On 5 June 1967, the state of Israel went to war with its Arab neighbours, Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Although the conflict only lasted six days, it changed the political landscape of the region for decades and is therefore a constant focal point for historians. Zaki Shalom provides a short but detailed account of the diplomatic manoeuvres that culminated in the war. In the years and months prior to the Six Day War, Shalom argues, Syria had sought to undermine the status quo that had developed between Israel and Jordan. A strategic marriage of convenience suited both countries and was designed to maintain stability and reduce tensions in the area; Syria wished to disrupt this arrangement, through militant attacks from Jordan's territory, in order to provoke an Israeli backlash that would force Jordan and other Arab states to confront Israel. Shalom cites the Samu Raid in November 1966 – when Israel responded to Syrian activity by attacking the Jordanian village of Samu, which was believed to be a source of terrorist activities – as a significant turning point in how Israel framed the military–political situation. The Samu Raid itself was condemned internationally; the US State Department contemplated withholding military aid and “American anger at Israel knew no respite” (38). It was decided that a subsequent retaliatory strike had to be aimed at the real perpetrators of terror against Israel – Syria, not Jordan. Israeli diplomats therefore sought to persuade their American counterparts that Syria's actions threatened not only Israel's interests, but also those of the United States. As divisions within the government widened between the military, which advocated a swift reprisal, and political figures who vacillated but preferred a diplomatic solution, Foreign Minister Abba Eban visited Washington seeking American support in reopening the Tiran Straits following their closure by Egypt. Alongside this development was the apparent building up of Egyptian forces on Israel's borders, a situation exploited (read: manipulated and exaggerated) by Israeli intelligence to ensure American support for military action. Eban's visit was the last opportunity for Israel to obtain a declaration from the Johnson administration condemning Egypt's actions and promising to restore Israel's right to navigation. This was not forthcoming, to Eban's dismay, but Washington did “green-light” the use of force, so long as it was a surgical strike. The diplomatic route had failed and the military, as it had wanted all along, went to war.
Overall, this is a rather frustrating book. For instance, the author makes use of a range of Israeli, American and British archives and memoirs, offering a well-evidenced account of the decision-making processes of various Israeli officials; in particular, Foreign Minister Abba Eban's role in seeking a nonmilitary solution to the impending crisis and his mission to Washington is presented as a significant moment of disharmony within Israel's government. However, where Shalom offers useful insights into the inner workings of Eban, Prime Minister Levy Eshkol and Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, the views of the Johnson administration are more sparsely represented, making the book's title – The Role of US Diplomacy … – somewhat misleading. While some US officials are represented, including Walt Rostow and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, they are mainly discussed in relation to Eban's mission to Washington; their deliberations and decisions are not always considered within the context of the Johnson administration's interdepartmental discussions. Most of the book is written in a reasonably engaging and fast-paced style, which suits the rapidly escalating tensions it depicts, yet there are frequent oddly chosen phrases (“Eban was well aware of the bad historic experience Israel had with the United Nations” (26); “Israel also willed Washington to inform the king” (41)).
Perhaps the most frustrating – and oddest – issue with this book is the fact that it lacks an introduction and conclusion. The first chapter provides useful historical context to the simmering tensions between Israel and Syria, but as it does not serve the purpose of a traditional introduction the reader is thrust into the narrative of the book with little sense of direction. A proper introduction would set out the parameters of discourse, by informing the reader of the book's main thesis, engaging with other relevant works and staking a claim to why its findings are new or valuable. As it stands, one is forced to rely on the back-cover blurb to discern the author's intentions, that, “Despite a plethora of books on the war, analysis of US–Israeli/US–Egypt intensive political and diplomatic activity and dialogue in the period preceding the war has not been forthcoming to date.” This claim notwithstanding, important recent publications on the Six Day War do not appear to be referenced,Footnote 1 and the endnotes reveal a surprisingly sparse bibliography. The lack of a conclusion is a similar concern; the final chapter ends abruptly with the assertion that had Golda Meir been sent to the United States in Eban's place, “she would have ‘shaken the hallowed corridors in Washington’ and screamed ‘bloody murder’ over the abandonment of Jewish people; so loud that no element in the administration would have been able to ignore her” (161). Shalom's suggestion that this was a missed opportunity for Israel is an interesting one but deserves further exploration: if Eshkol had sent Golda Meir, would the Johnson administration have reacted differently and alerted those groups within the Israeli government pushing for military action against Syria? A separate conclusion would have given the author room to discuss this and other questions, as well as draw together the arguments made in the preceding pages. Ultimately, one is left wondering whether the responsibility for these flaws lies with the author, the editor or both. Certainly some of the above criticisms should have been picked up by somebody along the publication process. What makes it so frustrating is the relative ease with which these issues should have been spotted and could have been resolved.
