Using a database of more than 8,000 companies from 35 countries, we find that the value of corporate diversification is related to the level of capital market development, international integration, and legal systems. Our results suggest that the financial, legal, and regulatory environments each have an important influence on the value of diversification. Moreover, the optimal organizational structure and corporate governance may be very different for firms operating in emerging markets than they are for firms operating in more developed and internationally integrated countries.

We study the effect of trading consolidation by examining the response of liquidity and stock price to the exercise of deep in-the-money corporate warrants. This enables a relatively clean test of the value of trading consolidation. The exercise at the warrant expiration is fully anticipated and has no information content. An effect can come from the value of trading consolidation that improves liquidity. Indeed, we find that liquidity and stock prices both increase significantly at warrant expiration. Further, the price increase is positively related to the pre-exercise extent of fragmentation, to post-exercise improvement in stock liquidity, and to the proportional increase in the number of shares following the warrant exercise.

This paper examines the degree of anonymity—the extent to which a trader is recognized as informed—on alternative market structures. We find evidence that is consistent with less anonymity on the NYSE specialist system compared to the NASDAQ dealer system. Specifically, when corporate insiders trade medium-sized quantities (500–9,999 shares inclusive), NYSE listed stocks exhibit larger changes in proportional effective spreads than NASDAQ stocks. Taken together, these findings are consistent with Barclay and Warners (1993) contention that stealth (medium-sized) trades are more likely based on private information and insider trades are more transparent on the NYSE specialist system relative to the NASDAQ dealer system. The results support the hypothesis by Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) that the unique relationship between specialists and floor brokers on the NYSE leads to less anonymity.

Credit derivatives are among the fastest growing contracts in the derivatives market. We present a simple, easily implementable model to study the pricing and hedging of two widely traded default-triggered claims: default swaps and default baskets. In particular, we demonstrate how default correlation (the correlation between two default processes) impacts the prices of these claims. When we extend our model to continuous time, we find that, once default correlation has been taken into consideration, the spread dynamics have very little explanatory power.

We propose a multifactor model in which the spot rate, LIBOR, follows a lognormal process, with a stochastic conditional mean, under the risk-neutral measure. In addition to the spot rate factor, the second factor is related to the premium of the first futures rate over the spot LIBOR. Similarly, the third factor is related to the premium of the second futures rate over the first futures rate. We calibrate the model to the initial term structure of futures rates and to the implied volatilities of interest rate caplets. We then apply the model to price interest rate derivatives such as European and Bermudan-style swaptions, and yieldspread options. The model can be employed to price more complex interest rate derivatives such as path-dependent derivatives or multi-currency-dependent derivatives because of its Markovian property.

We use a unique set of equities in the when-issued market to provide new tests of the law of one price in financial markets. We compare the prices of when-issued and regular way shares of publicly traded subsidiaries and their parents around the time the subsidiaries are fully divested and we find that the when-issued shares of the subsidiary trade at a discount. Pricing differences stem from measurement factors such as exchange location and bid-ask clustering that bias the observed when-issued pricing differential away from zero. The remaining difference is due to asymmetric movements in bid and ask quotes in the two markets. We also find evidence of temporary price pressures on the date of execution of the spinoff of the subsidiary firms that bear resemblance to the pricing in the when-issued market. We interpret the evidence as consistent with the law of one price in the presence of transaction costs and microstructure phenomena.

To explain post-earnings announcement drift, we construct a risk factor related to unexpected earnings surprise, and propose a four-factor model by adding this risk factor to Fama and French's (1993), (1995) three-factor model. This earnings surprise risk factor provides a remarkable improvement in explaining post-earnings announcement drift when included in addition to the three factors of Fama and French. After adjusting raw returns for the four risk factors, the cumulative abnormal returns over the 60 trading days subsequent to quarterly earnings announcements are economically and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, except for the first two days after the earnings announcement, the cumulative abnormal returns and the arbitrage returns from our four-factor model are relatively stable over the testing period and never significant on any day of the testing period. On the other hand, the arbitrage returns from the other models increase over the 60-day testing period. We argue that most of the post-earnings announcement drift observed in prior studies may be a result of using misspecified models and failing to appropriately adjust raw returns for risk.

This paper investigates whether management stock ownership and large non-management blockholder share ownership are related to firm value across a sample of 1433 firms from 18 emerging markets. When a management group's control rights exceed its cash flow rights, I find that firm values are lower. I also find that large non-management control rights blockholdings are positively related to firm value. Both of these effects are significantly more pronounced in countries with low shareholder protection. One interpretation of these results is that external shareholder protection mechanisms play a role in restraining managerial agency costs and that large non-management blockholders can act as a partial substitute for missing institutional governance mechanisms.

Does more leverage always worsen the debt agency problem? This paper presents a unified analysis that accounts for both risk-shifting and under-investment debt agency problems. For firms with positive marginal volatility of investment (defined as the change in cash flow volatility corresponding to a change of investment scale), equity holders' risk-shifting incentive will mitigate the under-investment problem. This implies that, contrary to conventional views, the total agency cost of debt does not uniformly increase with leverage. This model further predicts that, for high growth firms in which the under-investment problem is severe, the optimal debt ratio is positively related to the marginal volatility of investment. Empirical results support this prediction.

