The International Committee of the Red Cross has first-hand experience of the real consequences of the many armed conflicts now taking place and of the actual use and effects of weapons. It therefore has a particular interest in ensuring that the law takes into account the realities of the use of weapons in order to effectively reduce the amount of suffering caused in armed conflicts.

Ambitions to fulfil accountability demands in humanitarian action are high, including for protection activities in armed conflict settings. However, from a Dunantist position, meeting accountability demands is often not only unsatisfactory for practical reasons, but is also inappropriate in view of humanitarian principles and flawed from related ethical perspectives. Regarding accountability primarily as a technical exercise, rather than as being linked to ethical perspectives on humanitarianism and its principles, may thus inadvertently contribute to reduced acceptability of, and ultimately reduced access for, humanitarian actors. Dunantist actors wishing to stay true to their ethical approach need new ways of thinking about accountability, a reflection which can serve as an example for an ongoing need to consider differences between actors within the humanitarian–development nexus.

Over the past ten years, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has provided medical care to almost 118,000 victims of sexual violence. Integrating related care into MSF general assistance to populations affected by crisis and conflicts has presented a considerable institutional struggle and continues to be a challenge. Tensions regarding the role of MSF in providing care to victims of sexual violence and when facing the multiple challenges inherent in dealing with this crime persist. An overview of MSF's experience and related reflection aims to share with the reader, on the one hand, the complexity of the issue, and on the other, the need to continue fighting for the provision of adequate medical care for victims of sexual violence, which despite the limitations is feasible.

In situations of national crisis, it is not uncommon to see community members join together to provide security services to their communities, gap-filling or supplementing the security services of the State. These “community defence groups” perform many roles, from operating checkpoints and conducting surveillance missions to patrolling roads and even participating in combined combat operations with the State. Unfortunately, while many community defence groups perform an important service for their community, some have been accused of serious human rights abuses or even war crimes. This article examines the circumstances in which a State might be responsible in relation to wrongful acts of community defence groups operating within their territory.

Each community defence group differs in its structure, its activities and its relationship with the State. As such, any assessment of the potential responsibility of the State will depend upon the particulars of each group and its operations. The contribution of this article is to provide a framework for assessing State responsibility in relation to community defence groups. It does so by examining the potential attribution of acts of the community defence group to the State, applying secondary rules of State responsibility. In addition, it also considers the potential responsibilities of the State under primary rules of international law, namely international humanitarian law and international human rights law, in circumstances where the primary wrongful act is not attributable to the State.

This note discusses the challenges of water service delivery before, during and after protracted armed conflict, focusing on barriers that may impede successful transition from emergency to development interventions. The barriers are grouped according to three major contributing factors (three “C”s): culture (organizational goals and procedures), cash (financing practices) and capacity (know-how). By way of examples, the note explores ways in which development agencies can overcome these barriers during the three phases of a protracted armed conflict, using examples of World Bank projects and experiences in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Before the crisis, development agencies need to work to prevent armed conflict. In a situation of active armed conflict or when conflict escalates, development agencies need to remain engaged as much as possible, as this will speed up post-conflict recovery. When conflict subsides, development agencies need to balance the relative effort placed on providing urgently needed emergency relief and water supply and sanitation services with the effort placed on re-establishing sector oversight roles and capacity of local institutions to oversee and manage service delivery in the long term.

This article argues that the growing involvement of civilians in activities on the digital battlefield during armed conflicts puts individuals at risk of harm and contributes to the erosion of the principle of distinction, a cornerstone of international humanitarian law (IHL). The article begins by outlining the ongoing trend of civilianization of the digital battlefield and puts forward brief scenarios to illustrate it. It then examines the narrow circumstances under which such forms of civilian involvement may qualify as direct participation in hostilities under IHL, and discusses what this means for the individuals concerned, particularly from the perspective of their loss of protection under the law. The analysis shows that certain types of State conduct which put civilians in harm's way by inducing them to directly participate in hostilities may constitute standalone violations of IHL and human rights law obligations. Beyond these specific prescriptions, the encouragement of civilian involvement undermines the principle of distinction, with dangerous ripple effects on the interpretation of those rules of IHL that flow from it. Accordingly, the article concludes that States should act to reverse the trend of civilianization of the digital battlefield and refrain as much as possible from involving civilians in the conduct of cyber hostilities.

• • Cyber operations have become a reality in contemporary armed conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is concerned by the potential human cost arising from the increasing use of cyber operations during armed conflicts.

• • In the ICRC's view, international humanitarian law (IHL) limits cyber operations during armed conflicts just as it limits the use of any other weapon, means or method of warfare in an armed conflict, whether new or old.

• • Affirming the applicability of IHL does not legitimize cyber warfare, just as it does not legitimize any other form of warfare. Any use of force by States – cyber or kinetic – remains governed by the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant rules of customary international law, in particular the prohibition against the use of force. International disputes must be settled by peaceful means, in cyberspace as in all other domains.

• • It is now critical for the international community to affirm the applicability of international humanitarian law to the use of cyber operations during armed conflicts. The ICRC also calls for discussions among governmental and other experts on how existing IHL rules apply and whether the existing law is adequate and sufficient. In this respect, the ICRC welcomes the intergovernmental discussions currently taking place in the framework of two United Nations General Assembly mandated processes.

• • Events of recent years have shown that cyber operations, whether during or outside armed conflict, can disrupt the operation of critical civilian infrastructure and hamper the delivery of essential services to the population. In the context of armed conflicts, civilian infrastructure is protected against cyber attacks by existing IHL principles and rules, in particular the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. IHL also affords special protection to hospitals and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, among others.

