more aid and assistance (95). The figure of Bolivia's ambassador to Washington after 1952, Víctor Andrade, whose "herculean efforts" Siekmeier argues put Bolivia "on the map" for many in the US, stands out (68). We also learn of the many Bolivians who resisted US hegemony. As Siekmeier notes, this is what explains the establishment of the Katarista movement in the 1980s, *cocalero* organizations and Evo Morales's subsequent rise to power.

Given that Bolivia – and Bolivians – are explicitly at the centre of this book, I was therefore a little surprised by its stylish cover, which features portraits of Dwight Eisenhower and Che Guevara rather than Victor Paz Estenssoro or Víctor Andrade. However, this does not detract from the multilayered and insightful introduction into Bolivian history and Bolivians' relations with the United States during the Cold War and after that the book offers. What Siekmeier is saying throughout is that Bolivia, its leaders and its population mattered, that they were not simply victims or Washington's subordinate dependents, but that the history of the Bolivian Revolution and its international relations evolved as a result of dynamic, fluid interactions. Certainly, the way in which Bolivia's Revolution evolved, the interaction of its leaders with their counterparts in Washington and the impact of hemispheric developments on Bolivia were far from foregone, structurally determined, conclusions when the Revolution took place in 1952.

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Zaki Shalom, *The Role of US Diplomacy in the Lead-Up to the Six Day War: Balancing Moral Commitments and National Interests* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2012, £45.00/$65.00). Pp. vi + 182. ISBN 978 1 84519 468 0.

On 5 June 1967, the state of Israel went to war with its Arab neighbours, Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Although the conflict only lasted six days, it changed the political landscape of the region for decades and is therefore a constant focal point for historians. Zaki Shalom provides a short but detailed account of the diplomatic manoeuvres that culminated in the war. In the years and months prior to the Six Day War, Shalom argues, Syria had sought to undermine the status quo that had developed between Israel and Jordan. A strategic marriage of convenience suited both countries and was designed to maintain stability and reduce tensions in the area; Syria wished to disrupt this arrangement, through militant attacks from Jordan's territory, in order to provoke an Israeli backlash that would force Jordan and other Arab states to confront Israel. Shalom cites the Samu Raid in November 1966 – when Israel responded to Syrian activity by attacking the Jordanian village of Samu, which was believed to be a source of terrorist activities – as a significant turning point in how Israel framed the military–political situation. The Samu Raid itself was condemned internationally; the US State Department contemplated withholding military aid and "American anger at Israel knew no respite" (38). It was decided that a subsequent retaliatory strike had to be aimed at the real perpetrators of terror against Israel – Syria, not Jordan. Israeli diplomats therefore sought to persuade their American counterparts that Syria's actions threatened not only Israel's interests, but also those of the United States. As divisions within the government widened between the military, which advocated a swift reprisal, and political figures who vacillated but preferred a diplomatic solution, Foreign Minister Abba Eban visited Washington seeking American support in

reopening the Tiran Straits following their closure by Egypt. Alongside this development was the apparent building up of Egyptian forces on Israel's borders, a situation exploited (read: manipulated and exaggerated) by Israeli intelligence to ensure American support for military action. Eban's visit was the last opportunity for Israel to obtain a declaration from the Johnson administration condemning Egypt's actions and promising to restore Israel's right to navigation. This was not forthcoming, to Eban's dismay, but Washington did "green-light" the use of force, so long as it was a surgical strike. The diplomatic route had failed and the military, as it had wanted all along, went to war.

Overall, this is a rather frustrating book. For instance, the author makes use of a range of Israeli, American and British archives and memoirs, offering a well-evidenced account of the decision-making processes of various Israeli officials; in particular, Foreign Minister Abba Eban's role in seeking a nonmilitary solution to the impending crisis and his mission to Washington is presented as a significant moment of disharmony within Israel's government. However, where Shalom offers useful insights into the inner workings of Eban, Prime Minister Levy Eshkol and Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, the views of the Johnson administration are more sparsely represented, making the book's title – *The Role of* US *Diplomacy* . . . – somewhat misleading. While some US officials are represented, including Walt Rostow and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, they are mainly discussed in relation to Eban's mission to Washington; their deliberations and decisions are not always considered within the context of the Johnson administration's interdepartmental discussions. Most of the book is written in a reasonably engaging and fast-paced style, which suits the rapidly escalating tensions it depicts, yet there are frequent oddly chosen phrases ("Eban was well aware of the bad historic experience Israel had with the United Nations" (26); "Israel also willed Washington to inform the king" (41)).