To sign option trades as buys and sells, researchers often employ stock trade classification rules including the quote, the Lee and Ready (1991), the Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara (2000), and the tick methods. Using a proprietary CBOE dataset that reports trade direction, we find that these four rules sign correctly 83%, 80%, 77%, and 59% of all classifiable trades, respectively. These rates are based on separate classifiable samples because each of the four rules fails to classify some trades (e.g., the quote rulecannot classify midspread trades). Outside-quote and reversed-quote trades are highly misclassified by all four rules. The probability of such trades is related to trading frequency, trade size, moneyness, and maturity. Underlying asset price changes around the time of the trade improve classification precision. We find that the components of index option complex trades not executed on the Retail Automated Execution System are misclassified almost 50% of the time by any method. The elimination of these trades (15% of the sample) results in a success rate of over 87% for the quote rule.

We empirically compare a wide range of term structure models used in the pricing and, in particular, hedging of caps and swaptions. We analyze the influence of the number of factors on the hedging and pricing results, and investigate the type of data—interest rate or derivative price—in combination with the estimation technique that should be used to obtain the best hedging and pricing results. We use data on interest rates, and cap and swaption prices from 1995–1999. The empirical results show that, if the number of hedge instruments is equal to the number of factors, multi-factor models outperform one-factor models in hedging caps and swaptions. However, if one uses a large set of hedge instruments, one-factor models perform as well as multi-factor models. We find that models with two or three factors imply better out-of-sample predictions of cap and swaption prices than one-factor models. Estimation on the basis of current derivative prices leads to more accurate out-of-sample prediction of cap and swaption prices than estimation on the basis of interest rate data.

This paper examines how firm characteristics, legal rules, and financial development affect corporate finance decisions. In contrast to the existing literature, I use data on unlisted companies to show that institutions play an important role in determining the extent of agency problems. In particular, I find that in countries with good creditor protection, it is easier for firms investing in intangible assets to obtain loans. The protection of creditor rights is also important for ensuring access to long-term debt for firms operating in sectors with highly volatile returns. Ceteris paribus, firms are more leveraged in countries where the stock market is less developed. Unlisted firms appear more indebted than listed companies even after controlling for firm characteristics such as profitability, size, and the ability to provide collateral. Finally, institutions that favor creditor rights and ensure stricter enforcement not only are associated with higher leverage, but also with greater availability of long-term debt.

Patterns of clustering in IPO gross spreads can be identified not only in the U.S., but also in many other markets across the world. The evidence indicates, however, that these clustering patterns are not necessarily collusive. Clustering is widespread in many countries with low gross spreads. In fact, the amount of clustering observed is negatively related to the gross spread level of a country. Additionally, an analysis of abnormal gross spreads following Hansen (2001) indicates that few clusters contain abnormal positive surpluses.

We examine the relative prices of sibling American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). These ADRs are issued against classes of shares with different voting rights that are issued by the same foreign firm. Though superior and inferior voting siblings begin trading in the U. S. at nearly equal values, prices quickly separate. For non-Mexican issues, superior voting ADRs command a premium. For Mexican issues, superior voting shares trade at a discount. The Mexican discount is inconsistent with the benefits of U. S. listing discussed in other recent studies and cannot be explained by differences in cash flow rights, systematic risk, liquidity, voting control of major blockholders, or ownership restrictions. Our analysis suggests, however, that control for our Mexican firms has shifted to creditors and competitors, thus, eroding equity voting premiums.

This paper examines the performance of momentum trading strategies in foreign exchange markets. We find the well-documented profitability of momentum strategies during the 1970s and the 1980s has continued throughout the 1990s. Our approach and findings are insensitive to the specification of the trading rule and the base currency for analysis. Finally, we show that the performance is not due to a time-varying risk premium but rather depends on the underlying autocorrelation structure of the currency returns. In sum, the results lend further support to prior momentum studies on equities. The profitability to momentum-based strategies holds for currencies as well.

This paper aims to develop and compare bounds on the pricing formulas for European type discrete Asian options. The lower bound is found by conditioning the maturity payment of the Asian option by the geometric average and the bound derived can be expressed as a portfolio of delayed payment European call options. Several exercise price-dependent upper bounds are derived. Like the lower bound, one of the upper bounds is expressed as a portfolio of delayed payment European call options. Through a numerical analysis, we conclude that more information is gained from the readily calculated bounds than from the usually applied pricing approximations. From the closed-form solutions of the bounds, hedging positions are finally derived.

I test whether corporate governance is ineffective in emerging markets by estimating the link between CEO turnover and firm performance for over 1,200 firms in eight emerging markets. I find two main results. First, CEOs of emerging market firms are more likely to lose their jobs when their firm's performance is poor, suggesting that corporate governance is not ineffective in emerging markets. Second, for the subset of firms with a large domestic shareholder, there is no link between CEO turnover and firm performance. For this subset of emerging market firms, corporate governance appears to be ineffective.