choice of rules precedes the actions that people pursue within those rules. Constitutions are thus products of planning and are prior to the spontaneous ordering that characterizes market processes. This paper explores an alternative conceptual framework wherein rules and actions are coeval and not sequential. Hence, constitutions are subject to spontaneous ordering just as are ordinary market processes. All societies necessarily possess constitutional frameworks that frame the actions of participants; however, those frameworks are not fully settled prior to action but rather evolve through action, which means, in turn, that constitutions, like societies, are living entities and not background precepts against which societal life evolves.

In his article ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’, Ha-Joon Chang rightly argues that historical evidence does not irrefutably suggest that countries characterized by free markets perform better than those in which the state plays a much more prominent role. However, his method of substantiating his claims by means of examples from different sources and periods does not convince. A more systematic and theoretically founded approach is needed. This comment focuses on the cross-section versus time-series approach and the relation between culture, institutions and economic development.

This paper addresses the issue of how rules are conceptualized by Hodgson in Old Institutional Economics (OIE). The argument is put forward that the concept of rules can be constructively clarified. Rather than provide a general form of single rules within a rule system, we argue for a taxonomic range of single rule forms. This approach has the additional advantage of providing a more explicit account of how rules operate as part of a rule system. It also provides one way to address the fluidity of rules. Rules are understood to be more or less fluid (incomplete) and subject to a practical dynamism. This, we argue, can be differentiated from the idea of tendency based on the capacity of agents not to follow rules. A useful concept here is that of ‘mezzo rules’ or recodifications that both define the rule and distance the agent from their own rule-following behaviour. In pursuing the argument we also highlight various methodological implications. First, conceptual development is a key aspect of the OIE, particularly when it is located within Dow's structured pluralism. As such elaboration on rule forms enhances the consistency of OIE as methodology. Second, the exploration of a taxonomic range of rules and of forms of fluidity can provide useful resources in mapping out institutional processes in real research.

This paper reviews the assessment of the routines and capabilities literature provided by T. Felin and N. J. Foss, ‘The Endogenous Origins of Experience, Routines and Organizational Capabilities: The Poverty of Stimulus’, published by the Journal of Institutional Economics. Although valuable points are raised, the assessment is largely off target because it is fixated on the implausible view that the literature assessed is strongly shaped by the tradition of behavioral psychology (B. F. Skinner and others). At the same time, important portions of the routines and capabilities literature that are highly relevant to the authors’ substantive concerns, and which are plainly inconsistent with the main interpretive claim, are not considered.

This article complements Ha-Joon Chang's critique, entitled ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’, of the ‘dominant discourse’ on institutions and economic development which takes the view that getting the institutions right (by strengthening private property rights and market freedoms) is a prerequisite for development. It does so by commenting on the concepts of economic development and institutions, discussing the theory of how institutional change affects development, and examining the possibility and desirability of such institutional change as a prerequisite of development.

The use of height data to measure living standards is now a well-established method in economics, and a number of core findings in the literature are widely agreed upon. There are still some populations, places, and times, however, for which anthropometric evidence remains thin. This paper introduces a new dataset from the Tennessee State Prison to track the heights of comparable black and white males born between 1820 and 1906. Shorter statures were associated with close proximity to the Mississippi River, and the largest share of the white–black stature gap was associated with nativity. Black and white statures declined throughout the 19th century, and farmers were taller than non-farmers.

This paper offers an alternative to the view of the routines literature provided by T. Felin and N. J. Foss, ‘The Endogenous Origins of Experience, Routines and Organizational Capabilities: The Poverty of Stimulus’, published by the Journal of Institutional Economics. The emphasis here is on practice-based theories of organizational routines that are grounded in close, ethnographic observation of real routines. While this literature may be unfamiliar to some readers, it is relevant here because it specifically contradicts the core assertions made by Felin and Foss. Further, this literature provides a clear theoretical foundation for subsequent research on problems such as stability and change in routines, the nature of capabilities and dynamic capabilities, and complex ecologies of routines.

We examine an aspect of the argument of Teppo Felin and Nicolai Foss (‘The Endogenous Origins of Experience, Routines, and Organizational Capabilities: The Poverty of Stimulus’; 2011) where they reject the claim of Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen (‘Darwinism, Causality and the Social Sciences’; 2004) that habits depend crucially on stimuli from the social environment. We argue that while rightly stressing human agency they also create a false dichotomy between agential and environmental factors in the explanation. Felin and Foss create further confusion by hinting – without adequate clarification – at an untenable notion of human agency as an uncaused cause. We raise several questions of clarification for these authors.

Ha-Joon Chang, in his article ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and History’, provides a description and critique of the mainstream view of institutions and development. It applies well to Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the effort to introduce these Anglo-American institutional structures (Global Standard Institutions; GSIs) in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in uneven and unstable economic performance, not development. As a result, the relationship among institutions, development and economic policy in Latin America today has generally moved far beyond this ‘mainstream’. The institutions to insure macro stability have generally been preserved, and some countries do follow GSI prescriptions. However in most countries, especially in South America, the effort to find the right mix of institutions for development has moved far beyond this mainstream. The result has been innovative initiatives to address more fundamental development issues such as inequality, property rights and international economic institutions. This process is likely to continue, facilitated by the currently robust democratic political systems that grew out of the earlier turmoil.

Ha-Joon Chang, in his article ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’, argues that the institutions and development literature is theoretically and empirically flawed, trapped by a failure to account for the contextual factors that influence the institutions that drive development. These judgments emerge from a lack of appreciation of the methodological standards of that literature and, especially, from a description of the institutions and development literature that few contributors to it would recognize. At the same time, despite the emphasis he gives to contextual factors, his critique ignores the role of politicians and the progress made in the institutions literature in understanding their incentives to pursue development.

In recent years, there have been major advances in the empirical analysis of the link between institutions and development. However, a number of methodological problems – both theoretical and empirical – remain unresolved and have been well articulated by Ha-Joon Chang in his article ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’. These problems raise valid concerns about the policy relevance of the evidence arising from the studies. A more reliable approach to study the link between institutions and development and overcome the inherent problems of cross-country empirical analysis is to direct focus to microeconomic analysis of institutions. Such an approach avoids ideologically driven normative judgments about the superiority of particular institutional arrangements and also offers a more credible and tractable avenue to investigate institutional change.

This comment criticizes Ha-Joon Chang's assessment of contemporary institutionalism, in his article entitled ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’, for failing to show fundamental problems in the discourse. I argue that the current discourse's insights are structurally biased because it fails to satisfactorily address methodological problems of doing meaningful comparative research. The discourse is characterized by a limited focus on differences of degree, a neglect of interaction, and a tendency to represent societies from a partial perspective. The result is an unbalanced debate that tends towards equating developed country institutions with economic success.

This article draws on several of the major breakthroughs in the institutions and development field to demonstrate that criticisms of work in this field as a whole based on its allegedly universal and unquestioning support for liberalizing institutions and the simplistic rationale and deficient empirical methods that have been used to buttress that support are outdated, inappropriate and misleading.

In his comprehensive analysis of the relationship between institutions and economic growth, Ha-Joon Chang, in his article ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’, reviews the empirical evidence on this relationship emphasizing the contrast between the conclusions that one can derive from the time-series evidence and the claims often made in favor of ‘liberalized institutions’ based on the results of cross-section studies. Does the time-series evidence contradict the results of cross-section studies regarding the relationship between institutions and growth? In this comment, I argue that in stressing the contrast between these two kinds of evidence, Chang falls short of a full criticism, consistent with his theoretical analysis, of cross-section studies while at the same time failing to infer what the time-series evidence really shows.