Perhaps the most frustrating – and oddest – issue with this book is the fact that it lacks an introduction and conclusion. The first chapter provides useful historical context to the simmering tensions between Israel and Syria, but as it does not serve the purpose of a traditional introduction the reader is thrust into the narrative of the book with little sense of direction. A proper introduction would set out the parameters of discourse, by informing the reader of the book's main thesis, engaging with other relevant works and staking a claim to why its findings are new or valuable. As it stands, one is forced to rely on the back-cover blurb to discern the author's intentions, that, "Despite a plethora of books on the war, analysis of US–Israeli/US–Egypt intensive political and diplomatic activity and dialogue in the period preceding the war has not been forthcoming to date." This claim notwithstanding, important recent publications on the Six Day War do not appear to be referenced,[1] and the endnotes reveal a surprisingly sparse bibliography. The lack of a conclusion is a similar concern; the final chapter ends abruptly with the assertion that had Golda Meir been sent to the United States in Eban's place, "she would have 'shaken the hallowed corridors in Washington' and screamed 'bloody murder' over the abandonment of Jewish people; so loud that no element in the administration would have been able to ignore her" (161).

[1] For instance, Clea Lutz Bunch, "Strike at Samu: Jordan, Israel, the United States, and the Origins of the Six Day War," *Diplomatic History*, 32, 1 (Jan. 2008), 55–76; Douglas Little, "The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957–68," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 25, 4 (Nov. 1993), 563–85.

Shalom's suggestion that this was a missed opportunity for Israel is an interesting one but deserves further exploration: if Eshkol had sent Golda Meir, would the Johnson administration have reacted differently and alerted those groups within the Israeli government pushing for military action against Syria? A separate conclusion would have given the author room to discuss this and other questions, as well as draw together the arguments made in the preceding pages. Ultimately, one is left wondering whether the responsibility for these flaws lies with the author, the editor or both. Certainly some of the above criticisms should have been picked up by somebody along the publication process. What makes it so frustrating is the relative ease with which these issues should have been spotted and could have been resolved.

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Martin A. Berger, *Seeing through Race: A Reinterpretation of Civil Rights Photography* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2011, $60.00/£41.95). Pp. xii + 243. ISBN 978 0 5202 6863 0.

The cover of the 17 May 1963 issue of *Life* showed firemen turning hoses on peaceful black protestors in Birmingham, Alabama. One of the most influential news sources of the period, the magazine's photographic essay on the events in Birmingham was widely read and its iconic images became part of a civil rights canon credited with generating white support for racial reform. But in this new interpretation of civil rights imagery, Berger suggests that white viewers' understanding of events in the city was formed through "a race-based lens that was only loosely tied to visual evidence," and which ultimately limited reform.

Early civil rights historiography established the key role images played in gaining support for the movement, a consensus forming that the presentation of blacks as victims of white violence effected reform. Berger argues, however, that the representation by the white press of a nonthreatening civil rights movement, portraying blacks as lacking agency and placing them in limited roles while emphasizing white power, held more complex messages with which earlier historians failed to engage. While acknowledging that the photographs generated sympathy, Berger contends that the emphasis on reproducing dramatic scenes was a distraction from the business of reform; the movement was reduced to "a narrative of spectacular violence," at the expense of examining underlying issues (4). The focus on violence also suggested that whites were granting rights to passive victims. This simplified narrative became the accepted and acceptable face of civil rights. Ultimately, Berger argues, well-meaning northern whites reduced reform to incremental improvement.

One of the many strengths of this book is its multidisciplinary approach. Of particular interest is Berger's examination of the distinction made by psychologists between shame and guilt. Many liberal whites expressed shame at white-on-black violence and hoped that this would trigger reform. But Berger suggests that shame evoked limited empathy with blacks, thus restricting reform; experiencing guilt may have led to greater empathy and more support for radical change.

In one of the most compelling parts of his analysis, Berger discusses a selection of "lost" images of civil rights, ignored by the white media because they complicated the accepted narrative. These include graphic examples of white-on-black violence, and images of peaceful black protest published despite, rather than because of, their