• • During armed conflicts, the employment of cyber tools that spread and cause damage indiscriminately is prohibited. From a technological perspective, some cyber tools can be designed and used to target and harm only specific objects and to not spread or cause harm indiscriminately. However, the interconnectivity that characterizes cyberspace means that whatever has an interface with the Internet can be targeted from anywhere in the world and that a cyber attack on a specific system may have repercussions on various other systems. As a result, there is a real risk that cyber tools are not designed or used – either deliberately or by mistake – in compliance with IHL.

• • States’ interpretation of existing IHL rules will determine the extent to which IHL protects against the effects of cyber operations. In particular, States should take clear positions about their commitment to interpret IHL so as to preserve civilian infrastructure from significant disruption and to protect civilian data. The availability of such positions will also influence the assessment of whether the existing rules are adequate or whether new rules may be needed. If States see a need to develop new rules, they should build on and strengthen the existing legal framework – including IHL.

La Revue Internationale a publié, l'an dernier, un article du général-major médecin E. Evrard sur la protection juridique des transports aériens sanitaires en temps de guerre. Nous sommes heureux de reproduire aujourd'hui le texte d'un rapport préliminaire présenté pour la Ve session de la Commission médico-juridique de Monaco. Car des études doivent être poursuivies dans ce domaine où les dispositions du droit international sont actuellement insuffisantes (Réd.).

After two years of tortuous negotiations and despite support for a total ban on anti-personnel mines by nearly half of the 51 States participating in the final session of the Review Conference of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), held in Geneva from 22 April to 3 May 1996, only minimal restrictions on the use of antipersonnel landmines were finally adopted. Nine years after entry into force of amended Protocol II, anti-personnel mines will have to be detectable and those scattered outside of marked minefields, by air, artillery or other means, will have to self-destruct after 30 days. However, long-lived mines will remain available for production, export and use — including indiscriminate use. Regrettably, this modest legal response to a major international humanitarian crisis, though adopted by consensus, is unlikely to significantly reduce the horrendous level of mine casualties.

For almost two decades, the International Red Cross Movement has been engaged in a continuing process of self-examination regarding its contribution to peace and disarmament. At the same time, public attention is being focused on, and sometimes even captivated by, various bilateral and multilateral efforts to achieve progress in nuclear and non-nuclear arms control in fields such as the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, nuclear and chemical weapon-free zones, confidence- and security-building measures, and so on. The two lines of action are usually dealt with individually without proper consideration of the manifold interconnections existing between them. Only recently have efforts been made to clarify the relationship between the two. The purpose of this article is to bring them together and to do so by asking the question: To what extent can the effort to promote and implement international humanitarian law be seen as a contribution in terms of arms control?

On 8 June 1977, the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts adopted two Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. This was the result of nearly ten years of intensive and delicate negotiations. Additional Protocol I protects the victims of international armed conflicts, while Additional Protocol II protects the victims of non-international armed conflicts. These Protocols, which do not replace but supplement the 1949 Geneva Conventions, updated both the law protecting war victims and the law on the conduct of hostilities. This article commemorates the 40th anniversary of the adoption of the 1977 Additional Protocols.

That is what Henry Dunant wrote in his notebooks, most of which were never published, and we are pleased to publish a study shedding light on Dunant's role as promoter of protection for prisoners of war.

In Belgium's capital, ceremonies were recently held to mark the centenary of the Brussels Declaration. At the formal commemorative sitting, Mr. J. Pictet, Vice-President of the ICRC, drew attention to the parallel development of the law of Geneva and the law of The Hague, to which the Brussels Declaration gave a decisive impetus. The study is therefore well-timed. As usual, the, views expressed are those of the authors alone. It may be added that the original is in French and that the English version is a translation by the ICRC.

On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice finally rendered its Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The procedure had been dragging on since the start of the public sittings on 30 October 1995. Several deadlines set by the Court for reaching a decision came and went, ultimately giving rise to the fear that there would be no decisive majority to affirm the basic unlawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons. This would have been a bitter setback for the initiators of the Advisory Opinion proceeding and for the development of international law.

In our opinion, the most important event at the Twenty-fifth International Conference of the Red Cross was its adoption of the new Statutes and Rules of Procedure of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. These new texts are the outcome of a suggestion by the League and almost four years of negotiation with the ICRC. They set out guidelines for the Movement for the span of at least a generation, and the fact that they have been adopted by consensus is a guarantee of their soundness and their durability.

In this issue, the Review has chosen to feature the voices of hibakusha, those who survived the nuclear bombings in Japan.* These three hibakusha have shared their experiences with the hope that our readers will understand the horrors of nuclear weapons use. They have each suffered and witnessed the horrific suffering of others caused by nuclear weapons, and their families may continue to suffer medical problems for generations to come. Each calls for assurances that nuclear weapons will never be used again. These are their stories.

Los juristas, conscientes de la multiplicidad de normas aplicables en la guerra, dan una definición relativamente elaborada del derecho international humanitario. Seguún ellos, «se entiende por derecho international humanitario las normas internacionales, de origen conventional o consuetudinario, destinadas específicamente a regular los problemas humanitarios que se derivan directamente de los conflictos armados, internacionales o no, y que limitan, por motivos humanitarios, el derecho de las partes en conflicto a utilizar los métodos y los medios de guerra de su elección o que protegen a las personas y a los bienes afectados, o que pueden ser afectados, por el conflicto».